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 -Abstract-
How do practices contribute to the formation of the mind of Christ in 
community such that the community truly becomes the body of Christ?” This 
dissertation demonstrates that Christ acts on his Church through a complex 
interaction of community and practices to generate the identity, diversity, and virtue 
of his body. This is a controversial claim because many hold that the matter of virtue 
rightly consists of adherence to cherished foundations like Scripture and tradition 
accompanied by calls to obedience. Nonetheless, this study seeks to identify resources
to help the Church imagine a virtue ethics appropriate to a 21st century communion 
ecclesiology. It does so by reading Richard Hooker as an ecclesial ethicist.
Examining Hooker’s accounts of Scripture, participation, and liturgical practices, 
the dissertation develops a Hookerian account that extends the ecclesial ethics of 
Stanley Hauerwas and Sam Wells on both ends. On the front end, it derives from first 
principles an account of how humans come to see themselves as part of the theodrama
in which improvisation is required. On the back end, it grounds improvisation in a 
theory of mimetic virtue. Along the way it shows how a largely Barthian Christology 
coheres with a positive account of sacramental practices and that a Hauerwasian 
emphasis on practices is not sectarian. Hooker’s repudiation of appeals to timeless 
absolutes in ethical reasoning and his demonstration that the self-ordering of the 
Church is phronetic action means that contemporary “liberal accommodationism” and
“postliberal traditionalism” can no longer coopt Hooker to justify their ideologies. 
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 -Abbreviations & Bibliographic Notes-
In what follows, unless otherwise indicated, quotations from Hooker are taken 
from the Folger Library edition of Hooker’s works, which I take to be the current 
Hooker canon. I have modernized orthography and punctuation for the sake of 
uniformity and intelligibility. 
 With few exceptions, I have used the Turabian notes-bibliography style. 
Accordingly, for Kindle books, I have included both the Kindle location and fixed 
coordinates such as a section title, chapter, paragraph or other number.
Citations Of the Lawes of Ecclesiastical Politie follow a dual reference system which 
includes the divisions used in John Keble’s 19th century edition. When citing 
quotations, I provide an abbreviated form of the book title, period, Hooker’s book 
number, period, Hooker’s chapter number, period, and then Keble’s section number. 
After a semi-colon, I provide a more precise reference using the Folger’s volume 
number, colon, page number, period, and line number(s). For example: Laws.V.56.1; 
2:234.31-235.3 refers to the book entitled Laws, Hooker’s fifth volume, Hooker’s 56th 
chapter and Keble’s first section. The quote is be more precisely designated as Folger’s
second volume, page 234, beginning at line 31 and concluding at line 3 on page 235.
When cited, the title of each of Hooker’s works appears in the following 
abbreviated form:
Learned Discourse A Learned Discourse of Justification, 
Works, and How the Foundation of Faith is 
Overthrown
Laws Of the Lawes of Ecclesiastical Polity
Pride A Learned Sermon of the Nature of Pride
Dublin Dublin Fragments
Jude The First Sermon on Part of St. Jude
FLE The Folger Library Edition of the Works 
of Richard Hooker
Other Abbreviations
CD Barth, Karl. Church Dogmatics
ST Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologiae
Citations  of Church Dogmatics follow the standard convention of listing the 
Volume and Part-Volume. However, for the convenience of those accessing CD 
online as I do, I’ve followed the additional convention of listing the Paragraph and 
Sub-Section followed by the page number. For example: CD II/2 §33.1.184.
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 -Statement of Copyright-
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published 
without the author's prior written consent and information derived from it should be 
acknowledged.
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Introduction
PRELUDE: THE MIND OF CHRIST IN COMMUNITY
 The birth of an inquiry
The seed of this study was a New Testament course I took many years ago on the 
use of mimesis in Paul’s corpus. As one destined for the priesthood, the course left an 
indelible impression on me of how mimesis was central to Paul’s evangelistic method. 
Two concepts especially imprinted on me. 
The first concept is that of “the mind of Christ.” Paul speaks both of our being 
baptized “in Christ” and also of Christ being in us. “Christ in us” became for me a 
phrase denoting what Paul meant when he called Christians to be of “one mind.” Over
time that phrase evolved into “the mind of Christ.” I understand “the mind of Christ” 
to be the community’s sharing of an inner disposition in tune with the rationality of 
God. When Paul calls the Church at Corinth to be of one mind, he intends for them 
to be one body, drawn by the Holy Spirit into an encounter with Christ the 
Reconciler to whom they respond with the recognition of a political identity given in 
and for him. That political identity is shared by the elite and the common multitude, 
creating their unity while sustaining their diversity. This shared unity in diversity, 
manifest in a common Pentecostal grammar, constitutes the koinonia through which 
Christ is reconciling the world. Throughout this inquiry, I denote that unity and 
disposition with the phrase “the mind of Christ.”
The second concept that impressed me in my study of mimesis in Paul was that 
Paul himself understood that it takes time to form the mind of Christ in Christian 
community. In Galatians 4.19, Paul uses the imagery of childbirth to characterize his 
relationship with the Galatians: “My dear children, for whom I am again in the pains 
of childbirth until Christ is formed in you....” The community birthed by Christ 
through Paul’s work must remain in connection with Paul until it reaches the 
maturation point signified by birth. Imitation of one already formed in Christ is the 
crucial factor. Formation of the mind of Christ in community takes time, and requires
both apprenticeship and immersion.
If the seeds of this study were planted during my study of Paul, they were 
fertilized by the angst of a broken Church. In the last decade, my own ecclesial 
location, The Episcopal Church, suﬀered a tragic schism as we wrestled with how 
evolving Western sexual norms might inform our self-ordering. Relations with our 
sister Anglican provinces in Asia and Africa either soured or manifested broken 
communion as we committed legislatively to the path of ordaining partnered gay 
bishops and blessing same-sex marriages. And, most recently, ecumenical progress 
between the Anglican Communion and the Roman Catholic church chilled as the 
Church of England embraced the commitment to ordain female bishops. Fractured 
communion led me to ponder the factors that make that shared political identity, that
koinonia, such a fleeting dream.
The painful reality of broken communion led to this inquiry regarding how the 
mind of Christ is formed in community: how might it be true that diﬀerent 
approaches to ethical reasoning might fund a politics of opposition rather than the 
politics of reconciliation? Or, rather, to express it in the terms of my inquiry, what is 
the connection between our Christian truth claims and the generation of communities
who embody the mind of Christ? Since the hope is to cooperate with Spirit’s 
sustenance of the mind of Christ, Christology seems a reasonable starting point, but 
any inquiry into the formation of the mind of Christ in communities is at the same 
time a question of ecclesiology, for ecclesiology is about the embodiment of 
Christology. My question became “how do the practices of the Church lead to 
communities of virtue that denote the triune God?” 
 The fire of Sabah
My interest in the practices of the Church is not merely driven by the hope for 
reconciled communities of virtue. As a priest in The Episcopal Church, my intuition 
was that practices ought to be the key to reigniting the Gospel fire in a denomination 
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that lost more than 350,000 baptized members between 2003 and 2012.1 But my 
personal experience is that close attention to liturgical practices does not predictably 
correlate with that fire. I observed moribund parishes which set the highest standard 
in terms of the rigor of their compliance to liturgical standards but which manifested 
neither a clear sense of mission nor an evangelistic impulse.2 Indeed, an influential 
study found that “formal liturgy” “and regular use of ‘kneeling’” were correlated with “a
negative eﬀect on growth.”3 I wanted to understand why ecclesial practices sometimes 
generate Gospel heat, but in other cases block the wind that sustains the fire. 
I discovered that fire in Sabah. An independent study on planting the missional 
church led me to the Anglican Diocese of Sabah in Western Malaysia, where a mentor
sent me with the promise that there I would experience the Church as it is described 
in the Acts of the Apostles. As I approached St. Patrick’s Anglican Church for the 
first time on a hot summer day, I was amazed to witness the baptism of thirty-one 
adults and children. The parish membership grew in six years (1992-1998) from 841 to 
2,109, and now numbers more than 3,000, with over five hundred trained lay leaders 
leading more than three hundred cell groups in weekly mid-week gatherings. Sunday 
attendance includes five congregations worshiping in Malay, Chinese, and English 
vernaculars. As my mentor promised, I witnessed something extraordinary in Sabah. 
There one finds a diocese enflamed with a palpable pentecostal tongue.
What’s the diﬀerence between the moribund but rigorously liturgical American 
parish and the Gospel flame I witnessed in Sabah? Clearly, many factors contribute to 
church growth, and my purpose here is not to examine them. What interests me, 
however, is the church’s own account of her growth. Church leaders point to their cell 
1. “Baptized Members By Province and Diocese 2002-2012,” http:/
/www.episcopalchurch.org/sites/default/files/
baptized_members_by_province_and_diocese_2002_-_2012.pdf (accessed June 30, 2014).
2. The most predictive attribute of a growing congregation is having "a clear mission and
purpose." “Growing congregations are clear about why they exist and what they should be
doing.” C. Kirk Hadaway, Facts on Episcopal Church Growth: A New Look At the Dynamics of
Growth and Decline in Episcopal Parishes and Missions Based on the Faith Communities Today 2005
(Fact 2005) National Survey of 4,100 Congregations, Research-Based Perspectives for Building
Vital Faith Communities (The Domestic and Foreign Missionary Society and Faith
Communities Today, 2005), 18. 
3. Ibid., 17. Emphasis original.
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groups as the key factor. They’ve organized their parish in groups which meet weekly 
to practice the practices of the Church, just as a baseball team practices the practices 
of a champion. From the time a child is eighteen months old, every gathering begins 
and ends with worship. That’s every gathering - whether its apparent purpose is work, 
play, or simply sharing the blessings of community. Parish life consists primarily of 
worship in a variety of simple forms, and mostly in the home and workplace. Worship,
and not merely liturgy, is the daily work of the people. Such focus generates clarity of 
mission. At St. Patrick’s, the palpable content that permeates the air is the electricity 
animating a society of souls whose relationship to one another is constituted by three 
thousand communally-mediated personal relationships with Jesus Christ.
I share this reflection upon my Malaysian experience to name an impulse that 
shaped this study. In Sabah, I began to suspect that it is insuﬃcient merely to point to
Scripture, the creeds, and the prayer book and expect the mind of Christ to be formed
in the communities who curate the wisdom they contain. Those texts prescribe 
cherished means by which communities gravitate towards the good. But they don't tell
us how to move a local community's norms to the good they demarcate, and they 
don't give an account of how the Holy Spirit works in local communities to sustain 
them by inviting their particular responses to the phenomena of their lives. It is the 
local norming - the rich variety of our responses in history to first principles - that 
makes the church much more than a moribund skeleton mouthing prescribed texts, 
and instead a breathing, adapting, and loving organism, the mystical, living body of 
Christ. My question became, “How do the practices of the Church generate that 
pentecostal tongue? How do practices contribute to the formation of the mind of 
Christ in community such that the community truly becomes the body of Christ?”
METHODOLOGY
 The concerns of this study
My quest to understand the formative power of ecclesial practices led me to 
Richard Hooker. I turned to Hooker as I recognized that many of the tensions in the 
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contemporary Church are not about doctrine, but about how we should order our 
common life such that it manifests the good. We are most often divided on the 
question of how we recognize the good. If we by some chance agree on the good, we 
then stumble over the next question, which is how to move from our current location 
towards the good we want to manifest. Diﬀerently weighted values like justice and 
charity lead us to diﬀerent conclusions about the path to the good in the occasions 
when we agree on its content. Similarly, the intellectual disputes of Hooker’s context 
were, for the most part, not over diﬀerences in doctrinal content, but rather over 
practical questions about the self-ordering of the national church. Can a female serve 
as  governor of the local church? Does God require governance of the Church by 
bishops? Hooker recognized that such disputes arise from diﬀerences in our 
understanding of how we know what we know. Hooker can illuminate our 
understanding of how ecclesial practices form us because he answered the question of 
how we know what we know by developing from first principles a robust defense of 
ecclesial practices.
Precisely because the fragments of the contemporary Church are so often divided 
by the question of how we know what we know, the concern of this study is to 
identify resources to help the Church imagine a communion ecclesiology appropriate 
to 21st century dynamics. It does so by examining the response of Richard Hooker to 
challenges to the Church arising, like ours, from a pivotal change in the Western 
social imaginary.4 Richard Hooker is especially interesting because he shares many of 
the emphases of contemporary ecclesial ethicists,5 including a substantial deployment 
of Aristotle, an emphasis on the centrality of Jesus, and a high valuation of the 
tradition and practices of the Church.6 
I seek to answer the question, “how is the mind of Christ formed in community?” 
My thesis, in brief, is that Christ acts on his church through a complex interaction of 
4. The social imaginary is “the way that we collectively imagine, ever pre-theoretically, our
social life.” Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Belknap Press, 2007), 146. 
5. I deploy the category, “ecclesial ethicists,” as a technical term throughout this study. I
specify its meaning below. See page 14.
6. Samuel Wells, Christian Ethics: An Introductory Reader, 1 ed. (Wiley-Blackwell, 2010-05-10),
154-155. 
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community and practices to generate the reconciled political identity, diversity, and 
virtue of his body. 
It would seem that this is an obvious thesis. But to suggest that the matter of 
virtue is complex is to engage in controversy. It is just this complexity that Hooker’s 
interlocutors denied, and that is often denied in our time through our aﬃnity for 
universal ethics that ground moral reasoning in competing foundations in the hope of 
determining outcomes once and for all. To suggest that the formation of the mind of 
Christ in community is more complex than referral to another's preferred foundation 
is to engage in controversy. 
It seems warranted, therefore, to unpack my simple thesis here in order to 
illuminate the complexity involved in forming the mind of Christ in community. 
Accordingly, the more detailed thesis that shaped this study is that Christ the 
Creator, encountered historically and actually, blesses our common life by evoking our
creative response to grace with conditioned forms of law, scientia, and social 
structures. These historically encountered forms are the contingent, provisionally-
known, and yet reliable signs and tokens of goodness which create the context in 
which the Spirit draws us to recognize and respond to our relation to Christ the 
Reconciler, grasping and transforming both the “common multitude” and the elite, 
generating through common worship and sacramental practices the political identity, 
diversity, and virtue of the visible mystical body of Christ through which God is 
reconciling the world. 
In other words, there are no shortcuts. Enduring communion manifests the good. 
We cannot define the good in advance. To obtain the good, we have to cultivate 
virtue. We cultivate virtue by being the Church. We become the Church when Christ 
himself tutors us in the pentecostal tongue. It is that simple. It is that complex.
 The Wellsian typology
By examining Hooker’s defense of the relationship between ecclesial practices and
virtue, theology can better imagine and talk about an ecclesiology appropriate to the 
challenges of our time. In the conclusion of this study, I will demonstrate why this is 
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so by applying the Hookerian ethics developed in this study to a contemporarily 
divisive issue - the ordination of women as bishops.
The route to this constructive destination will include a secondary eﬀort to extend
the proposal of Stanley Hauerwas and Samuel Wells regarding the connection 
between the Church’s worship and its ethics. In my view, Hauerwas and Wells 
helpfully point to the fruits of that connection: attention to the practices of the 
Church shapes the way Christians describe our world and thereby transforms the way 
we think and act. One of my constructive aims is to extend their work by describing 
how that happens. How does the Holy Spirit work through ecclesial practices to 
generate the passion and virtue of the Body of Christ? Listening to Hooker will teach 
us much about the inner-working of this connection between practices and virtue, but
he only takes us part of the way to our destination. When Hooker is silent or vague 
about this connection, I will turn to Hauerwas and Wells to probe more deeply.
I will deploy a Wellsian typology as my fundamental framework for reading 
Hooker. Throughout this inquiry I assume the typology of ethics provided by Wells 
and Ben Quash, and I see this inquiry as a work within the domain of what they 
describe as ‘ecclesial ethics.’ Their other two categories are “universal” and 
“subversive” ethics. Wells describes their typology in his Christian Ethics: An 
Introductory Reader:
Universal ethics - whether grounded in right intentions, right actions, right outcomes, or right
relationships - tends to focus on the moment of decision as the central question in ethics....
Subversive ethics redescribes that moment and that decision by pointing out the power
relationships and unspoken assumptions hidden within the decision and (in some cases) the
whole construction of the need for and nature of the decision.” Ecclesial ethics share many of
the criticisms of universalists made by subversive ethicists, especially in emphasizing that it is
“the particular information, which universal ethics shuns, that makes ethics comprehensible.”
Ecclesial ethicists focus not on decisions, but on people, based on a new Aristotelianism,
insisting that good decisions are made by people of good character, and good character arises
from particular practices, habits, and descriptions of reality that help disciples respond to God
and one another.7
According to Wells’ typology, “the constructive dimension of ecclesial ethics” is 
not on “moments of decision” but “the description and the evaluation of” “other 
7. Ibid.
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significant issues.”8 In chapter three, I will describe one set of Hooker’s interlocutors, 
the Ramist realists, who, by my reading, sought to develop the slogan, “sola scriptura,” 
into a technology productive of right decisions. In contrast, Hooker’s constructive 
account in Laws is centered on the defense of ecclesial practices as the crucial means 
by which virtue is formed. Like contemporary ecclesial ethicists, his vision for the 
Church of England is predicated on the claim that the most fruitful focus of ethics is 
on the cultivation of virtue and not on the exhaustive definition of right actions in 
advance. As my argument unfolds, it will become clear that Hooker also emphasizes 
the other key themes characteristic of ecclesial ethicists:
1) “the reassertion of confidence in those institutions - notably the church - that
survive but which are shorn (or losing sight) of the practices that give their continued
existence meaning;”9  
2) a concern that ahistorical approaches to discernment lead to “inadequate
description[s] of the ethical situation if the circumstances, commitments, and characters of
those most closely involved are not taken into account;”10 
3) an account of virtue “recovered from Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas” which
foregrounds “the notions of practice (a cooperative activity that defines excellence or human
ends), telos (the final purpose of life), and tradition (which requires virtues to be sustained;”11 
4) a stress on the priority of habit formation as a crucial means by which the Spirit
“shape[s] the imagination of persons by so training them in community… within a tradition
that they learn to take the right things for granted and thus at the moment of decision act
apparently eﬀortlessly without anxiety or dismay;”12 and, finally,
5) a Scriptural hermeneutic which reads Scripture not as a catalogue of universal
axioms but as the grand drama of which all humans are a part, and which thereby
communicates the dispositions constitutive of Christian identity.13
The noteworthy aspects of Hooker’s thought I wish to appropriate accordingly 
have to do  with his own defense of the ecclesial practices of the Elizabethan Church. 
Throughout this study, I will read Hooker as an ecclesial ethicist, using Wells’ 
typology as a framework which invites attention to the emphases above, and thereby 
serves as a handy guide to excavation of core principles. I will then use the harvested 
core principles to develop a thick account of his treatment of ecclesial practices.
8. Ibid., 155.
9. Ibid., 155-156.
10. Ibid., 162.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., 163.
13. Ibid.
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Inductive and Historical
In reading Hooker as an ecclesial ethicist, I understand myself to be faithfully re-
describing Hooker’s thought in such a way that I can appropriate it for my 
constructive project. I take this method to be consistent with what Hauerwas 
commends in his Working with Words: On Learning to Speak Christian:
For it is my conviction that the work of the theologian is word work, or, as John Howard
Yoder would have it, the task of theology is “working with words in the light of faith.”
Accordingly, Yoder describes the approach he takes in Preface to Theology as inductive and
historical—that is, he invites his students (and readers) to watch Christians at work doing
theology to see what they can learn from those who have tried to do theology in the past.14
With my fundamental framework of reading Hooker as an ecclesial ethicist in 
view, I intend to read Hooker’s “ideas in their historical and social contexts, sensitive 
to what [he] could have meant by what [he] said, but not to stop at that, since in the 
end what I care about is making up my own mind about various things.”15  In this 
study, the “various things” are contemporary questions about the role of ecclesial 
practices. Accordingly, my interest is in what Hooker might say to us were he to sit at 
the table as a participant in our contemporary discourse. 
Some questions that concern historians will therefore be less significant in my 
project. For example, Hooker scholars have long debated the provenance of Hooker’s 
thought. To what extent is Hooker influenced directly by Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, 
Aquinas and other ancient and Reformation era thinkers? For my purposes, questions 
of provenance are less fruitful. Because of my method, I can be agnostic about the 
question of whether Hooker gets his Aristotelianism directly from the philosopher, 
from Aquinas, or from his tutor, John Rainold. Similarly, I will sidestep debates about 
whether Hooker’s Christian Platonism comes to him directly from Augustine, 
Pseudo-Dionysius, or is mediated through Aquinas. Rather than immerse myself in 
questions of provenance, my method allows me to assert that Hooker deploys 
recognizable tenets of what some describe as Platonism, Aristotelianism, 
Augustinianism, and Thomism at diﬀerent points in his argument, and to move on to 
14. Stanley Hauerwas, Working With Words: On Learning to Speak Christian, Kindle ed. (Wipf &
Stock Pub, 2011-02-16), Kindle location 95, Preface, para 5.
15. Jennifer A. Herdt, “Email Message to Author,” (November 30, 2012).
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consider how those careful deployments serve his constructive and rhetorical 
purposes.
That said, I understand my method to be, with Yoder and Hooker himself, 
“inductive and historical.”16 First, I will attend closely to Hooker’s historical and social
contexts and to his actual words, with the aim of reading Hooker for Hooker’s sake. 
That is, I will let Hooker speak for himself, naming occasionally what I take to be 
incorrect interpretations and proposing interpretations that I believe to be more 
faithful to his meaning. Second, I will pivot clearly towards my constructive purpose 
either by appropriating his thought with or without qualification or by extrapolating 
from his texts and contexts to what he might say were he to know what we know and 
were he to face the challenges we presently face. In other words, ultimately I hope to 
harvest commitments that a contemporary Hooker would be justified in accepting 
today based upon the available evidence  - ‘Hookerian’ commitments derived through 
extension of the logic of his texts that we ourselves are justified in holding today.
This two-step method is most evident in my treatment of Hooker’s account of 
sacramental practices. In chapters four and five, I exegete Hooker’s account of our 
fellowship with God and demonstrate how such fellowship is particularly intense in 
the sacraments. In both chapters, I pivot to my constructive purpose by bringing 
Hooker into conversation with contemporary thinkers who enable me to clarify 
ambiguities in, correct, or extend Hooker such that we are justified in appropriating 
Hookerian concepts in our contemporary discourse. This method enables me to 
explain how Hooker’s account of fellowship with God connects with a Hookerian 
account of mimetic virtue.
Most of this study consists of watching Hooker at work so that we can learn from 
him. My focus is on the present, however, and my methodological purpose is to place 
a Hookerian voice at the table in conversation with contemporary ecclesial ethicists. 
My aim is to read Hooker as an ecclesial ethicist in a way that will provide a 
constructive result for our contemporary challenges. With that aim in view, 
16. Hauerwas, Working With Words.
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throughout this study, I will hold Hooker explicitly or implicitly in conversation with 
the work of ecclesial ethicists whose focus in recent years has been on how virtue is 
formed through the practices of the Church. The two most prominent of these are 
Stanley Hauerwas and Samuel Wells. I will say more about them shortly.
 Qualifications
My constructive goals entail some necessary limitations on this inquiry’s utility for
others. They also entail the probability that some of my assumptions and arguments 
will be problematic or controversial within the domain of Hooker scholarship. While 
I will not try to anticipate all of these limitations and potential areas of controversy, I 
do wish to acknowledge the limited and potentially problematic nature of my method 
and claims about Hooker while maintaining that these limitations and the possibility 
of controversy in some of my claims about Hooker do not impede the inquiry’s 
explanatory and theological power in the particular way I intend to deploy Hooker. 
That is, I believe that, in spite of these limitations and potential problems, Hooker, as
appropriated in this study, can speak powerfully and fruitfully to contemporary ethics 
on the question of how virtue is formed by practices and other means.
I have already hinted at one such limitation. Because I rely on Elizabethan and 
Renaissance scholars and Hooker biographers to color Hooker's local context, 
historians themselves will find little here regarding his context that is not already well-
known in Hooker scholarship, though I do believe my study may generate some 
interesting questions that are worthy of further historical exploration. One example of
this potential for further contextual investigation is the extent to which Hooker’s 
rhetoric in Laws was influenced by his reactions to the rise of Ramism at Cambridge. 
In addition, my account of Hooker’s rhetorical moves in order to appropriate a 
Thomist account of mimetic virtue within a Reformation context may suggest 
interesting avenues for historians to explore.
I anticipate that some may have a methodological concern. I am not, like the 
historian, seeking a 'best reading' of Hooker. Rather, I am reading Hooker through 
the lens of a contemporary typology. Historians may charge, therefore, that my 
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reading of Hooker as an ecclesial ethicist is anachronistic. I agree. It is intentionally 
so. With Rorty, I respond that "such enterprises in commensuration are, of course, 
anachronistic. But if they are conducted in full knowledge of their anachronism, they 
are unobjectionable."17 My method is inductive, seeking to discover Hooker not for 
the purpose of reforming Hooker but in order to bring his method and principles to 
bear on contemporary problems. That is, I do not claim that Hooker was unjustified 
in holding certain viewpoints based on a premise that we occupy an allegedly superior 
contemporary vantagepoint, but rather, after attending carefully to his actual words, I 
consider whether we ourselves are justified in describing things in the same way today.
In addition, I do not ask Hooker to embrace "a premise he never formulated" or to 
oﬀer an opinion "on a topic he never considered."18
I hope this study poses a potent theological and philosophical challenge to those 
who presuppose a universal "ethics for everybody."19 My inquiry is self-consciously a 
work in ecclesial ethics, and so I begin with the premise that the conversation I wish 
to nourish with Hooker’s insights is a limited conversation of the Church and about 
the Church. I expect that my account of Hooker’s thinking about the natural law will 
be provocative for universal ethicists who read Hooker as supporting their views. 
One category of universal ethics directly engaged in this study is biblicism. In 
chapter three I draw a contrast between Hookerian ethics and what I dub 'Ramist 
realism, demonstrating how Hooker rebutted the claims of his Ramus-inspired 
colleagues that were based on appeals to timeless absolutes. Hooker’s arguments 
would likely discomfit contemporary biblicists who share characteristics with the 
Ramist Puritans of the Elizabethan era.
Similarly, I engage in this study those who seek an ethical foundation in the 
dogma of a magisterium or in a timeless, immutable understanding of natural law or 
human nature. In my view, Hooker’s description of the natural law as contingent, 
17. Richard Rorty, “The Historiography of Philosophy: Four Genres,” in Truth and Progress:
Philosophical Papers (Philosophical Papers (Cambridge)) (Volume 3), (Cambridge University
Press, 1998-03-13), 251. 
18. Ibid., 252.
19. Samuel Wells and Ben Quash, Introducing Christian Ethics, 1 ed. (Wiley-Blackwell,
2010-03-02), 113.
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dialectically-known, and often mutable mitigates against ethical judgments grounded 
in the premise of an immutable natural law.
There are, however, those within the domain of ecclesial ethics with whom I see 
this project in conversation. This conversation is, for the most part, only implied 
within the study itself. I want to acknowledge such implicit engagement here with just
a few remarks regarding my intentions.
In conversation with Protestant theologians seeking an account of virtue that does
not require a eudaemonism based on “substance” metaphysics or an infusion of grace, 
my project suggests that the way to such an account may be through Hooker.20 The 
Hookerian account which emerges in this study unites Hooker’s Reformed 
eudaemonism, a description of the real presence based on Wilfred Sellars’ account of 
personhood, and Wells’ improvisational ethics. Its hallmarks are the virtue of phronesis
and the method of dialectic, both grounded in a Barthian Christology. As a Reformed 
account of mimetic virtue, my hope is that it may point the way to a Barthian account 
of virtue.
En route to my destination, this study responds to the suggestions of Hauerwas 
and Wells, who, in their Christian Ethics, suggest constructively that the Eucharist is “a
corporate practice for discerning the good.”21 In chapter five, I summarize criticism of 
their emphasis on the priority of practices in nurturing the virtue of the community. I 
answer criticism of ecclesial ethicists by deriving from first principles an explanation 
for the role of practices in formation of the mind of Christ in community. In 
particular, I respond to charges that an emphasis on practices is excessively 
immanentist and potentially sectarian. My study qualifies and justifies ecclesial 
ethicists’ emphasis on sacramental practices.
One luminary whose voice appears throughout this study is Karl Barth, many of 
whose arguments, in my view, Hooker anticipated. As a contemporary voice in the 
20. For example, this seems to me the trajectory implied by Derek Woodard-Lehman’s ground-
breaking dissertation on Karl Barth. Derek Woodard-Lehman, “Freedom and Authority - the
Ethics of Revelation in Karl Barth” (PhD Dissertation, Princeton University, 2014).
21. Stanley Hauerwas and Samuel Wells, The Blackwell Companion to Christian Ethics, Second ed.,
Blackwell Companions to Religion (Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 9.
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Reformed stream of which Hooker was a part, Barth provides clarity and depth in 
matters that Hooker sometimes addressed only peripherally. My selective deployment
of Barth ought not suggest that this is a Barthian account. That is not my intent. 
Indeed, I do not claim that Barth would approve of the account oﬀered here, 
particularly as it pertains to sacramental practices. That said, those who worry about 
the christological implications of Barth’s doctrine of reconciliation will likely find 
cause for concern in my critique of Hooker, for my own reading of Hooker is no 
doubt influenced by my immersion in Barth’s Christology.
Some of my assumptions and presentations of Hooker’s context will no doubt 
rankle historians in ways that are trivial with respect to my arguments. For example, 
some historians have begun to question whether terms such as “Lutheran,” “Calvinist,”
and “Reformed,” can be used meaningfully in a description of late sixteenth century 
Protestantism. Their point is that such terms evolved slowly both in their usage and 
meaning, and it is anachronistic to project monolithic meanings onto those terms 
from our historical position. I take their point, but I nonetheless use the term 
“Reformed” repeatedly in my descriptions of Hooker’s context precisely because he 
himself used it, and because my interpretation does not rely on a historically precise 
understanding of what he meant in his usage of that term.
 Hooker's context
As Diarmaid MacCulloch reminds us in his essay surveying Hooker’s reputation, 
Hooker’s legacy “is not as straightforward as it has sometimes been portrayed.”22 Peter
Lake famously described him as the inventor of Anglicanism in his 1988 study,23 while 
ever since the nineteenth-century it has been a commonplace to credit Hooker with 
the doctrine of an Anglican via media “between the extremes of Roman Catholicism 
and continental Protestant Reform.”24 MacCulloch shows that there has been since 
22. Diarmaid MacCulloch, “Richard Hooker’s Reputation,” in A Companion to Richard Hooker, ed.
W.J. Torrance Kirby, Brill’s Companions to the Christian Tradition (Brill Academic
Publishers, 2008), 564. 
23. Peter Lake, Anglicans and Puritans? Presbyterianism and English Conformist Thought From
Whitgift to Hooker (London; Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988),  230.
24. W.J. Torrance Kirby, “Introduction,” in A Companion to Richard Hooker, ed. W.J. Torrance
Kirby, Brill’s Companions to the Christian Tradition (Brill Academic Publishers, 2008),  xxix. 
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the decade of his death the tendency to portray Hooker as the preeminent defender 
of whatever agendas suited the competing parties within what came to be known as 
Anglicanism. The diﬃculty in locating Hooker historically arises from the parties’ 
habit of appropriating Hooker’s prestige to their own cause: 
Thus Hooker entered the eighteenth century a moderate Whig, a Lockean Whig, a moderate
Tory, a ceremonialist parson, and a Non-juring defender of the Church’s apostolic
government. By now indeed anyone in English politics who wanted a name to command
instant respect or who wanted to score a debating point for their cause was ready to quote
Hooker: even Socinians and Deists tried it on.25
MacCulloch attributes the association of Hooker with an Anglican via media to 
the Oxford Movement. John Keble published a scholarly edition of his Works, and the 
Tractarians “excavated [Hooker] for discussion of the via media, a concept by then 
give canonical status in the Anglican writings of John Henry Newman,”26 even though 
Hooker’s view of justification “was the very reverse of Mr. Newman’s.”27 As 
MacCulloch notes, “in late Victorian England, Anglo-Catholics rather than 
Evangelicals wrote Anglican church history.”28  As a result, until the late twentieth-
century, Anglican historiography was largely determined by the lens of nineteenth-
century ecclesiastical conflict, and Newman’s notion that Hooker charted a middle 
way between Rome and Geneva remains pervasive at both the scholarly and popular 
levels.
The interpretative practice of mining Hooker in the abstract and 
compartmentalizing his thought dominated Hooker scholarship until the early 
twentieth century, when it became fashionable to locate Hooker in the domain of 
medieval scholasticism and to emphasize his debts to Thomas Aquinas.29 Without 
challenging the identification of Hooker with Thomist thought, Arthur McGrade 
(1960s) and Cargill Thompson (1980), theorized that Hooker's theology and politics 
are coherent if and only if Hooker is read primarily as a polemicist immersed in the 
25. MacCulloch, “Richard Hooker’s Reputation,” 600.
26. Ibid., 609. 
27. Henry Fish, Jesuitism Traced in the Movements of the Oxford Tractarians (London: Hamilton,
Adams, 1842). in MacCulloch, “Richard Hooker’s Reputation,” 608.
28. Ibid., 609.
29. W.J. Torrance Kirby, “From ‘Generall Meditations’ to ‘Particular Decisions’: The Augustinian
Coherence of Richard Hooker’s Political Theology,” in Sovereignty and Law in the Middle Ages
and Renaissance, ed. Robert Sturges, Arizona Studies in the Middle Ages and Renaissance
(Turnhout: Brepols, 2011), 44. 
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ecclesiastical controversies of the Elizabethan period who subordinated his logic to 
whatever was demanded by his polemics.30 McGrade and Thompson helpfully focused 
interpretation of Hooker on his Elizabethan context, and a large number of studies in 
the past thirty years have helped to clarify this context. 
Hooker studies have benefitted significantly in recent decades by widespread 
interest in sixteenth-century England generally and the Henrician and Elizabethan 
churches specifically. Studies by Diarmaid MacCulloch, Christopher Haigh, Patrick 
Collinson and others have suggested that the notions of monolithic continental and 
English Reformations, of a monolithic Elizabethan culture, and of a monolithic 
English Puritanism,  are unsustainable.31 In Hooker’s time, there were significant 
diﬀerences among schools and individuals within those schools with regard to the key 
doctrinal and ecclesiastical questions of the day.32 Evaluation of Hooker is therefore 
more complex than it was thought in previous generations. Puritans, it turns out, can 
no longer be dismissed as lacking in intellectual substance. Similarly, the description of
Hooker as an apologist for the Elizabethan Settlement requires considerable nuance; 
most recent studies portray him as a creative interpreter who is properly recognized as
mostly an apologist but also as a critic of established doctrines and structures.33
This focus on his Elizabethan context drew much needed attention to Hooker's 
apologetic intent. Whom was he trying to persuade? Since the publication of the 
Folger Edition of Hooker’s works (completed in 1990), studies by Peter 
Lake,Torrance Kirby, and a host of Hooker scholars have shown the significant 
diﬃculty in sustaining the premise of an Anglican via media between Rome and 
30. Ibid., 45-46.
31. Referring to the entrenched portrait of Hooker and the via media, Patrick Collinson deplores
“the damaging mistake of writing the history of that Church in the anachronistically
dichotomous terms of an Anglicanism not yet conceived and an alien Puritanism not yet
clearly disowned.” Patrick Collinson, The Religion of Protestants : The Church in English Society,
1559-1625, vol. 1979 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), ix. See also Diarmaid MacCulloch, The
Later Reformation in England, 1547-1603, Second Edition (British History in Perspective) (Palgrave
Macmillan, 2001).; Christopher Haigh, English Reformations: Religion, Politics, and Society
Under the Tudors (Oxford University Press, USA, 1993).; Peter Lake, Moderate Puritans and the
Elizabethan Church (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
32. Lake, Anglicans and Puritans, 8-10. 
33. Philip Secor, “In Search of Richard Hooker,” in Richard Hooker and the Construction of Christian
Community (Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies), ed. Arthur Stephen McGrade, (Mrts,
1997).
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Geneva.34 
Indeed, perhaps the most intriguing question in current Hooker studies involves 
his relation to mainstream reformed orthodoxy. An increasing number of scholars now
locate Hooker in substantial continuity with the magisterial reformers and suggest 
that the Thomist influence is more nuanced than previously thought.35 In this view, 
Hooker's apologetic intent is to persuade moderate Puritans that the Elizabeth 
Settlement is consistent with reformed orthodoxy and that the claims arising from the
presbyterian crisis are consistent not with reformed orthodoxy but rather with the 
doctrines of the radical reformers. 
In this view, the presenting cause for Hooker's treatise was an intramural 
theopolitical struggle between Geneva-inspired English protestants advocating 
presbyterian reforms and doctrinally similar Prayer Book protestants36 advocating 
conformity with the Elizabethan Settlement. Both factions considered themselves 
reformed; the presbyterian advocates were relatively more influenced by Geneva and 
Calvin, while the conformists were relatively more influenced by Zurich and 
Vermigli.37 The two groups had competed for leadership of England’s Reformed 
34. As McGrade notes, the “Anglican via media must indeed be understood as a via, a “way”
among powerful and competing alternatives, a path on which ‘strenuous exertion,
adaptation, and improvisation’ are constantly required, not as the one right place to be for all
eternity.” Arthur Stephen McGrade, “Forward,” in Richard Hooker and the Construction of
Christian Community (Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies), ed. Arthur Stephen
McGrade, (Mrts, 1997), xv.. For full treatments of the diﬃculty in sustaining Newman’s idea
of a middle way between Rome and Geneva, see Lake, Anglicans and Puritans. and Kirby,
“Introduction to a Companion to Richard Hooker,”
35. Kirby, “From ‘Generall Meditations’ to ‘Particular Decisions’: The Augustinian Coherence of
Richard Hooker’s Political Theology,” 44-48. 
36. These descriptions are borrowed from A.G. Dickens account of the divisions among the
Marian exiles, in which he contrasts the Geneva Puritans and the Prayer Book Puritans. A.G.
Dickens, The English Reformation [2nd Edition] (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1989).
37. Kirby has demonstrated the profound influence of Zurich through Vermigli and Bullinger in
several journal articles. See W.J. Torrance Kirby, “The Civil Magistrate and the ‘Cura
Religionis’: Heinrich Bullinger’s Prophetical Oﬃce and the English Reformation,” in Heinrich
Bullinger (1504-1575), ed. Emidio Campi and Peter Opitz, Zürcher Beiträge zur Reformations-
geschichte (Zurich: Theologische Verlag Zurich, 2007).; W.J. Torrance Kirby, “Peter Martyr
Vermigli’s Epistle to the Princess Elizabeth on Her Accession (1558): A Panegyric and Some
Pointed Advice,” Perichoresis 5.2, (2007): 3-21.; W.J. Torrance Kirby, “The Charge of Religion
Belongeth Unto Princes:’ Peter Martyr Vermigli on the Unity of Civil and Ecclesiastical
Jurisdiction,” Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte 94, (2003): 161-175.; W.J. Torrance Kirby,
“From Florence to Zurich Via Strasbourg and Oxford: The International Career of Peter
Martyr Vermigli (1542-1562),” in Bewegung Und Beharrung: Aspekte Des Reformierten
Protestantismus 1520-1650. Feschrift Für Emidio Campi, (Leiden and Boston: Koninklijke Brill
NV, 2009).
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caucus since the reign of Mary. 
Rather than merely recycling the conformist polemics of the previous two decades
and engaging English presbyterians in a series of interpretative skirmishes over specific
Scriptural passages, Hooker attacked those advocating presbyterian reforms on three 
fronts. First, he showed how their proposed reforms belied an insuﬃcient 
commitment to reformed christological and pneumatological dogma. Second, he 
challenged as inconsistent with reformed dogma their soteriological account of how 
grace functions in the economy of redemption. Finally, he refuted the theological 
premises of their presbyterian polity by showing that the reformed theopolitical 
emphasis on the hypostatic union leads to an ecclesiological vision of a visible, 
mystical Body of Christ under the earthly jurisdiction of a civil head served by bishops.
In short, Hooker’s account of how Christian community is constructed is grounded 
thoroughly in the reflections of the magisterial reformers on the salient theological 
issues of the Reformation, and he used cherished principles of the 
magisterial reformers to reject Geneva protestant demands for a presbyterian polity.
This emerging school of historiography, locating Hooker in substantial continuity 
with the magisterial reformers as he engages moderate Puritans polemically, figures 
prominently as the background of my study. Because my primary method is to read 
Hooker as an ecclesial ethicist, Hooker’s texts are foregrounded. This historiography 
is significant in this study to the extent that it informs my exegesis of Hooker’s texts. 
In addition, throughout this inquiry I presuppose that Hooker and his Laws are 
rightly situated within a frame in which Hooker engages his interlocutors - consisting 
of both opponents and allies - with an account of how we know what we know that 
acknowledges a shared history and tradition and competes for heirship to their 
common predecessors on the basis of his distinctive answers to that question. I build 
upon Lake’s suggestion that a key set of Hooker’s interlocutors were moderate 
Puritans, many of whom were influenced by the introduction of Ramist method at 
Cambridge in the late Elizabethan period. In chapter three, I will propose that 
Hooker’s ethics can be seen in sharp relief when compared to this contemporaneous 
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teaching by his colleagues. In the historical perspective stipulated here, Hooker’s 
ethics challenged the premises of this group of colleagues, which included both 
conformists and presbyterians, oﬀering a distinctive answer to the question of how we 
rightly discern the good.38 
 Nomenclature
(1) The Elizabethan context
Hooker scholars exhibit a variety of ways of categorizing the various players in the
Elizabethan debates. Kirby, for example, uses the term “Disciplinarian” to denote 
those English divines who advocated a polity based on Geneva’s example. I’ve adopted
Peter Lake’s categories in this study in order to diﬀerentiate between groups who 
exhibited widespread agreement on doctrine but diﬀered in their assessments of the 
practical implications of doctrine, especially in the areas of liturgy and governance. 
Following Lake, ‘presbyterian’  denotes those “who can be shown to have espoused
or defended the presbyterian platform of church government.”39 “Conformist’ denotes 
those  “who chose to make a polemical fuss about the issues of church government 
and ceremonial conformity and who sought to stigmatize as puritans those less 
enthusiastic about such issues than themselves.”40 Finally,
“The term ‘puritan’ is used to refer to a a broader span of opinion, encompassing those
advanced protestants who regarded themselves as the ‘godly’, a minority of genuinely true
believers in an otherwise lukewarm or corrupt mass. It is therefore used as a term of degree, or
relative religious zeal rather than as a clear-cut party label. Thus, while all presbyterians were
puritans, not all puritans were presbyterians.”41 
I recognize that ‘puritan’ is a contested category, but use it here as a convenient 
way of denoting the bulk of Hooker’s colleagues, whether conformist or presbyterian. 
Similarly, I recognize that “Reformed” is a contested category, to the extent that 
38. I am not concerned here with whether Hooker self-consciously constructed Laws in response
to this group of interlocutors. I leave that argument to the historians. It will become clear,
however, as a by-product of my inquiry, that Laws - whether intentionally or not - provides a
withering assault on the assumptions underlying the Ramist teachings of his Cambridge
colleagues.
39. Lake, Anglicans and Puritans, 7.
40. Ibid., 8.
41. Ibid., 7-8.
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historians debate whether the term had yet developed widespread usage by the 1590’s. 
I use it here as I perceive Hooker used it - as a convenient way of denoting the shared 
beliefs and loose aﬃnities of Protestant churches influenced especially by the 
distinctive streams of Geneva (Calvin) and Zurich (Bullinger).
(2) 'Empiricist' and 'the phenomenal'
In my rendering, Hooker posits a fundamentally empiricist epistemology in which 
all human knowing is derived from the phenomenal. By ‘empiricist’ I denote a very 
rich conception of ‘the empirical’ including both causes (material and eﬃcient) and 
reasons (what Aristotle described as formal and final causation). 
Given this rich conception of the empirical, ‘the phenomenal’ is that which 
appears to ordinary human perception and reason in the spaces of causes and reasons. 
This includes the special category of revelation, which transcends human reason but is
nonetheless encountered as phenomena perceived using the same human psychology. 
Either I am historically correct in this rendering, or this is a point of reparative 
reasoning in which my Hookerian account diverges intentionally from the historical 
Hooker in service of my objective of appropriating and adapting Hooker for 
contemporary ethics. 
(3) Universal theological claims vs universal ethics
Throughout this study, I distinguish between between universal ethical claims and
God's universal command that all created things exist in loving relation to Christ the 
Creator. I will claim in the next chapter that Hooker himself makes this distinction 
and that it plays an important role in his account of virtue. I perceive this distinction 
to be consistent with, though pressing upon, the typology of Wells and Quash,42 and 
that, in so pressing, I am following a similar move made by Hauerwas.43 Implicit here 
42. Wells recognizes this distinction. In introducing his typology of ethics with excerpts from
Barth’s doctrine of God, Wells notes that, "…. It becomes clear that, though the command of
God is universal, the ability to respond to that command is limited to “those who are elected
in Jesus Christ to be covenant-partners with God.”Wells and Quash, Introducing Christian
Ethics.; Wells, An Introductory Reader, 100. 
43. Stanley Hauerwas similarly diﬀentiates between God's universal command and the ecclesial
reception of that command with his universal claim that the cross and resurrection denote
the “grain of the universe”: "…. the witness of Christians across time would not have been
- 27 -
is the distinction between God’s universal address to humankind and the subset of 
humans who have noetic access to that address. In the Hookerian grammar I develop 
in this study, only those who come to know Christ as Reconciler have noetic access to 
Christ’s universal command.44  
In contrast, in Wells' typology, the universal ethicist presupposes that Christian 
ethics are "ethics for everybody."45 We shall see that, for Hooker, such a claim is 
problematic to the extent it funds eﬀorts to ground ethical arguments in a pre-
historical or ahistorical foundation, whether by categorizing Roman dogma as 
supernatural law or by viewing Scripture as a catalogue of timeless universal axioms.  
 Roadmap
My inquiry proceeds in five chapter-length moves following this introduction. 
This study builds from chapter to chapter, so it will be most fruitful to engage it in the
order presented. 
Chapter two, "Reading Richard Hooker as an Ecclesial Ethicist," is foundational. I
use Wells' typology to guide excavation of Hooker's sub-surface commitments which 
lead to his conclusions about the role of ecclesial practices in nurturing the virtue of 
the British people.  Of particular importance are theological and rhetorical moves 
which enable him to re-describe a recognizably Thomist account of mimetic virtue 
possible if God had not vindicated Christ's sacrifice on the cross through resurrection and
ascension. On the basis of such witnesses, Christians can rightly claim that to bear the cross
is not a confession peculiar to them; rather their lives reveal the "grain of the
universe."Stanley Hauerwas, With the Grain of the Universe : The Church’s Witness and Natural
Theology : The Giﬀord Lectures Delivered At the University of ST. Andrews in 2001, Kindle ed.
(Grand Rapids, Mich.: Brazos Press, 2001), 224. 
44. Humans are “by nature sons of Adam,” but God’s “saving eﬃcacy… bringeth forth a special
oﬀspring among men containing them to whom God hath given the gracious and amiable
name of sons.” These sons of God are “progeny… by spiritual and heavenly birth” of Christ,
“the second Adam.” This “life as all other gifts and benefits groweth originally from the
Father and commeth not to us but by the Son, nor by the Son to any of us in particular but
through the Spirit.” Richard Hooker, The Folger Library Edition of the Works of Richard Hooker:
Of the Lawes of Ecclesiastical Polity, Preface Books I-Iv, and V (Two Volumes), Library edition ed.
(Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1977-01-01). All citations to Hooker's works will
follow the standard dual reference system which includes the divisions used in John Keble’s 19th
century edition. When citing quotations, I provide an abbreviated form of the book title, period,
Hooker’s book number, period, Hooker’s chapter number, period, and then Keble’s section
number. After a semi-colon, I provide a more precise reference using the Folger’s volume
number, colon, page number, period, and line number(s). Laws.V.56.6; 2:237.29; V.56.6;
2:237.25-28; V.56.6; 2.238.1-3; V.56.7; 2:238.12-15.
45. Wells and Quash, Introducing Christian Ethics, 113. 
- 28 -
within the grammar of the Elizabethan Church. We'll see that Hooker adapts the 
Thomist concept of eternal law to frame his claims about how we know what we 
know. He posits an empiricist psychology which generates knowledge through 
inductive reasoning in response to encounters with phenomena in the natural, 
Scriptural, and spiritual domains. This leads him to a recognizably Aristotelian 
account of how we recognize the good.
In chapter three, I contrast the Hookerian ethics developed in the preceding 
chapters with ethical perspectives that arise from universal perspectives. A key move 
is to recognize that there are no timeless absolutes to be discovered in dogma or 
Scripture upon which ethics can be grounded. The only foundation is  Jesus Christ 
himself. One’s narrative location is the proper focus of ethical reasoning because the 
general can only approximate the natural law, for our general prescriptions inevitably 
exclude information that comformity with the natural law demands.
Given this foundation, in chapter four I ask, “if all human knowledge of the good 
is a posteriori, how do we ever gain assurance of the rightness of our knowledge beyond 
the inherent weaknesses of our probabilistic reasoning?” Hooker answers by pointing 
to our participation in Christ through his real presence in our lives. For Hooker and 
us, the fundamental question is, “how is Christ really present to us?.” On my account, 
Hooker oﬀers an ontology in which Christ is locally, diachronically, and synchronically
present in the individual human heart, irrupting into temporality in order to establish 
relationships of fellowship with the elect. Christ meets us in our particularity, 
establishing our rational recognition of a shared history, such that we are justified in 
our claims about him. 
 In chapter five, drawing upon the proposal of Stanley Hauerwas and Sam Wells 
regarding the role of liturgy in forming virtue in the community, I explore the role of 
ecclesial practices in nurturing and sustaining such sanctifying relationships. The 
Spirit uses the most ordinary phenomena of nature - like rainbows, the tactile feel of 
oil, the smell and taste of wine and bread, the cleansing experience of water - to 
sustain us in our journey, leading us over time toward a thick knowledge of the 
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Messiah's dispositions. Through practices - both sacramental and non-sacramental, 
Jesus' history becomes our history, we discover ourselves addressed by him in our 
particularity, and we discover ourselves transformed by his action upon us. By steps 
and degrees, disciples learn to take the right things for granted, and, imitating him, 
learn to improvise in their ethical actions so that they carry on in the same way as 
Christ and also in the same way as citizens of the eschatological New Jerusalem.
All of the foregoing constitute elements of what I will describe, with a nod to Sam
Wells’ Improvisation,46  as a Hookerian christodramatic ethics. But how is a 
christodramatic ethics significant? How does it help us to imagine an ordering of the 
Church that is relevant in our time?  
I conclude with a case study, examining a recent dispute in the Anglican 
Communion regarding women's ordination, to demonstrate how the Hookerian 
ecclesial ethics developed in this study might shape the debate and avoid fracture of 
the bonds of aﬀection between opposing sides. Such a possibility is ecumenically 
significant. By holding together community, individuality, and an understanding of 
how Christ is really present to us in our communal practices, a Hookerian ethics helps
us to imagine a communion ecclesiology appropriate to the challenges of our time.
46. Samuel Wells, Improvisation : The Drama of Christian Ethics (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Brazos
Press, 2004).
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- Chapter 2 -
Reading Richard Hooker as an ecclesial
ethicist
THE BIG PICTURE: HOOKER'S RHETORICAL STRATEGY
How do we discern the good? How do we know that the actions we propose are 
good? That our laws are right in the sense of corresponding to God’s law? Hooker’s 
fundamental response to these questions, as I shall argue in the remainder of this 
study, is that the answer is not as obvious as his interlocutors suggest. Our knowing of 
the right and good is a complex process for which there are no shortcuts that allow us 
to bypass the careful cultivation of virtue.
In this chapter, my historical argument will be that Hooker identified serious 
flaws in the foundation underlying certain positions of English presbyterians, Ramist 
realists,47 and even his conformist allies. Laws, therefore, may be fruitfully read as an 
extended disputation with these mostly oﬀstage interlocutors. In Laws, he attacks 
their proposals and defends his own brand of Reformed catholicism as the most 
prudent vision for the Church of England. My account of Hooker’s purpose is 
therefore consistent with what I described in chapter one as the emerging school of 
historiography which describes Hooker as one who, in substantial continuity with the 
magisterial Reformers, polemically engaged colleagues with whom he was largely in 
agreement on doctrinal matters. On my reading, Hooker’s most significant polemical 
engagement focused not on the matters of action - whether a woman can govern a 
national church, for example - but on the question of how we know what we know, a 
question that was central to the task of creating laws for the Church of England. 
The key historical move in this chapter is to notice that Hooker’s answer to that 
question closely matches the answers given by those whom Wells’ and Quash’s have 
classified as “ecclesial ethicists.” Insights arise when we read Hooker as a “bridge 
47. I describe this group in detail in the next chapter. See “The Ramist Realists” on page 85.
figure between universal and ecclesial ethicists,”48 recognizing his turn to Aristotle, his 
emphasis on the centrality of Jesus, and his high valuation of the tradition and 
practices of the Church as eﬀorts to inoculate the Church of England against his era’s 
most problematic ideas. In what follows, I read Hooker as an ecclesial ethicist in 
order to excavate core principles he applies in his defense of ecclesial practices.
Such excavation is both necessary and fruitful. Given my objective of 
understanding how our practices contribute to virtue, one might infer that the most 
direct path is suﬃcient - all that is needed is a harvest of the many insights one finds 
in Book V of Hooker’s Laws, which contains his defense of ecclesial practices. The 
challenge is more complex than that, however. Hooker rightly recognized that our 
thinking about ecclesial practices necessarily entails sub-surface philosophical, 
theological, anthropological, and christological commitments. More importantly, he 
recognized that the decisive diﬀerences separating Geneva-inspired advocates of 
Presbyterian reforms and Zurich-inspired defenders of the Elizabethan Settlement 
were at the level of these sub-surface commitments. Consequently, Hooker’s 
rhetorical strategy primarily aimed beneath the surface of the decades-long debates 
about practices, bishops, and female headship of the national church. He built his 
arguments about those presenting issues on the foundation of a rich account of their 
philosophical, theological, anthropological, and christological presuppositions. In 
other words, he began his defense by turning to first principles.
For that reason, we cannot fully comprehend Hooker’s treatment of ecclesial 
practices without attending to his philosophical, theological, anthropological, and 
christological commitments. Hooker intentionally set out to produce an “Aristotelian 
demonstration”49 of his claims. Consequently, he begins with the doctrine of God and 
derives his claims about the ordering of the Church step-by-step, proposing an 
ontology, an account of the natural law, an anthropology, and an epistemology. Only 
48. Wells and Quash, Introducing Christian Ethics, 191. Wells and Quash apply this description to
Oliver O’Donovan in diﬀerentiating him from other ecclesial ethicists, largely because he is
“more sympathetic to natural law perspectives.” Wells and Quash locate Hooker within their
category of “universal ethics.” One of the fruits of my project is the demonstration that
Hooker rightly is categorized as an ecclesial ethicist.
49. Laws.I.6.3; 1:75, note w.
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after laying this foundation does he turn to the presenting causes of his treatise - 
matters of action involving the proper self-ordering of the Church of England. 
Harvesting his ideas fruitfully will require excavation and, in a few cases, critique and 
repair. By attending closely to the shape of Hooker’s Aristotelian demonstration, we 
receive a rich account of ecclesial practices that is derived from first principles. 
 What's at stake
Such excavation can become overwhelming given the extraordinary breadth of 
Hooker’s thought. One could easily lose sight of how each thread contributes to the 
portrait of how the mind of Christ is formed in community. With that complexity in 
mind, I will foreshadow my exegetical account with a ‘big picture’ sketch of Hooker’s 
project, explaining what I think he was trying to achieve, why he made certain moves, 
and how those moves are significant for the current constructive account. My 
exegetical demonstration will follow this section and take up the bulk of this chapter.
By my reading, the grand challenge shaping the intellectual discourse of the 
Church of England in Hooker’s era was not about whether the Church would manifest 
a robust form of Reformed catholicism, but about its content.50 What makes a church 
recognizable as a model of Reformed catholicism? Among the many participants in 
the discourse between 1580-1600, Geneva-inspired presbyterians presented one 
cluster of views, and Zurich-inspired conformists presented another.51 Hooker, an 
intellectual leader of the latter cohort, dialectically engaged both his opponents and 
his allies, proposing a vision for an English Reformed catholicism that inherited the 
strengths of both sets of views while overcoming their weaknesses. 
The salient presenting issues during this period concerned matters of action. 
50. Kirby argues this persuasively in W.J. Torrance Kirby, Richard Hooker, Reformer and Platonist
(Aldershot, Hants, England ; Burlington, VT: Ashgate Pub., 2005). I intend my phrase,
“Reformed catholicism” as a shorthand for the synthesis of Reformed dogma and Christian
Platonism which Kirby documents. The key point is to recognize that, in Hooker’s context,
the choice was not between Rome and Geneva, but between competing accounts of how to
be Reformed, all of which strived to distinguish the Church of England from the ways of the
Radical Reformers and the Roman church.
51. For the case that Elizabethan divines and Elizabeth herself were influenced strongly by the
Zurich over and against Geneva, see W.J. Torrance Kirby, The Zurich Connection and Tudor
Political Theology (Studies in the History of Christian Thought), 1st Edition ed. (Brill Academic
Pub, 2007-08-30).
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Controversy surrounded the royal supremacy, the designation of the queen as female 
governor of the church, and the extent to which the English church would be 
governed by ordained bishops and priests. For the purposes of this study, however, the
presenting issue of greatest interest was that of ecclesial practices: to what extent 
should the Church of England prescribe sacramental and non-sacramental practices 
which are not ordained clearly in Scripture and which manifest continuity with the 
anathematized Roman Church? Hooker’s Book V of Laws, the heart of his treatise, is 
an extended defense of a wide range of practices, ranging from the sign of the cross 
and commemoration of the saints to the Eucharist.
Underlying these presenting causes was a host of prior questions. How do we 
know what we know? How do we discern the good? How do we read Scripture in 
support of our ethical discourse? When can a church justifiably depart from its 
received traditions? What authority should we assign to human laws not derived from 
Scriptural mandates? Are sacramental practices merely formal rituals, or do they, in 
some mystical sense, edify? 
These deeper questions transcend their presenting causes. They are asked by every
generation. Even after the presenting causes ceased to be urgent as the conformists 
consolidated power and established facts on the ground, the deeper questions 
remained sources of tension.52 The questions persist because competing answers lead 
inevitably to competing visions for the Church. So it was for the Church of England as
it approached the seventeenth century. At stake for Richard Hooker were not just 
questions about whether Elizabeth could head the Church of England or whether 
psalm-singing would be allowed in worship, but, more importantly, fundamental 
claims about how the Holy Spirit creates and sustains the virtue of the English people.
52. The presenting questions were already answered and enshrined in ecclesial or
commonwealth law by the time Hooker’s Laws was published, and open opposition to the
Elizabethan Settlement was diminished. Nonetheless, skirmishes continued between the
presbyterians, conformists, and other Elizabethan divines throughout the 1590s largely along
the same philosophical lines. See Lake, Moderate Puritans. for a good account of these
ongoing tensions, and especially the controversy over the Lambeth Articles.
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 The givens of the emerging Reformed orthodoxy
In this study, I read Hooker as an ecclesial ethicist and Hooker’s Laws as a 
powerful and passionate apology for an ecclesial vision grounded in a particular 
account of virtue. In the next chapter, I will describe an opposing account promoted 
by Cambridge-based Ramist realists. Hooker’s treatise presents a sustained argument 
for a mimetic account of virtue grounded in a eudaimonistic view of the created order.
Why do we need the royal supremacy? Why do we need bishops? Why do we need 
long-cherished sacramental and non-sacramental practices? Threaded throughout 
Hooker’s eight volumes is the resounding answer, “Because they are instrumental 
means of grace through which the Spirit creates and sustains us as a commonwealth of
virtue.” On my account, Laws is a carefully architected apology for a vision of 
Reformed catholicism which cherishes and cultivates these instrumental means in 
order to cooperate with the Spirit’s sanctifying action.53
Hooker’s apology, however, had to carry on in the same way as his Elizabethan 
intellectual circles in order to be comprehensible and persuasive. Hooker could not, 
for example, simply retrieve a Thomist account of virtue and argue as though its 
descriptions were coherent with the normative descriptions of his circles. He could 
not simply retrieve a Thomist ontology and argue that its worldview was continuous 
with Reformed descriptions of the world and humankind’s location within it. He 
could not do these things because key concepts underlying his community’s normative
descriptions of the world had shifted as a result of the Reformation (which was already
well into its third generation of leaders when Hooker wrote). In order to sustain his 
argument, he had to frame his account of virtue within a Reformation grammar and 
worldview.
The most important ‘given’ for Hooker’s Reformed contemporaries was a 
53. As William Harrison notes, “In the Lawes, Hooker is concerned with sanctification and the
place of the human person in the process; justification is a peripheral matter and rarely
discussed.” William H. Harrison, “Powers of Nature and Influences of Grace in Hooker’s
Lawes,” in Richard Hooker and the English Reformation, ed. W.J. Torrance Kirby, (Dordrecht ;
Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003), 15.
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Protestant account of the doctrine of justification by grace through faith.54 This, in 
turn, had associated commitments. The first of these is the anthropological premise 
that humans have no innate capacity to know the mind of God.55 A second associated 
given is that humans know the good exclusively through God’s contingent and 
gracious acts of revelation.56 In addition to these givens were a pervasive skepticism 
towards reason as a means of discerning God’s will and a pervasive anxiety about 
claims that humans contribute to our own salvation in any way.57 All of these were 
54. The adjective, ‘Protestant,’ is key. The Roman Church embraced the doctrine of justification,
too, of course. I refer here specifically to descriptions by the magisterial Reformers which
diverged from those of Rome in the 16th century, particularly rejecting notions of grace as an
infused substance and denying any role in justification to the ecclesial authority of the Pope.
55. Some may say Thomas held this position, too. By my reading, however, Aquinas describes a
rationalist (and not an empiricist) anthropology including the human capacity to recognize
the transcendentals through intellection. This seems to be a claim that humans have a
capacity for a priori knowledge of the good. Occam apparently read Aquinas this way, too,
and famously rejected that possibility with his razor. Thomist scholars Joseph P. Wawrykow
and John L. Jenkins seem to agree, also. Wawrykow writes (commenting on ST I.78,82-83):
“There is in each human both a passive and active intellect. The active is responsible for
abstracting intelligible species from sense knowledge; these intelligible species are imprinted
on the passive intellect, which retains these species.” Joseph P. Wawrykow, The Westminster
Handbook to Thomas Aquinas, Westminster Handbooks to Christian Theology (Louisville:
Westminster John Knox Press, 2005-07-20), 6; John L. Jenkins, Knowledge and Faith in Thomas
Aquinas, Kindle for iPad ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2007), Kindle location 1384, Chap
4, para 1-5.; Ibid., Kindle location 1436, Chap 4, Sec 1, para 11-12.. See also Thomas Aquinas,
The Summa Theologica of ST. Thomas Aquinas (Five Volumes) (Christian Classics, 1981), I.85.6.
Thomas Aquinas, An Annotated Translation (With Some Abridgement) of the Summa Contra
Gentiles of Saint Thos Aquinas, trans. Joseph Rickaby (London: Burns and Oates, 1905), III.108.
Future citations of these classics  of Thomas Aquinas will use the shortnames of ST and SCG.
56. Again, some may object that “we find this in Aquinas, too,” and I agree. However, what’s in
view here is not a proper reading of Thomas, but a historical reaction to readings of Thomas
by the magisterial Reformers, whether they were correct or not. Denis Janz argues
persuasively that Luther read Thomas through the lens of his mentor, which was a
misreading. John Bowlin argues persuasively - against Jean Porter et al, that “Aquinas
considers the human good contingent, and it is this contingency, this diﬃculty, that the
prudent and the just must address if they are to avoid moral failure and will true goods with
constancy.” The logic of my argument in “Hookerian prescription: The priority of the
particular” (chapter three, beginning at page 96) is that Hooker agrees with Aquinas, if
Bowlin is right about Aquinas. Denis R. Janz, Luther and Late Medieval Thomism: A Study in
Theological Anthropology, Kindle ed. (Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2009-12-15). John R.
Bowlin, Contingency and Fortune in Aquinas’s Ethics (Cambridge Studies in Religion and Critical
Thought), Reissue ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2010-06-10), 55.
57. In asserting that hyper-Augustinian anxiety about pelagianism informed discourse in
Hooker’s context, I am not suggesting that such concerns were actually warranted with
respect to Aquinas. Indeed, I don’t believe Thomas argued that humans contribute to our
own salvation in a Pelagian way. But I am suggesting that Luther’s critique of Thomas
suﬃciently shaped Reformation discourse such that English Calvinists in the 1590s projected
their anxieties about pelagianism onto Thomas. This anxiety resonates in the anonymous A
Christian Letter, the only refutation of Hooker’s Laws published during his lifetime. “A
Christian Letter With Hooker’s Notes,” in The Folger Library Edition of the Works of Richard
Hooker, Volume Iv: Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity: Attack and Response, the Folger Library. The
Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity) (V. 4), ed. John E. Booty, (Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 1982-01-01). See also Egil Grislis, “Providence, Predestination, and Free Will in
Richard Hooker’s Theology,” in Richard Hooker and the English Reformation, ed. W.J. Torrance
Kirby, (Dordrecht ; Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003); W. David Neelands,
“Richard Hooker and the Debates About Predestination, 1580-1600,” in Richard Hooker and
the English Reformation, ed. W.J. Torrance Kirby, (Dordrecht ; Boston: Kluwer Academic
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constraints which shaped the grammar with which Hooker could describe his vision 
for the Church.58 
Hooker’s great achievement, in my view, is the construction of an account of 
virtue that is coherent within a Reformation grammar and worldview. His account of 
virtue addresses the givens of his time. For Hooker, such an account, and not the 
competing accounts of his interlocutors, is the hallmark of Reformed catholicism.
 Key moves of interest in this study
It is with good reason that so many commentators have associated Hooker with 
Thomas Aquinas through the centuries. Though Hooker cites Thomas clearly only 
about eight times,59 reading Hooker’s Book I of Laws can feel like one is reading an 
English compilation of Aquinas’ greatest hits. Allusions and echoes abound, and it may
be that Hooker intentionally imitated the structure of Summa Theologiae in composing 
his doctrinal treatments.60
One should be cautious in identifying Hooker simply as “the English Thomas,” 
however, for at least two reasons. First, such an identification underweights the fact 
that Hooker was a brilliant and wide-ranging scholar in his own right who drank 
deeply from the same wells as Thomas. Except when he quotes Thomas directly, 
similarities may well be due to his own synthesis of Plato, Aristotle, Pseudo-Dionysius,
or early-church fathers like Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria, Gregory of Nyssa, 
Cyril of Alexandria, or Augustine of Hippo. Indeed, one might just as reasonably be 
led to describe Hooker as “The English Aristotle” and “The English Augustine” given 
Publishers, 2003); Jennifer A. Herdt, Putting on Virtue: The Legacy of the Splendid Vices, Reprint
ed. (University Of Chicago Press, 2012-05-09), Part III.
58. One could argue that each of these givens appear in medieval thinkers like Thomas Aquinas
et al, too. But that’s not the point I am making here. My point is that, at minimum, Hooker’s
historical location in late Elizabethan England required a redescription of these givens in a
grammar intelligible to a community hostile to Rome for geopolitical, ecclesiological, and
theological reasons and heavily influenced by the language and concepts of the late
Reformers.
59. W. David Neelands, “The Theology of Grace of Richard Hooker” (PhD Dissertation, Trinity
College and University of Toronto, 1988), 304. 
60. Peter Munz identifies more than one hundred passages with obvious debts to Thomas, and
John S. Marshall proposes “that Hooker deals with the principal doctrinal topics in the order.
and in the spirit, of Thomas' Summa Theologiae.” Ibid., 306-307.
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his similarly heavy debts to each of them in other parts of his corpus.61 In my view, 
such temptations inadequately capture how Hooker actually used the authorities he 
deploys.62 The second, more important cause for caution is that such an identification 
could lead one to miss Hooker’s creativity in imagining how one might describe an 
account of mimetic virtue within the constraints of the emerging Reformed 
orthodoxy.
Noticing Hooker’s creativity is the task of this section. Since the similarities to 
Thomas are hard to miss,63 my purpose here is to invite attention to certain Hooker 
adaptations while continuing to share my ‘big picture’ impressions of his rhetorical 
strategy. In anticipation of the detailed exegetical account which appears in the next 
section, this section provides the highlights of those adaptations with a focus on their 
role in Hooker’s rhetorical strategy.
Hooker’s first major adaptation is to propose his own version of the doctrine of 
duplex cognitio Dei using Thomas’ conception of the eternal law. Hooker’s re-
conception describes the cosmos and its providential ordering in terms of the first and
second forms of the eternal law. The first eternal law, opaque to humankind, is that 
which governs the inner life of the triune God. The second eternal law, in contrast, is 
known by all creatures through the light of reason, and expresses the divine will 
throughout the created order. Hooker derives the natural law and all human laws from
61. This point is argued by A.S. McGrade in an essay analyzing Hooker’s usage of medieval and
patristics sources. See Arthur Stephen McGrade, “Classical, Patristic, and Medieval Sources,”
in A Companion to Richard Hooker, ed. W.J. Torrance Kirby, Brill’s Companions to the
Christian Tradition (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2008).
62. In a penetrating polemical essay, “Thomas’s Alleged Aristotelianism, or Aristotle Among the
Authorities,” Mark Jordan says of Thomas what I believe it true for Hooker, as well, with
respect to the most prominently deployed authorities we find in Hooker: “For Thomas,
Aristotle is not a unique or perennial authority. Aristotle is a pagan author whose texts can
be brought into helpful constellation with other authorities. Thomas does not regard
Aristotle as a block of doctrine to be carried in whole. He treats Aristotle instead as the
teacher behind a set of pedagogical texts. The unity of the teaching is just the dialectical
congruence that thoughtful reading can perform. For all of these reasons, Thomas is not
tempted to misleading imitation of Aristotle.” Hooker is neither merely the English Thomas,
the English Augustinian, nor the English Aristotle precisely because he treats them as
teachers, reads them thoughtfully, and deploys them discriminately in responding to specific
theological or philosophical questions. Mark D. Jordan, Rewritten Theology: Aquinas After His
Readers, 1 ed. (Wiley-Blackwell, 2005-12-23), 87. 
63. I agree with Neelands’ view that, on the subjects of law, nature, grace, and Christology,
“Hooker's treatments so clearly follow Thomas on certain topics that dependence must be
assumed.” Neelands, “The Theology of Grace of Richard Hooker,” 307. 
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the second eternal law. This adaptation enables him to claim that human laws - such as
the ecclesiastical laws of England - have the same origin as Holy Scripture. The 
diﬀerences in authority we assign them are not due to diﬀerent origins but due to 
diﬀerent levels of vulnerability to probabilistic error.
Hooker’s second major adaptation is to propose a psychology that carries on 
substantially in the same way as the magisterial Reformers, while adapting their 
anthropology by recovering a more optimistic account of human intellectual capacities
after the Fall. Hooker’s reparation generates two claims that are important in this 
study. First, for Hooker, human faculties remain apt in spite of the Fall, with both a 
will that desires the good and a light of reason which renders humans capable of 
comprehending the good. Our vision of the good is obscured partially by sin. Second, 
Hookerian psychology denies innate access to knowledge of the good. Unlike the 
angels, humans cannot participate in the mind of God through intellection of the 
transcendentals. For Hooker, the light of reason in humans is reduced to an innate 
capacity for discursive logic that enables us to deduce reliably the principles of the 
eternal law and the relations of things to each other. Our minds are blank slates at 
birth, but we grow in our knowledge of the good through our empirical experience of 
God’s actions upon us.
Hooker’s third key move arises from this psychology. On the basis of these 
adaptations, Hooker argued that humans have no possibility of engaging the Word 
objectively. He appropriates the Thomist description of the relative authorities of 
Scripture, doctors of the Church, and philosophy, and he adapts the Thomist 
distinction between revelation and reason.64 The only objective element is God’s Logos
-  the eternal law proclaimed through “the sacred books of Scripture… the glorious 
works of nature… by spiritual influence…[and] in some things…only by worldly 
experience and practice.”65 Yet we engage these always through the light of reason, 
which is inherently subjective. In our encounter with all of these we are vulnerable to 
64. Aquinas, Summa Theologica 1.8.2. Subsequent citations of Aquinas will follow the standard
convention of listing abbreviated for the book, the part number, the question, and article
number. For example ST 1.8.2.
65. Laws.II.1.4; I:147.27-148.7.
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probabilistic error in our comprehension of what is revealed due to the noetic eﬀects 
of sin and the inherent limitations of human finitude.
So how do we recognize the good? Hooker answers that we flock to the signs and 
tokens by which humankind has historically marked their encounter with the good. 
The inherited wisdom is that we recognize the good most reliably when we subject 
ourselves to the communal process of discernment through which humans dialectically
engage what previous generations have named as the signs and tokens marking the 
good. The chief of these is Scripture, which is reliable and suﬃcient with respect to 
the supernatural path to the good that is Christ. But all the world is a symphony 
singing the Word of God's revelation of the good. Additional signs and tokens by 
which we come to know the eternal law include human laws, customs, and sacramental
practices of the Church (spiritual experiences).
Hooker’s Aristotelian demonstration -  that the eternal law is manifest in our laws 
and sacramental practices and that humans deductively recognize the good through 
God’s actions upon us -  provides a crucial starting point as we strive to understand 
how the mind of Christ is formed in community. Yet one further Hookerian 
distinction is needed. Hooker proposes that the proper distinction for ethical 
reasoning is not between reason and faith, but between knowledge and practical 
wisdom. In seeking the good, our communal discernment is about ‘matters of action’, 
which, in my view, is Hooker’s invocation of the Aristotelian virtue of phronesis. 
Phronesis is an important concept throughout this study. I will be driving towards the 
claim that our ecclesial practices generate mimetic virtue, which, in turn, entails the 
capacity to make phronetic judgments which are good because they are patterned on 
the mind of Christ.66
66. Kirby argues in Kirby, Richard Hooker, Reformer and Platonist. that Hooker’s Aristotelianism is
often overemphasized by scholars. He notes that Hooker balances the two great traditions of
Christian Neoplatonism, the Augustinian and the Pseudo-Dionysian. Though Hooker rejects
a Platonist epistemology in favor of a more Aristotelian empiricism, he does not drive a
wedge between Aristotle and Plato. By my reading, Hooker had a strong Aristotelian bent in
his epistemology and ethics, perhaps received from his tutor, Rainold, who lectured on
Aristotle. He also relied extensively on Christian Platonism, particularly in his accounts of
the law and in his description of participation in Christ. In both of these, it seems to me that
he imitated Thomas.
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The foregoing provides the highlights of the subterranean journey on which 
Hooker takes us before turning to his surface engagement in defense of Elizabethan 
ecclesial practices. With that preliminary sketch in view, I now turn to the task of 
excavating the concepts we will need in the remainder of the study.
FAITH FORMS CHARITY: SOME EPISTEMOLOGICAL 
IMPLICATIONS
The preceding section sketched the highlights which unfold exegetically in the 
rest of this chapter. My aim in what follows is to excavate key aspects of Hooker’s 
ontology, psychology, and his account of our communal discernment of the good. The 
concepts presented here are logically prior to and presupposed by Hooker’s critique of
Ramist realism and his account of our participation in Christ which are my focus in 
chapters three and four.67 My intent is to prepare the reader for concepts assumed 
later in this inquiry by providing a highly focused exegetical summary of Hooker’s 
thought, expanding my discussion only where I feel more clarification is warranted in 
order to support the constructive freight that appears in the subsequent chapters. 
My summary of Hooker’s sub-surface commitments proceeds in three related but 
distinct sub-sections. The first two demonstrate key moves Hooker makes to 
appropriate a Thomist account of mimetic virtue, and the third demonstrates his 
deployment of five Aristotelian epistemological concepts. First, I turn to Hooker’s 
account of the objective knowledge of God. I will sketch Hooker’s version of the 
duplex cognitio Dei, a common Reformed doctrine he shaped for his rhetorical purpose 
of refuting key arguments of those advocating Genevan reforms. The key move is to 
recognize that, for Hooker, all creatures encounter Christ as Creator and Governor, 
which means that the natural law that all creatures encounter is Christ himself. Next, 
I sketch aspects of Hooker’s psychology that are presupposed in my constructive 
chapters. The key move is to recognize that Hooker subtly adapts medieval 
67. I consider Hooker’s scriptural hermeneutic and his critique of Ramist realism in ““Special
Equity” and the particular” on page 82. I examine Hooker’s account of participation in Christ
in “Participation as Fellowship” on page 119.
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psychology to reflect the Reformation dogmatic claim that faith precedes charity, 
which thereby limits crucially how humans recognize the good. The third part follows 
from this, taking note of Hooker’s re-imagining of how we recognize the good. I will 
claim that Hooker deploys the Aristotelian methods of phenomena, endoxa, dialectic, and
the virtues of episteme and phronesis in order to make the point that our decisions about
the good are necessarily local, particular, and mutable. The key move is to recognize 
that, for Hooker, the creation of godly laws is properly a question about the creation 
of a godly people precisely because all ethical reasoning is the subject matter of the 
virtue of phronesis.
The concepts mined in this section set up appropriation of his accounts of 
participation and practices that constitute the heart of this study, for reflection on 
how the Spirit creates a godly people leads Hooker to an extended defense of 
Elizabethan liturgical practices. These four introductory moves will therefore help the 
reader make sense of the constructive proposals I will oﬀer in the remainder of this 
inquiry.
In this what follows, I agree with historical reconstructions of Hooker’s account 
of reason by Neelands,68 Kirby,69 Lake,70 and Shuger.71 My emphasis on dialectic and 
contingency in describing our discourse regarding the natural law is consistent with 
Porter,72 Jenkins,73 and, most fully, Bowlin.74 
My account of Hooker’s epistemology comports with Wells’ and Quash’s 
description75 of Hooker, but clarifies that more nuance is required in describing 
68. W. David Neelands, “Scripture, Reason, and ‘Tradition’,” in Richard Hooker and the
Construction of Christian Community (Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies), ed. Arthur
Stephen McGrade, (Binghamton: MRTS, 1997).
69. W.J. Torrance Kirby, “Reason and Law,” in A Companion to Richard Hooker, ed. W.J. Torrance
Kirby, Brill’s Companions to the Christian Tradition (Brill Academic Publishers, 2008). See
also W.J. Torrance Kirby, “Richard Hooker’s Theory of Natural Law in the Context of
Reformation Theology,” The Sixteenth Century Journal 30, no. 3 (Autumn 1999): 681-703.
70. Lake, Anglicans and Puritans. See chap.“Reason and Scripture.”
71. Debora K. Shuger, Habits of Thought in the English Renaissance : Religion, Politics, and the
Dominant Culture, vol. 13 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).
72. Jean Porter, Natural and Divine Law: Reclaiming the Tradition for Christian Ethics (Saint Paul
University Series in Ethics) (Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1999-12-14).
73. Jenkins, Knowledge and Faith.
74. Bowlin, Contingency and Fortune in Aquinas’s Ethics (Cambridge Studies in Religion and Critical
Thought).
75. Wells and Quash, Introducing Christian Ethics, 104, 113, and 119.
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Hooker’s understanding of the natural law. Hooker’s ethics are not universal in the 
sense that they are “ethics for everybody” but are more limited in scope in the sense of
“ethics for our community.” “The sources of Christian ethics are available to 
everybody and binding on everybody,”76 but the historical manifestation of the natural 
law is necessarily local, contingent, and particular. By my reading, Hooker is properly 
read as an ecclesial ethicist. Pace Wells and Quash, Hooker is not a universal ethicist, 
but, like Oliver O’Donovan, “a kind of bridge figure between ecclesial ethics and 
universal ethics.”77
Though my rational reconstruction of Hooker’s hermeneutics is largely consistent 
with the readings of scholars cited above, my rendering of it in the Aristotelian 
grammar of phenomena, endoxa, and dialectic is uncommon among Hooker scholars. In 
describing Hooker’s account in this way, I am not suggesting that Aristotle is 
exclusively or directly the source of his thinking, but rather that Aristotle’s influence 
is evident. In terms of how this came to be, I note Torrance Kirby’s suggestion that 
Hooker’s “method is a somewhat eclectic blend of Renaissance (Erasmian) humanism 
(as is Calvin's) with certain scholastic (especially Neoplatonic and Aristotelian) 
elements (compare Peter Martyr Vermigli here).”78 
In what follows, my most significant disagreement is with the popular attribution 
to Hooker of the memes, “Scripture, Tradition, and Reason” and “Three-Legged-
Stool.” I perceive my position to be largely in accord with the consensus of Hooker 
scholars over the past three decades in challenging these memes. I therefore disagree 
with those who suggest that Hooker treated reason as an alternative source of 
authority alongside Scripture and tradition, and also disagree with those who suggest 
that Hooker similarly commended the authority of  ‘tradition’  - understood narrowly 
as the received dogma of the  Church.79 If there is a three-legged-stool to be found in 
Hooker, its legs are  “Phenomena, Endoxa, and Dialectic.”
76. Ibid., 191.
77. Ibid.
78. Torrance Kirby, “E-Mail Message to Author,” (July 10, 2012).
79. These readings have a long tradition, spanning at least two centuries. Diarmaid MacCulloch
traces that reading in MacCulloch, “Richard Hooker’s Reputation,”
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As signaled in my synopsis, one could render a rough sketch of Hooker’s account 
of the Christian life by pointing to Thomas Aquinas and then accounting for certain 
adaptations arising from the Reformation claim that faith forms charity. Three of 
these adaptations - the first having to do with emanation of the eternal law, the 
second with psychology, and the third with epistemology -  will prove important in 
this study to the extent that they circumscribe the means by which humans discern 
the good. I introduce those adaptations here.
 Hookerian ontology
Hooker’s first major adaptation is to propose his own version of the doctrine of 
duplex cognitio Dei using Thomas’ conception of the eternal law. The key move in this 
sub-section is to argue that, ultimately for Hooker, the law one meets in nature is 
Christ himself, the divine Logos, and Christ meets us uniquely in our particularity. 
These points emerge when one considers carefully his doctrine of the duplex cognitio 
Dei. This move allows him to argue subsequently that Scripture and human laws share 
the same origin. 
In developing his version of this Reformed doctrine, Hooker shows that all 
humans encounter Christ the Creator and Governor, thus investing Christ’s authority 
in both the natural and supernatural laws. Reasoning from first principles, he notes 
that, “from the Father, by the Son, through the Spirit, all things are.”80 The agency of 
the Son is clear. 
Hooker’s rhetorical strategy, in my view, is to defend the ecclesial laws 
constituting the Elizabethan settlement by demonstrating that they are derived from 
the same divine source as Scripture. To do this, he appropriates Thomas’ notion of the
eternal law. Hooker adapts Thomas by distinguishing between what he describes as 
first and second forms of the eternal law. These two forms enable Hooker to add more
emphasis to the distinction between the inner life of the triune God and the 
communication of the triune God’s will within the created order. By emphasizing this 
80. Laws.I.2.2; 1.59.29-30. Cf. Laws.I.2.3; I:60.18-20, where Hooker states, “To himself he is a law
in all those things, whereof our Savior speaketh, saying, “my Father worketh as yet, so I”
(John 5:17).
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distinction, Hooker’s re-description of the eternal law carefully coheres with the 
Reformation’s emphasis on the concepts of the ontological and economic Trinity and 
its anthropological premise that humans have no innate capacity to know the mind of 
God. 
The eternal law
As even the pagans know, God is the first cause and law of all things, “assign[ing] 
unto each thing the kind” and “moderat[ing] the force and power” that determine 
each thing’s “form and measure of working.”81 The ‘personal wisdom of God’ is in all 
things; all things participate in God as an eﬀect participates in its cause.82 Because 
“only the works and operations of God have him both for their worker and author of 
the law whereby they are wrought,”83 the first eternal law is “that order which God 
before all ages hath set down with himself, for himself to do all things by.”84 This first 
eternal law, which is “that law which as it is laid up in the bosom of God,”85 includes 
“those natural, necessary, and internal operations of God, the generation of the Son, 
[and] the proceeding of the Spirit.”86 This law, however, is opaque to creatures, for “we
are neither able nor worthy to open and look into [it].”87 
While the first form of the eternal law governs the inner life of the triune God and
manifests its creative power, Hooker’s second form governs earthbound voluntary 
agents. From the divine perspective, the content of the first and second forms of the 
eternal law is identical, for they both express God’s will; however, creatures encounter 
God’s will only in the second form, which communicates the eternal Word to the 
created order.88 
81. Laws.I.2.1; 1.58.27-30.
82. Laws.V.56.5; 2.236.28-29. Cf. Aquinas: “When something receives particularly that which
belongs to another universally (or totally), the former is said to participate in the latter.”
Thomas Aquinas in his Commentary on Boethius's De hebdomadibus in John Wippel,
“Metaphysics,” in The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas (Cambridge Companions to Philosophy),
ed. Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump, (Cambridge University Press, 1993-05-28)..
Loc. 1255. Sec. V, para 2.
83. Laws.I.2.2; 1.59.3-4.
84. Laws.I.2.6; 1.63.2-3.  Cf. ST I-II.93.1
85. Laws.I.3.1; 1.63.15-16.
86. Laws.I.2.2; 1.59.6-8.
87. Laws.I.2.5; 1.62.11.
88. Kirby, “From ‘Generall Meditations’ to ‘Particular Decisions’: The Augustinian Coherence of
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The second form of the eternal law encompasses all “that which with himself in all
his works he hath set down as expedient to be kept by all his creatures.”89 For Hooker,
the second form of the  eternal law incorporates “any kind of rule or canon”90 that 
determines the actions of things within time and space. 
There are many such determinative rules and canons, so Hooker organizes his 
description of them into two primary categories - the natural and the divine law. 
Within the former genus, Hooker identifies species of law corresponding to 
distinctions among created beings. He interweaves his account of the law with his 
account of cosmological order.
The natural law
Natural law is that “which ordereth [all] natural agents,”91 a category that, for 
Hooker, properly includes all created beings. Yet, for expedience, he further 
categorizes natural agents according to whether they are involuntary or voluntary 
agents. Involuntary agents, which Hooker sometimes calls necessary agents, are those 
things “void of life”92 “which keep the law of their kind unwittingly, as the heavens and
elements of the world, which can do no otherwise than they do,”93 while voluntary 
agents are characterized by rational or “intellectual natures.”94 Voluntary agents share 
the trait of rationality but are also of two kinds - material and immaterial. Earthbound 
voluntary agents (animals) manifest rationality in material form, while celestial 
voluntary agents (e.g., angels) manifest rationality in immaterial form.95 Humans are a 
special class of the former category, distinguished from other animals by the desire to 
imitate God through their pursuit of “knowledge of truth and by growing in the 
exercise of virtue.”96
Various species of natural law correspond to this description of reality. 
Richard Hooker’s Political Theology,” 51-52.
89. Laws.I.3.1; 1.63.8-9.
90. Laws.I.3.1; 1.63.14.
91. Laws.I.3.1; 1.63.18.
92. Laws.I.6.2; 1.75.2.
93. Laws.I.3.2; 1.64.6-8.
94. Laws.I.3.2; 1.64.9.
95. Laws.I.4.1; 1.69.20-71.3.
96. Laws.I.5.3; 1.74.1.
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Involuntary natural agents are ruled by “the determination of the wisdom of God, 
known to God himself the principal director of them.”97 Hooker names as “celestial 
and heavenly law”  “that which Angels do clearly behold and without any swerving 
observe.”98 For spirits and angels are ruled by “their intuitive intellectual judgment 
concerning the amiable beauty and high goodness of that object, which with 
unspeakable joy and delight doth set them on work.”99 Irrational living agents, such as 
“beasts,” are ruled by their instinctive “judgment of common sense or fancy 
concerning the sensible goodness of those objects wherewith they are moved.”100 In 
contrast, “the rule of voluntary agents on earth is the sentence that reason giveth 
concerning the goodness of those things which they are to do.”101 
It is diﬃcult to overemphasize this last claim. Hooker names the law that rules 
earthbound voluntary agents “the law of reason.” For Hooker, the human telos is to 
participate in the rationality of God, and humans do that when they are ruled by the 
Word spoken which is comprehended exclusively via the light of reason. This 
foreshadows what we will see below: Hooker describes our noetic access to the good 
entirely in terms of our discursive capacity.
The key move here is to notice that the natural law is a subject which acts upon all
created beings, drawing them toward fulfillment of their telos. By re-describing the 
eternal law in terms of its first and second forms, Hooker clarifies that the actuality of 
divine alterity is ever present to created beings.102 In Book I of Laws, Hooker’s speaks 
97. Laws.I.8.4; 1.84.20-21.
98. Laws.I.3.1; 1.63.18-20.
99. Laws.I.8.4; 1.84.26-85.2.
100. Laws.I.8.4; 1.84.24-25.
101. Laws.I.8.4; 1.85.2-4.
102. While he would express “serious reservations” about Hooker’s eudaemonism, Barth agrees
with Hooker’s basic description of the law as alterior (Hooker’s eternal law) and interior
(Hooker’s discursive judgments about the law made possible by the light of reason which
commands the will). “An imperative to which I owe absolute obedience must necessarily
come in the most radical sense from within, in order that it may claim me most radically
within. A command which transcends our actions cannot in the last analysis be merely a
command which I have given myself on the basis of what I myself have seen and
experienced and felt and judged of the good and the true and the beautiful. It must come to
me as something alien, as the command of another, demanding as such that I should make
its content the law of my life. If there is an ought, it must not be the product of my own will,
but touch from outside the whole area of what I can will of myself. It must lay upon me the
obligation of unconditioned truth—truth which is not conditioned by myself.” Karl Barth,
Church Dogmatics, trans. G.W. Bromilly and T.F. Torrance (Edinburgh: T&T Clark
International, 1956), Part 2, vol. 2, 651. Subsequent citations of Church Dogmatics follow the
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of this subject in an abstract grammar. I shall argue below that this subject whose 
Word orders all natural agents is the eternal Logos, the Christ himself. For Hooker, 
the natural law and human freedom are never separated from their christological 
ground.
The supernatural path in Christ
All of the species of natural law are derived from the second form of the eternal 
law; they govern all things so that God’s purpose is fulfilled. As Hooker narrates it, 
these laws governing all things would have been suﬃcient to bring each created thing 
to its telos in God, were it not for the Fall. Because the natural way to our telos of 
eternal blessedness is blocked by the original and persistent reality of sin, God makes 
known “the supernatural way of salvation and law for them to live in that shall be 
saved.”103 Hooker alludes to Augustine’s de Trinitate in describing how God causes 
healing of the will so that humans return to God:
Whereas we now love the thing that is good, but especially in respect of benefit to us, we shall
then love the thing that is good only or or principally for the goodness of beauty in itself. The
soul being in this sort as it is active, perfected by love of that infinite good, shall, as it is
receptive be also perfected with those supernatural passions of joy, peace, and delight.104
Since “the natural path to everlasting life” is the habit “of doing good” and 
“performing exactly the duties and works of righteousness,”105 a way blocked by sin, 
“God hath revealed a way mystical and supernatural, a way directing unto the same 
end of life.”106 That supernatural way “that leadeth us from misery into bliss” is the 
way of virtue.107 
Here Hooker follows Aquinas closely. God grants the theological virtues of faith, 
hope, and charity that are the ground of all other virtues, where faith is trust in the 
standard convention of listing the Volume and Part-Volume. However, for the convenience
of those accessing Barth online as I do, I’ve followed the additional convention of listing the
Paragraph and Sub-Section followed by the page number. For example: CD II/2 §38.1.651.
On Barth’s correction of Kant on the question of the alterity and interiority of the divine
command, see Woodard-Lehman, “Freedom and Authority,” 162-164.
103. Laws.I.11.5; 1.117.10-12.
104. Laws.I.11.3; 1.113.18-23.
105. Laws.I.11.5;1.117.
106. Laws.I.11.6; 1.118.15-16.
107. Laws.I.11.6; 1.118.22.
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“hidden wisdom in Christ,”108 where hope’s “highest object… is that everlasting 
goodness which in Christ doth quicken the dead,” and where “the final object [of 
charity] is that incomprehensible beauty which shineth in the countenance of Christ 
the son of the living God....”109 
For Hooker, God’s laws concerning this deliverance of humankind from the 
consequences of sin:
… are supernatural, both in respect of the manner of delivering them which is divine, and also
in regard of the things delivered which are such as have not in nature any cause from which
they flow, but were by the voluntary appointment of God ordained….110
The key move here is to notice that, alongside the natural law that governs all 
things, Hooker describes a “supernatural” or “divine” law that God has revealed as the 
path by which sinful humankind is directed to eternal blessedness. That path is 
participation in the Christ. The second form of the eternal law is communicated to 
humans, therefore, through both the natural law and the supernatural path revealed in 
Scripture and the Sacraments.
Christ the Logos
We’ve seen that Hooker derives the natural law and all human laws from the 
second form of the eternal law. This adaptation sets up the rhetorically crucial claim 
that human laws - such as the ecclesiastical laws of England - have the same origin as 
Holy Scripture. As we shall see below, the diﬀerence in authority we assign them is 
due not to diﬀerent origins but to diﬀerent levels of vulnerability to probabilistic 
error. But Hooker’s account of the eternal law suﬀers from its abstract grammar. In 
this sub-section, therefore, I propose a minor reparation that clarifies, for the 
purposes of this study, the identity of the subject who orders all created things.
In his introduction to the concept of law, Hooker leaves some ambiguity as to 
108. Hooker here associates Christ with Wisdom and Logos, and also speaks of its hiddenness.
This corresponds with Barth’s notion of an veiling and unveiling of the divine will; Hooker
sees human comprehension of revelation as dialectic in a manner similar to Barth.
109. Laws.I.11.6;119.1-3.
110. Laws.I.11.6; 1.119.18-24. Note the echo of Scotus here. Hooker is at pains to clarify that this
supernatural path is not necessary, but dependent entirely upon the will of God.
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how the agency of the Son is made eﬀective. It fit Hooker’s rhetorical purposes to 
speak of the Logos in abstract terms in Book I of his treatise, but what he implies 
there, he makes explicit throughout Book V in his discussion of the real presence of 
the Son in our sacramental practices.111 It seems to me that Hooker understands the 
eternal law to be the divine Logos, and the divine Logos to be the Son.112 Even if it could
be shown that Hooker did not intend to make such an identity, we are justified in 
explicitly identifying the One whom we encounter in the created order not just as the 
Logos but as Jesus Christ himself. That is, the following clarification is warranted and 
will be assumed throughout this study: the objective content we encounter in the 
wondrous works of nature and through the fruits of “worldly experience and practice,”
is not some abstract law or ‘first cause’ but none other than Jesus Christ himself.113 
Given this reconstruction, I am in a position to summarize the first set of key 
Hookerian concepts upon which the rest of this study will rely. For Hooker, the 
objective basis of human knowledge of God is the divine Logos - the eternal law which 
both creates and governs that which is created so that the created order expresses the 
will of the triune God. Appropriating and adapting both Aquinas and Calvin in 
framing his defense of the Elizabethan settlement in terms of his own doctrine of the 
111. It is possible that Hooker means that the Logos is not identical to the Son, but is an abstract
principle willed by and governing the inner life of the Triune God. This seems to be the
argument of A.S. McGrade and Lee Gibbs. Their suggestion is that Hooker might intend to
say that the Logos is the abstract principle of the divine will, that the first form of the eternal
law corresponds to God’s absolute power, and the second form corresponds to God’s
ordained power. I disagree with this view. If their proposal is correct, however, he seems to
understand the distinction between the absolute and ordained power of God in the sense in
which “there are many things that are in accordance with the right law that God can do but
does not do.” In my view, the distinction between the first and second form of the eternal
law, then, would be the distinction between divine potentiality and what God actually
causes, where only the latter is expressed within the created order. David Neelands
attributes this position to McGrade and Gibbs, citing FLE 6.98, n. 30 in Neelands, “Scripture,
Reason, and ‘Tradition’,” 77, n. 8.  
112. Cf. John Calvin, The Institutes of the Christian Religion (Acheron Press, 2012-12-15), I.5,II.14..
Torrance Kirby agrees. Kirby has argued widely that Hooker’s presentation is consistent
with many early church fathers in its reliance on the NeoPlatonic ideas of a first principle,
idea of ideas, that is the source of all creation. On the other hand, Kirby holds that Hooker
identifies the eternal law as the Logos and Son. See Kirby, “Reason and Law,”; Kirby, Richard
Hooker, Reformer and Platonist.; Kirby, “Richard Hooker’s Theory of Natural Law in the
Context of Reformation Theology”.;W.J. Torrance Kirby, “Creation and Government: Eternal
Law as the Fountain of Laws in Richard Hooker’s Ecclesiastical Polity,” in Divine Creation in
Ancient, Medieval, and Early Modern Thought, Essays Presented to Dr Robert D. Crouse, ed.
Willemien Otten, Walter Hannam, and Michael Treschow, Studies in Intellectual History
(Leiden and Boston: E.J. Brill, 2007).
113. Laws.II.1.4; 1.148.3-4.
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duplex cognitio Dei, Hooker distinguishes a second form of the eternal law, identical in 
content to the form governing the internal life of God but expressed in such a way 
that it irrupts into temporality and spatiality. All humans therefore encounter Christ 
historically and actually as Creator and Reconciler through our encounter with the 
Logos ensarkos within the created order. In addition, the elect know Christ as Deliverer 
or Redeemer especially through our encounter with the Logos ensarkos in Scripture and 
the sacraments.114
This second form of the eternal law - the Logos ensarkos - is manifest in the natural 
law known universally by humans through the faculty of reason. This natural law is 
itself manifest in unwritten form as ‘common sense’ and, for the providential 
governance of political societies, in the four kinds of positive law that order 
individuals, communities, nations, and the Church.115 Yet, because the natural way to 
our telos of eternal blessedness is blocked by the original and persistent reality of sin, 
the Trinity delivers humans through the special revelation of God in Christ as 
encountered in Scripture and the sacraments (what Hooker describes as the ‘divine 
law’).116 Thus, both the natural law and the divine law are derived from and express the 
eternal law; they collectively constitute God’s creative and governing will within the 
created order. 
Notice that, with the crucial exception of a personal relationship with the exalted 
Son, the human agent’s encounter with the eternal law is neither absolute, material, 
nor immediate. Rather the human agent encounters the eternal law in the conditioned
and mediated forms of Scripture, positive law, or custom, and always locally, 
temporally, and indirectly.117 Here, even before we encounter Hooker’s psychology, we
114. Laws.V.56.6; 2:237.25-28.
115. Laws.I.15.3; 1.131.25-132.20.
116. Laws.I.11.6; 1.118.13-119.24.
117. Woodard-Lehman, in discussing Barth’s discussion of the authority of the Word and under
the Word, notes that Barth describes the authority of the Word as immediate, absolute, and
material, and describes the divine command that the human agent experiences as “the
heteronomy of mediate, relative, and formal authority.” In my view, Hooker’s
eudaemonistic account of the natural law agrees in important ways with Barth’s description
of how the human agent experiences grace as command. Woodard-Lehman, “Freedom and
Authority,” 184. 
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see that that the eternal law can be known only in its immanent, sensible forms.118 
Hooker therefore would partially agree with Barth that,  “Apart from its immanent 
heteronomous correlates, God’s Word would be mute. God’s command would be 
silent.”119 Hooker, however, is more ready than Barth to include the practices of the 
Church and the symphony of the created order in the set of immanent, sensible forms 
through which the eternal law is mediated.
The key finding here is that, for Hooker, all creatures encounter Christ as Creator
and Governor, which means that the natural law that all creatures encounter is Christ 
himself. Christ is the concrete universal. As we shall see in chapter four, Hooker’s 
doctrine of the duplex cognitio Dei provides a necessary foundation for his doctrine of 
our participation in Christ. 
 Hookerian anthropology
Eudaemonism encumbered by sin
The first thing that must be said about Hooker’s theological anthropology is that 
it is teleological. Hooker’s eudaemonism may be his most prominent resemblance to 
Thomas Aquinas. His anthropology begins with the observation that, at the beginning
of life, we are most diﬀerent from the angels in the fact that they have the full 
knowledge of God we seek and we have no understanding of God at all: “men if we 
view them in their spring, are at the first without understanding of knowledge at all. 
Nevertheless from this utter vacuity they grow by degrees, till they come at length to 
be even as the Angels themselves are.”120 However, humans potentially grow to possess
the full knowledge of God that is always the mark of the angels. Humans naturally 
thirst for knowledge of God and therefore knowledge of the good, and this thirst 
drives the journey which leads to knowledge of the good.121 
118. My concern here is to describe Hooker’s account of the natural law. I will return to this point,
however, in responding to John Webster’s complaint that the ecclesial ethicists’ account of
the Church is excessively immanentist.
119. Ibid., 187. This is Woodard-Lehman’s summation of Barth’s account of how theonomy
becomes hetoronomy for the human agent.
120. Laws.I.6.1; 1.74.20-24.
121. Laws.I.5.2; 1.73.9-20.
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An infinite gulf, however, separates the finite from knowledge of God so that 
knowledge of God depends on divine revelation.122 While this is a standard premise of 
Reformation theology,123 Hooker’s subtle understanding of why this is so turns out to 
be important to our study. In what follows, I will briefly comment on Hooker’s 
understanding of sin and its epistemological implications.
Like Calvin, Hooker described the noetic eﬀects of sin with the metaphor of 
sight.124 There is a distinction between that which is revealed and that which is known 
by the light of reason. While God does indeed reveal throughout creation that which 
ought to lead humans to recognize God rightly as Creator, the noetic eﬀects of sin are 
such that humans misperceive that which is revealed. Human reason is nearly blinded 
by sin such that we see that which God reveals in creation wrongly.125 Given the reality
of faith, however, the study of creation has a fruitfulness like that of Scripture: both 
creation and Scripture have a common source in God and thus lead to reliable 
knowledge of God. A key premise for Hooker, as with Calvin, is that, given faith, 
humans can reliably know the law by which the Creator governs temporal existence.126
122. Laws.I.11.5; 1.1.116.2-117.12.
123. Barth reminds us that this is not merely a philosophical limitation, but a theological
implication of the alterity of God. Not merely “finitum non capax infiniti” but “homo peccator
non capax verbi Domini.” Barth, CD, 1/1 §6.3.220.. Neder amplifies: “Barth is not merely
rejecting an unwarranted mixing of divine and human essences considered abstractly. He is
rejecting a confusion of divine and human decisions - the divine decision of election and the
corresponding decision of faith and obedience - and therefore divine and human essences.”
Adam Neder, Participation in Christ: An Entry Into Karl Barth’s Church Dogmatics (Louisville,
Ky.: Westminster John Knox Press, 2009), 13. Emphasis original.
124. Hooker was distinctive in following Calvin closely in describing sin in terms of cognition
rather than will. As with Calvin, for Hooker, “blindness is now an acute stigmatism that can
be corrected by the light of faith and the spectacles of Scripture.” As we shall see, Hooker’s
doctrine of participation, therefore, describes the means by which Christ heals our sight.
David Steinmetz lists twenty-four 16th century theologians who embraced the claim that a
natural knowledge of God is possible but disagreed with Calvin’s account of it. Calvin, per
Steinmetz, was ‘singular’ in claiming that the noetic eﬀect of the Fall caused a misperception
of revelation. Hooker, however, followed Calvin in this. These others saw the noetic eﬀects
in terms of sin’s bondage of the will, David Curtis Steinmetz, Calvin in Context, 2nd ed.
(Oxford University Press, USA, 2010-10-14), 30. 
125. Just as knowledge of the good is an act of reason (caused first by a turning of the will), “there
was never sin committed wherein a less good was not preferred before a greater, and that
willfully.” Our natural thirst for knowledge is frustrated by ignorance, for the good we seek
“hath evidence enough for itself, if reason were diligent to search it out.” But communal
“neglect” of the good causes “a show of that which is not,” and we choose that which is “less
good.” Sometimes, in our choices, we are deceived by Satan; “sometimes the hastiness of our
wills prevent[ ] the more considerate advice of sound reason,” and “sometimes the very
custom of evil make[s] the heart obdurate against whatsoever instructions to the contrary.”
Laws.I.7.7; I:80:24-29, 81:10-16.
126. Hooker’s treatment of the noetic eﬀects of sin are developed in the Dublin Fragments, wherein
he diﬀerentiates his view from his fellow English Calvinists, and closely conforms to
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For Hooker, human faculties remain apt in spite of the Fall, for humans still have 
“a reasonable understanding, and a will thereby framable to good things, but [are] not 
thereunto now able to frame [themselves].”127 The Trinity foreknew this, and 
predestined Christ’s reconciling mission “to countervail this our imbecility, and to 
serve as his hand, that thereby we which cannot move ourselves, may be drawn, but 
amiably drawn.”128 God causes the doxastic restructuring129 required in us that make 
possible our apprehension of cause and eﬀect, so that we are able in faith to pursue the
good boldly, while our knowledge of it nonetheless remains enshrouded in an 
unfolding mystery. 
Hookerian psychology
This leads to a second key premise of Hooker’s theological anthropology. When 
Hooker considers the doxastic restructuring that heals our relational capacities, he 
describes something similar to, yet subtly distinct from, a Thomist psychology. In 
what follows, the key move is to notice that Hookerian psychology denies innate 
access to knowledge of the good. For Hooker, the light of reason in humans is reduced
to an innate capacity for discursive logic that enables us to deduce reliably the 
principles of the eternal law and the relations of things to each other. Our minds are 
blank slates at birth, but we grow in our knowledge of the good through our empirical 
experience of God’s actions upon us. This distinction will prove crucial in his accounts
of how we recognize the good, our participation in Christ, and are the reason practices
are so important to the Church.  
Calvin’s metaphor of sight. See Richard Hooker, “The Dublin Fragments,” in The Folger
Library Edition of the Works of Richard Hooker, Volume Iv: Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity:
Attack and Response, the Folger Library. The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity), (Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 1982-01-01). Subsequent citations to this documents will be cited
with the short name, Dublin. For more on Hooker’s treatment of sin, see Grislis, “Providence,
Predestination, and Free Will in Richard Hooker’s Theology,” and Neelands, “Richard
Hooker and the Debates About Predestination, 1580-1600,”
127. Dublin.2; 4:103.19-21.
128. Dublin.2; 4:103.21-24.
129. I’ve borrowed the phrase “doxastic causality “ from John Jenkins in his account of Aquinas’
Posterior Analytics. The doxastic causality condition is the state in which the principles of an
Aristotelian demonstration “are ‘better known’ to us” and have become “the cause or
epistemic ground of our assent to the conclusion” of the demonstration. I take this state to
mark the moment of what is often called justifying grace.It is the moment in which we
recognize Christ as our Reconciler. Jenkins, Knowledge and Faith, Kindle location 626, Chap. 1,
Sect. 1.7, para 8. 
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According to Thomas, a property of the intellect is its indefectibility in 
recognizing the quiddity of at thing.130 We apprehend a thing when we realize its 
essence, which is to say that to apprehend a thing is to perceive its inherent nature. 
Because both speculative and practical reasoning rely upon the natural light of one’s 
participation in the divine, a human subject recognizes the goodness of an object 
through its participation in the divine Mind.131 This natural light of reason is imprinted
on all things “subject to Divine providence” whereby “they derive their respective 
inclinations to their proper acts and ends.”132 Thereby, human reason, unaided by 
grace, participates in the eternal law and is therefore able to reach conclusions in 
accord with it.133
From this summary, it seems that Thomist psychology supports a rationalist 
theory of knowledge.134 To know a thing in its particularity is to participate in God’s 
knowledge of its particularity. Knowledge of a thing begins with intellection of its 
essence through our participation in the divine Mind, triggering consciousness of our 
innate knowledge of its essence through our recognition of it. We have a priori 
knowledge which is not gained from experience but resulting from our rational nature 
(our intellectus). I shall argue below that Hooker subtly adapts this psychology by 
130. Thomas Aquinas, ST, I.85.6.; Thomas Aquinas, SCG,  III.108.4.
131. “The name intellect is derived from the fact that it apprehends what is innermost and
profound in the thing: for to understand (intelligere) is “to read what is within” (intus legare).
Sense and imagination apprehend only superficial accidents; only the intellect goes to the
interior and essence of a thing.” Jenkins, Knowledge and Faith, Kindle location 1436, Sect. 4.1.
132. Thomas Aquinas, SCG, I-II.91.2. “Since all things subject to Divine providence are ruled and
measured by the eternal law, as was stated above (Article [1]); it is evident that all things
partake somewhat of the eternal law, in so far as, namely, from its being imprinted on them,
they derive their respective inclinations to their proper acts and ends.
133. Ibid., I-II.109.2. Thomas states that “…in the state of integrity, as regards the suﬃciency of
the operative power, man by his natural endowments could wish and do the good
proportionate to his nature, such as the good of acquired virtue; but not surpassing good, as
the good of infused virtue.”
134. By my reading, Thomas teaches a rationalist psychology because he assumes the innate
capacity for intellection of transcendentals. By innate ability, I refer to the capacity for
humans to apprehend the quiddity of a thing. Note that this recognition happens prior to
any discursive operation on the idea of the object. That is, recognition of the essence of a
thing happens prior to judgments about its relatedness to other beings or its diversity, and
prior to judgments about its truth or falsehood. The natural light of reason is such that,
following recognition of a thing’s essence, though one’s knowledge is imperfect and one may
have substantively more to learn about the inherent nature of the thing, one has a reliable
preliminary grasp of it. There is a reliable correspondence between the idea of the quiddity
of the thing formed in the intellect and its reality. Wawrykow agrees. See note 55 on page 36.
Jenkins, Knowledge and Faith, Kindle Loc. 1436, 1610, Sect 4.1, 4.5.; John Milbank and
Catherine Pickstock, Truth in Aquinas (Radical Orthodoxy), Kindle ed. (Routledge, 2000),
Kindle location 706, Chap. 2, Sect. 2, para 5-6.
- 55 -
assuming we have no such innate capacity beyond the capacity to reason discursively, 
and that human knowledge of the good is a posteriori, accumulating as a result of 
discursive reasoning in response to phenomena. Hookerian psychology does not 
support a rationalist theory of knowledge.
In a brief description, Hooker describes the human as constituted by body and 
soul. The soul is further divided into a ‘diviner’ and a ‘baser’ part (these might 
correspond to Thomas’ intellectus and ratio, respectively, though Hooker does not 
describe them with Thomist language). Hooker speaks of a ‘spirit of our minds’ that 
seems to correspond to the ‘diviner part.’ In our perfected state, the spirit of our 
minds directs the soul. Because, in our redeemed state, the light of reason enables the 
mind to comprehend the eternal law in our encounters with it, the eternal law is 
thereby hierarchically mediated  from soul to body within the human person. That is, 
the soul is most excellent and directs our bodies “and the spirit of our minds the 
soul.”135 The “understanding faculty of the mind” (seemingly corresponding to Thomas’
ratio) produces “mandates” experienced by the will as commands. The eternal law is 
thereby mediated, making known to us what our duties to God and our neighbor.136 
This bears a strong resemblance to the Thomist psychology if one grants the 
correspondences I have suggested might be present between ‘diviner part’ and 
intellectus, and between the ‘understanding faculty of the mind’ and ratio. But Hooker 
continues, explaining that whatever the mind knows about ‘the grand mandates’ 
requiring obedience by the will and about the existence, “power, force, wisdom, and 
other properties” of God, it learns “by the same method” by which it learns of “our 
duty… towards man.”137 We discover that the apparent continuity with a Thomist 
psychology gives way to a significant discontinuity, for the exclusive method by which 
135. Laws.I.8.6; I:87.1-6.
136. While Hooker here acknowledges a natural law that governs the creature, I will argue in
chapter five that the force of his logic is that Christian ethics focuses properly not on
decisions, but rather on the cultivation of the virtue of the Christian. See “Knowing God and
Recognizing the Good, Revisited” on page 191.
137. Laws.I.8.7; I:87.7-12. “This is therefore the first law whereby the highest power of the mind
requireth general obedience at the hands of all the rest concurring with it unto action.
Touching the several grand mandates which being imposed by the understanding faculty of
the mind must be obeyed by the will of man, they are by the same method found out
whether they import our duty towards God or towards man.”
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we learn of our duty to God and man is discursive reasoning. 
Whereas Aquinas imagined an intellectus capable of accessing God’s knowledge of 
the transcendentals because of human participation in Being and thereby enabling 
judgments about the relations of things,138 Hooker imagines the mind of man as like a 
blank slate - with no innate capacity to apprehend the quiddity of things, and especially God. 
We don't have an innate knowledge of God: “We bring not the knowing of God with 
us into the world.”139 Hooker describes “the soul of man” [as] at the first like a book, 
wherein nothing is written, and yet all things may be imprinted.”140 
Furthermore, reality is constituted by particulars. Humans apprehend particulars 
directly and without mediation and have unconfused contact with reality: “We know 
things either as they are in themselves, or as they are in mutual relation one to 
another.”141 Humans intuit such relations between things by observing cause and eﬀect
empirically. Whereas the Thomist psychology assumes we innately have a priori 
knowledge residing in our intellectus, Hooker’s psychology assumes we have no such 
innate capacity beyond the capacity to reason, and that human knowledge is a 
posteriori, accumulating as a result of discursive reasoning in response to  phenomena. 
Hooker restricts the Thomist psychology of intellection to the angels, and seems 
to collapse the human intellect to ratio, such that the light of reason is reduced to an 
innate capacity for discursive logic that enables humans to deduce reliably (yet 
probabilistically) the principles of the eternal law and the relations of things to each 
other. We are born with minds that are open slates, but we do indeed come to know 
the agency of God, an eternal law that we experience as a divine pressure, guiding 
things to their telos of participating in the divine rationality. Importantly, this 
knowledge is the empirical knowledge of an act upon us.142 For Hooker, there is no 
natural intellection of transcendentals. Reason is reduced almost entirely to the 
138. Jenkins, Knowledge and Faith, Kindle loc. 1384, chapt. 4, para 3, chapt 4, sect 4.1, sect 4.5. See
also Milbank and Pickstock, Truth in Aquinas, Kindle location 673-706, Chapt. 2, sec. 2.
139. Laws.V.21.3; II:85.25-26.
140. Laws.I.6.1; I:74.26-27.
141. Laws.I.8.6; I:86.23-25.
142. Laws.I.3.4; I: 67.17-20.
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discursive function. 
According to Hooker’s psychology, therefore, either we recognize goodness 
through “knowledge of the causes whereby it is made such” or, lacking the 
philosopher-king’s comprehension of the causes, we discover it through recursive 
attention to the “signs and tokens” whose presence corresponds to our experience of 
goodness.143 The first seems to be an allusion to the Aristotelian maxim that we 
understand a thing only when we comprehend its causes,144 for Hooker declares that it
“is the most sure and infallible way.”145 Yet, because so few are willing to “tread so long
intricate mazes for knowledge sake,” the latter way of studying signs and tokens of 
goodness is most common.146 
This psychology, which arises from the Reformation insight that faith precedes 
charity, is decisive for Hooker’s account of our participation in Christ and helps us 
anticipate why, in his view, ecclesial practices are of such great importance to the 
formation of the mind of Christ in the community. How is it possible, given this 
psychology, for finite humans to know the eternal Christ as our Christ as Creator and 
Redeemer? If humans do not have an innate capacity to know the good through 
intellection of transcendentals, then how can we have confidence that our laws reflect 
the divine will at all? We can anticipate already that Hooker’s ultimate answer, in 
keeping with Reformation dogma, will posit the irruption of the Christ into time and 
space, transcending those impermeable boundaries so that we might know the mind of
Christ through  successive encounters. That’s the account I will develop over the next 
three chapters. In the next section, however, we will see that Hooker begins to answer
these questions by adapting a recognizably Aristotelian epistemology which is once 
again evocative of Thomas, though adapted subtly for his Reformation context.
143. Laws.I.8.2; I:82.29-30.
144. Aristotle, The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, Vol. 1 (Bollingen Series
Lxxi-2), ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984-09-01). Phys.194b18;
A Po. 71 b 9–11, 94 a 20.
145. Laws.I.8.2; I.83.1-2.
146. Laws.I.8.2; I:83.3-4.
- 58 -
 Hookerian epistemology
In the last section, I showed that Hooker adapts the medieval notion of the light 
of reason by rendering it in a decidedly more empiricist register. Reason is reduced 
almost entirely to the discursive function. There is no innate knowledge of the good. 
That move locates Hooker safely alongside the magisterial Reformers, who similarly 
constrained human knowledge of the good to revelation. As we have already seen, 
however, Hooker adapted two Thomist teachings which enable him to avoid a strict 
voluntarist perspective. First, he assigned the status of revelation to the phenomena 
Christians experience throughout the created order. He achieved this with his 
innovative appropriation of the Thomist notion of the eternal law within a Reformed 
account of the duplex cognitio Dei. The law Christians encounter in the created order 
has the same source as the supernatural law we encounter in the Scripture and the 
sacraments  (Rom. 1:18-20).147 Second, as we have already seen, he appropriated the 
Thomist doctrine that human faculties remain apt in spite of the Fall, “and a will 
thereby framable to good things,”148 a move which enabled him to describe the human 
condition as primarily a cognitive rather than a voluntaristic problem.149 
What emerges from these preliminary moves are eudaemonistic accounts of the 
created order as revelatory and of the human person as one who intrinsically desires 
the good but has no possibility of knowing the good apart from such revelation. 
Moreover, human psychology permits knowledge gains only through the discursive 
function of the innate light of reason as the person responds to encounters with other 
particulars within the created order. Given these accounts, it remains for Hooker to 
explain how humans recognize the good, and how, given the reality of sin and the 
147. “This is because what is known about God should be plain to them because God made it
plain to them. Ever since the creation of the world, God’s invisible qualities—God’s eternal
power and divine nature—have been clearly seen, because they are understood through the
things God has made. So humans are without excuse.” (Rom 1:19–20 CEB)
148. Hooker, “Dublin,” 103. Hereafter all references to this will be indicated with the short name,
Dublin. Hereafter all references to this volume will be cited with the document short name,
the abbreviation FLE, the volume number, page number, and line numbers, as in Dublin, FLE
4.103.19-21.
149. As noted above, Hooker and Calvin are notable among the Reformers in describing sin
primarily in the grammar of cognition rather than will. See note 124 on page 53.
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frailties of the human mind arising from our finitude, communities adjudicate 
competing descriptions of the good. With those questions in view, I turn now to 
summarize Hooker’s re-imagining of how we communally recognize the good. The key
move here is to notice how Hooker deploys the Aristotelian methods of phenomena, 
endoxa, and dialectic and the virtues of episteme and phronesis. I will argue that Hooker’s 
claim is that we recognize the good most reliably when we subject ourselves to the 
communal process of discernment through which we dialectically engage what 
previous generations have named as the signs and tokens marking the good.
Phenomena
As we saw above, Hooker’s well-known optimism about nature’s eﬃcacy as a 
pedagogue presupposes that nature has been redeemed, and that we encounter in 
nature the enfleshed Christ as he reigns both on his cross and his throne. Christ, 
through nature, teaches God’s law in sundry ways.150 Indeed, Christ engraves human 
hearts not exclusively through Scripture, but also through “the glorious works of 
nature,” personal experience of the Spirit’s direction, and the fruits of “worldly 
experience and practice:”
Some things she [Wisdom] openeth by the sacred books of Scripture, some things by the
glorious works of nature, with some things she inspireth them from above by spiritual
influence, in some things she leadeth and traineth them only by worldly experience and
practice. We may not so in any one special kind admire her that we disgrace her in any other,
but let all her ways be according unto their place and degree adored.151 
Hooker’s pithy claim requires some unpacking. Wisdom is the subject, acting 
upon its object, humankind, and it acts by causing encounters with Scripture, nature, 
spiritual influences, and the practical world of organized society. Our encounters with 
Scripture, nature, “worldy experience and practice,” here distinguished from “spiritual 
influence,” are all products of the senses. “Spiritual influences” - which I will develop 
150. Laws.I.16.5; I.138.21-22; Laws.I.16.5; I.138.33-139.1-3; Laws.I.8.3; I:84.7-16; Richard Hooker, “A
Learned Sermon of the Nature of Pride,” in The Folger Library Edition of the Works of Richard
Hooker, Vol. 5: Tractates and Sermons, (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1990-01-01).
312. Hereafter all references to this sermon will be indicated with the short name, Pride.
Hereafter all references to this volume will be cited with the document short name, the
abbreviation FLE, the volume number, page number, and line numbers, as in Pride, FLE
5.312.15-18.
151. Laws.II.1.4; I:147.27-148.7.
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as our experience of the real presence over the course of the next three chapters - 
seemingly occupy for Hooker a special category to the extent that we struggle to 
describe them with the grammar of sensory experience. Yet spiritual influences are 
also experiences in the sense of encounters with that which is beyond the self. For 
Hooker, all of the means by which Wisdom engraves human hearts entail encounters 
with external agents. 
In explaining how Christ teaches God’s law, Hooker seems to have in mind 
Aristotle’s method of “phainomena, the appearances, or, more fully, the things 
appearing to be the case.”152 Christ tutors us in the eternal law through our God-
empowered reasoning about phenomena we encounter in daily life. We learn to 
recognize the ‘signs and tokens’ indicative of goodness through attention to 
phenomena and communal reflection on the mysteries they present. 
The insight that Christ schools humans invariably through our experience of 
phenomena is fundamental to Hooker’s account of our participation in Christ, which 
I will introduce in chapter four. This is a theology which holds that phenomena are 
the exclusive source of our knowledge of goodness and for the concepts we use in our 
discernment of goodness. We recognize the good through direct and particular 
experiences. Whether Wisdom teaches us through our hearing of Scripture 
proclaimed, or through our participation in “the glorious works of nature,” or through 
our personal experience of the Spirit’s direction, or through the fruits of “worldly 
experience and practice,” the infallible knowledge that guides our ethical action is 
imprinted through our experience of phenomena. And we acquire such knowledge not
in an instant but over a lifetime:
For whatsoever we know, we have it by the hands and ministries of men, which lead us along
like children from a letter to a syllable, from a syllable to a word, from a word to a line, from a
line to a sentence, from a sentence to a side, and so turn over.153 
152. Christopher Shields, “Aristotle,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2012
Edition), ed. Edward Zalta, (Stanford: Center for the Study of Language and Information,
2013), 7. 
153. Richard Hooker, “The First Sermon on Part of ST. Jude,” in The Folger Library Edition of the
Works of Richard Hooker, Vol. 5: Tractates and Sermons, (Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 1990-01-01). Hereafter all references to this sermon will be indicated with the short
name, Jude. FLE 5.15.8-25.
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As we shall see, for Hooker, Scripture and the sacraments are phenomena 
themselves. Phenomena like the Church lead us to them, helping us to recognize them
as the most reliable signs and tokens of goodness. They themselves are phenomena 
directing our attention to the person of Jesus the Christ.
The claim that the Church and commonwealth are themselves phenomena 
through which Christ schools humankind is important to Hooker’s account. They 
signal that Hooker’s account, in spite of its insistence that all encounters with the 
Word are inherently subjective, does not slide down the self-centered slope which 
leads to relativism or an account of the Church governed by private judgment. As we 
shall see in the next section, Hooker’s deep sense of the limits of human reason, 
brought about by our sin and finitude, lead him to a highly communitarian and 
christocentric account of our discernment of the good.
Endoxa
We saw above that Hooker holds that phenomena are the exclusive source of our 
knowledge of goodness and also for the concepts we use in our thinking about 
goodness. Christ’s Spirit teaches us to recognize the good through particular 
experiences of phenomena. Hooker sees Scripture, the works of nature, worldly 
practice, and our personal experience of the Spirit’s direction as distinct categories of 
phenomena through which Christ schools humankind. But if all knowledge arises from
inherently subjective experiences of phenomena, how does the community avoid 
idolatry?154 Hooker answers that “the most certain token of evident goodness is if the 
general persuasion of all men do so account it.”155 For Hooker, we mitigate the perils 
of subjectivity through attention to the ‘signs and tokens’ of goodness. 
154. Hooker served in an ecclesial context in which Calvinist anxiety about the perils of
subjectivity in discerning God’s will were a given. I will develop this further in discussion
the Ramist realists in chapter five. Cf. Calvin, The Institutes of the Christian Religion, I:XI.8..
“The human mind, stuﬀed as it is with presumptuous rashness, dares to imagine a god
suited to its own capacity; as it labours under dullness, nay, is sunk in the grossest
ignorance, it substitutes vanity and an empty phantom in the place of God. To these evils
another is added. The god whom man has thus conceived inwardly he attempts to embody
outwardly. The mind, in this way, conceives the idol, and the hand gives it birth.”
155. Laws.I.8.3; I:83.17-19. Emphasis added.
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In this sub-section, I will develop a thick account of these signs and tokens by 
recalling the Aristotelian concept of endoxon. The key move is to recognize that, 
similarly to Aquinas,156 Hooker rhetorically bundles the Church’s accumulated 
knowledge, whether discerned through our encounters with Scripture, human laws, or 
the spiritual domain, into endoxa, and thereby shows that they share a common 
source in the eternal law. This strategy enables him subsequently to argue, over and 
against certain Puritan interlocutors, for the preservation of Elizabethan sacramental 
practices on the basis that our encounters in the spiritual domain also nourish virtue. 
Similarly to Scripture, they communicate the eternal law to the baptized.157 
This task immediately brings into view a common fallacy in popular depictions of 
Hooker’s legacy. It is a commonplace to attribute to Hooker a doctrine in which 
‘tradition’ is placed alongside Scripture and reason as part of a three-fold set of 
authorities that legitimately guides Christian thought. The corrections needed to the 
contemporary commonplace are two-fold. First, Hooker does not posit Scripture, 
tradition, and reason as three alternative sources of authority we rightly use in our 
discernment of the good. Rather, in keeping with scholasticism, he sets nature and 
Scripture alongside each other as sources of all knowledge, both of which are derived 
from the eternal law and, therefore, both of which we ‘jointly and not severally’158 use 
in our discernment of the good. Second, Hooker’s category of nature includes the 
aforementioned categories of nature’s glorious works and our worldly experience and 
practice, with the accumulated knowledge from all sources passed down from 
generation to generation as the ‘voices of men’ and, in some cases, as localized human 
laws.
These two corrections lead to the following clarifications which will unfold below. 
156.  Thomas Aquinas, ST, I.8.2..
157. Barth agrees partially with Hooker’s recognition of the eternal law in human customs and
positive law. I believe the Hookerian account is rightly qualified by (and that Hooker would
agree with) Barth’s distinction in describing the relation between the eternal and human law
in Barth, CD, III/4 §53.1.66. As Woodard-Lehman observes, “Barth draws distinctions
between human laws that obscure the divine law and those that witness to it. And, here,
Barth insists that divine law not only can be mediated by human law. It must be. And
though divinely given, we must also give this law to ourselves and to one another.”
Woodard-Lehman, “Freedom and Authority,” 184, note 89.
158. Laws.I.14.5.I.129.11.
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First, for Hooker, communities discern the good through attention to the eternal law 
as it is discerned jointly and not severally in nature and Scripture, mediated always 
through the light of reason. Second, communities accumulate the knowledge of the 
eternal law in the form of endoxa.
When Hooker suggests that “the general and perpetual voice of men is as the 
sentence of God himself,”159 and when he speaks of that which nature teaches,160 he 
speaks as one long-immersed in the Aristotelian scholastic tradition during his tenure 
at Corpus Christi college. By my reading, when Hooker refers to ‘the voice of men’ 
and more generally in terms of that which reason discerns in nature, his meaning in 
such references is nuanced, an allusion to endoxa, the Aristotelian method paired with 
Aristotle’s method of phainomena.161 Consideration of endoxa is not merely respect for 
those who go before us, but a reliable process of puzzle-solving by which we resolve 
mysteries arising from our study of phenomena. That process consists of gathering and
testing ‘the signs and tokens of goodness,’  setting aside those which fail testing, 
moving forward by critical examination of the ways in which our most authoritative 
predecessors framed those puzzles.162 I take Hooker’s ‘voices of men’ to be broader 
and more complex than the Thomist “Doctors of the Church.”163 It incorporates 
accumulated wisdom in both ecclesial and non-ecclesial domains, and it includes both 
the expert discoveries derived from formal scholastic method and the informally 
derived wisdom we denote by “common sense.” It encapsulates communal reflection 
in response to all kinds of phenomena, including Scripture and spiritual experience, 
shapes the concepts by which we describe them, and thereby articulates the norms 
159. Laws.I.8.3; I:83.3-84.1.
160. See, for example, Laws.1.14.5
161. Endoxa are “those opinions are reputable which are accepted by everyone, or by the
majority, or by the wise - i.e., by all, or by the majority, or by the most notable and reputable
of them.” Aristotle, Complete Works Vol 1. Top. 100b21–23.
162. “We must, as in all other cases, set the phenomena before us and, after first discussing the
diﬃculties, go on to prove, if possible, the truth of all the reputable opinions about these
aﬀections or, failing this, of the greater number and most authoritative; for if we both resolve
the diﬃculties and leave the reputable opinions undisturbed, we shall have proved the case
suﬃciently.” Aristotle, The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, Vol. 2
(Bollingen Series Lxxi-2), ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1984-09-01). EN 1145b1-7.
163. Thomas Aquinas, ST, 1.1.8 ob 2. Wawrykow, Handbook for Thomas Aquinas, 13-15.
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that inform our experience of them.
This background illuminates Hooker’s complaint about the philosophical method 
of his interlocutors. I will develop this contrast in detail in chapter three by comparing
Hooker to his Ramist realist colleagues. I anticipate that argument now in order to 
illuminate Hooker’s teaching about the role of endoxa in Hooker’s account of reason.
Hooker appropriates and adapts the Thomist conception of authorities in our 
pursuit of sacred knowledge. Hooker adapts the Thomist distinction between 
revelation and the intrinsic and extrinsic authorities mediated through reason.164 He 
retains the Thomist ranking of authorities according to their probabilistic  character. 
In Hooker’s appropriation all the sources are treated as revelatory in character 
because they reveal the eternal law, and all are mediated via the light of reason. In 
place of the distinction between revelation and reason, Hooker’s domains consist of 
direct and indirect revelation. These Hookerian domains, however, are re-framed in 
ways supportive of Hooker’s extended argument with presbyterians and Ramist 
realists.165 
 First, there is a domain within which only Scripture expresses the eternal law in a 
manner comprehensible to fallen humanity. That domain is the supernatural path to 
eternal beatitude that is the incarnate Christ.166 Importantly, in Hooker’s schema, not 
all things found in Scripture belong to this supernatural domain.
Many of the questions that arise in communal life belong to a second domain in 
which the eternal law is expressed both by divine law (Scripture) and the natural law of
reason. There is a distinction here between Scripture’s revelation of the supernatural 
law of God’s deliverance of humankind in and through Christ and Scripture’s 
recordation of the histories and practices of particular communities in biblical history.
We shall see in chapter three that, in contrast with his interlocutors, Hooker assigned 
164. Thomas Aquinas, ST, 1.8.2.
165. In my view, this is motivated in part by the rhetorical challenge. Hooker is seeking to refute
a view of sola scriptura that claims the only reliable source of our knowledge of the good is
Scripture. Rhetorically, Hooker must demonstrate that positive laws derived from the
accumulated wisdom of the ages also articulate the eternal law, even though it is more
vulnerable to probabilistic error. I develop this claim below.
166. Laws.I.11.6; 1.118.15-16.
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diﬀerent levels of authority to diﬀerent parts of the Scriptural narrative on the basis of
this distinction. Simply put, the Hookerian account holds that Scripture contains both
supernatural and natural law, where the former denotes the Gospel of the deliverance 
of humankind by Jesus Christ.
Within this latter domain, in which the eternal law is revealed to humans through 
Scripture, “the glorious works of nature,” personal experience of the Spirit’s direction, 
and through the fruits of “worldly experience and practice,” the proper philosophical 
method by which the good is discovered begins with the particularities of the puzzle 
the community confronts.167 The community then gathers and tests the endoxa which 
seem to be applicable, and thereby reaches conclusions which may or may not validate 
the received wisdom. Hooker’s recurring complaint was that, within this second 
domain, his opponents failed to recognize the authority of these non-scriptural 
sources, and, when applying scriptural guidance, failed to assess adequately whether 
and how general principles from Scripture were applicable to the particularities of the 
presenting ethical questions.
I noted above the commonplace attribution to Hooker of a doctrine in which 
‘tradition’ is placed alongside Scripture and reason as part of a three-fold set of 
authorities that legitimately guides Christian thought. That depiction is problematic 
for a number of reasons,168 but for our present purpose it is suﬃcient to clarify that 
Hooker infrequently referred to ‘tradition,’ and when he did, he almost always used 
the term in a highly negative sense.169 By my reading, Hooker distinguishes endoxa (or 
‘voice of men,’ as Hooker referred to it) from ‘tradition’ in the sense of Roman 
Catholic sacred tradition having an authority like that of Scripture. ‘Tradition,’ for 
167. I discuss this point in the next section where I describe Hooker’s emphasis on dialectical
discourse. I develop this concept in great detail with respect to scriptural reasoning in
chapter two. See “Hookerian prescription: The priority of the particular” on page 96.
168. Within reflections on the mutability of ecclesiastical laws, Hooker proposes not a three-
legged stool, but a hierarchy of authorities. Those authorities are, ranked according to their
ordering on a probabilistic spectrum, (1) that which Scripture plainly delivers regarding its
subject matter, the supernatural path in Christ; (2) the general and perpetual voice of men;
and (3) the judgments rendered by “the Church by her ecclesiastical authority” in the local
and immediate sense. In context, Hooker is responding directly to claims by Thomas
Cartwright that laws need not be obeyed if judged by individuals to be inconsistent with
Scripture. Hooker, like Whitgift before him, is asserting the current authority of the Church
headed by Queen Elizabeth to order the aﬀairs of the national church.
169.  Neelands, “Scripture, Reason, and ‘Tradition’,” 93.
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Hooker, usually referred to Roman Catholic declarations pertaining to things 
necessary to salvation, the authority of which was forcefully rejected by the 
Reformers. Hooker rejected the addition of Roman ‘traditions as a part of 
supernatural necessary truth,’ noting that ‘we do not reject them only because they are
not in the Scripture but because they are neither in Scripture nor can otherwise 
suﬃciently by any reason be proved to be of God.”170  
As we have seen, Hooker’s doctrine of duplex cognitio Dei traces the genealogy of 
both human positive law and Scripture to the eternal law in order to demonstrate that 
both manifest God’s law. In Hooker’s schema, Scripture is the sole element in the 
category of ‘divine law,’ whereas various forms of law constitute the category of natural
law. The importance of this schema is not solely in the distinction it protects between
the natural and supernatural paths to eternal blessedness, nor in the clarity it provides 
about which sources of authorities govern in each domain. The schema also 
illuminates diﬀerences in the reliability we reasonably assign to those authorities. 
Elements in the category of divine law are reasonably assumed to be of the highest 
reliability because they, by definition, consist of direct revelation of God within 
history. The principles thereby revealed carry the authoritative rank of necessity. In 
contrast, elements in the category of natural law are derivative, consisting of socially 
mediated and historically experienced principles, and thus, though they have their 
origins in the eternal law, are subject to the compounded probabilistic errors of 
human receipt and transmission. The principles thereby revealed cannot be said to be 
necessary because they are only provisionally known. 
Rome’s error was categorical. Roman ‘tradition’ was not divine law, but human 
law. Rejection of Roman tradition properly was not a matter of naming all things 
Roman as false, but rather of naming as idolatrous the claim that Roman tradition has 
the same authority as scripture’s account of the supernatural path in Christ.171 
170. Laws.I.14.5; 1.129.22-24. This is a significant example of Hooker’s rejection of appeals to
timeless absolutes. I describe Hooker’s allergy to timeless absolutes in chapter two. See
“Appeals to timeless absolutes” on page 103.
171. “Whether we do now stand bound in the sight of God to yield to traditions urged by the
Church of Rome the same obedience and reverence we do to his written law, honoring
equally and adoring both as divine; our answer is no. They that so earnestly plead for the
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Rhetorically, Hooker’s careful distinction between Roman ‘tradition’ and the ‘voices 
of men’ enabled him to distinguish Elizabethan ecclesial practices received from Rome
from Roman dogma, and thereby argue for their retention.
In contrast with his negative view of Roman ‘tradition,’ Hooker held a high view 
of the authority of ‘the voice of men.’ As I have suggested above, however, the 
trajectory of credible opinions in resolving a question is not a source of authority 
separate from and alternative to reason, but rather is itself a phenomenon presented to
and examined by reason. Consideration of endoxa is not consideration of some 
authority severable from reason, but rather is integral to proper philosophical 
reasoning. As I will show in the next sub-section, in each considered question, the 
voice of men properly is heard, examined critically, and either aﬃrmed, rejected, or 
amended. 
Hooker does not, therefore, posit a three-fold set of authorities by which the 
baptized discern the way to the good, but rather sets nature and Scripture alongside 
each other. After Scripture, the voices of men are most reliable, followed by local 
ecclesial laws and customs:
It suﬃceth therefore that nature and Scripture do serve in such full sort that they both jointly
and not severally either of them be so complete that unto everlasting felicity we need not the
knowledge of any thing more than these two may easily furnish our minds with on all sides,
and therefore they which add traditions as a part of supernatural necessary truth have not the
truth but are in error.172
For Hooker, Christ schools the Church in the eternal law through both nature 
and Scripture.173 Though they diﬀer in the reliability we reasonably assign them as 
authority of Tradition, as if nothing were more safely conveyed than that which spreadeth it
self by report, and descendeth by relation of former generations unto the ages that succeed,
are not all of them (surely a miracle it were if they should be) so simple, as thus to persuade
themselves; however if the simple were so persuaded, they could be content perhaps very
well to enjoy the benefit, as they account it, of that common error. What hazard the truth is
in when it passeth through the hands of report, how maimed and deformed it becometh;
they are not, they cannot possibly be ignorant. Laws.I.3.2; I:123.5-18.
172. Laws.I.14.5.I.129.10-16.
173. Hooker’s account of the relation between nature and Scripture is consistent with the
scholastic tradition. Porter notes that, though “theologians frequently equated nature and
reason…,” “the scholastics do distinguish between nature, understood specifically as pre-
rational, and the characteristically human ability to reason.” Hooker’s ‘voices of men”
(endoxa) correspond to the scholastic school source called ‘reason.’ Given that identity, one
can say that Hooker, with the scholastics, saw “nature, reason, and Scripture as three
mutually interpreting sources for moral norms.” Porter, Natural and Divine Law, 85,121. 
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sources of authority, the Church must attend to both in order to discern the good. 
Both sets of phenomena are mediated via the light of reason. The Church mitigates 
the perils of subjectivity through attention to the ‘signs and tokens’ of goodness 
discerned in response to encounters with both sets of phenomena, and such wisdom is
gathered and passed on from generation to generation in the form of endoxa, and 
sometimes in the form  of positive law.
Dialectic
Because the various sources of phenomena through which Christ schools the 
Church in the eternal law diﬀer in the reliability we reasonably assign them as signs 
and tokens of the good, and because sin and creaturely finitude inevitably impede our 
comprehension of the good, communities must have a way of resolving contradictions 
and tensions in such discernment. The key move in this sub-section is to recognize 
that Hooker understood the process of creating  such wisdom in the sense of the 
Aristotelian method of dialectic. 
If nature’s voice is “God’s instrument,” and “the general and perpetual voice of 
men is as the sentence of God himself,” then God reveals Godself through both 
nature and the transmission of received wisdom from generation to generation. This is
a christocentric natural theology, an optimistic view of the revelatory role of nature, 
but one that simultaneously is aware of the problems inherent in the methods of 
receipt and transmission. Hooker’s observation that “the voice of men” is the 
“perfectest and strongest” “sign and token,” is descriptive and not prescriptive. He is 
fully aware of the probabilistic nature of all signs and tokens. His phenomenological 
point is that the most important way that humans discern the good is through study of
received wisdom about the good. 
For Hooker, discourse is the primary means by which nature tutors. Whatever 
principle we choose as our subject, “it was at the very first found out by discourse, and 
drawn from out of the very bowels of heaven and earth.”174 “The law of reason or 
human nature is that which men by discourse of natural reasons have rightly found out 
174. Laws.I.8.5; I:86.10-11. Emphasis added.
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themselves to be all for ever bound unto in their actions.”175 Good laws are those 
“draw[n] from the laws of nature and God, by discourse of reason, aided with the 
influence of divine grace.”176 Whereas, the “mysteries of heavenly truth” are taught 
readily in Scripture, “… all kinds of knowledge else have that virtue in themselves 
whereby they are able to procure our assent unto such conclusions as the industry of 
right discourse doth gather from them.”177 That most reliable token of goodness, most 
commonly referred to by Hooker to as ‘the voice of men,’ is the trajectory of 
conclusions reached by men through the time-honored process of rational and 
communal discourse.
Hooker’s emphasis on rational discourse arises from a commitment to logic as a 
means by which valid conclusions are reached in developing all forms of knowledge.178 
God presupposes human reason in God’s self-revelation: “God hath not moved their 
hearts to think such things as he hath not enabled them to prove.”179 Indeed, the 
incarnated Christ relied on the tension of rational disputation to reveal the light:
Our Lord and Savior himself did hope by disputation to do some good, yea by disputation not
only of but against the truth, albeit with purpose for the truth....There is as yet no way known
how to dispute or to determine of things disputed without use of natural reason.180 
Disputation is the reliable and orderly means through which humans seek truth 
together and reach conclusions that contribute to knowledge and authorize communal
actions. Via public discourse, we discover the eternal law and establish norms 
consistent with it to which all in the community are bound:
 
… of this we are right sure, that nature, Scripture, and experience itself have all taught the
world to seek for the ending of contentions by submitting itself unto some judicial and
definitive sentence, whereunto neither part that contendeth may under any pretense or color
refuse to stand.181
175. Laws.I.8.8; I:89.28-31. Emphasis added.
176. Laws.III.8.18;.I:235.14-16. Emphasis added.
177. Laws.V.21.3; II.85.18-21. Emphasis added.
178. As we shall in chapter five, Hooker’s Cambridge-based interlocutors agreed. The dispute
arose because many of them preferred the logic of Peter Ramus to that of Aristotle.
179. Laws.V.10.1
180. Laws.III.8.17; 1.234.2-9.
181. Laws.Preface.6.1; I.24-28.
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Disputation is thus a means of knowledge, though fraught with a probability of 
error. Course correction is often necessary. Through discourse, we accept and reject 
the norms of the past as experience warrants. This dialectic pattern is how we discover
laws consistent with the eternal law. Such humble, self-critical discourse is necessary if
communities are to discern the good. For example, trial and error brought an 
evolution in the forms of government men prefer,182 and is the means by which a 
community receives and tests the conclusions of those it recognizes as authoritative 
and thereby itself contributes to knowledge.183 Through calm and patient logic, the 
community discerns the truth.184
For Hooker, the dialectical nature of principles derived from human experience of
the eternal law arises from the probabilistic nature of human judgments and the 
contingency of the good.185 As I will show in chapter three, Hooker’s opponents erred 
in their opposition to certain ecclesiastical laws as a consequence of their habit of 
lifting general principles from Scripture and applying them without due regard to the 
particularities that rightfully determine whether and how such principles may be 
applied. Such generalities do not illuminate but instead are like “cloudy mists cast 
before the eye of common sense.”186 
We are right, therefore, to expect to encounter goodness near where “the 
universal consent of men” suggest it may be found, for the dialectical process of 
transmission of such wisdom from generation to generation clears the mists that cloud
our eyes, giving us cause for confidence that we can in fact recognize the good we are 
to do:
The light therefore which the star of natural reason and wisdom casteth is too bright to be
obscured by the mist of a word or two uttered to diminish that opinion which justly hath been
182. Laws.I.10.5; 1. 100.16-101.11.
183. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, ST, I-II.94.2.
184. Laws.V.21.2;84.1-5. “Our desire is in this present controversy, as in the rest, not to be carried
up and down with the waves of uncertain arguments, but rather positively to lead on the
minds of the simpler sort by plain and easy degrees till the very nature of the thing itself do
make manifest what is truth.”
185. As John Bowlin argued with respect to Aquinas, so it was with Hooker: “the goodness of the
will’s object… can change as fortune does, haphazardly, unexpectedly, and independent of
our bidding.” Bowlin, Contingency and Fortune in Aquinas’s Ethics (Cambridge Studies in
Religion and Critical Thought), 54.
186. Laws.V.9.2;1.43.29-30.
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received concerning the force and virtue thereof even in matters that touch most nearly the
principle duties of men and the glory of the eternal God.187 
Episteme and Phronesis
I conclude this introductory sketch of selected Hooker claims by turning to 
Hooker’s distinction between “matters of faith” and “matters of action,” which, on my
account, are his deployment of the Aristotelian virtues of episteme and phronesis. The 
distinction between episteme and phronesis will be prominent in the remainder of this 
inquiry. In this section, I will argue that, for Hooker, our decisions about the good are
mostly local, particular, contingent, and, therefore, mutable. The key move is to 
recognize that the cultivation of virtue necessarily precedes godly laws because our 
ethical choices flow from the virtue of phronesis. In what follows, I will first explain 
why this distinction was important to Hooker’s rhetorical strategy, examine how he 
deployed it, and propose a qualification to his distinction which I believe enables us to
appropriate it in our contemporary discourse.
Undergirding much of Hooker’s rhetoric is a strong philosophical commitment to 
the idea that faith and reason are not disjunctive. Reason so dominates human 
psychology that faith presupposes reason. This insight draws attention to a position 
held by many of Hooker’s colleagues that is not uncommon today. Many Puritans - 
both opponents and allies of Hooker’s - were influenced by Ramist realism taught in 
the 1590’s and onward at Cambridge by William Perkins and others.188 Extending the 
logic of sola scriptura, they argued for the exclusive authority of Scripture in ethical 
reasoning based on the assumption that faith and reason are disjunctive. On this view, 
187. Laws.III.8.17; 1.234.25-31.
188. See “The Ramist Realists” on page 85. My proposal in chapter two is that they were
important interlocutors in the background of Laws. From his post at Cambridge. William
Perkins, in particular, spawned generations of clergy schooled in his way of avoiding the
error of subjectivity through a rejection of scholastic Aristotelian logic in favor of a method
grounded in the work of Peter Ramus. At its heart, it was deeply anxious about how
subjectivity impedes our discernment, so it created an exegetical method that serves like a
technology which, they felt, enables us to mine the eternal law objectively from Scripture.
This background helps to clarify why Hooker carefully carved out a space for the exclusive
authority of Scripture, and then argued that the mere presence of a practice in Scripture is
not axiomatic for us today, and, conversely, that the mere absence of a practice in Scripture is
not warrant for eliminating it from our common life. Deployment of the categories of
episteme and phronesis complicates the suggestion that we mine universal axioms from
Scripture by denying the premise that the paths to the good are singular.
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faithfulness entails obeying Scripture rather than one’s subjective reason in all aspects 
of life. Hooker rejected this premise, insisting that the first question to consider is 
“whether the light of reason be so pernicious that in devising laws for the church men 
ought not by it to search what may be fit and convenient.”189 Hooker claimed that it is 
impossible to choose between Scripture and reason because reason precedes, is 
integral to, and follows our engagement of Scripture. Humans cannot choose between 
faith and reason. Humans cannot choose to avoid subjective engagement with 
Scripture precisely because human psychology is fundamentally rational. 
Hooker claimed that his opponents’ puzzlement was due to two category errors. 
The distinctions needed are not between faith and reason but, first, between the 
domain in which Scripture alone can direct us and the domain in which other sources 
of knowledge contribute helpfully.  The second distinction is between matters of faith
and matters of action. The first distinction sheds light on the need for the second.
The category, ‘things necessary to salvation,’ pertains to the first domain, which 
Hooker calls ‘supernatural.’ Only Scripture is authoritative with regard to the 
supernatural path to eternal bliss given in Jesus Christ. That said, those principles of 
salvation found in Scripture themselves are phenomena that humans encounter and 
gather dialectically into endoxa that we thereupon encounter embedded in human 
positive laws. In addition to the obvious prohibitions against murder and adultery, 
Hooker seems to have in mind here scriptural imperatives enshrined into positive 
ecclesiastical law, such as the requirements for baptism and eucharist. Discovered 
originally in Scripture, these divine laws are also manifest in natural law as ordinances 
of the Church. They include the bond Christ creates in all who participate in him and 
“the kind of worship” appropriate to him:
… unto the Church as it is a society supernatural this is peculiar, that part of the bond of their
association which belong to the Church of God must be a law supernatural, which God
himself hath revealed concerning that kind of worship which his people shall do unto him.190
189. Laws.III.8.18; 1:235.3-5.
190. Laws.1.15.2; 1:131.16-20.
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Such divine laws are of the category of knowledge, and, being eternally true, are 
immutable. So the first category error has to do with things either necessary or 
unnecessary to salvation, and the recognition that exclusive scriptural authority and 
immutability pertain only to the former, for “they belong forever, yea, although they 
be positive laws, unless being positive God himself which made them alter them.”191
From this arises the second distinction. We discover divine law originally in 
Scripture alone, but because we also encounter it in its endoxic manifestations as 
positive ecclesiastical laws, and because both Scripture and positive law therefore treat
matters essential and non-essential to salvation, when evaluating our positive laws, we 
must further distinguish between the matters they treat. Hooker proposes accordingly
that the proper distinction for ethical reasoning is not between reason and faith, but 
between matters of faith and matters of practical action:
Touching matters belonging unto the Church of Christ the we conceive, that they are not of
one suit. Some things are merely of faith, which things it doth suﬃce that we know and
believe; some things not only to be known but done, because they concern the actions of men.
Articles about the Trinity are matters of mere faith, and must be believed. Precepts concerning
the works of charity are matters of action, which to know, unless they be practiced, is not
enough. This being so clear to all men’s understanding, I somewhat marvel that they especially
should think it absurd to oppose Church-government a plain matter of action unto matters of
faith, who that themselves divide the gospel into Doctrine and Discipline.192
Hooker’s distinction between matters of ‘mere faith’ and ‘matters of action’ is 
crucial to his larger argument against his opponents’ method of ethical reasoning. I 
propose that this distinction can be most fruitfully understood in terms of the 
Aristotelian virtues of knowledge (episteme) and practical wisdom (phronesis). In 
contrast with the virtues of episteme and techne,193 phronesis is an intellectual virtue 
consisting of excellence in action towards the end of producing the good, “a true and 
191. Laws.1.15.3; 1.131.32-132.1.
192. Laws.3.3.2; 1:210.1-13 Emphasis original
193. Aristotle, Complete Works Vol 2. EN 1139b.18-36, 1140a.1-23. For Aristotle, the intellectual
virtue of knowledge is attained through study of a field’s causes. One reasons inductively
from first principles, proceeds through deduction to the particulars, and reaches
demonstrable conclusions. In contrast with episteme, techne is not the understanding of an
object through comprehension of its causes, but ‘a seasoned state of capacity to make.’ Techne
is often translated into English as ‘art’ or ‘craft.’ But perhaps the most important aspect of
techne for our purposes is that it is an intellectual excellence oriented towards production of a
thing. In chapter two, I will argue that the Ramist realists strived to cultivate techne through
their exegetical method rather than the phronesis they should have preferred.
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reasoned statement of capacity to act with regard to the things that are good or bad 
for man.”194 Cultivation of the virtue of phronesis necessarily precedes godly laws 
because such laws are the fruit of a people skilled in deliberating about how “to act 
with regard to the things that are good and bad.” Adopting that nomenclature for our 
analysis, we can substitute those Aristotelian concepts in my conclusion above, and 
declare that Hooker proposes that the proper distinction for ethical reasoning is not 
between reason and faith, but between the respective subject matters of knowledge 
(episteme) and practical wisdom (phronesis).
Recognizing Hooker’s deployment of these Aristotelian virtues puts in perspective
Hooker’s distinction between ‘matters of mere faith’ and ‘matters of action.’ It is not 
that faith and reason are opposed, but that matters of faith, as the subject matter of 
episteme, involve knowledge of things that are necessary and eternal, and matters of 
action, as the subject matter of phronesis, have to do with deliberation ‘about what is 
good and expedient.’ The principles of that which is good cannot change precisely 
because they are necessary and eternal, while that which is conducive to the good cannot 
be demonstrated and must be chosen through deliberation, for, inherently, it can be 
otherwise than it currently is. 
Hooker recognized the potential for puzzles in the subject matters of both faith 
and action. He ranked ecclesial sources of authority on a probabilistic spectrum 
194. EN 1140a.24 - 1140b.12. “Regarding practical wisdom [phronesis] we shall get at the truth by
considering who are the persons we credit with it. Now it is thought to be a mark of a man of
practical wisdom to be able to deliberate well about what is good and expedient for himself,
not in some particular aspect, e.g., about what sorts of thing conduce to health or to strength,
but about what sorts of things conduce to the good life in general. This is shown by the fact
that we credit men with practical wisdom [phronesis] in some particular respect when they
have calculated well with a view to some good end which is one of those not the object of
any art. Thus in general the man who is capable of deliberating has practical wisdom. Now
no one deliberates about things that cannot be otherwise nor about things that it is
impossible for him to do. Therefore, since knowledge [episteme] involves demonstration, but
there is no demonstration of things whose first principles can be otherwise (for all such
things might actually be otherwise), and since it is impossible to deliberate about things that
are of necessity, practical wisdom cannot be knowledge nor art; not knowledge because that
which can be done is capable of being otherwise, not art because action and making are
diﬀerent kinds of thing. It remains, then, that it is a true and reasoned statement of capacity
to act with regard to the things that are good or bad for man. For while making has an end
other than itself, action cannot; for good action itself is its end. It is for this reason that we
think Pericles and men like him have practical wisdom, viz. because they can see what is
good for themselves and what is good for men in general; we consider that those who can do
this are good at managing households or estates.”
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because there is a distinction between a principle and our comprehension of the 
principle that has to do with our method of knowing. Though the principles 
constituting matters of faith are eternal and immutable, they are to be distinguished 
from our comprehension of them. The methods by which we deduce these principles 
socially and historically - through our encounter of the Christ the Redeemer in 
Scripture, the phenomena constituting our encounter with the Christ the Governor in
the created order, our creation and gathering of endoxa, and our dialectical discourse 
regarding these things - render our comprehension inherently uncertain. Therefore, 
though the principles themselves are eternal and therefore immutable, we might 
reasonably expect ongoing disputation regarding them, and expect a trajectory in 
meanings of the concepts we use to speak about them.
While Hooker acknowledges this potential need to correct the concepts we use in
speaking of matters of faith (such as God’s deliverance in Christ), the need for 
correction is clearer in matters requiring phronetic judgement. Refusing to make such 
corrections can be perilous. Hooker notes that “The end wherefore laws were made 
may be permanent, and those laws nevertheless require some alteration, if there be any
unfitness in the means which they prescribe as tending unto that end and purpose.”195 
The potential for error is greatest in matters of action wherein multiple options are 
possible. Phronesis is an intellectual virtue of a godly commonwealth, precisely because:
Men’s consultations are always perilous. And it falleth out many times that after long
deliberation, those things are by their wit even resolved on, which by trial are found most
opposite to public safety. It is no impossible thing for states, be they never so well established,
yet by oversight in some one act or treaty between them and potent opposites, utterly to cast
away themselves forever.196 
Laws having to do with the practical action of ordering the state or church are 
among the subject matter of phronesis. Such laws are deliberative choices made in cases
which may be otherwise than they are; those choices are not necessary, but 
provisional. Such laws are therefore mutable. This signals the importance of Hooker’s 
objection to ahistorical thinking, and his insistence that such laws are contingent and 
195. Laws.III.10.3; 1.242.13-16.
196. Laws.III.11.9; 1:254.1-7.
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mutable. The phronetic character of laws pertaining to matters of action means that 
the expedient chosen eventually becomes no longer expedient, requiring their 
amendment or abolition:
Laws, as all other things human, are many times full of imperfection, and that which is
supposed to be behooveful unto men, proveth often times most pernicious. The wisdom
which is learned by tract of time findeth the laws that have been in former ages established
needful in later to be abrogated. Besides that which sometime is expedient doth not always so
continue, and the number of needless laws unabolished doth weaken the force of them that
are necessary.197
Hooker’s opponents argued that the doctrine encapsulated with the slogan, sola 
scriptura, means that universal axioms discovered in Scripture should exclusively 
determine matters of action, including questions about how the church is ordered. In 
response, Hooker insisted that there is much that Scripture does not plainly deliver, 
and there is much that Scripture leaves unsaid, leaving the Church of England to 
determine how best to order itself in each context:
…. no more is by us maintained, than only that Scripture must needs teach the Church
whatsoever is in such sort necessary, as hath been set down, and that it is no more disgrace for
Scripture to have let a number of things free to be ordered at the discretion of the Church,
than for nature to have left it unto the wit of man to devise his own attire, and not to look for
it as the beasts of the field have theirs....”198
Reflecting on these general principles, Hooker presses his point that the Church 
is warranted in making ecclesiastical laws pursuant to the good with an eye to that 
which is expedient and convenient in its own historical context. Scripture provides 
only general guidance with regard to the ordering of the Church. Referring to the 
scriptural mandates cited by his opponents, he observes that:
... these rules are no such laws as require any one particular thing to be done, but serve rather
to direct the Church in all things which she doth, so that free and lawful it is to devise any
Ceremony, to receive any order, and to authorize any kind of regiment, not special
commandment being thereby violated, and the same being thought such by them, to whom
the judgment thereof appertaineth. as that is it not scandalous, but decent, tending unto
edification, and setting forth the glory of God, that is to say, agreeable unto the general rules
of holy Scripture….199 
197. Laws.IV.14.1;1:336.24-31.
198. Laws.III.4.1; 1:213.2-8.
199. Laws.III.7.4; 1:128.19-24.
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 Now that I’ve highlighted Hooker’s deployment of the Aristotelian virtues of 
episteme and phronesis, we are in a position to notice how they function rhetorically in 
his treatise.200 
On my account, the distinction between the subject matters of episteme and 
phronesis echoes the logic of Augustine’s distinction between that which is worthy of 
our clinging and that which is a means to that which is so worthy.201 They help us 
recognize the potential to create idols out of the signs and tokens of grace by 
confusing our practices and ordering of our common life with the eternal realities into
which they draw us. The distinction is helpful because Hooker is engaged in a dispute 
about such signs and tokens of the good -  questions, for example, about whether the 
Church of England should have bishops, whether a female queen can head the church, 
and whether certain ecclesial practices are warranted. 
His deployment of episteme and phronesis enables him to clarify that such questions 
are not, with certain exceptions, of the category of things which are eternally given 
(that which is good and the only thing worthy of our clinging). Rather, they are of the 
category of questions about that which is conducive to the good. As we shall see in 
chapter six, this will enable Hooker to claim that multiple paths are consonant. The 
phronetic character of ecclesial laws means that they are not universally applicable, 
but particular to a concrete community such as the Church of England. Our decisions 
about that which is conducive to the good are oﬀered with the humility which 
recognizes that such laws are necessarily mutable because of the vulnerability to 
probabilistic error that attends all practices derived from natural law. Rome can be 
Rome, Geneva can be Geneva, and England can be England. To those who argued that
the Elizabethan Church should conform to the norms of the emerging Reformed 
200. In my discussion of criticism of the ecclesial ethicists and their emphasis on practices, I will
connect phronesis with Jeﬀrey Stout’s account of cognitive and practical commitments. In the
Hookerian account, I understand ought-to-do judgments and practical commitments to be
the subject matter of the virtue, phronesis. See page 199.
201. Augustine of Hippo, Augustine: On Christian Doctrine, trans. D.W Robertson (New York:
Macmillan Publishing Company, 1958).10. “The things which are to be enjoyed are the
Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, a single Trinity….” By my reading, Augustine makes a
sharp distinction intended to help us recognize our propensity for turning the means of
grace into idols. Constituents of the temporal economy of salvation are unworthy of our
clinging. They are not to be enjoyed; they are to lead us to the one thing that is to be enjoyed,
which is the Trinity.
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consensus which took its lead from Geneva, Hooker argued that it is right and proper 
for the Church of England to make decisions about its self-ordering which diverge 
from the paths of both Geneva and Rome.
 The Big Picture Revisited
The ultimate destination of this inquiry is an account of how the mind of Christ is
formed in Christian communities, with the secondary objective of explaining how 
ecclesial practices contribute to the creation of a virtuous community. Thus far, we’ve 
paid close attention to key moves Hooker made in order to adapt a recognizably 
Thomist account of mimetic virtue and deploy it such that it was intelligible within 
the conceptual norms of Reformed orthodoxy. The chief of these dogmatic claims was
that, until we know Christ the Redeemer, humans do not have noetic access to the 
good due to sin and human finitude. We’ve seen that Hooker appropriated a 
recognizably Thomist ontology and anthropology, and, like Thomas and his 
immediate predecessors in the medieval scholastic tradition, deployed Aristotelian 
methods and epistemological concepts. We are now in a position to see how the 
concepts excavated in this chapter will be important in the ensuing chapters. 
To sharpen my Hookerian account of virtue, in the next chapter I will contrast it 
with competing accounts which, in my view, were among Hooker’s primary rhetorical 
targets. Hooker’s ontology will play an important role, and his deployment of 
Aristotelean epistemological concepts will be foregrounded. By providing an account 
of the natural law grounded in the eternal law, these sub-surface commitments enable 
Hooker to criticize a deontological ethics based on his opponent’s implementation of 
a sola scriptura hermeneutic, and to defend his own account in a grammar intelligible to
them. 
In chapter four, I will be considering Hooker’s account of our participation in 
Christ and proposing a way to describe the real presence that prepares us for the 
subsequent account of mimetic virtue. Hooker’s adaptation of the Thomist 
conception of eternal law will help us to describe how all humans naturally participate 
in Christ, while many are in communion with Christ. Also, we have now clarified that 
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the reformed catholic context presupposes that humans have no innate access to the 
good, and that all human learning about the good develops through our encounters 
with the signs and tokens of grace. Hooker’s psychology will help us to recognize the 
need for and imagine a grammar to describe a personal relationship with Christ that is 
intelligible within a context of reformed catholicism. 
I’ll develop that account of virtue in chapter five, following reflection on Hooker’s
teaching about ecclesial practices. Once again, Hooker’s ontology and psychology will 
help us to imagine an account of the real presence that is intelligible within a reformed
catholic context while also helping us to think more robustly about the relationship 
between the real presence and virtue. 
The Hookerian psychology and especially the concepts of endoxa and phronesis will 
figure prominently in my final chapter, in which I will consider how the Hookerian 
account might help us to frame contemporary ethical questions and think about a 
global communion ecclesiology.
THE CHRISTIAN LIFE ACCORDING TO RICHARD 
HOOKER: A PRELIMINARY SKETCH
The hope of the chapters that follow is to consider the aggregate eﬀects of these 
Hookerian ontological, anthropological, and epistemological commitments and to 
contemplate how they might fruitfully inform our contemporary ethical discourse. My
proposal will be that such consideration leads to a christodramatic ethics that 
vindicates Hauerwas and Wells’ turn to ecclesial practices as a means of our discerning
the good, and that have important implications for how we imagine a global Church in
the 21st century.
For now, the significance of the christodramatic ethics developed in this study 
might be best anticipated through a preliminary glimpse of a metaphor to which I’ll 
return in my final chapter. 
For Hooker, life for all humans is like a journey to the summit of “the highest of 
the mountains” (Is 2:1). At the summit - indeed, in a certain sense identical to the 
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summit - is re-union with Jesus Christ, the cause of our journey. Christ summons all 
humans to the summit, but not all respond. Those who do respond do not reach the 
summit in a single ecstatic moment, but simply hear Christ’s call, turn, and take the 
first step onto the trailhead. We pilgrims begin the journey, but, partially blinded as 
though in a fog, find ourselves at times in brambles, on dangerous precipices, and, 
often, simply lost in the wilderness. We have no way of orienteering on our own. 
There are thus certain questions we ask as we try to make our way to the summit. 
Some of those have to do with the nature of our destination - its worthiness, its 
beauty, its goodness. These are questions about the summit itself. These first 
questions are of the category of episteme, and they do indeed have universal answers. 
Other questions have to do with how to move toward the summit safely from 
wherever we find ourselves on the mountain. This second set of questions are of the 
category of phronesis. They have to do with our next steps toward the summit. 
Precisely because the mountain is itself alive, shaped by phenomena like wind, rain, 
quake, and fire, as well as by the pilgrims who precede us, we cannot always simply 
follow the well-trod trail. While the summit itself remains constant, the best way 
forward depends on our location on the mountain. The right path to the summit is 
inherently local, contingently known, and particular to our coordinates at our moment
in time.
How then do we find our way to the summit given the fog through which we see 
only dimly? Thus far, only a partial answer has been given. Christ is not only our 
destination, but our sustainer. Christ alone guides us. But how? Given the fog and the 
great distance, how do we hear and recognize his voice? How do we rightly navigate?
Hooker answers with his doctrine of our participation in Christ and a defense of 
liturgical practices. But before turning to those (in chapters five and six), we need to 
consider why the facile account of sola scriptura proposed by certain Puritan leaders 
provides an insuﬃcient answer.
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“Special Equity” and the particular
In his Preface to Laws, Hooker unmasks how the habits of thought nourished by 
his opponents function in service of their project of wresting  ecclesial power from the
Elizabethan conformists. Their ideology is justified by timeless truths discovered in 
both Scripture and the early church fathers. The task of this chapter is to appropriate 
Hooker’s extensive critique of their universal claims. I can summarize that critique by 
simply alluding to the Wellsian distinction beween universal and ecclesial ethicists. In 
short, Hooker would agree with Wells and Quash that “the particular information, 
which universal ethics shuns... makes ethics comprehensible.”202
To demonstrate this claim, I will dig into Hooker’s unmasking of his opponents’ 
ideology with the hope of understanding more clearly why universal ethics are 
problematic. First, I will comment briefly on his rhetorical and polemical method. 
Next, I will examine the concepts and methods of a subset of his opponents whom I 
dub the Ramist realists. My claim is not that Hooker’s opponents were all Ramist 
realists, but that Ramist realism was a rising ideology gaining traction among 
opponents and colleagues alike during the 1590s. I’ll then contrast them with Hooker 
by briefly commenting on his critique of their view of Scripture in general, and then by
digging deeply into his critique of their ethical reasoning. Finally, I will thicken the 
Hookerian account by oﬀering both philosophical and theological critiques of Ramist 
realism, holding it in conversation with Barth’s doctrine of election.
UNMASKING IDEOLOGY
As noted in chapter one, Hooker scholars have long noted his polemical tone, and 
Hooker scholarship in recent decades has increasingly characterized Hooker as a 
Reformed polemicist in substantial continuity with the magisterial reformers. By my 
reading, Hooker engaged much of his career in an intramural theopolitical struggle 
202. Wells and Quash, Introducing Christian Ethics, 192.
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between Geneva-inspired English divines advocating presbyterian reforms and 
doctrinally similar colleagues advocating conformity with the Elizabethan Settlement. 
Renaissance scholars Debora Shuger and Arthur Ferguson sharpen our understanding 
of Hooker’s purpose,203 helping us to see that Laws was not mere polemic in support 
of those espousing support of the Elizabethan settlement.204 To the contrary, Laws is 
an artful eﬀort to unmask and debunk a rising ideology, nourished by Ramist 
commitments and infecting opponents and colleagues alike, which justified radical 
reform by denying England’s “history of... legitimate discernment” and “mak[ing] the 
Bible a timeless absolute.”205 
Hooker signals this in his Preface to Laws. “The common sort” are not moved to 
favor his opponents’ proposals by “the force of particular reasons,” for “the multitude 
never did nor could so consider [particular reasons] as to be therewith wholly 
carried.”206 Rather,
… certain general inducements are used to make salable your cause in gross, and when once
men have cast a fancy towards it, any slight declaration of specialities will serve to lead
forward inclinable and prepared minds.207
Presbyterian propaganda seeks its ends through six steps. First, his opponents rip 
the current ecclesial leadership “with marvelous exceeding severity and sharpness of 
reproof,”208 casting themselves typologically as heirs of the Old Testament prophets. 
Second, they “impute all faults and corruptions wherewith the world abounds” to the 
Elizabethan settlement.209 Third, they “propose their own form of church government 
as the only sovereign remedy of all evils, and… adorn it with all the glorious titles that 
203. Arthur B. Ferguson, Clio Unbound: Perception of the Social and Cultural Past in Renaissance
England, Duke Monographs in Medieval and Renaissance Studies, vol. 2 (Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 1979), 207-224; Shuger, Habits of Thought, 26-30.
204. Conformists may have successfully routed English presbyterians politically by the early
1590s, rendering the possibility of further reforms unlikely in the short term. My suggestion
is that Hooker recognized that, by 1592, the ideology was suppressed but not eradicated, and
therefore his treatise is less an attack on their proposals for reform and more an attack on the
ideology underlying their proposals for reform.
205. Rowan Williams, “Forward,” in A Companion to Richard Hooker, ed. W.J. Torrance Kirby,
Brill’s Companions to the Christian Tradition (Boston: Brill Academic Publishers, 2008), xxi.
206. Laws.Preface.3.5;I.15.6-9.
207. Laws.Preface.3.5;I.15.9-12.
208. Laws.Preface.3.6;I.15.15-16.
209. Laws.Preface.3.7;I.15.20-21.
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may be.”210 Fourth, they: 
… fashion[ ] the very notions and conceits of men’s minds in such sort that when they read the
Scripture, they may think that every thing sounds toward the advancement of
[presbyterianism], and to the utter disgrace of the contrary.211 
Because “their minds are forestalled and their conceits perverted beforehand,”212 
the uninformed are persuaded that the orders of “pastors, elders, doctors, and 
deacons”213 are seen clearly in Zion and Jerusalem while all other forms of governance 
are to be associated with Samaria and Babylon.214 Fifth, 
From hence they proceed to a higher point, which is the persuading of men credulous and
over capable of such pleasing errors, that it is the special illumination of the holy Ghost
whereby they discern those things in the word, which others reading yet discern them not.215
Hooker continues, describing how the sixth step in presbyterian propaganda 
generates division:
 
After that the fancy of the common sort hath once thoroughly apprehended the Spirit to be
author of their persuasion concerning [the presbyterian proposals], then is instilled into their
hearts that the same Spirit leading men into this opinion doth hereby seal them to be God's
children, and that, as the state of the times now standeth, the most special token to know
them that are God's own from others is an earnest aﬀection that way. This hath bred high
terms of separation between such and the rest of the world, whereby the one sort are named
The Brethren, the godly, and so forth, the other worldlings, timeservers, pleasers of men not
of God, with such like.216
The final step is to teach the credulous to be impervious to the logic of their 
dissenting neighbors:
But be they women or be they men, if once they have tasted of that cup, let any man of
contrary opinion open his mouth to persuade them, they close up their ears, his reasons they
weight not, all is answered with rehearsal of the words of John, “We are of God; he that
knows God, hears us; as for the rest, you are of the world, for this world’s pomp and vanity it
is that you speak, and the world whose you are hears you.217
We don’t have to speculate about why Hooker wrote Laws because he tells us in 
his Preface. Hooker’s masterpiece is an artful eﬀort to unmask and discredit an 
210. Laws.Preface.3.8;I.16.2-4.
211. Laws.Preface.3.9;I.16.9-12.
212. Laws.Preface.3.9;I.16.28.
213. Laws.Preface.3.9;I.17.2.
214. Laws.Preface.3.9;I.17.1-5.
215. Laws.Preface.3.10;I.17.10-14.
216. Laws.Preface.3.10;I.18.8-17.
217. Laws.Preface.3.10;I.19.22-27.
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ideology that fueled discontent within the Elizabethan Church. Hooker is less clear in 
identifying his interlocutors, but he does name some of them. The most obvious of 
these are the allies of his old opponent from the Admonition Controvery of the 1580s, 
Thomas Cartwright, whom he regularly quotes. By extension, we might say that 
Hooker’s interlocutors included all those who continued to resist the Elizabethan 
Settlement. By my reading, Hooker also understood himself to be in conversation 
with presbyterian opponents and conformist allies alike, both of whom were exposed 
to an ideology emanating from a prolific circle of Cambridge divines, the Ramist 
realists. To that group and their ideology, I now turn.
THE RAMIST REALISTS
The task of this section is to bring into view contrasting assumptions about how 
we recognize the good. A bringing-into-view is necessary because our assumptions 
about how we recognize the good entail prior philosophical and anthropological 
commitments that function as givens in our ethical reasoning. By examining key sub-
surface commitments of one subset of Hooker’s opponents, ‘givens’ that are prior to 
their surface-level disagreements over scriptural hermeneutics, Hooker’s own 
philosophical and anthropological commitments will be seen in sharp relief. The task 
of the next section will then be to follow the contrast, drawing out the implications of 
these presuppositions for the way we understand both the authority and the art of 
reading Scripture. 
The contrast I want to draw is with an outlook I shall denote as Ramist realism. 
While I shall point to an actual group who manifested this outlook in Hooker’s time, 
my focus is on the present. I also deploy Ramist realism as a type, a recognizable habit 
of thought with a capacious tradition within Western Christianity. I take Barth’s 
distinction between biblical and biblicist thinking to be referring to this outlook,218 
and, similarly, I take Stanley Hauerwas to have this outlook in view in his critique of 
218. See Karl Barth, Karl Barth’s Table Talk, ed. John D. Godsey, Scottish Journal of Theology, vol.
Occasional Papers (10) (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1963).  CD/IV.1.§§60.1.
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literalism in his Unleashing the Scripture: Freeing the Bible From Captivity to America.219 
While I don’t believe that contemporary biblicists are conscious of an inheritance 
from Ramist realism, reflection on the premises of Ramist realism does, I believe, 
enable us to understand these habits of thought helpfully, and thereby helps us to see 
Hooker’s contrasting commitments more clearly.
Ramist realism denotes habits of thought which presuppose the possibility of 
objective knowledge of the good through the application of logic to Scripture. 
Christian ethics are biblical ethics in the sense that Scripture is seen as the singularly 
valid source of authority from which universal axioms can be mined. We discern the 
good through systematic exegesis of a particular kind. Such exegesis avoids the perils 
of human subjectivity.
The contrast I want to draw, however, requires deeper excavation of the premises 
underlying such thinking. To do that, I will draw upon historians’ accounts of 
Hooker’s colleagues who practiced and cultivated the Ramist realism perspective at 
Cambridge during the period in which Hooker penned his masterpiece. My method is 
to highlight some key underlying premises of Ramist realism and then to show how 
and why Hooker explicitly refuted those premises. The result, I trust, will be a more 
nuanced view of Hooker.
While Hooker mentions this group polemically in Laws, the scholarship on the 
influence of Ramism in English Puritanism is sparse.220 Peter Lake provides valuable 
insight into its practice through his ground-breaking studies of the puritanism of 
Laurence Chaderton, Edward Daring, Thomas Cartwright, William Whitaker, and 
William Bradshaw, Moderate Puritans and the Elizabethan Church.221 John Morgan 
similarly documents the embrace of Ramism by Cambridge Calvinists in his Godly 
Learning: Puritan Attitudes Towards Reason, Learning and Education, 1560-1640,222 noting 
219. Stanley Hauerwas, Unleashing the Scripture: Freeing the Bible From Captivity to America
(Abingdon Press, 1993-10-01).
220. Neelands hints at this influence, noting that “Calvin, who followed the Reformers of the
Rhineland in explaining the sense of the sanctification wrought in the person by grace, was
chiefly influenced by the new logic of Ramus, which Hooker criticized.” Neelands, “The
Theology of Grace of Richard Hooker,” 328.
221. Lake, Moderate Puritans.
222. John Morgan, Godly Learning: Puritan Attitudes Towards Reason, Learning and Education,
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that “Dudley Fenner, in England, made Ramism the cornerstone of much (but 
certainly not all) future puritan thought by the extremely significant step of changing 
Ramus’ examples from classical to scriptural texts.”223 Both of these engage positively 
the 1980 PhD dissertation of Donald McKim, Ramism in William Perkins.224 McKim 
documented the use of Ramist methodology by a wide variety of English Calvinists as 
part of his project of demonstrating the influence of Ramism in Puritan thought. The 
most prominent of these was the subject of his study, William Perkins. A highly 
influential scholar and contemporary of Hooker’s, William Perkins’ Ramist realism 
provides a stark contrast to the Hookerian account of Christian formation developed 
in this study.225
Both McKim and Lake describe Perkins as a ‘moderate’ Puritan who did not 
advocate the presbyterian form of government. A contemporary of Hooker’s, Perkins 
is of interest in the current study because his legacy stretches from his late sixteenth 
century work as a prominent professor at Christ College Cambridge to the 
seventeenth century work of John Milton.226 Perkins “fostered… the Puritan plain style
method of preaching” that was a presenting issue in Hooker’s treatise, developed the 
form of Biblical exegesis that came to be seen as the Puritan alternative to “the 
methods of continental Protestant scholastics,” and, most importantly, taught that 
Ramism “provided… a secure philosophical and epistemological basis for the belief 
1560-1640 (Cambridge University Press, 1988-04-29), 106-112.
223. Ibid., 109.
224. Donald K. McKim, “Ramism in William Perkins” (PhD Dissertation, University of
Pittsburgh, 1980). See also Donald K. McKim, “The Functions of Ramism in William Perkins’
Theology,” The Sixteenth Century Journal 16, No. 4, (Winter 1985): 503-517.
225. By inventing the term, Ramist realism, I am not taking a position in historical debates about
any of the figures mentioned or on the extent or influence of Ramism among Cambridge
Calvinists. My purpose is not to make historical claims about Ramist Puritans or to the extent
that Hooker consciously engaged the Ramist Puritans in his own works. I focus on the use of
Ramism by Hooker’s contemporaries in order to place in sharp relief the Hookerian account
of Christian formation developed in this study. Placed in contrast to Ramist Puritanism, the
significance of Hooker’s achievement stands out. I appropriate the descriptions of McKim,
Lake, and Morgan in order to hold their descriptions in contrast with Hooker’s thinking. My
arguments do not depend on these scholars’ historical claims about Ramism because I am
deploying their descriptions heuristically in order to provide insights into recognizable
contemporary habits of thought with which I want to draw a contrast. My contrast would
hold even if these scholars’ historical claims about Ramism were refuted because it is evident
from Hooker’s account - quoted below - that Hooker engaged dialectically some group
holding substantially similar beliefs described here as Ramist realism.
226. McKim, “Ramism in William Perkins,” 286-288.
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that humans can ascertain the mind of God….”227 
Perkins was a leading player at Cambridge, shaping its curriculum during the time 
when Hooker, an Oxford scholar himself, was immersed in his defense of the 
Elizabethan settlement. While Perkins did not advocate Genevan-style reforms, "the 
list of Cambridge Ramists reads like a list of the most radical Cambridge Puritans.”228 
Significantly, both allies and opponents of Hooker’s might well have embraced the 
presuppositions of Ramist realism that I describe below.
Ramist method entails “definition and division.”229 In contrast with the 
Aristotelian scholastic method taught by Hooker, syllogisms do not prove the truth of
propositions, but merely “solve doubts when questions arose in matters of definition 
and division.”230 The key principle of Ramist epistemological method is to divide 
knowledge areas into opposing binaries or dichotomies.231 McKim notes that, “As 
Perkins approached a passage or text he applied Ramist method: defining, dividing, 
classifying from general to specific.”232 A key assumption underlying this method was 
that, by so doing, “the "interior logic" or thought pattern of the author could be 
plainly shown. The inner relationships of all parts of the discourse became 
immediately visible.”233 Since the author of Scripture is the Holy Spirit, “The interior 
logic of the Holy Spirit, who stood behind the formation of Scripture, could be 
opened to view.”234 Ramist realists believed that their exegetical method “could lay 
bare the very mind of God Himself.”235 The exegete thereby discovered 'natural truths'
in the Bible that are universal in application and that are, because of the method, free 
from the taint of human subjectivity.236
The key observation here has to do with the theological and philosophical 
227. Ibid.,  iv-v.
228. Ibid., 297.
229. Ibid., 77.
230. Ibid.
231. Ibid., iv.
232. Ibid., 295.
233. Ibid., 296.
234. Ibid., 298.
235. Ibid.
236. Morgan, Godly Learning: Puritan Attitudes Towards Reason, Learning and Education, 1560-1640,
106-112.
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premises underlying Ramist realist method. “Perkins never attempted to justify or 
"prove" the divisions he made. To him these divisions had yielded self-evident axioms, 
the validity of which was beyond question.”237 The presupposition of Ramist exegesis is
not only that the language of Scripture is perspicuous, but that the meaning clearly 
expressed and easily understood is axiomatic. The task of the exegete, then, is not to 
move from the particulars of the pericope to a logically sound conclusion based on the
text, but to “discover the ‘arguments’ already present in his text.”238 These axiomatic 
arguments discovered in the text are objectively known “‘universal rules’… discovered as
refractions of the mind of God….”239 “This was so because for the Ramists, the 
‘arguments’ were built into the very fabric of the universe itself.”240
McKim clarifies the ethical implications of these premises:
In all this it was assumed that the mind will immediately give its assent to all true propositions
which were actually axioms. Thus Scripture quotations alone were suﬃcient to prove a point
since these can function in discourse as self-evidencing axioms. In Perkins and the other
Ramists, the Scripture citation is usually all that is needed to support a "division" made.241
For the Ramist Puritan, right thinking is inseparable from right living, and right living is 
constituted by “artifacts”242 demonstrating one’s assent to self-evident axioms discovered in 
Scripture. The rightful task of theology, therefore, is not to discern the good but to assert the 
true:
The system of Ramus gave sure results for the Ramist to whom the subject/ object problem
was not an obstacle. It gave access to truth that did not need to be proved in the scholastic,
Aristotelian fashion. Instead, truth need only be asserted. For the Puritans who followed
Ramus, Christian doctrine was a series of self-evincing axioms. These axioms were so self-
evident as to remove all doubts of their truth.243
Right living is the activity that produces “that which has been made well or done 
well” - where ‘well’ is defined by the “universal rules” discovered through the Ramist 
method.244 The project of defining and dividing in order to discover the principles of 
right living is urgent not because it manifests participation in the life of God, but 
237. McKim, “Ramism in William Perkins,” 296. Emphasis added.
238. Ibid.
239. Ibid., 300.
240. Ibid., 299.
241. Ibid., 302.
242. Ibid., 301.
243. Ibid., 304.
244. Ibid., 301.
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because it fulfills the conditions God establishes for the contingent covenantal 
relationship between Creator and creature. Right action is urgent, and it consists of 
obedience to universal truths discovered dichotomously. 
Ethics, therefore, are expressed rightly in the language of deontological axioms. 
The key questions are about how the community reliably recognizes what God 
commands and how it develops individuals willfully submissive to those commands. 
The discourse is not about ‘knowledge of God’ understood as personal participation in
the life of God, but ‘knowledge of God’s arts’ understood as logical discovery of 
universal rules ordained by God. The theological grammar subtly shifts from God as 
subject, interacting here and now with human subjects, to God’s art as object, acted 
upon by human subjects capable of comprehending its refraction through 
ratiocination. 
Implicit in Ramist realism is a philosophical optimism about human access to 
reality that cohabits oddly with the theological pessimism expressed in the doctrine of
total depravity. The Ramist realist is no nominalist: “Ramists believed that all 
concepts are objectively real.”245
Deeply embedded within Ramist realism are two worldview-shaping assumptions. 
First, sola scriptura is no longer a slogan pertaining narrowly to how one knows one’s 
status before God, but a dogmatic claim about the only means by which humans have 
access to divine truths about right thinking and right living. We discover God’s “art” 
through Scripture alone.246 Where such an assumption prevails, it is diﬃcult to 
appreciate a central role for the sacraments, which is perhaps why it was necessary for 
Hooker to devote an entire volume to the defense of sacramental practices. Second, 
Ramist realism presupposes a reality that can be truthfully described through division 
into neat binaries and reductive epitomes. A world whose truth is known through 
divisive dichotomies is quite distinct from a world dialectically known and described 
in syllogistic syntheses. We ought not be surprised when these diﬀerent views of the 
245. Ibid., 299.
246. Ibid., 301.
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world yield diﬀerent views of the Church.
HOOKERIAN CRITIQUE: THE NATURE OF SCRIPTURE
On Hooker’s account, the resistance of certain Puritans to the Elizabethan 
Settlement was grounded in epistemological error. That is, their demand that the laws 
of England and practices of the Church be justified exclusively by biblical sources was 
an instance of what Wittgenstein would later describe as “philosophical puzzlement” 
that can only be “dissolved by pointing out where wrong turns were made.”247 His 
critique of his opponents’ scriptural hermeneutics arises directly from the foregoing 
philosophical premises and consisted of at least five counterpoints. We’ve already seen
his primary claim - (1) that the supreme authority of Scripture pertains particularly and
narrowly to the revelation of the supernatural path to our beatitude in Christ and not 
to all matters of action in life.248 In addition to this, Hooker asserted, in direct 
refutation of the presuppositions of Ramist realism: (2) that the authority of Scripture 
is not self-authenticating, (3) that its axioms are not perspicuous, (4) that there is no 
possibility of an objective interpretive stance that delivers us from the risk of 
interpretative error, and (5) that we cannot merely extract self-authenticating axioms 
from Scripture but rather must reach fitting conclusions by reasoning inductively from
the particular narrative context of principles drawn from Scripture. 
 The jurisdiction of Scripture
Hooker was sharply critical of what he considered “a dangerous extremity” - the 
claim that “Scripture did not only contain all things in that kind necessary, but all 
things simply, and in such sort that to do anything according to any other law were 
not only unnecessary, but even opposite unto salvation, unlawful and sinful.”249 If God 
had intended all things to be contained in Scripture, then God would “clean have 
abrogated amongst them the law of nature.”250 The stakes in refuting this claim are 
247. Brad J. Kallenberg, Ethics as Grammar: Changing the Postmodern Subject (South Bend: Univ of
Notre Dame Press, 2001-09), 187.
248. Laws.I.14.1; 1:124.29-32. Laws.I.14.1; 1: 126.1-13.
249. Laws.II.8.7; I:191.21-25.
250. Laws.II.8.6;I:190.10-11.
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high: “Admit this, and what shall the Scripture be but a snare and a torment to weak 
consciences, filling them with infinite perplexities, scrupolosities, doubts insoluble, 
and extreme despairs.”251
Hooker worried equally about a correlative claim by his opponents - the erroneous
notion that sola scriptura means that “the choice of good and evil in the daily aﬀairs of 
this life”252 is to be determined exclusively by scriptural axiom:
Make all things sin which we do by direction of nature’s light and by the rule of common
discretion without thinking at all upon Scripture, admit this position, and parents shall cause
their children to sin, as oft as they cause them to do anything, before they come to years of
capacity and be ripe for knowledge in the Scripture.253
Decrying such puzzlement about the meaning of sola scriptura, Hooker insisted 
upon the distinction between “whatsoever is in such sort necessary,”254 and matters 
non-essential to salvation:
… it is no more disgrace for Scripture to have let a number of things free to be ordered at the
discretion of the Church, than for nature to have left it unto the wit of man to devise his own
attire, and not to look for it as the beasts of the field have theirs....255
While Scripture does indeed provide all things necessary to salvation, that 
doctrine is not to be understood to mean that Scripture is “the only law whereby God 
hath opened his will touching all things that may be done, but there are other kinds of 
laws which notify the will of God….”256 Rather, the doctrine presupposes that Wisdom
teaches by Scripture, nature, “spiritual influence,… [and] in some things… only by 
worldly experience and practice.”257 Furthermore, the doctrine is correctly understood 
to assert that Scripture teaches “all things which are necessary to be known that we 
may be saved, but known with the presupposition of knowledge concerning certain 
principles whereof it receiveth us already persuaded, and then instructeth us in all the 
251. Laws.II.8.6;I:190.16-19.
252. Laws.II.8.6;I:190.15-16.
253. Laws.II.8.6;I:191.4-9.
254. Laws.III.4.1; I: 213.3-4.
255. Laws.III.4.1; I: 213.4-8.
256. Laws.II.1.4; I.147.15-17.
257. Laws.II.1.4; I.147.27-148.6.
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residue that are necessary.”258 
 Not self-authenticating
Hooker is quite concerned “that the benefit of nature’s light be not thought 
excluded as unnecessary”259 in our seeking of an ethical foundation in Scripture. One of
the reasons is that, though knowledge of our “salvation could not be obtained”260 
without it, Scripture is not self-authenticating.  This insight arises from philosophy: 
“Scripture indeed teacheth things above nature, things which our reason by itself 
could not reach unto.”261 Precisely because “Scripture teacheth all supernaturally 
revealed truth,”262 human authority is necessary for us to learn what Scripture teaches. 
“… unless besides Scripture there were some thing which might assure us that we do 
well, we could not think we do well, no not in being assured that Scripture is a sacred 
and holy rule of well-doing.”263 
Because scripture’s supreme authority has to do particularly with the supernatural 
path Christ has revealed, and we are unable to recognize Christ’s authority until we 
have a personal relationship with him, “Scripture could not teach us the things that are
of God unless we did credit men who have taught us that the words of Scripture do 
signify those things.”264 Here Hooker refutes his interlocutors on anthropological 
grounds: “Now it is not required or can be exacted at our hands that we should yield 
unto any thing other assent than such as doth answer the evidence which is said to be 
had of that we assent unto.”265 This criterion arises from the foregoing philosophical 
premises regarding human participation in the rationality of God. “The greatest 
assurance generally with all men is that which we have by plain aspect and intuitive 
beholding.”266 The authority of Scripture arises from “that which we see with our 
258. Laws.I.14.1; I.126.5-9.
259. Laws.I.14.1; I.129.1-2.
260. Laws.III.8.13; I:231.4
261. Laws.III.8.12; I:230.7-8.
262. Laws.III.8.13; I:231.2-3.
263. Laws.II.4.2; I:153.22-25.
264. Laws.II.7.3; I:177.31-33.
265. Laws.II.7.5; 1:179.25-27.
266. Laws.II.7.5; 1:179.10-12.
- 93 -
eyes;”267 a man assents to Scripture as the Word of God “because we hold that his 
speech revealeth there what himself seeth….”268
Scripture, therefore, is not self-authenticating; rather, the Church testifies to the 
authority of Scripture, authenticating it through its concrete witness. Reason need 
only assent to the testimony of the Church regarding scripture’s authority if the 
actions of the Church evince scripture’s divine origins. Scripture becomes 
authoritative - in the eyes of rational men and women - only when the actions of the 
Church mean what they must mean if the Church is to perform the truth that is 
Christ.
Furthermore, that Scripture is not self-authenticating renders false his opponents’ 
claims regarding the universality of axioms extracted from Scripture whose subject is 
not the supernatural path revealed in Christ. Such claims, if generally accepted by the 
community, are binding only upon the community. Such claims are about and for the 
community and not about and for all humanity, for “it is the general consent of all that
giveth them the form and vigor of laws.”269 Christian ethics are of the Church, by the 
Church, and for the Church. 
 Not perspicuous
We saw above that the Ramist realists translate the claim that Scripture contains 
all things necessary to salvation into a doctrine of scripture’s perspicuity. Hooker 
addresses directly the question of “whether containing in Scripture do import express 
setting down in plain terms, or else comprehending in such sort that by reason we may 
from thence conclude all things which are necessary.”270 We see here the distinction 
between the Ramist claim that Scripture contains perspicuous axioms and the 
humanist assumption that scriptural comprehension requires reasoning from the 
particularity of texts as phenomena to general conclusions about their meanings. 
Hooker proceeds by distinguishing between two categories of subject matter in 
267. Laws.II.7.5; 1:179.20.
268. Laws.II.7.5; I:179.22.
269. Laws.VIII.6.11; III.403.10.24.
270. Laws.I.14.2; I.126.14-17. Emphasis original.
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Scripture in like fashion to his treatment of scripture’s jurisdiction. He invokes 
Augustine's point that truths regarding the supernatural path Christ has revealed "are 
plainly set down in Scripture so that he which heareth or readeth may without any 
great diﬃculty understand."271 Thus Scripture is perspicuous with respect to the 
supernatural path of salvation. Yet some things aren't so plain and therefore require a 
learning not available to all men:
Other things also there are belonging (although in a lesser degree of importance) unto the
oﬃces of Christian men which because they are obscure, more intricate and hard to be judged
of, therefore God hath appointed some to spend their whole time principally in the study of
things divine to the end that in these more doubtful cases their understanding might be a light
to direct others.272
Scripture, then, is neither self-authenticating nor plain in its meaning, at least 
once one moves beyond claims about the saving action of Jesus Christ and into 
questions of matters of action. In the latter category, expertise in scriptural 
interpretation tends to be required, and the world rightly admires the “pillars” whose 
“great and rare skill” of interpretation and “whose exercises, labors, and divine studies 
[God] hath so blessed.”273 
 Not objective
Related to the argument against perspicuity is the observation that Scripture does 
not contain axioms that can be objectively known. The vagaries of human subjectivity 
cannot be avoided by shouts of sola scriptura. Scripture is neither self-authenticating 
nor self-interpreting. Hooker demonstrates this by reference to his opponents’ own 
love of proof-texting: 
… even such as are readiest to cite for one thing five hundred sentences of holy Scripture, what
warrant have they, that any one of them doth mean the thing for which it is alleged? Is not
their surest ground most commonly, either some probable conjecture of their own, or the
judgment of others taking those Scriptures as they do?274
His opponents “ground themselves on human authority, even when they most 
271. Laws.Preface.3.2; I:13.11-12.
272. Laws.Preface.3.2; I:13.12-18.
273. Laws.II.7.4; I:179.3-8.
274. Laws.II.7.9; I:184.34-185.4.
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pretend divine.”275 The Spirit does not directly illuminate us in the reading of Scripture
such that human reason is bypassed in biblical interpretation,276 One cannot “go from 
the books of Scripture to the sense and meaning thereof”277 by “exclud[ing] the use of 
natural reasoning.”278 This ought not cause anxiety, for Scripture is not reduced in its 
power through acknowledgement of our subjectivity: 
… in respect of that end for which God ordained it, perfect, exact, and absolute in itself, we do
not add reason as a supplement of any maim or defect therein, but as a necessary instrument,
without which we could not reap by the scripture’s perfection that fruit and benefit which it
yieldeth.279
As we saw in the previous chapter,280 the common reduction of Hooker’s 
hermeneutics to the formula of “Scripture, Tradition, and Reason” is highly 
problematic, not least because Hooker refused to place Scripture and reason in 
opposition. Instead, he presented - already in the 1590s - a compelling ‘post-liberal’281 
argument: reason precedes and is necessarily integral to all scriptural exegesis. There is
no stance of objectivity from which humans can engage Scripture.
HOOKERIAN PRESCRIPTION: THE PRIORITY OF THE 
PARTICULAR
We’ve seen that Hooker argues that all humans are governed by the eternal law. 
Yet, Hooker strongly resists universal prescriptions of the good, especially when it 
comes to the self-ordering of the church. Instead of such prescriptions, the Hookerian
account is characterized by the priority of the particular. 
To get a preliminary feel for the depth of Hooker’s emphasis on the particular, 
one can turn to his doctrine of predestination in the Dublin Fragments. In describing 
275. Laws.II.7.9; I:185.6-7.
276. Laws.III.8.15.
277. Laws.III.8.15; I:233.9-10.
278. Laws.III.8.15; I:233.15-16.
279. Laws.III.8.10; I:227.2-9.
280. See page 63.
281. George A. Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age
(Westminster John Knox Press, 1984).
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God’s response to sin, Hooker, adapting Aquinas, distinguishes between God’s 
determining will and God’s positive will.282 God does not predestine humans to be 
sinners, but rather responds to their sin as the “accidental event” it is.283 This 
distinction between God’s determining and positive wills is decisive for Hooker in 
reflecting on predestination. God’s determining will is that all be saved, but God’s 
positive will is concerned with “vengeance against Satan and Satan’s slaves.”284 Hooker 
seems to see graceful ethical reasoning as properly in analogy to God’s treatment of 
humanity, understood in Thomist terms of God’s antecedent and consequent will. 
Essential/accident, determining/positive, general/particular - throughout his corpus, 
Hooker turns repeatedly to these distinctions in his quest for truthful descriptions. 
Nowhere is the distinction between the general and the particular more significant 
than in his prescription for the ethical reasoning by which communities discern the 
good.285
Hooker is often described as an apologist for the status quo, but this confuses his 
cognitive commitments with their consequences. He appears to be an apologist 
because he insists that the starting point in Christian ethics is to listen to the Church. 
That cognitive commitment leads to an inherently conservative (though not illiberal) 
posture:
282. Aquinas, citing Damascene, speaks of God’s “antecedent will” and God’s “consequent will.”
The antecedent or determining will does not refer to God’s self-determining or divine
establishing, but rather to the will wherein God determines humanity. “It may be said of a
just judge, that antecedently he wills all men to live; but consequently wills the murderer to
be hanged. In the same way God antecedently wills all men to be saved, but consequently
wills some to be damned, as His justice exacts. Nor do we will simply, what we will
antecedently, but rather we will it in a qualified manner; for the will is directed to things as
they are in themselves, and in themselves they exist under particular qualifications.” ST.
1a.19.6 ad 1.
283. Hooker, “Dublin,” 32.
284. Richard Hooker, “Notes Towards a Fragment on Predestination,” in The Folger Library Edition
of the Works of Richard Hooker, Volume Iv: Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity: Attack and Response,
the Folger Library. The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity) (V. 4), (Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 1982-01-01), 94. Hereafter referred to as Notes Towards a Fragment on Predestination
followed by volume, page, and line numbers.
285. The Hookerian account necessarily speaks of the particular because the distinction I have
described here permeates Hooker’s corpus. In the 21st century, however, particular is less
helpful because it can become itself an abstraction, and imply support for the notion of a
reality behind the reality we encounter in history. That is not the way I use it in this study. In
the Hookerian account, the phenomena we experience reliably refer to the reality of the
objects we encounter, and the general/particular distinction distinguishes the inferences we
make as we encounter phenomena from the cases, situated in discrete contexts, to which we
might apply them.
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... there is cause why we should be slow and unwilling to change without very urgent necessity
the ancient ordinances, rites, and long-approved customs of venerable predecessors. The love
of things ancient doth argue staidness, but levity and want of experience maketh apt unto
innovations. That which wisdom did first begin and hath been with good men long continued,
challenges allowance of them that succeed, although it plead for itself nothing. That which is
new, if it promise not much, doth fear condemnation before trial; till trial, no man doth acquit
or trust it, what good soever it pretend and promise.286
We saw in chapter two that, for Hooker, the “voices of men” carry the greatest 
weight after that which “Scripture doth plainly deliver.”287 But to what human 
authorities does he refer? To answer this, we have to dig a bit into Hookerian political
concepts.
Hooker recognized that his rendering of the duplex cognitio Dei in terms of a 
second form of the eternal law has political implications. When viewed from the 
perspective of human access to knowledge of God, all humans and especially all the 
baptized are equal: 
For we have here only the being of Sons of God, in which number how far soever one may
seem to excel another, yet touching this that all are sons they are all equals, some happily better
sons than the rest are, but none any more a son than another.288
As Neelands notes, for Hooker, “there is no eﬀective or practical diﬀerence, just 
as there is not perceptible diﬀerence, between the visible and invisible church, except 
at the end, when it shall be clear if there be any in the church who do not 
persevere.”289 If there is no practical diﬀerence between the visible and the invisible 
church until the fulfillment of time, then, when theology speaks of a right ordering of 
the church, the practical assumption must be that we are all, translocally and 
transtemporally, equal in our status before God and that the Spirit may use anyone at 
any moment to confess the Word given.290 
Hooker therefore admonished his opponents who urged that the Church of 
286. Laws.V.7.3; II.36.26-37.8
287. Laws.V.8.2;II.39.8. For the priority of voices of men, see Laws.I.8.2-3.
288. Laws.V.56.12;II.244.7-11.  Emphasis added.
289. W. David Neelands, “Richard Hooker on the Identity of the Visible and Invisble Church,” in
Richard Hooker and the English Reformation, ed. W.J. Torrance Kirby, (Dordrecht ; Boston:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003), 109.
290. John Howard Yoder, “Sacrament as Social Process: Christ the Transformer of Culture,” in
The Royal Priesthood: Essays Ecclesiological and Ecumenical, (Herald Press (PA), 1994), 371-373.
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England adopt the presbyterian discipline of Geneva in lieu of the polity of the 
Elizabethan church. They failed to appreciate that the Elizabethan polity united the 
Christians of the commonwealth in one “society of souls,”291 binding together the elite 
and the common multitude under God while preserving the diversity that gave the 
commonwealth its vigor. Their denial of the rightfulness and necessity of setting apart
bishops, presbyters, and deacons as guardians of ecclesial law was simply wrongheaded:
The most natural and religious course in making of laws is that the matter of them be taken
from the judgment of the wisest in those things which they are to concern. In matters of God,
to set down a form of public prayer, a solemn confession of the Articles of Christian faith,
rites, and ceremonies meet for the exercise of religion, it were unnatural not to think the
Pastors and Bishops of our souls a great deal more fit than men of secular trades and callings.292
This judgment of the wisest in the matters of God is characteristic of the best 
form of ecclesial government, for the best government is that which is “administered 
by the best,” by those excelling all the others together in excellence:293”
Inequality as touching gifts and graces they grant because this is so plain that no mist in the
world can be cast before men’s eyes so thick but that they needs must discern through it that
one minister of the gospel may be more learned, holier, and wiser, better able to instruct,
more apt to rule and guide than another....294
The things essential to salvation are for the most part so “familiar and plain that 
truth from falsehood and good from evil is most easily discerned in them, even by men
of no deep capacity. And of that nature for the most part are things absolutely unto all
men's salvation necessary, either to be held or denied, either to be done or avoided.”295 
But some things aren't so plain and therefore require a learning not available to all 
men:
Other things also there are belonging (although in a lesser degree of importance) unto the
oﬃces of Christian men which because they are obscure, more intricate and hard to be judged
of, therefore God hath appointed some to spend their whole time principally in the study of
things divine to the end that in these more doubtful cases their understanding might be a light
to direct others.296
291. Laws.V.77.2; 2.425.14-19.
292. Laws.VIII.6.11; 3.403.10.24
293. Aristotle, Complete Works Vol 2,  Pol.1288b.34-38.
294. Laws.VII.3.1; 3.153.16-21.
295. Laws.Preface. 3.2; 1:13.5-9.
296. Laws.Preface. 3.2; 1:13.12-18.
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In short, the equality of our access to knowledge of God and of our election in 
Christ does not mean that we are equal in the gifts and graces must conducive to the 
fruitfulness of the church. Our diﬀerences matter, and our ecclesiastical polity rightly 
presupposes a high valuation of the judgment of the wisest. Our election in Christ 
entails a gift of a political identity shared by the elite and the common multitude, 
creating our belongingness to a particular society of souls whose governance scheme is 
a democratically-inclined polity which places a high value on the diversity of our gifts 
and graces.
The “voice of men” for Hooker, therefore, seems to entail a continuous translocal 
and transtemporal conversation in which all humans share and debate the coordinates 
of the good. Some of these coordinates are enshrined in local custom, some in local 
positive law, and some in “the general and perpetual voice of men” which is like “the 
sentence of God himself.”297 With respect to ecclesial law, then, ‘the voices of men’ 
does not correspond  merely to ‘doctors of the church’, although such experts have a 
special role.
In this continuous conversation, the “bare consent of the whole Church” trumps 
the discretion of the local church.298 Hooker would thus agree wholeheartedly with 
Barth “that the Church is constituted as the Church by a common hearing and 
receiving of the Word of God.”299 Endoxa rightly carry enormous weight in guiding 
the local church’s and the disciple’s discernment. 
Yet, even in listening to the whole Church, Hooker denies the timeless appeal to a
golden era. We see this in Hooker’s deployment of ancient and medieval church 
authorities. In a comparison of Cartwright’s and Hooker’s appeals to the church 
fathers, John Luoma notes:
Perhaps the most interesting point in Hooker's use of consensus is that it is not enmeshed in
an overestimation of any age - even that of the apostles…. He shows great reverence for the
early church (the majority of his citations are from the first six hundred years), but he does not
neglect any century.300 
297. Laws.I.8.3;I.84.1-2.
298. Laws.V.8.2;II.39.22-23.
299. Barth, CD, 1/2 §§20.2, 588.. 
300. John K. Luoma, “Who Owns the Fathers? Hooker and Cartwright on the Authority of the
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Luoma notes that what distinguishes Hooker is that he “is willing to gather his 
consensus from throughout the history of the church.”301 He adds, 
Hooker consciously attempts to form a broad based consensus, allowing each Father to speak
for himself as part of a multifaceted consensus (consisting of Scripture, reason, and the
Fathers) but weaving each into a comprehensive argument.302
For Hooker, there was no golden era whose voice halts the deliberative process or 
circumscribes the questions we may ask and the answers that are possible. The 
Church is equally vulnerable to error in all ages, even though not all generations have 
been equal in their faithfulness. Our discourse is both translocal and transtemporal. 
Though there is ambiguity, there is continuity: “No, the Church of Christ, which was 
from the beginning, is and continues unto the end, of which Church all parts have not 
been always equally sincere and sound.”303
Hooker describes at length the rationale underlying his view of proper ethical 
reasoning in the ninth chapter of Book V. The English presbyterians, as we have seen, 
pressed for radical change in the ecclesial laws concerning worship practices and 
governance, and they grounded their arguments in appeals to universal axioms mined 
from Scripture or the early church fathers. In refuting such Ramist-like thinking, 
Hooker emphasized the importance of inductive thinking that attends properly to the
particularity of things. Generalities, Hooker said, are “cloudy mists cast before the eye
of common sense”: 
The cause of [their] error is ignorance what restraints and limitations all such principles have
in regard of so manifold varieties as the matter whereunto they are applicable doth commonly
aﬀord. These varieties are not known but by such experience from which to draw the true
bounds of all principles to discern how far forth they take eﬀect, to see where and why they
fail, to apprehend by what degrees and means they lead to the practice of things in show
though not indeed repugnant and contrary one to another, requireth more sharpness of wit,
more intricate circuitions of discourse, more industry and depth of judgment than common
ability doth yield. So that general rules, till their limits be fully known (especially in matter of
public and ecclesiastical aﬀairs), are, by reason of the manifold secret exceptions which lie
hidden in them, no other to the eye of man’s understanding than cloudy mists cast before the
eye of common sense. They that walk in darkness know not whether they go.304
Primitive Church,” The Sixteenth Century Journal 8, no. 3 (October 1977), 56.
301. Ibid., 57.
302. Ibid., 58.
303. Laws.III.10.1;I.201.9-12.
304. Laws.V.9.2;II.43.16-31.
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General axioms are popular “because of their plainness at the first sight,” but “men
of exact judgment [know] such rules are not safe to be trusted over far.”305 “No wise 
man will desire himself to be cured [by general rules] if there be joined with his disease
some special accident” that distinguished his case from others “in the same infirmity, 
but without the like accident” because it could “be to him either hurtful or at the least
unprofitable.”306 For the same reason:
… we must not, under a colorable commendation of holy ordinances in the Church, and of
reasonable causes whereupon they have been grounded for the common good, imagine that all
men’s cases ought to have one measure.307
Central to Hooker’s prescribed model for ethical reasoning is the concept of 
‘special equity.’ The adjective is decisive. ‘Equity’ seems to denote for Hooker a 
conformity to the natural law with attention to justice and fairness. ‘Special’ denotes a 
prudential departure from the general rule in a particular case intended to bring about 
such conformity. Special equity attends to the data diﬀerentiating the particular from 
the general, and modulates ethical reasoning as needed so that the justice which the 
general law seeks is obtained:
Not without singular wisdom therefore it hath been provided, that as the ordinary course of
common aﬀairs is disposed of by general laws, so likewise men’s rarer incident necessities and
utilities should be with special equity considered. From hence it is that so many privileges,
immunities, exceptions, and dispensations have been always with great equity and reason
granted, not to the edge of justice, or to make void at certain times and certain men through
mere voluntary grace or benevolence that which continually and universally should be of force
(as some understand it) but very truth to practice general laws according to their right
meaning.308
Because of their broad reach, good laws are necessarily expressed in general 
language, and the more far-reaching the consensus to which the Christian listens, the 
more generally the judgment of the Church is expressed in custom and law.  This leads
to inequity. The universal reasoning of his opponents fails to achieve the good the 
natural law intends because it fails to attend to “material circumstances” that ought to 
shape their reasoning:
305. Laws.V.9.2; II.44.3-5.
306. Laws.V.9.2; II.44.5-10.
307. Laws.V.9.2; II.44.10-13.
308. Laws.V.9.3;II.44.13-24. Emphasis added.
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Moral laws are the rules of politics, those politics which are made to order the whole Church
of God unto all particular churches, and the laws of every particular church rules unto every
particular man within the body of the same church. Now because the higher we ascend in
these rules the further still we remove from these specialties, which being proper to the
subject whereupon our actions must work, are therefore chiefly considered by us, by them
least thought upon that wade altogether in the two first kinds of general directions, their
judgment cannot be exact and sound concerning either laws of churches or actions of men in
particular because they determine of eﬀects by a part of the causes only out of which they
grow, they judge conclusions by demipremises and half principles, they lay them in the balance
stripped from those necessary material circumstances which should give them weight, and by
show of falling uneven with the scale of the most universal and abstracted rules, they
pronounce that too light which is not if they had the skill to weigh it.309 
Thus far, we’ve seen Hooker’s critique of the Ramist realist presuppositions about the
nature of Scripture and also his general laws and the priority of the particular in ethi-
cal reasoning. I turn now to his critique of appeals to scriptural timeless absolutes in
ethical reasoning.
HOOKERIAN CRITIQUE: REASONING BY NON SEQUITUR
 Appeals to timeless absolutes
We have already seen that Hooker rejected his opponents’ claims to a golden era 
in their appeals to the church fathers. Similarly, he rejected appeals to a golden era in 
Scripture, recognizing as non sequiturs their deployment of timeless absolutes whether 
discovered in the Old or New Testaments. He foreshadowed this challenge to their 
logic in his Preface to Laws:
“…. it is the error of the common multitude to consider only what hath been of old, and, if the
same were well, to see whether still it continue; if not, to condemn that presently which is,
and never to search upon what ground or consideration the change might grow; such rudeness
cannot be in you so well borne with whom learning and judgment hath enabled much more
soundly to discern how far the times of the church and the orders thereof may alter without
oﬀense….”310
What Hooker signals in his Preface he delivers in the fourth book of his first 
volume, describing discoveries of timeless universal axioms in Scripture as uncertain or
insuﬃcient:
“For it is out of doubt that the first state of things was best, that in the prime of Christian
religion faith was soundest, the scriptures of God were then best understood by all men, all
parts of godliness did then most abound: and therefore it must needs follow that customs,
laws, and ordinances devised since are not so good for the Church of Christ, but the best way
is to cut oﬀ later inventions, and to reduce things unto the ancient state wherein at the first
they were. Which rule or canon we hold to be either uncertain or at leastwise insuﬃcient, if
not both.”311 
309. Laws.V.81.4;II.476.34-477.16
310. Laws.Preface.4.4; I.23.28.31.
311. Laws.IV.2.1; 1.276.30-277.8.
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Appeals to timeless absolutes serve ideology by shutting down conversation or by 
setting boundaries on the kinds of questions that can be asked and the ranges of 
answers that are permissible. There are multiple forms of such appeals. One can, for 
example, appeal to abstract values like equality or justice. Alternatively, one can appeal
to creation’s primordial ordering to justify a return to that ‘natural’ state. Hooker’s 
interlocutors deployed a third method, most frequently appealing to a golden era to 
which the Church must return. As Hooker notes, the intended rhetorical eﬀect of 
such appeals to timeless absolutes is to manipulate discourse through circumscription.
In contrast, Hooker denies the indefeasibility of the judgments of all eras:
The glory of God and the good of his Church was the thing which the apostles aimed at, and
therefore ought to be the mark whereat we also level. But seeing those rites and orders may be
at one time more, which at another are less available unto that purpose, what reason is there
in these things to urge the state of one only age as a pattern for all to follow?312
Hooker asks, “Are we bound while the world standeth to put nothing in practice 
but only that which was the very first?”313 He concludes, “Our end ought always to be 
the same, our ways and means thereunto not so.”314 His prescription, in brief, is to be 
informed by the superabundance of God’s love as reflected in the extraordinary 
diversity in both nature and in the Church itself:
A more dutiful and religious way for us were to admire the wisdom of God, which shineth in
the beautiful variety of things, but most in the manifold and yet harmonious dissimilitude of
those ways, whereby his Church upon earth is guided from age to age, throughout all
generations of men.315
The priority of the particular permeates Hooker’s defense of ecclesial practices in 
Book V. For example, presbyterians challenged the Elizabethan practice of ordaining 
presbyters and deacons without title and popular election by appealing to the 
apostolic era. In defending the practice, Hooker argued that the ancient era was not 
intrinsically normative unless the situation then and now is identical: 
312. Laws.IV.2.3; I.278.15-21.
313. Laws.V.20.4;II.75.8-10.
314. Laws.IV.2.3; I.278.14.15.
315. Laws.III.11.8; I.253.15-20.
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We forget not to examine whether the present case be the same which the ancient was or else
do contain some just reason of which it cannot admit altogether the same rules which former
aﬀairs of the Church now altered did then require.316
Similarly, he defended the Elizabethan practice of providing residences and 
‘livings’ to ministers as an example of “special privilege” in contrast with mere 
“privilege”:
 
For the voice of equity and justice is that a general law doth never derogate from a special
privilege, whereas if the one were contrary to the other, a general law being in force should
always dissolve a privilege. The reason why so many are deceived by imagining that so it
should do and why men of better insight conclude directly it should not doth rest in the subject
or matter itself, which matter indefinitely considered in laws of common right is in privileges
considered as beset and limited with special circumstances by means whereof to them which
respect it, but by way of generality it seems one and the same in both, although it be not the
same if once we descend to particular consideration thereof.317
Defending the procession of the cross during worship, Hooker makes the point 
that precedent does not require that we attach the same meanings to things that 
generations before us did. To say it was so long ago, does not mean that it is so today. 
The meanings we associate with symbols evolves. He gives the example of the brazen 
serpent which was of soteriological significance to the Hebrews and remained a 
processional symbol in Jewish worship until the time of King David, by which time it 
had become merely “a memorial sign or monument of God’s miraculous goodness 
towards them.”318
In chapter after chapter of Book V, Hooker presses home his claim of the divine 
authority for local churches to evolve practices suitable to their specific contexts. He 
provides a history of rogation processions and other litanies, demonstrating their 
significant evolution since 506 CE.319 Defending the Elizabethan liturgical calendar, he
demonstrates that diﬀerent churches in history have followed diﬀerent fasting 
patterns and days of the week. He similarly demonstrates evolution in the vocations, 
authority, and support of deacons and presbyters.320 And he describes such evolution 
using the Aristotelian category of phronesis:  “So that the instituting and ordaining 
316. Laws.V.80.8;II.468.10-13.
317. Laws.V.81.4; II.476.19-30 Emphasis original
318. Laws.V.65.18;II.318.1-2.
319. Laws. V.41.2-3; II.163.6 - 165.2. 
320. Laws.V.78.5; V.80.3.
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both of these and all other times of like exercise is as the Church shall judge expedient 
for men’s good.”321 
Defending rites of burial against charges that they are unbiblical and 
noncontinuous with those of the Apostolic era, Hooker asks rhetorically, “Again if it 
might be proved that no such thing was usual among them, has Christ so deprived his 
Church of judgment that what rites and order soever the later ages thereof have 
devised the same must needs be inconvenient?322 In Book VI, Hooker traces the 
history of the practice of penitence, showing how it evolved in response to the 
Church’s changing cultural situation. Initially, the practice was voluntary, individual, 
and public. Over time it became voluntary and private, then mandatory and private, 
and then, in the Elizabethan Church, “external repentance for a sacrament, internal 
for a virtue.”323 Explaining why churches reasonably have such authority to evolve 
ecclesial practices locally, Hooker quotes Acts 27.38 - the story of Paul throwing food 
into the sea during a storm - as an example of casting oﬀ the good for a greater good.324
“For of two such evils being not both evitable, the choice of the less is not evil.”325
So what is the rule? In what conditions does the local church have the discretion 
to “cast oﬀ the good for a greater good?” This question returns us to what I’ve 
suggested are his deployments of the virtues of episteme and phronesis. Near the 
beginning of Book V, he explains:
The Church hath authority to establish that for an order at one time which at another time it
may abolish, and in both do well. But that which in doctrine the Church doth now deliver
rightly as a truth, no man will say that it may hereafter recall and as rightly avouch the
contrary. Laws touching matter of order are changeable by the power of the Church; articles
concerning doctrine not so.326 
321. Laws.V.72.9; II.391.19-21.
322. Laws.V.75.4;II.412.20-23.
323. Laws.VI.4.3; III.17.15-16.
324. Laws.V.9.1;II.42.8-11.
325. Laws.V.9.1;II.42.12-13.
326. Laws.V.8.2;II.38.17-23.
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 Appeals to false analogies
The Ramist method of defining, dividing, and classifying encouraged the frequent 
use of typologies and reasoning by analogy. But it is one thing to analyze things by 
placing them in logical categories, and quite another to reason ethically by claiming 
that Old Testament and apostolic practices prefigured and thereby dictated 
contemporary Christian practices. A species of appeals to timeless absolutes, such 
appeals tend to exclude the particular information which might modulate reasoning 
from the general case in order to achieve equity. Hooker consistently refuted 
ideological claims of his interlocutors by unmasking their use of false typologies and 
analogies. 
One such claim was that Christ had forbidden all change of laws set down in 
Scripture.327 In support of this, opponents proposed that the household of the Jews 
prefigured the household of Christ. Since there was but one enduring law of Moses 
governing that people, they claimed, so, too, did Christ intend for there to be one set 
of ecclesiastical laws for his own household. Hooker denied such prefiguration:
“… seeing that nations are not all alike, surely the giving of one kind of positive laws unto one
only people, without any liberty to alter them, is but a slender proof, that therefore one kind
should in like sort be given to serve everlastingly for all.”328
In order to argue that no practice should be warranted if it is not first found in 
Scripture, Thomas Cartwright appealed to Paul’s teaching that “meats and drinks… are
sanctified… by the word of God.”329 In Cartwright’s logic, Paul’s claim that meat and 
drinks are sanctified defines the category of things which may be used or done by 
disciples. Those things explicitly mentioned in Scripture may be used; all others 
belong to the type of things which may not be used. Hooker set aside the appeal, 
noting that “though meats and drinks be… sanctified by the word of God, and by 
prayer, yet neither is this a reason suﬃcient to prove that by Scripture we must of 
327. Laws.III.11.1; I.246.title
328. Laws.III.11.6; I.251.7-10.
329. Laws.II.2.3;I.151.20-21. The scriptural reference is to 1 Tim 4:5.
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necessity be directed in every light and common thing which is incident into any part 
of man’s life.”330
Opponents, in arguing against the use in worship of non-canonical readings, 
including the apocrypha, appealed to the example of the rules governing the Jewish 
Temple, in which nothing could be brought into the temple  - “neither brooms, nor 
fleshhooks, nor trumpets, but those only which were sanctified.”331 Hooker refuted the
claim on the grounds that it posited a false analogy: “it would be demanded by what 
rule the legal hallowing of brooms and fleshhooks must needs exclude all other 
readings in the Church save Scripture.”332
Responding to opponents upset because the priest oﬀers the bread and wine to 
individuals during the Eucharist, whereas Jesus denoted the entire gathering of 
disciples in his “Take, eat, and drink,”333 Hooker recognized that sermons and 
sacramental are diﬀerent types of remembering, and that Jesus and a contemporary 
priest are not analogues. He wittily summarized his consistent objection to false 
analogies, “The softness of wax may induce a wise man to set his stamp or image 
therein; it persuadeth no man that because wool hath the like quality it may therefore 
receive the like impression.”334
To be clear, Hooker did not deny the use of analogical reasoning. Quite the 
opposite. As we saw above in his use of the church fathers, he granted the authority of
precedent:
In Scripture we grant every one man’s lesson to be the common instruction of all men, so far
forth as their cases are like, and that religiously to keep the Apostle’s commandments in
whatsoever they may concern us, we all stand bound.335
That said, in order for precedent to have force, the similarity between precedent 
and the particular case must be strong, for “the laws positive were not framed without 
330. Laws.II.2.3;I.150.24-28.
331. Laws.V.20.1;II.2.72.14-15. I render besomes as brooms.
332. Laws.V.20.2;II.2.73.12-14. I render besomes as brooms.
333. Laws.V.68.1; II.344.7.
334. Laws.V.68.2; II.346.9-21.
335. Laws.III.11.11; I.256.20-24.
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regard had to the place and persons for which they are made.”336 
For example, when his opponents argued for correspondences between factions in 
Corinth and Rome of which Paul wrote and the presbyterians opposing Elizabethan 
sacramental practices, he named the analogy as false. There is no analogy between 
Jewish and Gentile Christians and the “weak brethren”  of the Elizabethan Church, 
and there is no analogy between “scandalous meats” and “ceremonies which have been 
abused in the church of Rome.”337 “Between these two cases are great odds.”338 “For 
neither are our weak brethren as the Jews, nor the ceremonies which we use as the 
meats which the Gentiles used.”339  “Their use of meats was not like unto our of 
ceremonies, that being a matter of private action in common life, where every man 
was free to order that which himself did; but this a public constitution for the 
ordering of the Church.”340
Cartwright also compared the nurse who baptizes an infant to a thief who uses a 
seal stolen from a prince:
As by the seal which the prince has set apart to seal his grants with, when it is stolen and set
to by him that has no authority, there grows no assurance to the party that has it; so if it were
possible to be the seal of God which a woman should set to yet for that she has stolen it and
put it to not only without but contrary to the commandment of God, I see not how any can
take any assurance by reason hereof.”341
Hooker refuted Cartwright’s argument against the eﬃcacy of baptism by a female 
nurse by naming Cartwright’s deployment of a false analogy:
Their argument taken from a stolen seal may return to the place out of which they had it. For
it helpeth their cause nothing... That God has committed the ministry of baptism unto special
men, it is for order’s sake in his Church, and not to the end that their authority might give
being or add force to the sacrament itself.342
Similarly, Hooker denied the false analogies by which those “rapt with the pang of 
336. Laws.III.11.6; I.250.32-251.1
337. Laws.IV.12.7; I.324.21-23.
338. Laws.IV.12.7; I.324.29.
339. Laws.IV.12.7; I.324.30-31.
340. Laws.IV.12.7; I.325.6-9
341. Laws.V.62.19; II.285 See notes.
342. Laws.V.62.19; I.285.11-286.6.
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a furious zeal”343 argued for the razing of English churches due to the claim that they’d 
been tainted by the rites of Rome in the same way the high places of Israel had been 
tainted by the worship of idols:
Now whereas commandment was also given to destroy all places where the Canaannites had
served their gods, and not to convert any one of them to the honor of the true God: this
precept had reference unto a special intent and purpose which that there should be but one only
place in the whole land whereunto the people might bring such oﬀerings, gifts, and sacrifices
as their Levitical law did require.... we should likewise consider how great a diﬀerence there is
between their proceedings, who erect a new commonwealth which to have neither people nor
law, neither regiment nor religion the same that was, and theirs who only reform a decayed
estate by reducing it to that perfection from which it hath swerved. In this case we are to
retain as much, in the other as little of former things as we may. Since therefore examples have
not generally the force of laws which all men ought to keep, but of councils only and
persuasions not amiss to be followed by them whose case is the like, surely where cases are so
unlike as theirs and ours, I see not how that which they did should induce, much less any way
enforce, us to the same practice.”344  
The foregoing militates against recommendation of the Ramist realist method of 
discerning the good. Scripture is not properly seen as a catalog of axioms productive of
bald moral maxims. This is not a claim that Scripture is anything less than a fount of 
divine wisdom. Rather, it is a claim that, as a general rule, such wisdom cannot be 
discovered simply by extracting texts out of context and positing them as timeless 
axioms for moral reasoning. Hooker insists that a proper biblical hermeneutic 
recognizes the particularity of narrative, and reasons from the particular to the 
general, giving historical and cultural context its due, rather than presuming the 
axiomatic nature of biblical texts. Furthermore, he insists that gracious ethical 
reasoning similarly recognizes the priority of the particular, attending to the 
circumstances of cases in order to fulfill the general intent of the natural law, which 
positive law can only approximate. The good consists of that which is both beneficial 
and amiable, and Scripture often recognizes a range of possible paths. 
HOOKERIAN CRITIQUE: NO RAMIST SHORTCUTS
The Hookerian account developed so far contrasts sharply with this brief sketch 
of Ramist realism. Ethics do not take the form of divine command theory. There is no
avoiding the subjectivity of our encounter with Scripture and ethical reasoning 
343. Laws. V.17.1;II.61.16.
344. Laws. V.17.5;II.63.17-64.5 Emphasis added.
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requires a priority on the particular. In what follows, I switch to a more constructive 
register in order to underscore salient features of the emerging Hookerian account. 
First, I will take note of significant philosophical diﬀerences that are decisive in our 
descriptions of reality. Second, I will suggest that the Reformation doctrine of 
election leads properly to a view of reality that is open, and in which there are no 
universal rules apart from Christ. If my suggestions are sustained, then skepticism 
toward Ramist-like appeals to timeless absolutes is in order on scriptural, 
philosophical, and theological grounds.
Hooker writes of “the poverty” of Ramism, pointing to its suggestion that Ramist 
method makes knowledge of the mind of God accessible without substantial 
investment in true arts and learning. Hooker lampoons Ramist method for its 
“marvelous quick dispatch,” revealing “as much almost in three days, as if it dwell 
threescore years with them.”345 For Hooker, the “speedy discourse” of Ramism 
restrains discernment, limiting human knowledge of God to the generalities accessible
to the least of men. Such short cuts are not the path to wisdom.
Stanley Hauerwas, quoting John Howard Yoder, observes that “the task of 
theology is ‘working with words in the light of faith.’”346 “Working with words” entails 
working with our descriptions of reality, which is the special domain of philosophical 
and theological inquiry (reason and revelation). Describing reality requires a grammar, 
and grammar is the domain of philosophy. The philosopher engages our discourse on 
matters of practical divinity so that our reasoning is grounded in reality. The 
theologian does so, however, “in light of faith.” That is, the theologian deploys 
philosophy from the perspective of faith. To describe reality so that it is grounded in 
ultimate reality is to describe reality so that it is grounded in that which God has 
revealed about God and creation, which is to say we must speak of God, “but the God 
to whom and about whom we must speak defines the words we use.”347
345. Laws.1.6.4; 1:76.9-20.
346. Hauerwas, Working With Words, Kindle location 81-100, Preface, para 5-7. Hauerwas quotes
Yoder, citing John Howard Yoder, Preface to Theology: Christology and Theological Method
(Brazos Press, 2007-09-01), 41..
347. Hauerwas, Working With Words, Kindle location 81-100, Preface, para 5-7.
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The philosophy and theology underlying the Hookerian account contrast sharply 
with those of the Ramist realist. Philosophically, the account diverges in its 
description of how humans know reality. Theologically, the account diverges in its 
description of the stakes of our knowing. I will describe the philosophical  divergences
here, and reserve discussion of the theological diﬀerences in the next section.
Hooker’s complaint about the ‘speedy discourse’ of Ramist method points directly
to the most fundamental philosophical diﬀerence. In the Hookerian account, binaries 
and epitomes can not suﬃciently describe reality in all its complexity. Reality defies 
description through reduction. One reason for the complexity of the world is the 
ongoing creativity that reflects creation’s participation in the rationality of God. 
Hooker appropriates the Aristotelian concepts of phenomenon, endoxon, and 
dialectic in order to describe human experience of and engagement with this 
creativity. Humans encounter phenomena, dialectically gather endoxa that describe 
these phenomena, and then create structures and concepts in response to phenomena 
that then themselves become phenomena for all who follow. Reality is not fixed, but 
open.
We saw that Ramist realism evinces a philosophical optimism about human access
to reality, but that optimism is circumscribed by the qualification that such access is 
exclusively in the form of axiomatic principles discovered in Scripture. The current 
account is optimistic as well, but in a diﬀerent way. Reality is directly known, but 
always phenomenally.348 The phenomena we experience reliably refer to the reality of 
the objects we encounter, though we are always vulnerable to probabilistic error in our
apprehension of them. As I will develop in the next chapter,349 our descriptions of 
reality occupy two descriptive domains - the spaces of causes and reasons. In the 
interpretative stance of causes, we reason inductively by identifying eﬃcient causes. 
This scientific knowing is least resistant to reductive summarization and categorization 
schemes. Yet this is not our only manner of knowing. We also experience things and 
ideas as final causes; they manifest themselves to us rationally through their addressing
348. See page 60.
349. See page 132.
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us and through our responses to them - through our shared history. We know them 
personally in their particularity. We are justified in our claims about their dispositions.
When we make such claims, we do so within the descriptive domain of the logical 
space of reasons. Such personal knowing defies schematic reduction. It cannot be 
exhausted in binaries and epitomes. Ramist method gives no account of personal 
knowing.
 Dialectic, not division
A second, related philosophical diﬀerence follows from this. The Hookerian 
account of this study privileges phenomena, endoxa, and dialectic as the primary 
methods of inquiry into the nature of reality. These methods are themselves 
phenomena - concepts known within the logical space of reasons. The privileging of 
these tools, however, entails assumptions about the nature of reality and human 
participation in it. This is best seen in contrast. To argue for them as methods of 
ethical discernment over and against the method of mining axioms objectively 
discovered in Scripture is to presuppose something about reality and human 
knowledge of it. At minimum, such privileging assumes that dialectical discourse more
fruitfully assists us in knowing the good. 
The dialectic common in Hooker’s era was derivative of the medieval scholastic 
practice based on Aristotelian dialectics. In my Hookerian account, I do not denote 
merely that particular form, but rather the broader category of dialectical deduction 
appropriate “for training, for conversational exchange, and for sciences of a 
philosophical sort.”350 We have already seen that conversational exchange with moral 
exemplars is particularly important in the formation of mimetic virtue. Dialectical 
discourse generally involves premises to be tested and relevant endoxa. One of the 
potential results of such testing may simply be the negation of the premise. In that 
instance, it simply resolves binaries in a fashion similar to Ramist method. Yet the 
premise might instead be aﬃrmed, elevated partially into a new premise, or 
transformed through correction. The key move here is to notice the orientation 
350. Aristotle, Complete Works Vol 1, Top. 101a26-b4.
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towards a “mediating synthesis”:
Dialectic is a tool whose chief use is to resolve and reconcile binaries, not through a median
synthesis (something like splitting the diﬀerence and avoiding extremes), but through a
mediating synthesis (sublation as elevation, transformation, abolition, and preservation all at
once) It is overcoming contradictions and resolving tensions by inheriting the strengths of
predecessor/competitor theories and practices while overcoming their weaknesses.351 
This orientation towards synthesis in our primary method of ethical discernment 
signals a worldview quite distinct from that reflected in intellectual inquiry grounded 
by self-authenticating axioms. It implies a communal quest for knowledge of the good 
in which address and response are expected, and in which our conclusions are at best 
probabilistic. More importantly, however, it sees this communal quest itself as 
creative and open. Through dialectic, humans overcome contradictions and resolve 
tensions, creating a mediating synthesis that not only describes the good, but 
(potentially) manifests the good. 
 Dialectic and the doctrine of election
Underlying the deployment of phenomena, endoxa, and dialectic as primary 
methods of inquiry is a presupposition involving the nature of reality, or at least the 
nature of human communal knowing. That presupposition contradicts the premise 
underlying the claim that we objectively know universal rules ordained by God directly
through discovery of axioms in Scripture. This presupposition is not merely related to 
a scriptural hermeneutics but precedes and informs it. Creation is open and ongoing. 
In the Church's language game, the community participates in the rationality and 
creativity of God dialectically, not just by creating new synthetic concepts but also by 
re-creating structures that are the context of our life with God. The orientation 
towards synthesis signals the premise that humans do not just encounter God’s 
creativity, but imitate and cooperate with it. In so doing, humans do not merely obey 
universal rules ordained by God, but participate in the rationality of God.
I must oﬀer at this point a provisional attempt to think beyond Hooker in order 
to underscore the importance of the christodramatic ethics which will follow. In the 
351. Derek Woodard-Lehman, “Email Message to Author,” (August 2, 2013). Emphasis original.
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foregoing, dialectical discourse is presented as a method of inquiry that characterizes 
communal life in Christ. I alluded to a presupposition that precedes and informs 
hermeneutics. It might appear that I am merely suggesting that the presupposition is 
to be identified with a preferred resolution to a problem in epistemology. My 
argument might thereby be reduced to the claim that we rely upon dialectical 
discourse rather than Ramist-like methods because of its greater pragmatic merit - 
dialectical discourse is more fruitful because creation is complex. But such reduction 
would be to miss a larger point that I feel is largely unrealized in Hooker, but to which
Barth points.
My claim is indeed that dialectical discourse is preferable to Ramist-like 
alternatives because creation is complex. The important points, however, are that this 
is an ontological problem, not merely an epistemological one, and that there are no 
universal rules upon which our ethics can be grounded.
Precisely because "election is ‘new every morning’” there is new creation, and 
because there is new creation, creation is indeed 'open.'352  Our descriptions of reality 
must be dialectic because our knowledge of God is determined by God's continuing 
act of election which itself constitutes the cosmos. Put another way, our 
epistemological problem is not merely - with Aristotle - that our knowledge is 
probabilistic at best because of human finitude, but that our object of study - the 
cosmos - is itself dynamic and complex (rather than static) due to God's continuing 
creative acts of justification. In epistemology, we have to deal with both the 
soteriological problem of our blindness and the ontological problem of the dynamism 
of creation.353 
We saw in my description of Hooker’s doctrine of participation that the self-
determination of the Father is to be in relation to the Son, and the identity of the Son 
is determined by relation to the Father. Our participation in Christ’s humanity arises 
352. David W. Congden, “Creatio Continue Ex Electione: A Post-Barthian Revision of the Doctrine
of Creatio Ex Nihilo,” Koinonia XXII, (2010), 49.
353. I am indebted to David Congden for helping me to recognize that this is an ontological
problem, not merely an epistemological one.
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ultimately from the triune God’s self-determination to be present to God’s creation. 
As Barth observed, in speaking of the divine decision of election, “we are not dealing 
with a systematic relationship but with one which can be the object and content only 
of a law which is itself spirit and life, concrete history.”354 In speaking of Christ’s 
election, “there is no reason whatever why we should suddenly substitute for this 
concept a concept of isolated and static being.”355 Christ’s election is decisive for 
history, “an eternal happening,”356 yet this is not to be understood as God’s static 
agenda:
Only as concrete decree, only as an act of divine life in the Spirit, is it the law which precedes
all creaturely life. In virtue of its character and content this decree can never be rigid and
fixed. It can never belong only to the past. Because it is God’s decree it must, of course, be
constant, authoritative and powerful. But because it has pleased God to let it be a concrete
decree, it never ceases to be event.357
David Congden clarifies the implications of Barth’s insight:
… the divine life-in-the-Spirit that constitutes the living actuality of election takes place
within the event of Jesus Christ. The awakening work of the Spirit does not simply point
toward a finished and completed reality in the past; it is rather constitutive of the event
itself….The Spirit does not enable a mere "recollection" of a "completed and isolated"
election. Instead, the Spirit actualizes the contingent "repetition" of Christ's election in both
hidden and manifest forms, thus extending the originating event to embrace new concrete
particularities ….358
God’s self-determination to be for us is not an abstraction that happened pre-
temporally, but a reality that happens in every moment as Christ re-creates and 
governs the cosmos. God meets us always in our irreducible particularity. Hence, 
“election is ‘new every morning’”:
What happens in the present and the future is not simply the noetic acknowledgement or
recognition of what has already happened on behalf of all in Jesus Christ. Rather it is Christ
himself confronting us today, proclaiming the divine "Yes" to us and to all. The act of election
is thus no eternally past or perfect decision, but it repeatedly occurs as a particular, concrete
event in the pentecostal totality of Christ's past, present, and future historicity… Election
itself is a continuous election: it is God's continuous reaﬃrmation of Godself as God-for-us
and God's continuous reaﬃrmation of the creature as creature-for-God.359 
354. Barth, CD. 2.2.§§33.184.
355. Ibid.
356. Ibid.
357. Ibid. 
358. Congden, “Creatio Continue Ex Electione,” 48.
359. Ibid., 49.
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God's continuing creative acts of justification constitute creation, and this has 
immense ethical implications:
Creation, we can thus say, is an eternal act rooted in the eternal Word of God who is self-
determined by the eternal decision of election…. Creation, properly speaking, is new creation.
We cannot isolate an old creation, or "nature," from which to draw general theological or
ethical concepts. Our only epistemic access to creation is through election, and thus through
the Spirit of God who meets us in the word that justifies sinners. Moreover, since election is a
continuous christological event, so too is creation.360 
A profound implication for ethics thus arises from the doctrine of justification. 
Precisely because Christ’s Spirit meets us personally, reconciling us in our 
particularity, Christ’s “creative act repeats itself in the justifying word that declares 
new life to dead sinners.”361  Creation is always new creation. Therefore, “we cannot 
isolate an old creation, or "nature,” from which to draw general theological or ethical 
concepts.“ There are no universal rules, no original created human nature to which we 
can point in order to ground our ethics, no axioms governing matters of action that we
can mine in order to secure our covenantal position with God. There is only Christ 
himself, “the concrete universal, the contingent event that is universally significant in 
that it includes all other people and events within its singular reality.”362
Ramist-like methods of definition and division, therefore, are properly rejected as 
methods of theological and ethical inquiry. This rejection is not merely on pragmatic 
grounds, but because their deployment represents theological puzzlement: a failure to 
recognize that theological inquiry is an ontological problem, not merely an 
epistemological one. Our descriptions of reality must be dialectical because our 
knowledge of God is determined by God's continuing act of election which itself 
constitutes the cosmos. Reality is neither fixed materially nor static, but dynamic, and 
there are no universal rules to be mined or upon which to ground our ethics, precisely 
because of Christ’s justifying acts of re-creation.
360. Ibid.
361. Ibid.
362. David Congden, “Email Message to Author,” (August 9, 2013).
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CHAPTER SUMMARY
We are now in a position to take measure of what has been said about the 
contrast between Hookerian and Ramist scriptural hermeneutics. We have seen that 
the Hookerian account rejects the assumptions of Ramist hermeneutics. The divine 
wisdom found in Scripture is neither self-authenticating, self-interpreting, objective, 
nor universal. Scripture is not a catalog to be mined, but a practice that forms us in the
mind of Christ.363 The Ramist scriptural hermeneutics postulated the possibility of 
direct, objective knowledge of God’s law. As we have seen, Hooker denied this 
possibility, insisting that God is always wholly other and the good therefore only 
indirectly, inferentially, and probablistically known. Ramist-like hermeneutics treats 
Scripture as a catalogue of timeless absolutes, and through its focus on the general 
loses sight of the particular. But the particular is the proper focus of ethical reasoning 
precisely because the general can only approximate the natural law, for though our 
faculties are apt, our universal judgments are necessarily contingent and inherently 
probabilistic eﬀorts to clear “the mists that cloud our eyes.”364
So far, we’ve seen Hooker’s powerful critique of Ramist-like ethical reasoning. But
this tells us, negatively, only that such reasoning is not how the mind of Christ is 
formed in community. We’ve not yet seen Hooker’s positive account, though we have 
anticipated some of its tenets. The Hookerian account maintains the centrality of 
Christ and the priority of Scripture’s witness to Christ. Our engagements with 
Scripture are phenomena and therefore inherently subjective in the same way as our 
encounters with the glorious works of God. No Ramist shortcut can provide an 
objective foundation upon which to base our ethical reasoning.
If Ramist realism is a false path, how, then, is the mind of Christ formed in 
community? Hooker’s answer begins with an account of our participation in Christ. 
To that we now turn.
363. This perspective of Scripture as a practice is manifest in chapters 18-22 (on preaching and
teaching) and 37-40 (on psalms and canticles) of Book V of Laws.
364. Laws.V.9.2;1.43.29-30.
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- Chapter 4 -
Participation as Fellowship
INTRODUCTION
Is there an objective ground for our judgments of the good? Is there a connection 
between Christian cognitive and practical commitments and the generation of 
communities who embody the mind of Christ? How does the community of Christ 
reliably discern the good? In this chapter, we will only begin to answer these questions
because we will quickly see that the question of how the mind of Christ is formed in 
communities is deeply theological. Our inquiry quickly leads us into the 
ecclesiological, epistemological, and soteriological domains. We’ll enter each of these 
domains in order to explore more fully the epistemic role of the Spirit. The task of 
this chapter will be to consider in depth the agency of the Spirit in calling the elect 
into fellowship with Christ. I will argue that the Spirit actuates a reciprocal knowing 
of and responsiveness to Christ mediated by a sociality, an interactivity, and a history 
of shared life, all of which are constituted by a restored rationality. Such fellowship, 
we shall see in the next chapter, provides the epistemic ground of our ethical 
reasoning.
The key move is to notice Hooker’s two levels of description of the real presence 
of Christ. The first level describes the real presence in the relational terms of the 
covenant of grace, while the second level clarifies how Christ is truly present to us in 
our personal relationships with him, redirecting our reification of the real presence 
from physically proximate things to the hearts of believers. Reflection on these two 
levels of description of the real presence sets up our consideration of practices in the 
next chapter. 
The arguments of this chapter unfold in three movements. The first movement 
recalls Hooker’s distinction between our universal participation in Christ the Creator 
and Governor and our personal participation in and fellowship with Christ the 
Reconciler, and describes that participation in relational terms of the covenant of 
- 119 -
grace. The second movement explains why our personal experience of Christ’s real 
presence is best described in grammar appropriate to the space of reasons. The final 
movement explains how Christ is really present to the community both diachronically 
and synchronically. 
In my exegesis of Hooker’s account of participation which is presented 
throughout this chapter, I largely agree with readings of Kirby,365 Shuger,366 
Harrison,367 and Irish.368 Kirby and Shuger both take note of Hooker’s deployment of 
dual epistemologies, describing them as Platonic and Augustinian. I propose that 
these are best rendered as the grammars appropriate to the spaces of causes and 
reasons, respectively. I disagree with Rasmussen’s ‘presence and absence’ description 
of Hooker’s sacramental hermeneutic.369 My reading of Hooker’s account of 
participation disagrees with those who read his account as largely Thomist in 
character. Though there are strong similarities, the anthropological and 
epistemological commitments examined in chapter two required that Hooker re-
describe our participation in Christ in a Reformation grammar.
PARTICIPATION IN CHRIST
365. Kirby refers to Hooker’s dual epistemologies in most of his descriptions of Hooker’s account
of the law, usually describing them in terms of Neoplatonic ontology and Augustinian
political theology, wherein he, like me, focuses on Hooker’s use of a relational semantic field
(e.g., conjunction, copulation, etc.) and the hypostatic union. For a good example of this
emphasis, see Kirby, Richard Hooker, Reformer and Platonist.
366. Shuger, Habits of Thought. 43.
367. Harrison makes the point, with which I agree, that the subject of Laws is sanctification, not
justification. Harrison, “Powers of Nature and Influences of Grace in Hooker’s Lawes,”
368. Charles W. Irish, “‘Participation of God Himself:’ Law, the Mediation of Christ, and
Sacramental Participation in the Thought of Richard Hooker,” in Richard Hooker and the
English Reformation: Studies in Early Modern Religious Reforms, (Dordrecht ; Boston: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 2003).
369. Barry G. Rasmussen, “Presence and Absence: Richard Hooker’s Sacramental Hermeneutic,”
in Richard Hooker and the English Reformation: Studies in Early Modern Religious Reforms,
(Dordrecht ; Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003).
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 Real Presence as Conjunction
In his account of the real presence of Christ, Hooker re-describes Thomas’ 
account using the grammar of a thinner ontology implied by Luther's insight regarding
Christ's personal indwelling. For Hooker, this results in two levels of description. The 
first follows from the Reformation insight that faith forms charity,370 and the second is
an eﬀort to redirect a misplaced reification of the real presence in his interlocutor’s 
descriptions of the sacraments. 
The first level of description engaged Puritan colleagues dialectically. Because 
intellection of transcendentals is no longer possible (carrying on in the same way as the
magisterial Reformers),371 Hooker’s task was to describe how participation in Christ is 
possible given our finitude. One sees in Hooker’s solution the marks of both Thomist 
and Augustinian thinking. Aquinas described life with God in terms of love and 
fellowship, and Hooker certainly imagined a life with God in which such fellowship 
leads to transformation. Nonetheless, Aquinas described Christ’s real presence 
relatively more within the semantic field of participation (e.g., intellection of 
transcendentals, transformation, theosis), and Hooker described it relatively more 
within the semantic field of the covenant (copulation, conjunction, interaction). In 
doing so, Hooker follows Augustine in relying upon hypostatic concepts to describe 
our access to Christ's divinity through his humanity.372
Hooker turned to a second level of description in order to respond to 
philosophical puzzlement that ensued in light of Luther's insight regarding the nature 
of Christ's real presence within the heart of believers. This puzzlement had 
theological consequences related to the doctrines of election and predestination that 
included anxieties about whether one has or does not have Christ, and whether one's 
370. Here I allude to Reformation ‘givens’ regarding the human possibility of a priori knowledge
of the good, discussed above in chapter two. See”What's at stake”, page 33.
371. See “Hookerian psychology” on page 54.
372. This relatively greater emphasis on hypostatic union may have been a rhetorically strategic
move. Torrance Kirby argues that the doctrine is central to Hooker’s argument for the female
royal headship of the Church of England. See W.J. Torrance Kirby, Richard Hooker’s Doctrine
of the Royal Supremacy (Leiden ; New York: E.J. Brill, 1990), Chapter IV.
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relation to Christ could be threatened by the alleged heresy or apostasy of others 
within one's community. It also had ecclesiological consequences in the form of 
questions about 'superstitious' ecclesial practices, the role of ordained ministers, and 
the possibility of female leadership of the church. This second level of description 
sought to correct a misplaced reification of the real presence in the sacraments.
In what follows, I will first examine these two levels of description exegetically. 
The key moves are to recognize that Hooker describes the real presence in term of 
conjunction, that he locates that real presence within the heart and soul of the 
believer, and that our participation in Christ grows by steps and degrees as we are 
sustained in a personal relationship - a fellowship - with him.
Universal participation in Christ
Hooker’s first level of description engages the magisterial Reformers dialectically. 
Luther’s decisive insight, for Hooker, is that charity is formed by faith. Encapsulated 
in this pithy statement are premises about the impossibility of finite and sinful 
creatures knowing God without God’s prior gracious action, the presence of Christ in 
the heart of the believer, and the Augustinian emphasis on the conjunction of Christ’s 
humanity and divinity. Christ justifies, giving his indwelling and personal presence, 
and such presence constitutes the forgiveness of sins (favor) and the gift of God 
himself (donum).373
Yet Luther’s view is dualistic. Either one is possessed by Christ or possessed by 
sin. No knowledge of God is possible without Christ’s indwelling. Luther was deeply 
skeptical of Erasmus’ account of mimetic virtue.374
Hooker embraced most of this. The clear point of departure was that Hooker 
strived to imagine a coherent account of mimetic virtue consistent with the insight 
that charity is formed by faith. For Hooker, the human telos is participation in the 
divine rationality.375 Hooker’s account of the real presence is thus bounded on the one 
373. Tuomo Mannermaa and Kirsi Irmeli Stjerna, Christ Present in Faith: Luther’s View of
Justification, 1st Fortress Press Ed ed. (Fortress Press, 2005-01-31), 19.
374. For Luther’s skepticism of mimetic virtue, see Herdt, Putting on Virtue, Chap 6. 
375. “Concerning perfections in this kind [those desires which grow externally] that by
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hand by the asymptote of human finitude, and on the other hand by a teleological 
account of the cosmos which presupposes that all creatures participate in their 
Creator.376 
For Hooker, participation, when fully realized, is fundamentally relational, 
characterized by mutual subjection and reciprocity. We possess Christ and Christ 
possesses us by “special interest property and inherent copulation.”377 This is the 
participation of those who know Christ as Reconciler. But not all persons manifest 
such knowing. There are those who know Christ only as Creator and Governor. There
is thus a level of participation fundamental to all, and another level that characterizes 
only those who know Christ as Reconciler.
The first level of participation in Christ is that which is common to all creation. 
Hooker begins with an allusion to the observation that a cause inherently participates 
in its eﬀects and an eﬀect in its cause:
… we may from that which hath been before suﬃciently proved assume to our purpose these
two principles, that every original cause imparteth itself unto those things which come of it,
and Whatsoever taketh being from any other the same is after a sort in that which giveth it
being.378
With these principles, Hooker demonstrates that the Father and the Son mutually
participate in one another: “It followeth hereupon that the Son of God being light of 
light, must needs be also light in light.”379 Following a reflection on the inner life of the
triune God, Hooker concludes that “The Son [is] in the father as light in that light out
of which it floweth without separation; the father [is] in the Son as light in that light 
which it causeth and leaveth not.”380
We see in Hooker’s Trinitarian illustration a significant echo of the Thomist 
understanding of participation and communion. Creaturely participation in the divine 
proceeding in the knowledge of truth and by growing in the exercise of virtue, man amongst
the creatures of this inferior world aspireth to the greatest conformity with God.”
Laws.I.5.3;I.73.32-74.3.
376. Hooker develops this teleological cosmology fully in Laws.I.5.
377. Laws.V.56.1; 2:234.29-31.
378. Laws.V.56.1; 2:234.31-235.3
379. Laws.V.56.1; 2:235.3-5.
380. Laws.V.56.2; 2:235.25-27.
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is grounded in the principle of “impartation” of causes in their eﬀects. 
Hooker develops his doctrine of participation in four moves within his defense of 
the sacraments. By tracing these moves, we see more clearly that the account of 
practices in chapter five is derived from first principles.381 The first move is to ground 
his doctrine in reflection on the Trinity. The second move is to consider diﬀerences 
between the participation of the Triune Persons in each other and participation of 
humans in Christ. A third move establishes the possibility of the local and ongoing 
presence of Christ within history using Hooker’s doctrine of conjunction. Finally, 
Hooker describes the material interaction through which Christ gives himself in 
covenantal relationship through sacramental practices. I will trace the first of these in 
this chapter and the fourth in the next chapter.
Participation within the Trinity
Hooker grounds his theory of participation in doctrine of the Trinity. He follows 
his metaphor of the Christ who is both "light of light" and "light in light" with an 
extended discussion of the relationship between the persons:
The persons of the Godhead, by reason of the unity of their substance, do as necessarily
remain one within another as they are of necessity to be distinguished one from another,
because two are the issue of one, and one the oﬀspring of the other two, only of three one not
growing out of any other. And since they all are but one God in number, one indivisible
essence or substance, their distinction cannot possibly admit separation. For how should that
subsist solitarily by itself which hath no substance but individually the very same whereby
others subsist with it, seeing that the multiplication of substances in particular is necessarily
required to make those things subsist apart which have the selfsame general nature, and the
persons of that Trinity are not three particular substances to whom one general nature is
common, but three that subsist by one substance which itself is particular, yet that all three have
it, and their several ways of having it are that which maketh their personal distinction? The
Father therefore is in the Son, and the Son in him, they both in the Spirit, and the Spirit in
both them.382 
Hooker's presentation is instructive. Shared participation in the divine Being does
not cause the relation of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. That is, shared participation is 
not logically prior to their relatedness. Rather, relatedness is constitutive of the 
identity of both Father and Son. The self-determination of the Father is to be in 
381. This derivation from first principles answers one of the common criticisms of the ecclesial
ethicists. See “Criticism of the Ecclesial Ethicists”, page 193. 
382. Laws.V.56.2; 2.235.5-21; Emphasis original.
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relation to the Son, and the identity of the Son is determined by relation to the 
Father. The determination of the Son by the Father is that the Son should “flow 
without separation” from the Father, and the self-determination of the Father is that 
the Father shall cause and “leaveth not” the Son. In the self-determination of the 
Father and in the determination of the Son by the Father, their “mutual inward hold” 
and “copulation” are “inherent.” The Son participates in the Father not as a 
consequence of an innate intellection of the mind of the Father made possible 
through a common material Being, but as a consequence of their inherent relatedness. 
For Hooker, Father and Son are essentially related because the Father determined 
that it would be so. 
Human participation in the Trinity
As noted above, Hooker distinguishes two degrees of human participation in God.
The first, common to all creatures, is the ontological participation of the eﬀect in its 
cause and the cause in its eﬀect. The second, arising exclusively from the acceptance 
of the human's election in Jesus Christ, is interpersonal, though "in no sort like unto 
that" of the interpersonal relation between Father and Son.383 This second level of 
participation corresponds to Luther’s indwelling of Christ in the heart of the believer.
The participation in God common to all creatures is that which is integral to the 
relation between Creator and creature. Hooker sees this within the framework of his 
description of Christ the Creator, for “all things which God in their times and seasons 
hath brought forth were eternally and before all time in God as a work unbegun is in 
the artificer which afterward bringeth it unto eﬀect."384 This universal participation in 
God results from the objective presence of Christ in all created things. Christ 
participates in all things in the sense of piercing them with his animating power:
All things are therefore partakers of God, they are his oﬀspring, his influence is in them, and
the personal wisdom of God is for that very cause said to excel in nimbleness or agility, to
pierce into all intellectual pure and subtile spirits, to go through all, and to reach unto every
383. Laws.V.56.5; 2.236.21-22.
384. Laws.V.56.5; 2.237.15-18
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thing which is. Otherwise, how should the same wisdom be that which supporteth, beareth
up, and sustaineth all?385
Hooker's second degree of human participation in Christ is personal in analogy to 
the relation of the persons of the Trinity. As I will explain in the next section, personal 
participation is not potential but actual and historical,386 denoting a knowledge of and 
union with one another that arises through a concrete history, like that of a daughter 
with her mother.
Hooker clarifies that the personal participation of humans in Christ is radically 
diﬀerent from that of the incarnated Son in the Father due to human finitude:
All other things that are of God have God in them and he them in himself likewise. Yet
because their substance and his wholly diﬀereth, their coherence and communion either with
him or amongst themselves is in no sort like that before mentioned.387
  
Human participation in Christ, therefore, has two degrees corresponding to 
Hooker’s version of the duplex cognitio Dei. All created things participate in Christ the 
Creator and Governor, where participation is described in terms of causes and eﬀects. 
Yet not all created things participate personally in Christ in the sense of having a lived
history through which both God's nature and authentic human nature are revealed 
through interactions occurring within time and space. Only those who accept their 
eternal election by Christ participate personally in Christ through a mystical 
385. Laws.V.56.5; 2.236.26-32
386. My usage of the phrase ‘historically and actually’ is an intentional invocation of Barth’s
actualistic ontology and ecclesiology, which I suggest Hooker would embrace. As Woodard -
Lehman observes, “Like faith itself, in both its kerygma and dogma, the Church is nothing
other than its common conversation and confession that results. We might call this Barth’s
“actualistic ecclesiology.””Woodard-Lehman, “Freedom and Authority,” 210. “Actual and
historical” are the hallmarks of Barth’s “actualism,” and, for George Hunsinger, have precise
technical meaning in Barth’s usage. My usage of these terms follows Hunsinger’s
explanation of Barth’s actualism: “This pattern appears again and again in the Church
Dogmatics. The church, the inspiration of Scripture, faith, and all other creaturely realities in
their relationship to God are always understood as events. They are not self-initiating and
self-sustaining. They are not grounded in a neutral, ahistorical, or ontological relationship to
God independent of the event of grace. Nor are they actualizations of certain ontologically
given creaturely capacities. Rather, they have not only their being but also their possibility
only as they are continually established anew according to the divine good pleasure. They
have their being only in act - in the act of God which elicits from the creature the otherwise
impossible act of free response.” George Hunsinger, How to Read Karl Barth: The Shape of His
Theology, With Special Reference to the Conception of Truth, Kindle ed. (Oxford University Press,
USA, 1994-04-29),  Kindle loc. 439, Chap 1, para 7.
387. Laws.V.56.6; 2:236.18-26. Emphasis added.
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conjunction:
For in him we actually are by our actual incorporation into that society which hath him for their
head and doth make together with him one body (he and they in that respect having one
name) for which cause by virtue of this mystical conjunction we are of him and in him even as
though our very flesh and bones should be made continuate with his.388
Thus, Hooker acknowledges the ontological basis by which all creatures 
participate in Christ the Creator, but distinguishes between that and the personal 
participation in Christ that mystically transforms the eternally elect as they respond 
responsibly to the revelation of Christ the Reconciler. The participation fundamental 
to all creatures does not constitute “being in Christ” in its fullest, saving sense:
It is too cold an interpretation, whereby some men expound our being in Christ to import
nothing else, but only that the self-same nature, which maketh us to be men, is in him, and
maketh him man as we are. For what man in the world is there which hath not so far forth
communion with Jesus Christ? It is not this that can sustain the weight of such sentences as
speak of the mystery of our coherence with Jesus Christ. The Church is in Christ as Eve was
in Adam. Yea by grace we are every of us in Christ and in his Church, as by nature we are in
those our first parents. God made Eve of the rib of Adam. And his Church he frameth out of
the very flesh, the very wounded and bleeding side of the Son of Man. His body crucified and
his blood shed for the life of the world, are the true elements of that heavenly being, which
maketh us such as himself is of whom we come.389 
Here Hooker strikes a soteriological note that will be important in what follows. 
All humans participate ontologically in Christ the Creator and Governor, but it is only
that personal participation in which Christ is known as Reconciler which mystically 
and salvifically transforms. The soteriological point is that the means of that personal 
participation in Christ - the means of grace - is the encounter with Christ in his 
human nature - the human nature reconciled to the divine, “his body crucified  and his
blood shed.” The body and blood oﬀered “for the life of the world” are inseparable 
from the divine; they are indeed “the true elements of that heavenly being” which 
transform us into that which he is eternally - authentic humanity, reconciled to the 
Father. Fellowship - understood as personal, reconciling participation in the Christ -  
is participation in the human nature that is inseparable but distinct from the divine 
nature of our risen Lord, the Logos ensarkos. 
388. Laws.V.56.7; 238.29-239.5; Emphasis added.
389. Laws.V.56.7; 2:239.13-26
- 127 -
Copulation and conjunction 
For Hooker, the Church is conjoined to Christ as Eve was to Adam, formed by 
Christ's body and blood just as Eve was formed from Adam's rib. The joyful and 
transforming participation in Christ to which all are called is not merely Platonic, but, 
in analogy to the sexual union, is material and personal, a deep fellowship 
characterized by a reciprocal "inward hold," "possession," and "inherent copulation."390
Similarly, the community of those who respond responsibly to their election are 
"oﬀspring of God"391 who are "sprung out of [Christ]"392 and whom "Christ… knoweth 
and loveth... even as parts of himself,"393 
This portrait of a union that is material and personal raises a significant 
philosophical question: how can Christ be present locally and across time? If Jesus 
died two thousand years ago, how can such union - in analogy to the sexual union of 
Adam and Eve - be possible for disciples living in the twenty-first century? How can 
the body and blood of Jesus of Nazareth by which we are conjoined to Christ be 
locally present to Christian communities in our time?
The question of how the body and blood of Jesus is present locally is not merely a 
question in sacramentology; it is immediately christological and ultimately 
soteriological. For our purposes, it is not just about the Eucharist. Rather, 
consideration of how Christ is present in the Eucharist is decisive for our 
understanding of how Christ is present in all ecclesial practices, and therefore 
becomes decisive for our understanding of the role of practices in the formation of 
Christ in community. 
We saw in the previous section that, for Hooker, personal, reconciling 
participation in Christ just is participation in the human nature that is inseparable but
distinct from the divine nature of our risen Lord, the Logos ensarkos. But how does one 
390. Laws.V.56.1; 2:234.29-31.
391. Laws.V.56.5; 2.237.23
392. Laws.V.56.6; 2.238.5-6
393. Laws.V.56.7; 2.239.5-6
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encounter Christ’s human nature? Calvin was willing to grant Christ’s reconciling 
presence in the Lord’s Supper “in a special manner” yet insisted that Christ’s local 
presence is constituted by his divine nature because his flesh “will remain in heaven till
he come to judgement.” Undergirding this is the Reformed doctrine that the 
Lutherans dubbed extra Calvinisticum which gives us the concepts of Logos asarkos and 
ensarkos. The concepts were:
… an attempt by the Reformed to maintain: (1) the proper, Chalcedonian distinction between
the natures, and (2) that the natures remain unaltered and undiminished. Therefore the Word
is fully incarnate in the human Jesus, but is etiam extra carnem – also outside the flesh.394
Darren Sumner observes that Calvin’s method of refuting the Lutheran doctrine 
of ubiquity was problematic to the extent that it posits a Word that is both “fully 
incarnate in the human Jesus” and “also outside the flesh.” The conception seems to 
imply the existence of a Christ who can be known known apart from Jesus of 
Nazareth:
The primary concern of the Fathers was that the body of the Word did not bind him to time
and space, bringing a hiatus to his divine transcendence. This has more to do with the
character of the person who becomes incarnate (as emerged in the kenosis debates) than with
the metaphysical reality of the hypostatic union per se. The subtle shift in the extra's center of
gravity among the Reformed after 1564 is evident in the illustration of 'Antwerp on the ocean':
that Antwerp is located on the ocean does not mean that Antwerp covers the whole world.
The analogy was originally to explain Christ's presence at the right hand of the Father: so the
fact that Christ is everywhere by virtue of his divinity (the ocean) does not mean that his
humanity is everywhere as well.395 
As Sumner concludes, “The implication of this constructive use of an ancient 
principle is that the extra Calvinisticum retains for the Logos a transcendent way of 
being in which he is not incarnate.”396
Hooker seems to have been aware of this problem. He agreed with Calvin that 
Christ’s “human substance in itself is naturally absent from the earth, his soul and 
body not on earth but in heaven only.”397 Yet Hooker importantly diverges from 
Calvin398 in granting the possibility of the local presence of Christ’s human body “after 
394. Darren Sumner, “The Twofold Life of the Word: Karl Barth’s Critical Reception of the Extra
Calvinisticum,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 15, no. 1 (January 2013): 42-57. 43.
395. Ibid.
396.  Ibid., 44.
397. Laws.V.55.6-7; 2.231.22-24.
398. Here I diverge from Kirby. By my reading, Hooker is more nuanced than Calvin in
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a sort”: 
…. because this substance is inseparably joined to that personal word which his very divine
essence is present to all things, the nature which cannot have in itself universal presence hath
it after a sort by being nowhere severed from that which everywhere is present. For inasmuch
as that infinite word is not divisible into parts, it could not in part but must needs be wholly
incarnate, and consequentially wheresoever the word is it hath with it manhood.399
Hooker quickly dismisses the Lutheran doctrine of ubiquity but endeavors to 
preserve Luther’s key insight that Christ must be present locally to us in his humanity 
if we who are finite are to know the divine. His constructive method is to adopt 
analogical language. He deploys the phrases “after a sort”  and “in some sort” to point 
to a mystical reality that can only be described with the humility of metaphor: “The 
nature which cannot have in itself universal presence hath it after a sort by being 
nowhere severed from that which everywhere is present.” 
Hooker distinguishes between “the person of Christ” and “the whole of Christ.” A
person, as I suggest below,400 is one with whom it is possible to share a lived history 
through which his or her nature is revealed. A person, therefore, is both a subject who 
reveals himself and an object that is capable of being known. One can know a person 
without encountering all of a person. So it is, “after a sort,” with Christ:
For the person of Christ is whole, perfect God and perfect man wheresoever, although the parts
of his manhood being finite and his deity infinite we cannot say that the whole of Christ is
simply everywhere, as we may that his deity is and that his person is by force of deity.401
How do we encounter the humanity of the risen Lord locally though it is located 
at the right hand of the Father in heaven and lacks the attribute of ubiquity? “By force
of deity.” The force of deity causes the possibility and the eﬃcacy of our personal 
describing how Christ's humanity can be locally present while Christ's body sits at the right
hand of the Father. Kirby sees Calvin and Hooker as nearly identical in locating the risen
Lord at the right hand of the Father, and notes that Hooker holds that the mystical body is
not present locally. My reading has Hooker addressing the problem I mention with the extra
Calvinisticum more subtly by gesturing towards an explanation of how we can claim we
encounter Christ's humanity even though he reigns at the right hand of the Father. This is
not a claim that Christ's body is located otherwise, but an explanation of how we can
nonetheless experience his humanity locally in our sacramental practices. Kirby and I agree
that Hooker describes our experience of the presence locally in terms of the hypostatic union.
399. Laws.V.55.6-7; 2.231.24-31. Emphasis added.
400. See “Personhood” on page 134.
401. Laws.V.55.8; 2.231.33-232.13. Emphasis original.
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participation in Christ through the conjunction of the divine and human natures in 
Christ:
For somewhat of the person of Christ is not everywhere in that sort namely his manhood, the only
conjunction whereof with deity is extended as far as deity, the actual position restrained and
tied to a certain place. Yet presence by way of conjunction is in some sort presence.402 
 Reification Redirected
I turn now to Hooker’s second level of description. Here the key moves are to 
understand that there are two forms of justified knowing - one in the realm of causes 
and the other in the realm of reasons, that a personal relationship is manifest in a 
shared history, and that our personal experience of Christ’s real presence is 
experienced in the space of reasons, not causes. On the basis of this account, we can 
understand how the Spirit creates the personal relationships with Christ that are 
essential to the account of mimetic virtue I will introduce in the next chapter.
Reconstructing Calvin's de-reification project
Earlier, I alluded to Hooker’s eﬀort to redirect a misplaced reification of the real 
presence on the part of his interlocutors. The interlocutors in view here clearly 
include those holding Roman and Lutheran perspectives of the real presence.403 It is 
easy to imagine, however, that Hooker also addressed his Elizabethan colleagues, 
whether for or against Genevan reforms, who evinced an insuﬃcient valuation of the 
real presence, failing to appreciate its sanctifying role in ecclesial practices.404
We saw in the previous section that all humans participate in Christ naturally, but 
that only those elect who respond responsibly to their election participate in Christ 
personally in the sense of the mutual indwelling that Luther describes. Hooker 
describes this personal participation in terms of the encounter with Christ’s humanity 
which is conjoined with Christ’s divinity. Given Luther’s dualistic proclamation that 
one either has Christ within or does not, much is at stake in the doctrine of the real 
402. Laws.V.55.8; 2.231.33-232.13. Emphasis original.
403. Laws.V.67.11; 2:340.2-15.
404. As Lake observes, Archbishop Whitgift, ostensibly an early sponsor of Hooker’s project,
defended the rites and ceremonies of the Church of England by denying them the duty of
edification. Lake, Anglicans and Puritans. 39.
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presence within the heart of believers. Does one have Christ or not? Is my neighbor’s 
sinfulness, heresy, or apostasy potentially a threat to Christ’s real presence within me? 
Is my own sin? And what is the significance of ecclesial practices grounded in the 
premise that Christ is really present in the community and in individuals?
In diﬀerent ways, Roman and Lutheran doctrine reified real presence in the 
sacraments. Calvin resisted this reification, famously responding with his weak form of
the real presence, which firmly locates Christ's humanity at the right hand of the 
Father. Hooker's challenge was to defend the ecclesial practices of the Elizabethan 
Church against claims that those practices are tainted by the 'dangerous superstition' 
of Rome. Hooker responded by rationally reconstructing Calvin's account in order to 
illuminate the essential connection between one's personal relationship with Christ 
and one's successive encounters with Christ's real presence, particularly in the 
sacraments.405 
Two kinds of knowing
Hooker’s second level of description is signaled by his repeated use of linguistic 
cues such as “after a sort” which qualify his explanation of how Christ’s humanity is 
present even though Christ is exalted in heaven. These qualifications imply that there 
are at least two ways of experiencing the presence of phenomena. Hooker, however, is 
vague here, and does not tell us what he is denoting. In what follows, I shift into a 
more constructive register to suggest that Hooker’s ‘after a sort’ cues reflect an 
ontology described in the grammar appropriate to the space of reasons.
As noted in chapter two,406 all human knowledge is derived from the phenomenal 
due to creaturely finitude. Given Hooker’s rich conception of the empirical, I suggest 
405. Here I depart from Kirby, who sees Hooker’s account as identical to Calvin’s. My proposal is
that Hooker subtly adapted Calvin's weak doctrine of the real presence in order to suggest
that, though the risen Christ's body is located in Heaven, we nonetheless encounter it locally.
This is not a claim that Christ's body is located otherwise, but a suggestion that we can
nonetheless experience his humanity locally in our sacramental practices. I shall demonstrate
in what follows that, for Hooker, Christ’s body can indeed, “in some sort,” be present locally
by force of deity even though his body is constrained to be at the right hand of the Father in
heaven. Neelands also sees Hooker’s position as diverging from Calvin and owing
inspiration to Cyril of Alexandria via Thomas instead. Cf. Neelands, “The Theology of Grace
of Richard Hooker”. 312-4.
406. See page 59.
- 132 -
that ‘the phenomenal’ is that which appears to ordinary human perception and reason 
in the spaces of causes and reasons. The phenomena we experience reliably refer to 
the reality of the objects we encounter (though, as Hooker himself emphasized, we are
vulnerable to probabilistic error in our apprehension of all phenomena). There is that 
which we know because we comprehend cause and eﬀect empirically - the realm of 
causes in which we know scientifically through inductive identification of material and 
eﬃcient causes. Such knowledge is communicable diachronically and synchronically, 
and capable of being gathered as endoxa and tested dialectically.
Yet the space of causes is not the only manner of our knowing. We also know 
things and ideas that are manifest to us - through experience of their ‘manifest image.’ 
That is, we know them not through our identification of their material or eﬃcient 
causes but through our experience of them as final causes. 
Aristotle taught in his Physics that descriptions which adequately explain 
phenomena include accounts of their material, formal, eﬃcient, and final causes. Yet 
there is an important distinction between having suﬃcient comprehension of all four 
causes and having justification to make claims about the phenomena encountered. If 
we encounter a statue of a president, we are justified in our claim that it is a statute of 
a president even if we don’t know its material or its sculptor. Though we may be 
unable to oﬀer a scientific description of it that would satisfy Aristotle, its final cause 
is manifest to us.407
Final causes are manifest to us rationally. Such knowing is the product of rational 
causation. We need not be skeptical of such knowing. We are justified in making 
claims about them and can oﬀer justification for our claims. When we make such 
claims, we place our characterization of the object of our knowing in ‘the logical space 
of  reasons.’408 
407. Aristotle, Complete Works Vol 1. Phys.194b23–35 
408. Wilfrid Sellars, Science, Perception and Reality (Ridgeview Pub Co, 1991-06-01). §36. My
treatment and deployment of Sellars’ conception of the logical space of reasons is informed
by Kevin Hector, Theology Without Metaphysics: God, Language and the Spirit of Recognition
(Current Issues in Theology, No. 8) (Cambridge University Press, 2011-10-31).
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Personhood
Personal relationships belong not to the realm of material relations and eﬃcient 
causation but to the realm of rational relations and final causality. They belong to the 
logical space of reasons.409 In personal relationships, we know persons as persons - 
their final end. Or, better, as persons carrying on towards their final end. We know 
them as both formal and final causes.
Not all persons are human,410 and personhood is not synonymous with human 
nature. There is a distinction between a human and a person that is akin to the 
distinction between the potential and the actual. A human is a neuro-physiological 
system, but a person is more than this. A person has the capacity to feel, to experience
emotions, to think, and to act, and the patterns in which these capacities are actuated 
constitute dispositions in the literal sense. A person's “second nature” is manifest as 
dispositions.411
Dispositions constitute the nature of a person, but their nature is represented 
through successive acts. To know the nature of a person, therefore, requires 
encounters of the successive acts through which their dispositions are revealed. 
Dispositions will be central in this study when I turn to the question of mimetic virtue
in the next chapter, but for now the key point is that a person’s nature is manifest to 
us as dispositions, and dispositions are revealed to us through successive 
representations, which is to say one’s person is manifest to us through successive 
encounters with their thoughts, words, and actions.
A personal relationship, therefore, is one in which the attention of two persons is 
directed to each other such that they encounter the successive acts of the other 
through which their natures are revealed. Such attention requires an initiating 
409. I am indebted to my colleague, Derek Woodard-Lehman, for introducing me to Sellars and
the reasons/causes distinction.
410. Per the account oﬀered here, other communicable mammals might be described as persons.
And so can the Trinity.
411. Wilfrid Sellars, “Metaphysics and the Concept of a Person,” in Box 34, Folder 3, ed. Special
Collections Department Archives of Scientific Philosophy, Wilfrid S. Sellars Papers,
1899-1990 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh), 28. 
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instance of attention-getting (such as the Thomist moment of doxastic causality), and 
then a series of reciprocating representations, of action and response, through which 
revelation of natures is communicated. More simply: a personal relationship is 
constituted by a shared history of address and response.412 
Real presence
The foregoing helps us to imagine the possibility of the local presence of Christ’s 
human nature. We saw before that we encounter the humanity of Christ in spite of 
his body’s location at the right hand of the Father in heaven by way of the conjunction
of his human and divine natures. We now are in a position to see how this is possible. 
His human nature is integral to his personhood, and is locally and universally present 
by the force of his divine nature. 
Perhaps this is best comprehended through an analogy. Imagine one sees a 
daughter just as she walks past a window. All one captures is a glimpse of the shoulder 
of a female form in a red sweater but one’s shared history enables one to recognize 
that form as “daughter.” All that was present was the shoulder, but yet in that glimpse 
of a shoulder we encounter the whole person: “that’s my daughter, my beloved!” 
Through the conjunction of her body with her personality which we have come to 
know, the fullness of her person is present to us and our shared history with her is 
evoked immediately in us. We experience her presence even though we have seen only
a part of her body. “… presence by way of conjunction is in some sort presence.” 
The reverse case is also true. When we capture only a glimpse of an aspect of her 
412. This account of personhood, derived from philosopher Wilfred Sellars, compares remarkably
well with Barth’s distinction between a ‘state’ and ‘history.’ Neder notes, “Barth defines
history by contrasting it with what he calls a state (Zustand). According to Barth, the concept
of a state ‘involves the idea of something completely insulated within the state in question,
the idea of a limitation of its possibilities and therefore of its possible changes and modes of
behavior.’” Neder, Participation in Christ, 32-33. In contrast, Barth says that “History,
therefore, does not occur when the being is involved in changes or diﬀerent modes of
behaviour intrinsic to itself, but when something takes place upon and to the being as it is.
The history of a being begins, continues and is completed when something other than itself and
transcending its own nature encounters it, approaches it and determines its being in the nature proper
to it, so that it is compelled and enabled to transcend itself in response and in relation to this new
factor. The history of a being occurs when it is caught up in this movement, change and
relation, when its circular movement is broken from without by a movement towards it and
the corresponding movement from it, when it is transcended from without so that it must
and can transcend itself outwards.” Barth, CD, III/2.§44.3.158. Emphasis added.
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personality which we have come to know through our shared history, the fullness of 
her person, which is inseparable from her body, is evoked immediately in us. There is a
rational presence. Though her body is at the same time elsewhere, it is in some sort 
present to us by force of her personality (or, what some might call her spirit). Presence 
by way of conjunction is in some sort presence.
So, Hooker points out, Christ’s body can indeed, in some sort, be present locally 
by force of deity even though his body is constrained to be at the right hand of the 
Father in heaven. He does not try to explain the nature of this presence beyond the 
linguistic cues indicating metaphor (after a sort and in some sort), but rather describes it 
as mystical. Yet he seems to hint here at something quite important to our 
contemporary discourse. This hint leads me to propose the reconstruction of 
Hooker’s account of being that follows.
It seems that “after a sort” refers to a relational presence that is manifest within a 
personal relationship in the sense of a shared sociality, actualized in interactions of 
address and response across the horizon of time. Such presence is real because the 
relationship is real. That is, it is the presence of a significant relation that is forged 
only through a shared history. Presence need not be physically proximate in order to be
real. 
Hooker seems to have in view here an account of being that describes reality (and 
participation) not merely in terms of material or eﬃcient causation, but in other terms
(‘after a sort'). He does not make explicit those other terms, but only gestures toward 
his perspective with his emphasis on the possibility of interpersonal relations that 
communicate the whole person without being dependent on the proximate physical 
presence of that person. This is a diﬀerent ontology, an account of being that is based 
not on material or eﬃcient causation but on relation, reason, and action. It is an 
account of being described in terms of formal and final causation. 
Authentic relationships in which persons participate in one another are mediated 
by physical things and events (shared bread, shared wine, shared water, shared milk, 
shared honey, shared oil). They are also mediated by memories of shared experiences 
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which are also physical to the extent they are mapped in phonemes and graphemes in 
the mind. Yet real relationships cannot be reduced to the material or physical things 
that mediate them or to the sum of all such material events through which they are 
mediated. Relationships are more than the materials that mediate them. That is, the 
physical properties of the persons or things in relation do not, themselves, determine 
the structure of their relation. We can relate to humans as though they are inanimate 
resources to be discarded when consumed, and we can relate to wooden things as 
though they are gods. And, tragically, we do. The relational presence which 
communicates the whole person is not determined by physical proximity of the 
person’s matter. 
Authentic relationships are expressions of communion between persons within 
history, and not exchanges of properties that can be suﬃciently described in terms of 
material or eﬃcient causation. Expressions of communion occupy "the space of 
reasons" in the sense that there exists a reciprocal knowing of and responsiveness to 
one another arising from a shared history. Hooker seems to be gesturing toward 
something like this in his description of interpersonal participation that is not 
determined by physical proximity but by something else. “After a sort” thus seems to 
indicate a diﬀerent account of being: a relational presence that is not determined by 
physical proximity but is nonetheless real, a presence mediated by reciprocal address 
and response across the horizon of time. It denotes a well known phenomenon - the 
meaningful presence of persons united through their shared history.
If this is correct, then Hooker seems to be implying that participation in Christ 
does not depend upon an exchange of properties, and therefore no theories of 
transubstantiation or consubstantiation are needed in order to justify claims that 
Christ is really and locally present in our sacramental practices.413 The reality of our 
relation to Christ within the context of a sacramental act is not dependent upon the 
physical presence of Christ's humanity. Instead of an exchange of properties 
(communicatio idiomatum), our participation entails an expression of interpersonal 
413. This is in fact the move Hooker makes when discussing the Eucharist. See See page 177 for
Hooker’s rejection of transsubstantiation and consubstantiation.
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knowing of and responsiveness to Christ arising from a shared covenantal history. 
Communicatio actionis reconciliantis Christi, not communicatio idiomatum.414 The meaning 
of our relation to Christ within the context of our sacramental acts is dependent upon
the intelligibility of our responsiveness to Christ given the context of our shared 
history with him.415 To the extent that our practices express our recognition of and 
response to the grace communicated as a summons to have our lives determined by 
Christ’s covenant of grace, our participation in Christ in our sacramental practices is 
real.416
 The communication of Christ's real presence
Yet more must be said. The assertion that the reality of our relation to Christ is 
not dependent upon the physical proximity of Christ's humanity is not a claim that 
our relation to Christ is possible without the real presence of Christ’s humanity. 
Rather, it is a claim that real presence is not to be confused with physical presence. 
The real presence of Christ’s exalted body is essential to Hooker’s soteriology. 
To understand why, we need merely recall Hooker’s account of the eternal law and
the discussion with which this chapter began regarding human participation in the 
Trinity.417 Pre-temporally, God willed that all creation would be eternally in a 
414. The communication of the reconciling actions of Christ, not the communication of properties,
more clearly describes what is expressed in the personal relationship the Spirits creates
between the elect and Christ. 
415. Fellowship, rather than participation, more carefully describes the communion with Christ in
which the divine is simultaneously alterior and immanent. This subtle distinction partially
answers one of John Webster’s criticisms of those who emphasize practices. Participation
understood as fellowship clarifies that the real presence through which the Spirit acts in
practices never ceases to be alterior even as the practices proclaim Christ’s immanence.
Compare Barth: “To put it in the simplest way, what unites God and us men is that He does
not will to be God without us, that He creates us rather to share with us and therefore with
our being and life and act His own incomparable being and life and act, that He does not allow
His history to be His and ours ours, but causes them to take place as a common history.” Ibid., IV/
1.§57.1.7. Emphasis added. As Neder notes, per Barth, “God share[s] his being with
humanity.... by including humanity in the history of the Covenant.” Neder, Participation in
Christ, 44. For Webster’s criticism and my response, see “John Webster’s Barthian Critique”
on page 193.
416. Compare Barth: “What is the nature of objective participation in Christ? The answer, [Barth]
responds, ‘is that we ourselves are directly summoned, that we are lifted up, that we are
awakened to our our truest being as life and act, that we are set in motion by the fact that in
that one man God has made Himself our peacemaker and the giver and gift of our
salvation.’” Ibid., 46-47. Neder quotes Barth, CD, IV/1 §57.14.. Emphasis added.
417. On human participation in the Trinity, see “Human participation in the Trinity” beginning
on page 125. On the essentiallity of human relatedness to God and other creatures, see
“Hookerian ontology” on page 44. 
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particular relation to its Creator, a relation of action in which God moves eternally 
towards God’s creation. Furthermore, God willed that the very being of God’s 
creatures entails a relatedness to God and to each other that is essential to their 
nature, a relation of action in which all creatures move symphonically  and reciprocally
toward their Creator. Precisely because of the covenant of grace, humans are 
essentially relational and related to Christ and each other, and their reality consists of 
this action, this movement. Real presence is not to be confused with physical presence
because real presence is manifest as an event in which one experiences being 
addressed by one wholly other than oneself in the logical space of reasons.
Relatedness to Christ is not an abstraction, but a pretemporal act of creation. The 
real presence of Christ, similarly, is not an abstraction but a temporal event in which 
one recognizes that one is addressed by Christ. Communion with Christ, therefore, 
requires neither the capacity to participate innately in the divine Mind nor materiality
in order to be real. Communion with Christ requires a re-membering, a re-cognition, a
re-conciliation of a relation that is already intrinsic to humans. Real presence is not to 
be confused with physical presence because its reality consists of this actual and 
historical re-membering, re-cognition, and re-conciliation of a relation that just is the 
reciprocal address and response of Creator and creature.418
Real presence to the community
For Hooker, it is insuﬃcient to claim that we share in Christ’s destiny and the 
benefits of his exaltation simply because we share his human nature:
It is too cold an interpretation, whereby some men expound our being in Christ to import
nothing else, but only that the self-same nature, which maketh us to be men, is in him, and
maketh him man as we are. For what man in the world is there which hath not so far forth
communion with Jesus Christ? It is not this that can sustain the weight of such sentences as
speak of the mystery of our coherence with Jesus Christ.419 
418. Compare Barth. Ibid., III/2.§44.3.164. As Neder notes, “Barth describes the event of human
fellowship with God in a variety of ways: the transcending of human beings by God and the
corresponding human transcendance of one’s state; the procession of divine action and the
return of fitting human action; the divine election of humanity and the human election of
God, and so on. All these ways of speaking point to the same event: the union of God and
humanity that occurs as God’s command is met with human obedience.” Neder, Participation
in Christ, 35.
419. Laws.V.56.7; 2:239.14-19
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Participation in Christ requires more than mere sharing of his human nature. As 
Paul taught the Philippians, participation entails a “know[ing of] Christ and the power
of his resurrection and the sharing of his suﬀerings by becoming like him in his death” 
(Phil. 3:10 NRSV). Participation in Christ’s exaltation entails necessarily a sharing in 
his humiliation; there can not be a knowing of one without the other, because they 
dynamically interpret one another. To share in his humiliation and exaltation - to 
claim the events of his death and resurrection as one’s shared history with him - is to 
share in his body and blood. 
The Church is in Christ as Eve was in Adam. Yea by grace we are every of us in Christ and in
his Church, as by nature we are in those our first parents. God made Eve of the rib of Adam.
And his Church he frameth out of the very flesh, the very wounded and bleeding side of the
Son of Man. His body crucified and his blood shed for the life of the world, are the true
elements of that heavenly being, which maketh us such as himself is of whom we come.420
Hooker implies a distinction that highlights the importance of human sharing in 
Christ’s body and blood. The participation in Christ that all creatures share - as the 
eﬀects caused by Christ the Creator - can be qualified as natural participation. This is 
the participation all humans share as sons and daughters of the First Adam. Our 
natural participation in Christ is potentially personal, arising as it does from the 
persons of the Trinity whose desire it is to be known by creation with the clarity and 
consequent adoration natural to the heavenly hosts. As we saw in the previous section,
actual personal participation in Christ entails a reciprocal knowing of and 
responsiveness to Christ mediated by a sociality, an interactivity, and a history of 
shared life, all of which are constituted by rationality. Our rationality, however, no 
longer avails for us naturally because the noetic eﬀects of sin include a distorted 
rationality, a blindness, a forgetfulness of our creaturely relation to our Creator, and 
the adoration of idols. 
Only our relationship with Jesus, the Second Adam, perfects our rationality and 
restores our sight, re-establishing the possibility of an actual personal participation in 
Christ. We participate in the First Adam naturally through our sharing in the rib he 
420. Laws.V.56.7; 2:239.19-26
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gave for the First Eve. We participate in the Second Adam through our sharing in the 
body and blood he shed for the Second Eve, the Church. The risen and glorified body 
of the Second Adam, which encompasses simultaneously his exaltation and 
humiliation, his Resurrection and Cross, is the cause of the Second Eve. The Church, 
as the eﬀect, participates in its cause in a way that transcends time and space by 
sharing in the body and blood which alone perfects human rationality and restores 
human sight, recovering for us our forgotten but natural identity, our shared history 
through which Christ the Creator, Governor, and Reconciler is really, personally 
present. 
Perhaps, then, ‘after a sort,’ is indeed a diﬀerent kind of presence, a presence that 
is not only genuine communion because it is mediated by a sociality, an interactivity, 
and a history of shared life, but a presence that is also appropriate to Christ’s 
particular body in its identity as the cause of our redemption - that non-material 
rational presence of a cause in its eﬀects.421 
Real presence to discrete individuals
There is a distinction between this claim of the possibility of Christ’s humanity 
being locally present rationally, socially, actually, and historically to the Church, and 
the further claim that Christ is so present to discrete individuals. How is Christ 
present in such a way that we individually encounter the phenomenon of “that mutual 
inward hold which Christ hath of us and we of him in such sort that each possesseth 
other by way of special interest property and inherent copulation?”422  
For Hooker, the answer arises once again from the universality of the presence of 
the human nature by way of conjunction. “Session at the right hand of God is the actual 
exercise of that regency and dominion wherein the manhood of Christ is joined and 
matched with the deity of the Son of God.”423 The Son in his humanity wills what the 
421. I am indebted to my colleague, Jeﬀ Boldt, for helping me to clarify my thinking about the
possibility of a presence appropriate to a cause that Christ’s body possesses but which our
bodies do not possess.
422. Laws.V.56.1; 2:234.29-31.
423. Laws.V.55.8; 2:233:12-14.
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Father wills, and, as “the head to the Church which is his body424” reigns as the “one to
whom all hearts are open, all desires are known, and from whom no secrets are hid.”425 
The Son’s soul and, “in some sort,” his body “is present in all things in which [his] 
deity… worketh”: 
Touching the manner how he worketh as man in all things, the principal powers of the soul of
man are the will and the understanding, the one of which two in Christ assenteth unto all
things, and from the other nothing which deity doth work is hid. So that by knowledge and
assent the soul of Christ is present in all things which the deity of Christ worketh. And even
the body of Christ itself although the definite limitation thereof be most sensible doth
notwithstanding admit in some sort a kind of infinite and unlimited presence likewise.426
In similar fashion, we encounter not only Christ’s human nature, but that 
particular humanity that cooperates perfectly with and is reconciled to the divine “in 
all things”: 
Again as the manhood of Christ may after a sort be everywhere said to be present because that
person is everywhere present from whose divine substance manhood nowhere is severed; so
the same universality of presence may likewise seem in another respect applicable thereunto,
namely by cooperation with deity and that in all things.427
By way of conjunction of the two natures, even though Christ’s body sits at the 
right hand of the Father in heaven, we encounter universally and locally the obedient 
Second Adam - authentic humanity - and we as individuals are possessed by the one 
who gave himself for us: “This government therefore he exerciseth both as God and as
man; as God by essential presence with all things, as man by cooperation with that 
which is essentially present.”428 
Real presence across generations
A final soteriological point remains. So far we have seen that the exalted Christ’s 
body is physically located on his divine throne from which he rules creation as Christ 
the Governor, and that his body is present locally and individually to all things through
424. Laws.V.55.8; 2:233.23.
425. “The Collect for Purity.” The Book of Common Prayer and Administration of the Sacraments and
Other Rites and Ceremonies of the Church Together With the Psalter Or Psalms of David According
to the Use of the Episcopal Church (The Church Hymnal Corporation, 2006). 355.
426. Laws.V.55.8; 2:233.30-234.7.
427. Laws.V.55.8; 2.231.33-232.13. Emphasis original.
428. Laws.V.55.8; 2: 233.28-30.
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our historical natural relation to his whole person as God’s Son. We have also seen 
that actual personal participation in Christ entails a reciprocal knowing of and 
responsiveness to Christ mediated by a sociality, an interactivity, and a history of 
shared life, all of which are constituted by a restored rationality. This rationality is 
restored through our sharing in his body and blood, as we are re-created by our share 
in the rib of the Second Adam. But how is our encounter with his humanity salvific in 
our time given our great chronological distance from the events of his life, death, and 
resurrection? How do we relate to his person as Reconciler given the great gulf of 
time? 
Hooker reasons that the aforementioned universal encounter with the person of 
Christ which draws us to recognize him as Lord and Reconciler is, through the 
conjunction of his divine and human natures, locally and actually present not only 
across time but “throughout all generations of men.” His divinity - which transcends 
time - causes his humanity to be present across time:
For his body being a part of that nature which whole nature is presently joined in deity
wheresoever deity is, it followeth that his bodily substance hath everywhere a presence of true
conjunction with deity. And for as much as it is by virtue of that conjunction made the body
of the Son of God by whom also it was made a sacrifice for the sins of the whole world, this
giveth it a presence of force and eﬃcacy throughout all generations of men.429 
Thus, the properties of his divine nature render the acts of his humanity - 
especially his “sacrifice for the sins of the whole world” - infinitely communicable from
generation to generation. Though his death on the cross was that of a man who shared
our humanity, nonetheless, the triune God communicates that finite act infinitely for 
the benefit of each generation so that God’s will of reconciliation shall be done:
Albeit therefore nothing be actually infinite in substance but God only in that he is God,
nevertheless as every member is infinite by possibility of addition, and every line by possibility
of extension infinite, so there is no stint which can be set to the value or merit of the
sacrificed body of Christ, it hath no measured certainty of limits, bounds of eﬃcacy unto life
it knoweth none, but is also itself infinite in possibility of application.430 
429. Laws.V.55.9; 2.234.7-13.
430. Laws.V.55.9; 2.234.14-20.
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 A Barthian clarification
Before turning to the implications of Hooker’s doctrine of participation for our 
study of how the mind of Christ is formed in community, a Barthian clarification of 
Hooker’s doctrine is warranted. This clarification is related to the insight the logos 
asarkos and the logos ensarkos are neither chronological nor exclusive. Rather, they 
mutually participate in the humiliation and glorification of God.431 
This leads to a potentially fruitful conversation between Hooker and Barth. As we 
have seen, Hooker develops the extra Calvinisticum by showing that the humanity of 
Christ, and indeed the merits of the humiliation of the Logos asarkos, are present in the
encounter with the risen Lord, even though the location of Christ’s body is the throne
of God in heaven. Hooker’s “after a sort” and “by way of conjunction” are the 
rhetorical vehicles by which he argues for the immanence of Christ’s humanity, an 
argument that is central to his project of defending the sacramental practices of the 
Church of England as essential ways in which the mind of Christ is formed in 
community. Barth adds some helpful clarity to Hooker’s constructive suggestion.
From our perspective in history, we never can know the eternal law as anything 
but logos ensarkos. As Barth cautioned, "Do not ever think of the second Person of the 
Trinity as only Logos. That is the mistake of Emil Brunner. There is no Logos asarkos, 
but only ensarkos."432  That insight follows from his crucial observation that Jesus 
Christ just is the subject of election. God can not be known apart from “the 
perception of His presence and action as incarnate Word.”433 Hunsinger summarizes 
this point: “We have noetic access to the Holy Trinity only through this mode, which 
represents its secondary objectivity.”434 Thus, the objective content we encounter in 
431. Sumner, “The Twofold Life of the Word: Karl Barth’s Critical Reception of the Extra
Calvinisticum”. 55-7.
432. Barth, Karl Barth’s Table Talk. 49 in Sumner, “The Twofold Life of the Word: Karl Barth’s
Critical Reception of the Extra Calvinisticum”. Sumner notes “These sessions occurred
between the winter of 1953 and the summer of 1956.”
433. Barth, CD. Vol. 4, Part 1. 181. Subsequent citations will follow the standard convention of
listing the Volume and Part-Volume. For example, CD IV/I.181.
434. George Hunsinger, “Election and the Trinity: Twenty-Five These on the Theology of Karl
Barth,” Modern Theology 24, no. 2 (April 2008): 179-198. 194.
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our time historically and actually is never an abstract logos asarkos but rather always the
enfleshed Son, Jesus Christ. Hooker seems to anticipate this conclusion:
God hath glorified in heaven that nature which yielded him obedience and hath given unto
Christ even in that he is man such fullness of power over the whole world that he which
before fulfilled in the state of humility and patience whatsoever God did require, doth now
reign in glory till the time that all things be restored.435
Quite simply, if we encounter Christ at all, we encounter the enfleshed Christ, and
if we encounter the enfleshed Christ at all, we encounter Christ whose divinity and 
humanity dynamically interpret one another436:
Does not everything depend on our doing justice to the living Jesus Christ? But, at root, what
is the life of Jesus Christ but the act in which God becomes very God and very man, positing
Himself in this being? What is it but the work of this conjunction? Presupposing that we are
speaking of the living Jesus Christ, can the being of Jesus Christ be distinguished from what
actually takes place, as the act of God, in His existence as the Son of God and Son of Man?437
For Barth, that Christ’s humanity is present in any encounter with the divine 
follows from the recognition that God is the one who in his self-determination chose 
never to be except to be for humankind, and therefore that the humiliation of the Son
of God is integral to the identity of the exalted Son of Man. Any encounter with 
Christ is simultaneously and necessarily an encounter with both Christ’s divine and his
human nature:
Does not everything depend on the inter-connexion: that the exaltation of the Son of Man
begins and is completed already in and with the happening of the humiliation of the Son of
God; and conversely that the exaltation of the Son of Man includes in itself the humiliation of
the Son of God, so that Jesus Christ is already exalted in His humiliation and humiliated in
His exaltation? Is it not the case, then, that His being in the unity of God and man is this
history in its inter-connexion? If we are speaking in any respect of this history, can we really
abstract from the literal sense of the two concepts? Do we really see and understand Him
concretely if we do not see Him in this twofold movement, and at the same time in both the
one movement and the other, so that there can be no question of a halt and therefore of a
“state”? We ask again: How could He be the living Jesus Christ if He were not the One He is
in this movement?438
Barth enables us to be more emphatic in asserting the possibility of local real 
presence of Christ while at the same time proclaiming Christ as the King who sits at 
435. Laws.V.55.8; 2:232.31-233.5
436. Sumner, “The Twofold Life of the Word: Karl Barth’s Critical Reception of the Extra
Calvinisticum”. 56.
437. CD IV/2.109
438. CD IV/2.110.
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the right hand of the Father. For, as Sumner observes, Barth closes the gap between 
Creator and creature:
Where Lutheran Christology suggested that the Word crosses the gap between the Creator
and the creature, and Reformed Christology that the Word bridges the gap (remaining on
both sides), Barth's actualist Christology suggests instead that in his person Jesus Christ closes
the gap. God and humanity remain distinct, but are unequivocally reconciled in the event of
the Son's incarnate life.439
Precisely because he closes the gap between Creator and creature (while 
maintaining divine alterity), de facto participation in Christ is, for Barth, the direct 
work of “the living Jesus Christ” upon the heart of the believer, testifying to and 
imparting himself through the agency of the Holy Spirit:
The beginning of the Christian life takes place in a direct self-attestation and self-impartation
of the living Jesus Christ, in His active Word of power which goes forth hic et nunc to specific
men in the work of the Holy Ghost.440 
To which our reconstructed Hooker, sitting today in a pub drinking a beer with 
Barth, might reply in imitation of Barthian prose, “Yes, and the living Jesus Christ 
testifies and imparts himself to the believer without requiring a “substantialist form of 
ancient metaphysics as applied to the problem of an ontology of the person,”441 and 
while remaining wholly other to the believer. And he does this by the action of his 
Spirit who establishes a personal fellowship between Christ and the believer in the 
logical space of reasons.”
COMMUNION WITH CHRIST
So far we have observed Hooker as he derives from first principles an account of 
being that describes how humans participate in Christ’s humanity, as well as the 
necessity and possibility of participation in Christ’s humanity by sharing in his body 
and blood, and I’ve suggested a few points which might be more fruitfully re-described
439. Ibid., 56.
440. Barth, CD, IV.4.31-32. 
441. Bruce L. McCormack, “Karl Barth’s Historicized Christology: Just How “chalcedonian” is
it?,” in Orthodox and Modern: Studies in the Theology of Karl Barth, (Baker Academic,
2008-10-01), Kindle location 2602, Sect 2, para 8.
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in a contemporary grammar which borrows from Barth and Sellars. But I have said 
very little so far about how the fellowship with Christ that’s in view here actually 
happens. In what follows, our focus begins to shift from theoretical to practical 
reason, for the question becomes, “from a practical perspective, how are Christians 
sanctified?” 
In framing the question this way, I hope to evoke Hooker’s distinction between 
episteme and phronesis. While the virtue of episteme cultivates in us the habit of seeing 
the world realistically (i.e., with resurrection eyes), Hooker sees the self-ordering of 
the Church as the subject matter of the virtue of phronesis (i.e., how we manifest the 
good given what we see with resurrection eyes).  The practical things we do to 
cooperate with God in the cultivation of virtue, in God’s sanctification of our 
community, arise from practical wisdom. They require cultivation of skills in 
phronetic judgment. To learn what is conducive to the good, we gravitate to the 
givens - those signs and tokens of God’s presence among us about which we learn from
the testimony of the voices of men. As with all such endoxa, they are only contingently 
known, fraught as they are with the probabilistic nature of human judgments.442 
When we consider the question of how we are sanctified, we therefore enter the 
realm in which all answers oﬀered are necessarily contingent and inherently 
probabilistic eﬀorts to clear “the mists that cloud our eyes.”443 Hooker’s optimistic 
account of how the Spirit works through our dialectical discourse gives us cause for 
confidence that we can in fact recognize how we best cooperate with God in nurturing
the fellowship that sanctifies. 
 The most genuine communion
I’ve already anticipated much of what follows in describing the real presence using
the grammar of a personal relationship with Christ within the logical space of reasons. 
In what follows, it only remains to apply the foregoing concepts in describing the 
Christian journey. The journey metaphor is appropos because Hooker’s account of 
442. Laws.III.3.2; 1:210-1-13. 
443. Laws.V.9.2;1.43.29-30.
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sanctification begins with the assertion that we begin our walk along the Way as an 
open book; Christ imparts himself not instantaneously in a solitary event, but “by 
degrees.”444 Charity does not bloom instantly at the point of doxastic causality. 
Rather, Christ gives “the Spirit of Christ,” a knowing of “that saving truth,” that 
justifying faith in Christ which Peter called “the seed of God.” From this seed alone, 
communion with Christ grows, and, through that communion, the mind of Christ is 
formed within us.
According to Hooker, the first degree of communion with Christ consists of “the 
participation of his Spirit.”445 This expression immediately generates the potential for 
confusion, for, in the preceding sections treating his account of being, I have asserted 
that all creatures participate naturally in Christ the Creator. I named that natural 
participation “the first degree of participation.” The important key to interpretation is
attention to the distinction between communion and ontological participation. In the 
preceding sections, I distinguished between this natural participation that is proper to
all creatures and the personal participation that is a potentiality for all humans. We saw 
that this potentiality for personal participation is actualized only in the space of 
reasons in which a reciprocal knowing develops through our sociality, interactions, and
shared history. This actualized personal participation in Christ corresponds to what 
Hooker describes as “communion with Christ.”446 The first degree of communion 
marks the transition from merely potential personal participation to actual personal 
participation:
That which sanctified our nature in Christ, that which made it a sacrifice available to take
away sin is the same which quickeneth it, raised it out of the grave after death, and exalted it
unto glory. Seeing therefore that Christ is in us as a quickening Spirit, the first degree of
communion with Christ must needs consist in the participation of his Spirit which Cyprian in
that respect well termeth germanissimam societatem, the highest and truest society that can
be between man and him which is both God and man in one.447
Here we see why I have spoken of a first degree of participation which precedes 
444. Laws.V.56.10; 2:242.5.
445. Laws.V.56.8; 2:240.27.
446. Laws.V.56.8; 2:240.26.
447. Laws.V.56.8; 2:240.22-30.
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Hooker’s first degree of communion. Hooker identifies this transition point as what 
Cyprian called the most genuine communion, germanissimam societatem, that “highest 
and truest” communion created by the action upon us “of his Spirit.” The selfsame 
Spirit who sanctified Jesus, consecrating him so that he might be for us a holy 
sacrifice, washing away our sin and its eﬀects, sanctifies us. “Christ is in us as 
quickening Spirit;” we participate in him through the agency of the Holy Spirit, who 
gathers the sons of God through the gift of “vocation or adoption” in Christ, a gift 
that brings about their re-birth in the second Adam.
Christ acts upon us through the agency of the Spirit he sends, creating this most 
genuine communion, grasping us in order to create that “mutual inward hold… in such 
sort that each possesseth other by way of special interest property and inherent 
copulation.”448 The movement from that first degree of participation, which is 
common to all creatures, to the next degree of participation in which our potential for
a personal relationship with Christ is actualized, is marked by Christ’s gift of his own 
Spirit. This corresponds to what Luther describes as the real presence of Christ in the 
heart of the believer. 
 An actualized personal relationship
We see now that this movement from potential to actualized personal 
participation or, more simply, fellowship, is coincident with what Augustine called the
outer and inner graces. Though we may have known of God’s great deeds in history, 
though we may or may not have heard of Jesus of Nazareth, these downward 
movements by God in history seem initially external to us, a story about and for 
someone else. In moving us from natural participation to genuine communion, 
however, Christ acts upon us, giving us the inner grace of his Spirit so that we re-
cognize him, and, in that meeting, we discover ourselves willing and empowered to 
respond intelligibly to him. The seed of faith is planted, and in that seed the flowering 
of our worship is already, though only potentially, present. By degrees, his story 
becomes our story, God’s great deeds become God’s great deeds for us, and we 
448. Laws.V.56.1; 2:234.29-31.
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discover ourselves in a new personal relationship - the most genuine communion - 
with God and with all creation. The seed of faith flowers over time into hope, charity, 
and the perfection of character that is the good fruit of worship and the content of 
obedience.
Christ achieves this by planting the “seed of God” within our souls, by pouring his 
Spirit into our hearts:
The first thing of his so infused into our hearts in this life is the Spirit of Christ, whereupon
the rest of what kind soever do all both necessarily depend and infallibly also ensue, therefore
the apostles term is sometime the seed of God, sometime the pledge of our heavenly
inheritance, sometime the handsell or earnest of that which is to come.449  
We see here Hooker’s continuity with the magisterial Reformers. Faith precedes 
charity. The content of the grace poured into our hearts is Christ himself, given 
through the agency of the Spirit, and the seed of faith grows through this unmerited 
presence of Christ within, flowering over time into charity. 
Hooker’s claim that Christ infuses his Spirit into our hearts ought to be 
interpreted metonymically. Humans have no innate capacity for intellection of 
transcendentals, nor any natural access to the divine Mind. The planting of the seed of
God is truly a real presence, truly an occupation and possession by the Spirit, but such 
real presence is not to be understood as the presence of an embodied material 
substance, as though the infinite were in some way confined within or dependent upon
the finite. “Christ’s infused grace” is the unmerited gift of Christ’s presence to us, 
filling and possessing us, through the agency of Christ’s Spirit.
Hooker’s meaning can perhaps be best understood through analogy to what we 
denote when we describe someone as being “possessed by demons.” The concept of 
the demonic, common in some form to most cultures, denotes what seems to be an 
experience of one’s consciousness being so overtaken by a distortion of authentic 
humanity that one is no longer able to function with normal human agency, but rather 
manifests a destructive agency. In art, this phenomenon is often depicted with 
449. Laws.V.56.11; 2:243.9-14.
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abnormally large heads, upper arms, or genitalia, signifying how such distortion is 
commonly manifested in the mind and in our power and sexual relations. ‘Possession’ 
denotes an occupation of the mind by something external to it such that the self is no 
longer able to respond consistently to its own will. Healing consists of liberation from 
the alien force that controls one’s will.
 Similarly, when we say a person is filled with Christ’s Spirit, we denote a state in 
which one’s personal center seems to have been occupied by something external to it, 
though in this case it is a benevolent possession: she or he has been ‘possessed’ by 
Christ’s Spirit, and responds to his will. Once again, there is transformed agency, 
except in this case, that agency is creative, constituted by a new-found charity, a 
“relational receptivity” to God and one’s neighbor.450 In both cases, one experiences 
the phenomenon of an external subject acting decisively upon oneself with the 
consequence of a change in human agency. When Hooker speaks of Christ’s infused 
grace, he describes the real presence of Christ within us, benevolently occupying our 
personal centers, transforming us through the renewal of our minds451, so that our 
holiness is his. 
That Hooker intends his description of the infusion of Christ’s Spirit into our 
hearts to be understood metonymically is evident from his more detailed description 
of this moment in his A Learned Discourse on Justification. “Infused into our hearts” 
means “dwelling in the soul of man, … inhabit[ing] and possess[ing] the mind”: 
The cause of life spiritual in us is Christ, not carnally or corporally inhabiting, but dwelling in
the soul of man, as a thing which (when the mind apprehendeth it) is said to inhabit and
possess the mind. The mind conceiveth Christ by hearing the doctrine of Christianity. As the
light of nature doth cause the mind to apprehend those truths which are merely rational, so
that saving truth, which is far above the reach of human reason, cannot otherwise than by the
Spirit of the Almighty be conceived. All these are implied wheresoever any one of them is
mentioned as the cause of spiritual life. Wherefore when we read that "the Spirit is our life,"
[Rom 8:10, KJV] or "the Word our life," [Phil 2:16; 1 Jn 1:1] or "Christ our Iife," [Col 3:4] we
are in every one of these to understand that our life is Christ, by the hearing of the Gospel
apprehended as a Saviour, and assented unto by the power of the Holy Ghost.452
450. “Relational receptivity” is John Milbank’s phrase. John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory:
Beyond Secular Reason (Political Profiles) (Wiley-Blackwell, 2006). 429.
451. Rom. 12:1-2
452. Richard Hooker, “A Learned Discourse of Justification,” in The Folger Library Edition of the
Works of Richard Hooker, Vol. 5: Tractates and Sermons, (Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 1990-01-01). 137-8. Hereafter all references to this document will be indicated with the
document short name, Learned Discourse.  FLE 5.137-8.
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This infusion of grace - this gift of possession by the Holy Spirit, that constitutes 
the most genuine communion, is not a material substance but rather is concomitant 
with a knowing of “that saving truth” wherein Christ is “apprehended as a Savior.” In 
Richard Rohr pithy’s phrasing, “The inner knowledge of God's love is itself the 
Indwelling Presence.”453 A personal relationship is actualized, manifested as a knowing 
in the logical space of reasons wherein we are rendered able to justify obedience to his 
will. Christ encroaches upon us so that we can no longer maintain our distance from 
him.454 We re-cognize the identity and relation received at birth that we have 
heretofore misapprehended, and discover ourselves motivated to respond rightly. This
identity is first and foremost of one in personal and life-changing historical relation to 
Jesus Christ as Creator, Governor, and Reconciler, a covenantal relation in which we 
are summoned to a new path, a path walked by all called to a common life in Jesus 
Christ, sharing in the vocation of Israel to be a light to all the nations.
 First steps of a lifelong pilgrimage
This summons to a new path walked by all so called to a common life in him 
brings into view a second knowing that is concomitant with genuine communion. Our 
communion with the Second Adam is actualized through our communion within the 
Second Eve. We are in Christ actually by our actual incorporation into his Church:
Our being in Christ by eternal foreknowledge saveth us not without our actual and real
adoption into the fellowship of his saints in this present world. For in him we actually are by
our actual incorporation into that society which hath him for their head and doth make
together with him one body (he and they in that respect having one name) for which cause by
virtue of this mystical conjunction we are of him and in him even as though our very flesh and
bones should be made continuate with his.455
The first step of communion with Christ, therefore, marks the transition from 
merely natural participation in “Christ, working as a creator, and a governor of the 
453. Richard Rohr, Immortal Diamond: The Search for Our True Self, Kindle ed. (Jossey-Bass,
2013-01-22). 163.
454. CD IV/3.1.202.
455. Laws.V.56.7; 2:238.23-239.5
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world by providence,”456 to that “highest and truest society”457 in which he implants the
seed of God through the gift of his Spirit, possessing our minds so that we know him 
personally and are incorporated into his Church. Yet, that is just the beginning of our 
journey sanctification by him, for “Christ imparteth plainly himself by degrees.”458 
But the participation of Christ importeth, besides the presence of Christ’s person, and besides
the mystical copulation thereof with the parts and members of his whole Church, a true actual
influence of grace whereby the life which we live according to godliness is his, and from him
we receive those perfections wherein our eternal happiness consisteth.459
As we live with Christ as our head and within the body that is his Church, he is 
truly and actually present to us and in us, and our lives - to the extent we manifest 
obedience to his will - are his. We are consecrated for holiness and then led to a 
knowing of what holiness is, summoning us to live according to a godliness that is his. 
Our lives are journeys toward  the summit of scientia. We are sanctified “by steps and 
degrees…till the day of [our] final exaltation to a state of fellowship in glory.”460 
 Chapter Summary
Thus far, an account of how Christ the Reconciler is really and personally present 
in the heart and soul of the faithful. This account, derived from first principles, 
suggests that the reality of our personal relation to Christ  is not dependent upon the 
physical proximity of Christ's humanity precisely because, as a final cause, it happens 
within the logical space of reasons. The Spirit causes a reciprocal knowing of and 
responsiveness to Christ mediated by a sociality, an interactivity, and a history of 
shared life, all of which are constituted by a restored rationality. The significance of 
our relation to Christ is dependent upon the intelligibility of our responsiveness to 
Christ given the context of our shared history with him. To the extent that our 
actions express our recognition of and response to Christ’s summons to have our lives 
determined by him, our fellowship with Christ is real.
456. Laws.V.56.10 2:242.11-12
457. Laws.V.56.8; 2:240.22-30
458. Laws.V.56.10 2:242.5-6
459. Laws.V.56.10; 2:242.28-243.4
460. Laws.V.56.13; 2:244.12-25
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So we have seen now an account of how the Spirit actuates personal relationships 
with Christ, but that does not explain how the mind of Christ is formed in community. 
How does the community develop the capacity to discern the good that it must have, 
if it is to act as it must act, if it is to proclaim what it must proclaim, if its common life
is to denote the triune God? Hooker answers by describing how ecclesial practices 
cultivate communities of character. We’ll examine his description in the next chapter.
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- Chapter 5 -
Practices and mimetic virtue
INTRODUCTION
We saw in the preceding chapter that Hooker describes our participation in 
Christ largely in terms of the covenant of grace, relying relatively more on the 
semantic field of relation (copulation, conjunction, interaction) to describe our 
personal relationships with Christ. Our participation is authentic fellowship in the 
sense of the participation of two persons in each other who become as one while 
remaining wholly other to one another, a union in which they share a history of 
interactions through which their dispositions are revealed and reciprocally shaped. 
We saw also that we can describe our encounters with the Christ in the grammar 
appropriate to personal relationships, the grammar Sellars described as the logical 
space of reasons. Furthermore, I’ve suggested that, through successive personal 
encounters, we come to know Christ's dispositions, and come to recognize him as 
Reconciler whom we trust as the Lord of Life. 
This description of ongoing interactive interpersonal communion sets up the 
argument of the current chapter. I will argue that such interpersonal communion 
precedes and provides the necessary context for our recognition and  imitation of 
Christ as the Supreme Exemplar. Ecclesial practices thereby provide the successive 
iterations through which virtue is formed mimetically over a lifetime.461 The mind of 
Christ is formed in community by the Spirit’s actuation of personal relationships 
through which Christ reveals his dispositions and tutors us, so that, through mimesis, 
we are “transformed by the renewing of [our] minds” (Rom. 12:2).
Here the key move is to understand how the personal relationship forged by 
Christ through ecclesial practices provides the necessary context for our justifiable 
461. Tom Wright describes Paul’s worldview in terms of story, practice, and symbol. I find
Wright’s treatment especially interesting because, as mentioned in my introductory chapter,
my thesis began with the observation of the priority of mimesis in Paul’s account of how the
mind of Christ is formed in Christian community. I take Wright’s heuristic deployment of
story, practice, and symbol as roughly comparable to my usage of ‘practices’ here. Practices,
in this study, include story and symbol. See the first two chapters of N. T. Wright, Paul and
the Faithfulness of God, Kindle ed., Christian Origins and the Question of God, vol. 4 (Fortress
Press, 2013-11-01).
trust in Christ as the supreme exemplar. I proceed in four movements. The first 
introduces the work of two ecclesial ethicists whose work it is the hope of this study 
to extend, Stanley Hauerwas and Samuel Wells. The second extends concepts 
introduced in the preceding chapter, regarding our experience of being addressed by 
and responding to Christ, by developing a thicker concept of the particularity of 
human agents in our encounter with Christ. The third movement provides an 
exegetical account of the sacraments, demonstrating how our encounter of the real 
presence of Christ in practices generates and sustains our personal relationships with 
him. The final movement returns to the work of Wells and introduces the work of 
virtue ethicist Linda Zagzebski to propose that the personal relationship with Christ 
caused by the Spirit via ecclesial practices leads ultimately to “thick concepts” that are 
productive of virtue. With these four moves, I will complete my description of the 
Hookerian account of how the mind of Christ is formed in community. I will 
conclude the chapter by considering how the Hookerian account answers key critics 
of the ecclesial ethicists.
In the exegetical treatments found in the third section, I agree with readings of 
Hooker’s account of sacramental practices by Kirby,462 Shuger,463 Harrison,464 and 
Irish.465 I disagree with Rasmussen’s implication that Hooker sees the bread and wine 
as channels of the real presence, and argue instead that Hooker evinces the Franciscan
“triggering” form of instrumentalism. I disagree with Staﬀord’s description466 of 
Hooker’s sacramental hermeneutic as “Thomistic” and, instead, see Hooker closely 
462. Kirby oﬀers an excellent account of Hooker’s understanding of the sanctifying eﬀects of non-
sacramental practices. W.J. Torrance Kirby, “Of Musique With Psalms: The Hermeneutics of
Richard Hooker’s Defence of the ‘sensible Excellencie’ of Public Worship,” in Lutheran and
Anglican: Essays in Honour of Egil Grislis, ed. John Staﬀord, (Winnipeg: University of
Manitoba Press, 2009).
463. Shuger is especially helpful in recognizing how the Eucharist generates political identity.
Debora K. Shuger, “”Societie Supernaturall”: The Imagined Community of Hooker’s Lawes,”
in Richard Hooker and the Construction of Christian Community (Medieval and Renaissance Texts
and Studies), ed. Arthur Stephen McGrade, (Mrts, 1997).
464. Harrison, “Powers of Nature and Influences of Grace in Hooker’s Lawes,”
465. Irish, “‘Participation of God Himself:’ Law, the Mediation of Christ, and Sacramental
Participation in the Thought of Richard Hooker,”
466. John K. Staﬀord, “Grace, Sin, and Nature: Richard Hooker’s Theology of Baptism,” in Richard
Hooker and the English Reformation: Studies in Early Modern Religious Reforms, (Dordrecht ;
Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003).
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following Calvin and other Reformed influences. Accordingly, my account largely 
agrees with the insights of Egil Grislis467, although my constructive extension of 
Hooker’s ‘after a sort’ ontology - which Grislis also highlights - naturally diverges from
Grislis’ historical reconstruction.
THE ECCLESIAL ETHICISTS
When we turn fully to the question of how the mind of Christ is formed in 
community, it is important to recognize that, for Hooker, the crucial means by which 
that happens includes participation in a well-ordered political society. A well-ordered 
community is essential to both commonwealth and church because the formal cause 
of a godly nation is a community of character.468 Or, rather, Christ himself is that 
formal cause; the community of character that is the formal cause of godliness and 
virtue is what “antiquity doth call… Christ’s body.”469 
Christ is also the eﬃcient cause of a godly nation. For “Christ doth personally 
administer the external regiment of outward actions in the Church by the secret 
inward influence of his grace giveth spiritual life and the strength of ghostly motions 
thereunto....”470 Christ causes the outer graces by causing the inner graces. The gift of 
spiritual life translates the elect into his kingdom and establishes not just a society but
a communion of saints, an abiding spiritual fellowship:
These being brought to the obedience of faith are every where spoken of as men translated
into that kingdom wherein whosoever is comprehended Christ is the author of eternal
salvation in them. They have a high kind of ghostly fellowship with God and Christ and
saints....471
 
467. Egil Grislis, “Reflections on Richard Hooker’s Understanding of the Eucharist,” in Richard
Hooker and the English Reformation: Studies in Early Modern Religious Reforms, (Dordrecht ;
Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003).
468. Here I allude to a Hauerwas classic on virtue which reflects on this Aristotelian doctrine that
Hooker presupposes. Stanley Hauerwas, A Community of Character: Toward a Constructive
Christian Social Ethic, 1 ed. (University of Notre Dame Press, 1991-01-31).
469. Laws.V.77.2; 2.425.14-19
470. Laws.VIII.4.5; 3.362.19-22
471. Laws.VIII.4.6; 3.365.15-19
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For Hooker, liturgical practices - understood in the broadest sense of all the 
components of our common worship - are essential means of grace through which 
Christ knits the political society of the elect into a spiritual body. Through ecclesial 
practices, the mystical society of souls is knitted into something much more than an 
association of individuals sharing an aﬃnity for the exercise of the Christian religion. 
As Hooker describes it, that society is indeed knitted into Christ’s body.472
For Hooker,  the sacraments render the elect “mystical member[s]” of Christ, 
causing us to experience “a real transmutation of our souls and bodies from sin to 
righteousness.”473 Psalm-singing and a bounty of other practices of the church trigger 
this transformation, rendering the church “both a society and a society 
supernatural.”474 Indeed the elevation of the hearts of men of common worship and 
prayer are the very means by which Christ’s Spirit transforms “the society of souls”475 
into the “visible mystical body which is his Church.”476
Crucially for Hooker, the Spirit transforms our common life so that it becomes 
itself a sacrament that denotes the inner life of God and draws others into it. 
Discernment of the good therefore happens at the intersection of ecclesiology and 
Christology. Our question eventually becomes “how do the practices of the Church 
lead to communities of virtue that denote the triune God?”
Phrasing the question this way helps us to see that our study is ultimately a 
problem in ecclesial ethics. The question presupposes that the goal of Christian 
community is to denote the triune God (the resulting ethics ought therefore be 
eschatological), and it also presupposes a critical connection between those 
472. Laws.V.77.2; 2.425.14-19
473. Laws.V.67.7; 2.335.32-336.15. Emphasis added.
474. Laws.I.15.2; 1:131.10-11
475. Laws.V.77.2; 2.425.14-19
476. Laws.V.24.1; 2:111.24-27. I am indebted to Debora Shuger for pointing out the richness of
Hooker’s phrase, “mystical visible body” of Christ. Shuger notes, “Lawes posits a visible
mystical body united by common agreement on the objects of their love: a community
realized in antiphonal chant, sacramental participation, and pastoral care. Hooker views the
church as primarily a house of prayer and sacramental worship; he is, moreover, the first
Elizabethan Protestant to define the church in this way.” Shuger, “”Societie Supernaturall”,”
324. 
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communities and the nurturing of virtue. But this premise is not uncontested. Since 
Kant, and particularly during Reinhold Niebuhr's era, act consequentialism and 
deontology have dominated Christian ethics. However, since the 1974 publication of 
Stanley Hauerwas' Vision and Virtue,477 his 1975 publication of Character and the 
Christian Life,478 and also the publication in 1981 of Alasdair MacIntyre's After 
Virtue!,479 there has been a renaissance in the field of virtue ethics.480 Karl Barth 
("speech-acts"), Hans Urs von Balthasar ("deed-words"), Hans Frei ("narrative"), 
George Lindbeck ("culture"), and Ludwig Wittgenstein ("practice") figure prominently
as precursors in this field. This return to classical-medieval approaches to ethics has, in
turn, spawned renewed interest in virtue formation as described by Paul, Augustine, 
and Thomas Aquinas. Ecclesial ethicists, who, like Hooker, are highly influenced by 
Aristotle, often emphasize the practices of the Church as the key to the creation of 
virtue. 
Ecclesial ethics, advocated by a growing number of scholars influenced by Stanley 
Hauerwas and one of Barth's students, John Howard Yoder, is a form of virtue ethics 
which may be fairly described as a form of a posteriori casuistical reasoning that seeks 
its foundations in the practices of the Church. It looks to the practices of the Church 
based on an important theological claim the emphasis of which distinguishes this 
school from others. The school places great priority on the particularity of Christian 
community. God chooses to reveal Godself through human contingency - through 
Israel manifest as the Jews, as Jesus, and as the Church. To abstract from the 
particularities of community is to depart from God's way of revealing Godself to the 
world. This school is skeptical of approaches that discover ethical norms in and for 
the general culture; rather, ethical questions are bounded by Hauerwas’ maxim that 
477. Stanley Hauerwas, Vision and Virtue: Essays in Christian Ethical Reflection (Fides Publishers,
1974).
478. Stanley Hauerwas, Character and the Christian Life: A Study in Theological Ethics (University of
Notre Dame Press, 1994).
479. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, Third Edition (University of Notre
Dame Press, 2007).
480. Samuel Wells, “How the Church Performs Jesus’ Story: Improvising on the Theological
Ethics of Stanley Hauerwas” (PhD Dissertation, University of Durham, 1995), 15-17.
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“the task of the Church is to be the Church.” Ethical questions and answers are 
particular to concrete Christian communities.
The ecclesial ethicist hermeneutic assumes that the Church bears the truth 
revealed in Christ in its beliefs, and that one knows what the Church believes through 
reference to its practices. The Spirit guides the world to grasp the truth about the 
triune God and itself by creating communities whose words and practices 
communicate the meanings necessary to reveal that truth. Virtue creation is about 
learning how to tell reliably the truth about God through our actions. The habits of 
our common life are therefore an essential part of the Spirit’s epistemic role: the 
practices of the Church are the crucial means by which the Spirit reveals to the world 
the truth it does not know. If we want to know the truth about God, we turn to our 
worship, where the Spirit guides our discernment-in-communion so that, in our 
liturgical practice, we utter the truth about God. If we want to learn about the 
greatest good, the greatest truth, and the greatest beauty - if we want to inquire about 
how God meets our needs - we turn in confidence to our sacramental practices 
because Jesus has promised to meet us there.
Samuel Wells' 1995 Durham University dissertation, How the Church Performs Jesus' 
Story: Improvising on the Theological Ethics of Stanley Hauerwas, is perhaps the most 
influential recent study in ecclesial ethics. Published in two parts, Transforming Fate 
into Destiny: The Theological Ethics of Stanley Hauewas (2004)481 and Improvisation : The 
Drama of Christian Ethics (2004),482 his dissertation extends Hauerwas by adding a 
much needed eschatological emphasis and by reading him in conversation with 
Wittgenstein, constructively emphasizing the priority of practice in habit formation. 
Worship is like a Christian version of the playing fields of Eton, preparing disciples 
for the eschatological Battle of Waterloo. Through common worship and dramatic 
immersion in our story (Scripture), the Spirit embeds the mind of Christ in 
481. Samuel Wells, Transforming Fate Into Destiny: The Theological Ethics of Stanley Hauerwas (Wipf
& Stock Pub, 2004-03-04).
482. Wells, Improvisation.
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community so that disciples can improvise Christianly such that our godly play in the 
world points to the eschatological reality of which we are the first fruits. Wells 
develops this further in his God’s Companions: Reimagining Christian Ethics (2006),483 
showing how every act in the Eucharist and in baptism performs a fundamental truth-
claim of the Gospel, forming the mind of Christ in disciples through the repetition of 
baptism and Eucharist.
Of special interest in the current study are Wells’ conclusions about the role of 
practices and the task of theology. As I described in chapter three, some of Hooker’s 
opponents advocated a Ramist approach to ethical reasoning that involved the mining 
of timeless absolutes from Scripture in response to questions of right action. Hooker 
rejected that approach both on hermeneutical and philosophical grounds, maintaining 
instead the Aristotelian approach which begins with the observation that the material 
cause of virtue is a virtuous community. Hooker defended the liturgical practices of 
the Church of England by demonstrating how they contribute to the production of a 
virtuous community. Hooker argued against a biblicist deontological ethics in favor of 
a virtue ethics. Wells makes a similar argument:
When ethics is understood as the adjudication of tricky cases of conscience by balancing
moral principles, the practice is implicitly socially conservative - since it assumes there is
nothing fundamentally wrong with the status quo, only with its anomalies. In contrast, the
Christian community lives within a tradition based on a story which in many respects
contradicts the assumptions of the contemporary social status quo. How then does the
community faithfully live out its story?484
According to Wells, both deontology and acts consequentialism are theological 
errors.485 The error involves confusion about the task of Christian ethics. The task is 
not to defend tradition or a particular ethical conclusion with regard to a proposed 
act. Rather, the task is "to describe the world in which Christians perceive themselves 
to live and act, and to help the Christian community form practices consistent with 
483. Samuel Wells, God’s Companions : Reimagining Christian Ethics (Malden, MA ; Oxford:
Blackwell Pub, 2006).
484. Wells, “How the Church Performs Jesus’ Story,” 198.
485. Wells, An Introductory Reader, 154-155.
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life in such a world."486 Wells’ allusion to preparing disciples for the Battle of 
Waterloo highlights the connection between such description and practices: practices 
are productive of right actions precisely because they instill right descriptions of the 
world in disciples. In short, practices produce a virtuous community by causing 
disciples to take the right things for granted.487 I will return to this insight later in the  this 
chapter.488
ADDRESS AND RESPONSE
We turn now to an account of how ecclesial practices are instrumental in the 
formation of the mind of Christ in Christian community. Because Hooker is vague or 
silent on certain relevant questions, my method will be to hold Hooker in 
conversation with Wells and other contemporary virtue ethicists in order to 
extrapolate as needed from Hooker’s account. Here, as in the preceding sections, the 
key move is to understand that Hooker defends the formational significance of 
practices, crafting a subtle synthesis of an Aristotelian account of virtue with an 
account of being and a psychology that are sensitive to sixteenth century philosophical
concerns. The next two sections explain how they function particularly in baptism and
the Eucharist, respectively. On the basis of this account, we can render a general 
account of practices which holds that common worship and sacramental practices are 
signs and tokens by which the Spirit draws us to recognize and respond to our relation
to Christ the Reconciler, grasping and transforming both the “common multitude” 
and elite, generating the political identity, diversity, and virtue of the visible mystical 
body of Christ.
486. Ibid.
487. Wells, “How the Church Performs Jesus’ Story,” 216.
488. See “Mimetic virtue” on page 186.
- 162 -
- 162 -
 Dispositions revealed
We saw in chapter two that Hooker’s ontology and psychology retain Aristotelian 
emphases on the contingency of events and the significance of virtue in making the 
moral life nonetheless possible, while expressing these emphases within an account of 
being that is sensitive to Reformation concerns about the implications of human 
finitude.489 We have seen throughout this study that Hooker tends to describe 
objective reality in terms of the space of causes: there is a form of relation that is 
proper to all created things that we can depict in terms of the presence of a cause in 
its eﬀects. We know objective reality directly through imperfect empirical observation
and inferences of causal relations.490 
Yet, how can a personal God be known personally given the gulf between the 
finite self and its divine ground? In the preceding chapter, I argued that the 
Hookerian account answers with an ontology that locates such possibility not within 
the space of causes but within the space of reasons.491 In short, there is a kind of 
knowing, born of our shared history and experienced as shared communion, that is not
constituted by “an empirical description of [an] episode or state” but which subsists 
“in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says.”492 
Our identity as rational persons is constituted, not by our humanity, but by our 
sociality, our activity and our participation in a history. Our knowing of other rational 
and communicative creatures, whether human or non-human, consists of an actual 
sharing in their sociality, in interactions with them, and in a sharing in their history. 
Our knowing of such persons is not reducible to epistemic facts. 
489. See “Hookerian anthropology” on page 52.
490. See, for example, “Hookerian epistemology” on page 59. See also “Universal participation in
Christ” on page 122.
491. Hooker, of course, did not use Sellar’s language. The contemporary philosophical grammar
reflects my constructive proposal which makes explicit that in only implicit in Hooker’s
account. See “Real presence” beginning on page 135.
492. John McDowell, Sellars and the Space of Reasons. (lecture., University of Pittsburgh, 2009),
http://www.pitt.edu/~brandom/me-core/downloads/McD Cape Town talk--Sellars
EPM.doc. In context, McDowell quotes Sellars, Science, Perception and Reality, Part VIII, §
106.36.
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 Agency and community
It is a convenient fiction to describe the psychology of individuals as though 
individuals can be isolated from the community of which they are a part. It is also a 
convenient fiction to speak of the community as though we can set aside momentarily 
the reality of the agency of individuals. The truth, however, is that these two cannot 
be separated, for they are mutually articulating.
In the preceding chapter, I described the development of interpersonal 
relationships in terms of address and response. We experience ourselves as addressed 
by another subject and we respond to them. The sequence of such calls and responses 
- our shared history - generates a personal relationship. As the subject addresses us 
successively, he reveals his dispositions, and we become able to make justifiable claims 
about his nature. We, as subjects, recognize him as subject. We know him.
Yet this pattern of address and response does not happen in a vacuum. It happens 
within a community. A disciple who dwells in the divine rationality necessarily does so
as one whose identity is shaped by community, and not by just one community, but by
the many circles of which she is a part. To the extent that she is a free and rational 
agent, she responds to an address by a single subject from within the web of her 
communal circles, simultaneously constraining and directing her responses to that 
address according to the norms of her circles. In her response to the one subject, she, 
at least tacitly, addresses her other circles, engaging and shaping their norms 
dialogically. 
Address and response between two subjects regarding matters of action are never 
private aﬀairs, though at times we like to pretend they are. They are inherently 
communal and dialectical, articulating our communally-shaped descriptions of the 
world and our own locations within it. Addressing and responding to fellow subjects in
our practical reasoning, we continuously adjudicate our normative descriptions and 
judgments. “Practical reason,” therefore, is “a kind of interchange of attempts at 
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justification among persons, each of whose actions aﬀect what others would otherwise
be able to do, and all this for a community at a time.”493 Our practical reasoning is thus
itself a communal practice.494
This leads to what may now be an obvious fact about the specific judgments we 
render as we respond to those who address us. Our responses are not shaped merely by
the communal norms that pertain to specific premises; they are determined as well by 
the community’s practice of moral reasoning itself.495 The way a community 
determines what questions may be asked and what serves as justifiable reasons 
communicate a worldview that, in turn, aﬀects one’s ethical reasoning.496  
Much can be deduced from this observation, but my interest now is simply to 
thicken our view of the narrative situatedness of the calls and responses of our 
interpersonal relations. The community shapes individual agency in both how we hear 
that which is addressed to us and how we determine our free and rational responses. 
The questions we feel free to ask and the reasons that are normatively available to 
justify our beliefs and actions influence profoundly how we adjudicate our descriptions
of the world and our place in it. 
The interpersonal relation in view in this study is of course that between Christ 
and each of his elect. Isolating the single subject’s relation to Christ simplifies analysis,
but, of course, the dynamic is more complex. The community determines to a 
significant degree how we hear ourselves as addressed by Christ and also how we 
determine our free and rational response. All of this has significant implications for 
how we order the Church, the hermeneutics we validate, and the form of our ethical 
reasoning, and highlights the importance of such decisions for each generation. My 
concern here, however, is to accentuate the specificity of our personal address by 
493. Robert B. Pippin, Hegel’s Practical Philosophy: Rational Agency as Ethical Life, 1 ed. (Cambridge
University Press, 2008-11-17), 273-274. 
494. Ibid., 273.
495. Ibid., 276.
496. I examine Hooker’s critique of appeals to timeless absolutes throughout chapter three. See
“Hookerian critique: Reasoning by non sequitur” on page 103.
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Christ. Though we hear his call always within a social circle which qualifies our 
hearing, Christ calls us by name.497 
We saw in the previous chapter that we participate in Christ by recognizing his 
real and justifying presence. Christ justifies, giving his indwelling and personal 
presence, and such presence constitutes the forgiveness of sins and the gift of God 
himself. The foregoing helps us to anticipate another diﬃculty with universal ethics.498
As we saw in chapter three, it is "the particular information, which universal ethics 
shuns, that makes ethics comprehensible."499 Christ does not reconcile us in the 
abstract; nor does he address us in the abstract. Christ’s Spirit meets us personally, 
reconciling us in our particularity. To be coherently Christocentric, our ethics should 
reflect this particularity.500
 Agency oriented theodramatically
Sam Wells, in Improvisation, provides such an approach to ethics. Just as Jesus 
Christ met the Samaritan woman at the well, redirecting her to the water of life,501 so 
he meets us where we stand, teaching us to see the world as it is redeemed by him, and
to carry on in such a way that our lives proclaim that eschatological reality.
Wells’ improvisational ethics combines the recognition that ethical reasoning 
consists of phronetic judgments with a crucial eschatological dimension. As he notes, 
it is insuﬃcient for Christian ethics to be merely teleological; to be proper Christian 
ethics, they must be eschatological:
Eschatology brings a shape to Christian theology and in turn to Christian ethics. By providing
an end to the story it enables us to perceive that the Christian narrative is indeed a story, not
an endless sequence of events. Since the end is provided from outside, it is not humanity's task
to bring this end about. Christian ethics is therefore about acting in accord with the ending
that will come about, rather than acting so that a desirable end will come about.502
497. “But now, says the LORD — the one who created you, Jacob, the one who formed you,
Israel: Don’t fear, for I have redeemed you; I have called you by name; you are mine.” (Is 43:1
CEB) Emphasis added.
498. Wells, An Introductory Reader., 154-5.
499. Ibid., 155.
500. See note 285 on page 97 on my usage of ‘particularity’ throughout this study.
501. Wells, Improvisation., 103-114.
502. Wells, “How the Church Performs Jesus’ Story”.189.
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Because Christian ethics are properly eschatological, Christian ethics are neither 
merely creation-centric nor merely biblical ethics. Neither are they pre-social or 
primordial or in any sense ahistorical. That is, Christian agency is properly oriented on
an axis beginning with the creation stories, through the drama of Israel culminating in 
Jesus and his Church, and ending in the biblical vision of the New Jerusalem. Such 
ethics exegete creation eschatologically . Taking the right things for granted therefore 
involves first and foremost the capacity for an individual to be knowledgeable of and 
attentive to the great drama of God (theodrama). Moreover, it requires that the 
Christian see oneself as an actor immersed in that drama. Drawing upon 
Wittgenstein, Wells teaches that the ethical life is about going on in the same way as 
those who went before us in the theodrama, while responding responsibly to stimuli 
within our own context, where responding responsibly consists of going on in such a 
way that our actions go in the same way as those who succeed us. That is, our actions 
should be in continuity with the stories of Israel, Jesus, and the Church while also 
pointing eschatologically to the eternal reality of the New Jerusalem. The crucial 
dimension that Wells adds is this last eschatological dimension. 
THE ROLE OF PRACTICES
 Hooker’s account of practices
In the preceding section, I suggested that a properly Christocentric ethics reflects 
the specificity of our address by and response to Christ. I also suggested, following 
Wells, that such an ethics helps us to locate ourselves within Christ’s temporal drama, 
and reorients us toward the New Jerusalem.
With these qualifications registered, I turn now to Hooker’s account of practices. 
The key move is to recognize that ecclesial practices are the primary means by which 
Christ schools us in his nature by revealing his gracious disposition towards his 
creation and towards us personally. Practices provide the setting of our successive 
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encounters with Christ’s real presence through which the Spirit forms our personal 
relationship with him.
 We know Christ personally by sharing in his life. But that sharing in his life is 
possible only because God acts to make such sharing possible. Given the subjective 
and rational reality of our personal participation in Christ’s life through ecclesial 
practices, Christ’s love for us becomes intelligible, and we are thereby justified in willing
what Christ wills and making claims about his nature. Because of this intelligibility, we
know him and respond responsibly, which is to say we respond with worship and 
obedience to his summons.
Non-sacramental practices
Before turning to Hooker’s account of sacramental practices, it is important to 
recall what I noted in the previous chapter - that consideration of how Christ is 
present in the sacraments is decisive for our understanding of how Christ is present in 
all ecclesial practices, and therefore decisive for our understanding of the role of 
practices in the formation of Christ in community.503 This focus on the sacraments 
ought not lead one to conclude that Christ is in some sense less present in non-
sacramental practices, or that the aforementioned principles of practices apply only to
sacramental practices. While the sacraments are indeed central, Hooker saw Christ’s 
sanctifying presence in and defended as edifying a wide range of non-sacramental 
practices. It is no accident that Book V of his Laws is the largest of his works. It 
contains eighty-one chapters, most of which defend non-sacramental ecclesial 
practices. Hooker defends the use of beautiful church buildings,504 reading Scripture 
publicly,505 public and common prayer,506 singing of psalms,507 commemoration of 
503. See page 128.
504. Laws.V.11-17.
505. Laws.V.18-22.
506. Laws.V.23-36, 41-49.
507. Laws.V.37-40.
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exemplars and other festivals of the Church,508 fasting,509 the churching of women,510 
ordination practices,511 and the rite of reconciliation.512 While the sacraments are 
indeed unique, the principles of practices apply to a wide range of ecclesial acts which 
sanctify to the extent that they successively represent Christ in the heart of the 
disciple. 
It is ironic that Hooker’s emphasis on practices was criticized by his fellow 
Puritans as Pelagian or seen as evidence of his aﬃnity for Rome.513 To the contrary, an 
emphasis on ecclesial practices such as those he defended - and many more which 
could be added today - is “more realistic about sin and more hopeful about 
reconciliation than those approaches that trust the reason/nature/creation complex to 
derive our knowledge of what should be from what is.”514 In that sense, it is a 
profoundly evangelical commitment, in the richest sense of the word:
For some the label ‘evangelical’ points to a checklist of traditional doctrines and for others to
a key inner experience. I mean neither. For a practice to qualify as ‘evangelical’ in the
functional sense means first of all that it communicates news. It says something particular
that would not be known and could not be believed were it not said. Second, it must mean
functionally that this ‘news’ is attested as good; it comes across to those whom it addresses as
helping, as saving, and as shalom. It must be public, not esoteric, but the way for it to be
public is not an a priori logical move that subtracts the particular. It is an a posteriori political
practice that tells the world something it did not know and could not believe before. It tells
the world what is the world’s own calling and destiny, not by announcing either a utopian or a
realistic goal to be imposed on the whole society, but by pioneering, a paradigmatic
demonstration of both the power and the practices that define the shape of restored
humanity.  The confessing people of God is the new world on its way.515 
Psalm-singing
One example will suﬃce to demonstrate Hooker’s claim. In Book V of Laws, 
Hooker defends the liturgical practice of singing psalms. The music of psalms 
transforms us, creating harmony within us through its etching of God’s harmonizing 
508. Laws.V.69-71.
509. Laws.V.72.
510. Laws.V.74.
511. Laws.V.76-81.
512. Laws.VI.1-6.
513. This is the thrust of the only eﬀort to refute Laws published during Hooker’s lifetime, A
Christian Letter. See “A Christian Letter,”
514. Yoder, “Sacrament as Social Process: Christ the Transformer of Culture,” 371.
515. Ibid., 373.. Emphasis original.
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Word in our minds: 
The reason hereof is an admirable facility which music hath to express and represent to the
mind more inwardly than any other sensible means the very standing, rising, and falling, the
very steps and inflections every way, the turns and varieties of all passions whereunto the mind
is subject, yea so to imitate them, that whither it resemble unto us the same state wherein our
minds already are or a clean contrary, we are not more contentedly by the one confirmed than
changed and led away by the other. In harmony the very image and character even of virtue
and vice is perceived, the mind delighted with their resemblances and brought by having them
often iterated into a love of the things themselves.516
Hooker quotes St. Basil to support his claim that the singing of psalms is a means 
of grace by which the seed of virtue is planted in the community:
[Quoting St. Basil:] For (saith he) whereas the holy spirit saw that mankind is unto virtue
hardly drawn, and that righteousness is the less accounted of by reason of the proneness of our
aﬀections to that which which delighteth, it pleased the wisdom of the same spirit to borrow
from melody that pleasure, which mingled with heavenly mysteries, causeth the smoothness
and softness of that which toucheth the ear, to convey as it were by stealth the treasure of
good things into man’s mind. To this purpose were those harmonious tunes of psalms devised
for us, that they which are either in years but young, or touching perfection of virtue as yet
not grown to ripeness, might when they think they sing, learn. O the wise conceit of the
heavenly teacher, which hath by his skill found out a way, that doing those things wherein we
delight, we may also learn that whereby we profit.517
Christ’s Spirit uses the singing of psalms to transform the society of the elect into 
a community by “strengthen[ing] our meditation of those holy words,… mak[ing us] 
attentive, and… raising up the hearts of men….”518 The music of psalms is
... a thing whereunto God’s people of old did resort with hope and thirst that thereby
especially their souls might be edified; a thing which filleth the mind with comfort and
heavenly delight, stirreth up flagrant desires and aﬀections correspondent unto that which the
words contain, allayeth all kind of base and earthly cogitations, banisheth and driveth away
those evil secret suggestions which our invisible enemy is always apt to minister, watereth the
heart to the end it may fructify, maketh the virtuous in trouble full of magnanimity and
courage, serveth as a most approved remedy against all doleful and heavy accidents which
befall men in this present life....519 
Some principles particular to the sacraments
Some ground-clearing is necessary before I proceed to the task of analyzing in 
more detail Hooker’s account of how practices form the mind of Christ in 
community. The necessity arises from the fact that Hooker distinguishes between the 
516. Lawes V.38.1; 2:151.14-24
517. Laws.V.38.3; 2:153.17-154.4
518. Laws.V.39.4; 2:15-18
519. Laws.V.39.4; 2:158.18-29
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sacraments of baptism and Eucharist and other ecclesial practices because of the 
special roles they play in the creation and sustenance of Christian community. 
That the sacraments have a unique and necessary role is not obvious to all 
contemporary Christian communities, and it was not obvious to many of Hooker’s 
contemporaries, either. The hope of Hooker’s sponsors was that his treatise would 
successfully defend the Elizabethan Settlement against English presbyterian 
opponents, and a major part of that eﬀort was a defense of the rites and ceremonies of
the English church. Yet, even Hooker’s sponsors were not persuaded of the mystical 
significance of the sacraments. Hooker’s primary sponsor, Archbishop Whitgift, 
defended the rites by ridding them of their mystical content, valuing them merely as 
formal acts that were the only objective evidence available by which one could discern 
one’s participation in the visible church. Moreover, this objective evidence was 
suﬃcient because faith, for Whitgift, was an act of the intellect entirely. As Lake put 
it in his review of Whitgift’s works, “all that was necessary to induce true belief was 
the availability of right doctrine (either preached or read).”520  
Implicit in this view are three significant premises commonly held by both 
Hooker’s contemporaries and by many Christians today. First, the understanding of 
faith as an act of the intellect that is induced by exposure to right doctrine implies an 
understanding that knowledge is primarily cognitive; that is, it implies that to know is 
to master concepts or propositions that are true. This contrasts profoundly with the 
conjunctive account of fellowship with Christ presented in this study - the idea of a 
personal knowing grounded in a shared history. Second, if the cure for unbelief is right
information, then to edify is to provide right information. Indeed, Whitgift made this 
explicit. His defense of the rites and ceremonies of the Church of England denied 
sacraments the duty of edification.521 Finally, the position that faith is preceded and 
caused by knowledge of right doctrine (and that edification consists of imparting right
520. Lake, Anglicans and Puritans, 39.
521. Ibid.
- 171 -
- 171 -
doctrine) implies that the central concern of the Church should be justification of the 
individual. Faith is understood exclusively in terms of justifying faith, and thus 
edification is, too. An inability to conceive of faith primarily in the grammar of 
sanctification, a de-mystified account of the sacraments, a laser-like focus on the 
justification of individuals, and a fear of Pelagianism circumscribe one’s ability to 
imagine sacramental practices as primary means by which the mind of Christ is 
mystically formed in community over time. All of these positions can be found in 
contemporary Christian communities. The Hookerian account challenges these 
premises.
These issues turn on the question of the purpose of the sacraments. Hooker 
dismisses unequivocally the claim that “all the benefit we reap by sacraments be 
instruction:”522 “It greatly oﬀendeth that some, when they labor to show the use of the 
holy sacraments, assign unto them no end but only to teach the mind, by other senses, 
that which the word doth teach by hearing.”523 If that is all the sacraments do, then 
rational communities will set aside the sacraments in favor of preaching, which is a 
much more eﬃcient form of instruction.524 But if sacraments do more, then these 
communities act irrationally. 
Hooker similarly dismisses conceptions of the sacraments in terms of “bare 
resemblances or memorials of things absent, neither for naked signs and testimonies 
assuring us of grace received before.”525 To the contrary, Hooker asserts, introducing 
the instrumentality principle, the sacraments are “means eﬀectual whereby God when 
we take the sacraments delivereth into our hands that grace available unto eternal life, 
which grace the sacraments represent or signify.”526
Depending on one’s perspective, one can ascribe sundry secondary purposes to the
522. Laws.V.57.1 2:245.1-6
523. Laws.V.57.1 2:244.28-31.
524. Laws.V.57.1 2:245.1-6
525. Laws.V.57.5; 2:247.16-22. Emphasis original.
526. Laws.V.57.5; 2:247.16-22.
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sacraments, but their primary purpose derives from their role in the covenant of grace:
… their chiefest force and virtue consisteth… in that they are heavenly ceremonies, which God
hath sanctified and ordained to be administered in his Church, first as marks whereby to know
when God doth impart the vital or saving grace of Christ unto all that are of capable thereof,
and secondly as means conditional which God requireth in them unto whom he imparteth
grace.527
Hooker names two ways that the sacraments fulfill their chief role in the covenant
of grace. In the first of these, Hooker agrees with Archbishop Whitgift in aﬃrming 
their formal character as objective marks of Christ’s presence to his Church. Because 
God is invisible, God blesses Christians by giving “them some plain and sensible token
whereby to know what they cannot see.”528 Through the sacraments, “Christ and his 
holy Spirit with all their blessed eﬀects… give notice of the times when they use to 
make their access, because it pleaseth almighty God to communicate by sensible 
means those blessings which are incomprehensible.”529
But Hooker adds a caveat mandated by the covenant: the sacraments are a “means 
conditional” by which God imparts grace. As Hooker later clarifies, “Neither is it 
ordinarily his will to bestow the grace of sacraments on any, but by the sacraments.”530 
The sacraments are not just a means of instruction, and not just a visible sign of 
Christ’s real presence, but are a means of grace bestowed only through their 
performance - with few exceptions that are not of interest to the present study.
We encounter here an obstacle to interpretation. Hooker is not always consistent 
in his use of the word ‘grace.’ Usually ‘grace’ serves synonymously with what I have 
denoted variously by “the local presence of Christ’s whole person” or “Christ’s real 
presence” or “Christ and his Spirit’s presence.” But sometimes Hooker uses grace to 
denote “Christ’s real presence, along with his blessed eﬀects.” That is, sometimes 
grace also includes particular consequences of Christ’s presence that are particular to 
the context of that presence. For example, in baptism, the grace bestowed includes 
527. Laws.V.57.3  2:245.31-246.2.
528. Laws.V.57.3  2:246.2-7.
529. Laws.V.57.3  2:246.15-20
530. Laws.V.57.4; 2: 246.32-33.
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both Christ’s real presence and the impartation of that justifying faith associated with 
the seed of God, whereas in the Lord’s Supper, the grace bestowed includes both 
Christ’s real presence and the sanctifying eﬀects that perfect us by degrees over the 
course of our lives.531 In all cases, grace means, at minimum, the real presence of Christ
to the individual believer and the Church.
The final ground-clearing task is simply to note that which has been observed 
previously: that the assurance of our encounter with the real presence of Christ comes 
not from an innate capacity to participate in the Divine Mind through intellection of 
transcendentals, but entirely as a consequence of the covenant of grace. But those 
covenantal promises are suﬃcient for us to boldly approach the throne of grace:
That saving grace which Christ originally is or hath for the general good of his whole Church,
by sacraments he severally deriveth into every member thereof; sacraments serve as the
instruments of God to that end and purpose, moral instruments the use whereof is in our
hands the eﬀect in his; for the use we have his express commandment, for the eﬀect his
conditional promise; so that without our obedience to the one there is of the other no
apparent assurance, as contrariwise where the signs and sacraments of his grace are not either
through contempt unreceived or received with contempt, we are not to doubt but that they
really give what they promise, and are what they signify.532 
At the conclusion of my examination of Ramist realism in chapter three, I noted 
Hooker’s implication that no Ramist shortcut can provide an objective foundation 
upon which to base our ethical reasoning. I began the last chapter with the question, 
“Is there an objective ground for our judgments of the good?” Here, at last, we find 
our answer. “We are not to doubt but that they really give what they promise, and are 
what they signify.” For the Hookerian account, there is indeed an objective 
foundation from which arises our recognition of the good. The epistemic ground is 
proclaimed in the covenant of grace: Christ’s divine promise to be present to the 
faithful in our sacramental fellowship with him. The epistemic ground is none other 
than Christ himself, who gives himself in fellowship in the sacraments.
In what follows, I will examine Hooker’s connection between this epistemic 
531. Laws.V.57.6; 2:248.4-14
532. Laws.V.57.5; 2:247.5-16.
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ground, our sacramental practices, and the development of Christian character in the 
minds of the elect. By considering the principles of instrumentality and rationality in 
baptism and eucharist, we will see that Hooker associates transformation of the minds
of the elect in the encounter with Christ during ecclesial practices.533
Instrumentality in practices
Hooker’s account of practices manifests the principle of instrumentality. The 
principle of instrumentality holds that the role in practices of ordinary things is not to
be vessels of Christ’s real presence, but, rather, simultaneously to enact and to 
proclaim the personal relationship that constitutes Christ’s real presence to us. The 
word ‘vessel’ in this is significant. A vessel carries a thing within its boundaries; it is a 
container, a receptacle. So the principle of instrumentality is a claim that, on Hooker’s
account, ordinary created things do not themselves carry or contain Christ’s real 
presence. They are not channels of grace themselves. Rather, they are instruments of 
grace that make Christ’s real presence intelligible to us. 
In his commentary on sacraments in general, Hooker notes an integral connection
between the particular grace to be conveyed and the common utility of the elements 
selected: “Grace intended by sacraments was a cause of the choice, and is a reason of 
the fitness of the elements themselves.”534 Fitness of use is a quality of instruments. 
But instruments can be channels or conveyors as well as implements, so the attribute 
of fitness does not clarify Hooker’s instrumentalism suﬃciently. 
This distinction is of interest because the Reformed streams, going back to the 
debates leading to the Consensus Tigurinus, divided on the question of the nature of 
instrumentalism in the sacraments. Influenced by older debates between Thomists 
533. Hooker evinces a pragmatic view of baptism, concerning himself much less than Barth with
the distinction between de jure and de facto participation in Christ. Barth sought to protect in
his descriptions “the freedom and sovereignty of God or the perfection of Jesus Christ’s
person and work, and indeed...cohere[nce] with his pneumatology, theology of the
resurrection, and indeed his view of participation in Christ in general.” In contrast, Hooker’s
focus was on ecclesiology. In an era in which Puritan colleagues pressed for exclusion of the
ungodly from the Church of England, Hooker emphasized the objective nature of the visible
church as the only church we are ordained to govern. Neder, Participation in Christ, 84.
534. Laws.V.58.1; 2:248.19-25.
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and Franciscans, Reformers advocated diﬀerent forms, with the more Lutheran view 
embracing the Thomist sense of instrumentalism that might loosely be described as 
“channeling” and those influenced by Bullinger embracing the Franciscan sense of 
“triggering.”535  
Triggering avoids any suggestion that the elements are secondary causes: the 
elements, by the agency of the Spirit, render a particular state in the partaker. For 
example, the rainbow triggered in the faithful descendants of Noah confidence in 
God’s promise never again to destroy the world by flood (Genesis 8:1 - 9:17), yet the 
rainbow did not thereby become a cause of that eﬀect. The Spirit alone was the cause 
of such confidence, working in the hearts of the faithful to render in them a state of 
confidence concomitant with their sighting of the rainbow.536 The rainbow is an 
instrument in the Franciscan sense of triggering, but not in the Thomist sense of 
channeling.
This example helps us to locate Hooker firmly in the Franciscan camp with 
respect to instrumentality in the sacraments. For he cites a similar example - that of 
Moses and the serpent - in clarifying the relation between grace and the elements:
Which grace also they that receive by sacraments or with sacraments, receive it from him and
not from them. For of sacraments the very same is true which Solomon’s wisdom observeth in
the brazen serpent,”He that turned towards it was not healed by the thing he saw, but by thee
O savior of all.” This is therefore the necessity of sacraments.537
 
This suggests that Hooker is consistent with the Consensus Tigurinus in seeing the 
elements as organum of grace in the sense of triggers of the eﬀects caused by the 
Spirit.538 The elements are not vessels or channels of grace. Indeed, the elements 
535. John H. Leith and W. Stacy. Johnson, Calvin Studies Iv : Presented At a Colloquium on Calvin
Studies At Davidson College and Davidson College Presbyterian Church, Davidson, North Carolina
(Davidson, NC: Davidson College, 1988). See also Reinhold Seeberg, Text-Book of the History
of Doctrines, trans. Charles E. Hay, vol. 2 (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1952), 2:126-127. 
536. I am indebted to my colleague, Tom McGlothlin, for this illustration.
537. Laws.V.57.4; 2: 246.30 - 247.5; Hooker quotes Wisdom 16:7. Cf. Calvin, The Institutes of the
Christian Religion. IV.14.18.
538. Heinrich Bullinger and John Calvin, “Consensus Tigurinus,” Creeds of Christendom, with a
History and Critical notes, http://www.creeds.net/reformed/Tigurinus/tigur-latin.htm
(accessed July 12, 2013).
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“contain in themselves no vital force of eﬃcacy, they are not physical but moral 
instruments of salvation, duties of service and worship, which unless we perform as the 
author of grace requireth, they are unprofitable.”539
Defending the necessity of baptism, Hooker establishes explicitly the 
instrumentality of the water. Baptism is not “a cause for grace, yet the grace which is 
given them with their baptism doth so far forth depend on the very outward 
sacrament that God will have it embraced not only as a sign or token what we receive, 
but also as an instrument or mean whereby we receive grace….540
From this we can conclude that Hooker’s account of baptism exhibits the 
principle of instrumentality: neither the water nor the ordinary washing it achieves are
vessels of Christ’s real presence. Rather, the outer act of washing by water, when 
combined with the words explaining God’s inner action of washing away sin, 
simultaneously enacts and proclaims the personal relationship that constitutes Christ’s
real presence to us, and, in that encounter, renders the eﬀects that the Spirit intends. 
As we consider the Eucharist, it is necessary to distinguish the principle of 
instrumentality developed here. Hooker oﬀers an instrumentalist view of the 
Eucharist that, in his assessment, renders the theories of consubstantiation and 
transubstantiation “unnecessary.”541 My interest here is not to engage his dismissal of 
these theories but to follow his particular application of the principle of 
instrumentality. His usage diﬀers from that of Aquinas, who also oﬀered an 
instrumentalist view of the Eucharist. As Liam Walsh notes, Aquinas held that 
“[Christ’s] humanity, joined to his divinity in hypostatic union, is an attached 
instrument of the divine; his sacraments are detached instruments by which the divine 
causality of grace, active in his humanity, reaches humans in place and time.”542 
Hooker, with Calvin, did not embrace the Thomist notion of secondary causation.  As
539. Laws.V.57.4; 2:246.20-30. Emphasis original.
540. Laws.V.60.2; 2:255.1-6. Emphasis added.
541. Laws.V.67.11; 2:340.10-15.
542. Liam Walsh, “Sacraments,” in The Theology of Thomas Aquinas, ed. Rik Van Nieuwenhove and
Joseph Wawrykow, (University of Notre Dame Press, 2010-08-15), 347. 
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we shall see, the physical elements of the sacraments are instruments on Hooker’s 
account, too, but only as a result of their contingent usage by God in fulfillment of the
covenant of grace.
Hooker is explicit in his aﬃrmation of the instrumentality of the bread and the 
wine. In reflecting on how best to interpret the words of institution, he notes, “The 
bread and cup are his body and blood because they are causes instrumental upon the 
receipt whereof the participation of his body and blood ensueth.”543 He clarifies how 
this instrumentality is manifest in contrasting Lutheran and Roman views with his 
own account. The proper exposition of Christ’s words of institution are:
This hallowed food, though concurrence of divine power, is in verity and truth, unto faithful
believers, instrumentally a cause of that mystical participation, whereby as I make myself
wholly theirs, so I give them in hand an actual possession of all such saving grace as my
sacrificed body can yield, and as their souls do presently need, this is ‘to them and in them’ my
body....544
This pithy summary is a dense application of Hooker’s principle of 
instrumentality. Some unpacking is in order.
“This is ‘to them and in them’” aﬃrms the real presence of Christ in the sacrament
but locates that presence in the faithful believer: “The real presence of Christ’s most 
blessed body and blood is not therefore to be sought for in the sacrament, but in the 
worthy receiver of the sacrament.”545 Hooker emphasizes that the sacrament 
“exhibit[s]” grace but “they are not really nor do really contain in themselves that 
grace which with them or by them it pleaseth God to bestow.”546 Rather, the Spirit 
acts to render the transformation of bread and wine in the heart and soul of the 
worthy receiver:
543. Laws.V.67.5; 2:334.16-19. Emphasis original.
544. Laws.V.67.12; 2: 341.1-7, Emphasis added.
545. Laws.V.67.5;2:334.30-32.
546. Laws.V.67.6;2:335.7-10.
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I see not which way it should be gathered by the words of Christ when and where the bread is
his body and or the cup his blood but only in the very heart and soul of him which receiveth
them.547
Though the elements themselves are not to be identified as themselves the real 
presence of Christ, and are not to be described as containers of his real presence, 
Christ is nonetheless “wholly theirs”548 by virtue of “that mystical participation”549 
caused by Christ’s Spirit. Hooker cites Tertullian, Irenaeus, and Theoderet to explain 
how this is so: 
Christ is personally there present, yea present whole, albeit a part of Christ be corporally
absent from thence; that Christ assisting this heavenly banquet with his personal and true
presence doth by his own divine power add to the natural substance thereof supernatural
eﬃcacy which addition to the nature of those consecrated elements changeth them and
maketh them that unto us which otherwise they could not be; that to us they are thereby
made such instruments as mystically yet truly, invisibly yet really work our communion or
fellowship with the person of Jesus Christ as well in that he is man as God, our participation
also in the fruit, grace, and eﬃcacy of his body and blood, whereupon there ensueth a kind of
transubstantiation in us, a true change both of soul and body, an alteration from death to
life.550
The elements neither are the real presence nor contain the real presence, and 
neither are their natural properties changed such that they no longer are what they are
naturally. Rather, they are rendered more than they naturally are only for the worthy 
receiver. To their natural substance is added an “eﬃcacy” that changes and makes 
them “unto us which otherwise they could not be.” Specifically, the Spirit uses “such 
instruments” to create “our communion or fellowship with the person of Jesus Christ” 
and also to cause “our participation also in the fruit, grace, and eﬃcacy of his body and
blood.” 
This is more readily understood by reference to my earlier example of the 
rainbow.551 God chose to use the rainbow as a sign of his promise never again to 
destroy the earth by flood. The rainbow, of course, remains the natural phenomenon 
it was before God chose to adopt it for this purpose, and the natural phenomenon is 
547. Laws.V.67.6;2:335.3-6.
548. Laws.V.67.12; 2: 341.4.
549. Laws.V.67.12; 2: 341.3-4.
550. Laws.V..67.11; 2:338.14-340.4
551. Calvin, The Institutes of the Christian Religion, IV.14.18.
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itself not to be confused with the divine restraint. Nonetheless, once God decided to 
use the rainbow for the new purpose of being a sign of his covenant faithfulness, the 
ordinary rainbow gained a supernatural eﬃcacy. Something was added to it that 
rendered it no longer what it naturally is, at least when it is beheld by the heirs to 
God's promise. Its ontology has been changed by divine decree though its physical 
properties remain unchanged. 
God used an ordinary physical thing to edify Noah in his faith. There is a cause 
and eﬀect relationship here, but the cause is not contained in the rainbow. Rather, the
Spirit alone is the cause, and the role of the rainbow is whatever the Spirit makes of it.
Similarly, the eﬀects are not contained in the rainbow. Rather, the edifying eﬀect is 
triggered by the sign of the rainbow, manifested entirely within the heart and soul of 
the worthy receiver. 
In like fashion, Christ chose to use ordinary things like wine and bread as signs of 
his promise always to be Christ-with-us. The wine and bread remain what they were 
before Christ chose to use them for this purpose. They are not to be confused with 
the real presence they signify. Once Christ decided to use them as signs of the New 
Covenant of his Body and Blood, the bread and wine gained a supernatural eﬃcacy. 
When consecrated, something is added to them that renders them no longer what 
they naturally are, at least when beheld by those who trust in Christ's promise. What 
they are - their being - changes, though their physical properties remain unchanged.552 
Their being changes solely because of the additional role that Christ the Creator 
assigned them within his covenant of grace. When consecrated, they become sure 
signs of his real presence, edifying those who consume them in faith.
The cause of our sanctification, Christ's real presence, is not contained in the 
bread and wine. Rather, the Spirit alone is the cause, and the role of the elements is 
whatever the Spirit makes of them. Similarly, the edifying eﬀects of the sacrament are 
not contained in the elements. Rather, the edifying eﬀects are instrumentally 
552. I am indebted to Tom McGlothlin for this illustration.
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triggered by the elements, manifested entirely in the heart and soul of the worthy 
receiver.
From this we can see that the Hooker’s particular form of instrumentalism in the 
Eucharist is coherent with that derived from first principles above. Ordinary things 
like water, bread, and wine are not channels of grace themselves. Rather, they are 
instruments of grace that make Christ’s real presence intelligible to us. And we, and 
not the elements themselves, are acted upon in the sacrament. For when we remember
him, we ourselves are re-membered. On this basis, Hooker is able to oﬀer his famous 
observation that it is not the bread and wine that are transformed, but us: “there 
ensueth a kind of transubstantiation in us, a true change both of soul and body, an 
alteration from death to life.”553 
In the next section, we will see that this transubstantiation in us occurs through 
our reunion with Christ, a reunion described in the grammar of the logical space of 
reasons.
Rationality in practices
It is fundamental to our Hookerian account that the telos of humans is to 
participate in the rationality of God. The principle of rationality holds that our 
participation in the life of God takes place in the logical space of reasons. This is not 
to say that faith consists of assent to propositions or that faith is merely intellectual, 
but rather to say that participation is experienced as a knowing of the whole person of
Christ through our communicative nature, our interactions, and our shared history 
with him. Christ’s reconciling actions for us are rendered intelligible and become 
553. Laws.V..67.11; 2:339.7-340.1. Emphasis added. Note that the edifying eﬀects of the sacrament
do not entail a material washing away of a sinful substance or a material transformation of
the properties of the human. Rather the transubstantiation of the human entails an
ontological transformation, an alteration from death to life. This is remarkably similar to
Barth’s account. As Neder notes, “He oﬀers an alternative account in which human
participation in God occurs not on the level of a cleansing or transformation of human nature
(substantially understood) by either the divine “essence” or “energies,” but rather as an
event of covenant fellowship in which human beings do not become gods, but rather the
human beings they were created to be.” Neder, Participation in Christ, 45.
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known by our rational faculties.
Hooker does not focus much, in his treatment of baptism within Laws, on the 
rational nature of our participation. This is most likely because his primary concern in 
Laws is sanctification and not justification, and so he satisfies himself mostly with 
brief references to the imparting of the seed of God within the soul of the baptized. 
However, some evidence that Hooker locates the participatory element of baptism in 
the logical space of reasons is visible in the way he describes the role of the rite in our 
ongoing relationship with Christ. In discussing the significance of Christ’s words in 
instituting the baptismal rite and the necessity of its physical action and spoken 
words, he describes baptism as a door into the household of God and a first step in our
journey of sanctification. It is:
… baptism which both declareth and maketh us Christians. In which respect we justly hold it
to be the door of our actual entrance into God’s house, the first apparent beginning of life, a
seal perhaps to the grace of election before received, but to our sanctification here a step that
hath not any before it.554 
Designation of baptism as a door and a first step in an ongoing journey reflect the 
language of event and history. Hooker is clear in declaring that baptism initiates a new
relationship, or at least a new stage in a largely unrealized relationship. The event 
described is that of the subject, Christ, acting upon another subject, the baptized, and,
as such, the event is, formally, the first personal interaction between Christ and the 
baptized. The event is seen as the beginning of a history that will be shared and 
ongoing. The consequence of the event is the occupation of the heart of the baptized 
by Christ’s Spirit such that Christ’s actions become communicable and intelligible to 
the baptized in the sense of providing justification for beliefs about Christ. Sociality, 
interaction, shared history, and intelligibility of final causes - these are the coordinates
of the logical space of reasons. 
Lest we be uncertain of this, we need only turn to Hooker’s Learned Discourse of 
554. Laws.V.5.60.3; 2:256.16-26.
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Justification wherein he considers justifying faith, the bestowal of which is marked by 
the baptismal event. Christ’s Spirit:
… inhabit[s] and possess[es] the mind…. As the light of nature doth cause the mind to
apprehend those truths which are merely rational, so that saving truth, which is far above the
reach of human reason, cannot otherwise than by the Spirit of the Almighty be conceived.555
Hooker develops this observation regarding the rational nature of our 
participation in his defense of the use of interrogatories in the baptismal rite. He 
notes that “We find by experience that… faith be an intellectual habit of the mind and
have her seat in the understanding.”556 The rational nature of faith, however, does not 
imply that faith’s object is known in the way that we know empirical facts. Rather, 
Hooker describes a knowing in which Christ’s person becomes intelligible to us in 
spite of the limits of reason. Such knowing is born of Christ’s downward action in the 
forms of revelation and the Spirit’s gift of the supernatural virtue of faith by which 
such revelation is rendered intelligible:
That which is true and neither can be discerned by sense, nor concluded by some natural
principles, must have principles of revealed truth whereupon to build itself, and an habit of
faith in us wherewith principles of that kind are apprehended. The mysteries of our religion
are above the reach of our understanding, above discourse of man’s reason, above all that any
creature can comprehend. Therefore the first thing required of him which standeth for
admission into Christ’s family is belief. Which belief consisteth not so much in knowledge as
in acknowledgement of all things that heavenly wisdom revealeth; the aﬀection of faith is
above her reach, her love to Godward above the comprehension which she hath of God.557
Similarly, our encounter with Christ during the Eucharist is best described with 
the grammar of the logical space of reasons.
Hooker locates the real presence of Christ not in the sacrament but “in the 
worthy receiver of the sacrament;”558 “the bread is his body and or the cup his blood 
but only in the very heart and soul of him which receiveth them.559 Moreover, Hooker 
unequivocally maintains that Christ is eﬃcaciously present. Indeed, Christ’s real 
555. Learned Discourse.26; FLE 5:137.30-138.4
556. Laws.V.63.2; 2:291.19-21.
557. Laws.V.63.1; 2:290.20-31
558. Laws.V.67.5;2:334.30-32.
559. Laws.V.67.6;2:335.3-6.
- 183 -
- 183 -
presence in the heart and soul of the receiver, triggered by the sign of Christ’s promise
to be Christ-with-us, renders an ontological change in the receiver like that rendered 
in the bread and wine by virtue of their selection as the ordinary objects which trigger 
the edifying eﬀects in the worthy receiver. What the receiver is - her ontology - is 
transformed by the real presence of Christ within her heart and soul such that her 
being is altered: Christ causes “a true change both of soul and body, an alteration from
death to life.”560 This echoes Luther. Christ dwells within, and such presence 
constitutes both reconciliation (favor) and the gift of God himself (donum). In short, 
the real presence of Christ within the worthy receiver transforms her such that she 
herself becomes a sign of Christ’s real and sanctifying presence in the community.
From this it should be clear that Hooker is a long way from the memorialism of 
Zwingli. To say that we experience the real presence of Christ according to the 
rationality principle, and to clarify that Hooker’s instrumentalism is of the ‘triggering’ 
form, is not to say that Hooker believes that the sacrament merely triggers the 
recollection of Christ in our imagination. To the contrary, Hooker denies this, 
emphasizing that the sacrament induces a personal knowing:
… not by surmised imagination but truly, even so truly that through faith we perceive in the
body and blood sacramentally presented the very taste of eternal life, the grace of the sacrament
is here as the food which we eat and drink.561
In short, the sign of Christ’s new covenant of grace renders intelligible to us 
Christ’s real presence such that we are justified in our belief that he addresses us with 
his promise in the sacramental food and drink. Moreover, such personal knowing of 
Christ’s presence renders intelligible to us “what the grace is which God giveth us, the 
degrees of our own increase in holiness and virtue…, [and] the strength of our life 
begun in Christ.562”
We encounter here the mystery. The surprising thing is that it is located neither 
560. Laws.V..67.11; 2:339.7-340.1. Emphasis added.
561. Laws.V.67.1; 2:331.13-16. Emphasis added.
562. Laws.V.67.1; 2:331.9-12.
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in the transformed properties of the bread and the wine nor the spiritual transport of 
the people to heaven. Instead, the mystery is in the ‘mystical conjunction’ that the 
Spirit causes in the human person. The eternal is naturally unknowable by humans 
because of our finitude - and because of the astigmatism of sin563 - but nonetheless the 
Spirit crosses the buﬀer zone, re-creating a personal knowing of the unknowable by 
binding the covenant of grace to ordinary phenomena like bread and wine. How does 
the Spirit do that? How does the Spirit communicate knowledge of Christ’s 
reconciling actions to our rational faculties such that they become intelligible as 
actions toward us and for us? How does the Spirit create Christ’s Indwelling Presence 
such that we experience ourselves as addressed personally by Christ’s love? Therein 
lies the mystery.
Yet it is clear that, for Hooker, our participation in Christ and his participation in
us - by way of sacramental practices - occurs in what I have described as the logical 
space of reasons. In the Eucharist, Christ’s history becomes our history, we discover 
ourselves addressed by him from both his throne and his cross, and we discover 
ourselves transformed by his action upon us. For:
… these mysteries do as nails fasten us to his very cross, that by them we draw out, as touching
eﬃcacy, force, and virtue, even the blood of his gored side, in the wounds of our Redeemer we
there dip our tongues, we are died red both within and without, our hunger is satisfied and our
thirst forever quenched, they are things wonderful which he feeleth, great which he seeth and
unheard of which he uttereth whose soul is possessed of this paschal lamb and made joyful in
the strength of this new wine, this bread hath in it more than the substance which our eyes
behold, this cup hallowed with solemn benediction availeth to the endless life and welfare
both of soul and body, in that it serveth as well for a medicine to heal our infirmities and
purge our sins as for a sacrifice of thanksgiving, with touching it sanctifieth, it enlightneth
with belief, it truly conformeth us unto the image of Jesus Christ; what these elements are in
themselves it skilleth not, it is enough that to me which takes them they are the body and
blood of Christ, his promise in witness hereof suﬃceth, his word he knoweth which way to
accomplish.564 
563. “Astigmatism” is Steinmetz’s metaphor for Calvin’s account of sin, which I borrow and
apply to Hooker. See note 124, page 53. Like Calvin, Hooker described the noetic eﬀects of
sin in cognitive terms. Our “natural thirst for knowledge” is frustrated by ignorance, for the
good we seek “hath evidence enough for itself, if reason were diligent to search it out.” But
communal “neglect” of the good causes “a show of that which is not,” and we choose that
which is “less good.” Sometimes, in our choices, we are deceived by Satan; “sometimes the
hastiness of our wills prevent[ ] the more considerate advice of sound reason,” and
“sometimes the very custom of evil make[s] the heart obdurate against whatsoever
instructions to the contrary.” See Laws I.7.7;  I.8.11.
564. Laws.V.67.13; 2:343.5-24.
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Section summary
Thus far, an account of our participation in Christ especially as it is mediated 
through the sacraments of baptism and Eucharist. We have seen that Christ’s Spirit 
uses ordinary water, bread, and wine as instrumental causes of the eﬀect of Christ’s 
real presence in us. As Hooker observes, it is we who are transubstantiated, not the 
elements themselves. The final cause is not transformed bread and wine but 
transformed humanity, and our encounter with such transformed subjects is known by
us in the logical space of reasons. The key point is that the practices themselves are 
not containers or channels of Christ’s real presence, but triggers through which the 
Spirit eﬃcaciously draws us by steps and degrees into an ever-deepening personal 
fellowship with Christ. 
MIMETIC VIRTUE
 Improvisation
In their Christian Ethics,565 Stanley Hauerwas and Sam Wells argue that ethical 
reasoning for the church is properly done as worship, and that a proper Christian 
ethics is rightly determined by our worship. Their volume follows Wells’ argument 
that every act in the Eucharist and baptism performs a fundamental truth-claim of the 
Gospel, forming the mind of Christ in disciples through the repetition of practices 
instituted by Christ. Of particular interest to this study is the insight, upon which 
their approach is based, that practices produce a virtuous community by causing 
disciples to take the right things for granted. The way the Church identifies those 
‘right things’ it should take for granted is by reference to Christ himself. 
I would clarify, however, that it is not the practices themselves that teach us the 
right things to take for granted, and it is not the practices that correct our vision so 
that we see the world the way it really is, but rather it is Christ himself. Virtue is born 
565. Hauerwas and Wells, Christian Ethics.
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not of practices but of a personal rationality. As we have seen, practices actualize and 
sustain the personal relationship  through which Christ’s history becomes our history. 
In that personal relationship, we discover ourselves addressed by him, and we discover
ourselves transformed by his action upon us.
But, if this is correct, how does Christ teach us the proper descriptions of the 
world? How does Christ himself teach us the right things to take for granted? How are
we ourselves agents? 
In his Improvisation, Wells draws upon the language of the theatre to emphasize 
that Christian ethics are necessarily dramatic. They do not merely require the ability 
to make aesthetic judgments. They require such judgments in a context of 
interpersonal address and response such that those judgments keep the story going. 
The particularity and contingency of human life require that Christian agents 
improvise in response to particular ethical questions such that their responses carry on
in the same way towards the New Jerusalem. Such improvisation is art, and, as 
Aristotle, Aquinas, and Hooker taught us, the art of making phronetic judgments is 
learned only at the feet of masters.
But from whom does one learn such an art?  In what follows, I will propose that 
sacramental practices generate the personal relationship with Christ that sets the 
necessary conditions for our imitation of him which, in turn, motivates right 
motivations. Before proceeding to that proposal, however, some background is 
necessary.
 Mimesis
Linda Zagzebski’s ‘divine motivation theory’566 provides a way forward.
Most distinctively Christian ethics seem to be deontological in that they 
presuppose a ‘divine command theory’ which characterize ethics in terms of obedience
566. Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski, Divine Motivation Theory, Kindle ed. (Cambridge University Press,
2004-08-02).
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to divine law that is grounded in the creation accounts. Zagzebski has proposed an 
alternative - which she dubs ‘divine motivation theory - which is grounded in 
Christology and which explains the formation of virtue in terms of the formation of 
motives corresponding to those of Christ. We learn virtuous behavior by looking to 
moral exemplars, and that virtuous behavior we observe is constituted by appropriate 
motive dispositions and corresponding actions that we can imitate.567
For the purposes of this study, I am chiefly interested in Zagzebski’s account of 
how the imitation of moral exemplars - including Christ - motivate right actions. In 
what follows, I will argue that the Spirit generates the personal relationship with 
Christ that sets the necessary conditions for such imitation through sacramental 
practices. 
According to Linda Zagzebski, virtue is formed through the creation of 
perceptions that are both aﬀective and cognitive and acquired through experience.568 
Zagzebski calls these perceptions emotions. Repetitive encounters with situations 
and/or objects lead us to create "aﬀective dispositions," and, in combination with our 
eﬀorts to create mental maps of our world, these dispositions lead to the development
of "thick concepts" which result in patterns of emotional responses to similar stimuli. 
Virtue arises from the creation of the right thick concepts which, in turn, motivate 
right actions.569 
Zagzebski turns to the concept of "moral exemplar" in order to provide a 
foundation for her theory.570 The right emotional response to a given situation/object 
is that response which one might observe in the moral exemplar in similar 
circumstances. The actions that correspond to particular emotions are those actions 
which one might observe when the moral exemplar has those emotions. We know 
what virtuous behavior is by looking to moral exemplars, and that virtuous behavior 
567. Ibid., 219. “Good motives for us are forms of imitating the divine motives.”
568. Ibid., 64-66.
569. Ibid., 64-65.
570. Ibid., 48-49.
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we observe is constituted by appropriate motive dispositions and corresponding 
actions that we can imitate.
 For Zagbeski, virtue is an embedded habit humans develop by imitating moral 
exemplars. The supreme exemplar Zagbeski has in view is the Christ.571 However, we 
should not expect other humans to share perfectly his emotions, his responses, and his
ends precisely because of the incommunicability of humans: there is something in 
particular that is of value in each human beyond that which is attributable to human 
nature. Because of this particularity, virtue does not consist of being a perfect imitator
of the exemplar. The diﬀerence that makes us unique means that virtue necessarily 
does not consist of conformance to a uniquely appropriate emotion, response, or end 
that we observe in Christ, but rather describes a range of fitting emotions, responses, and 
ends, all of which describe a range of ideal selves. Though the Christ defines the ideal 
range of virtuous motives and actions, divine motivation theory insists on the 
particularity of this ideal for each individual. 
This insistence on the particularity of individuals even as they seek to imitate 
Christ illumines the significance of narrative in ethical formation. Narrative exposes 
humans to the emotions, responses, and ends of Christ and those who followed Christ
well, oﬀering not just the supreme exemplar, but a rich variety of exemplars whose 
story is one of imitating the Christ well. In our encounter with their engagement of 
the world as mediated through narrative of which understand ourselves to be a part, 
we form those thick concepts that lead to motive dispositions, and thereby learn how 
to respond within the range of ideal emotions and actions to the stimuli of our 
contexts.
 Sacramental practices and right motivations
Zagzebski’s account of aﬀective dispositions which lead to the development of 
"thick concepts" intersects well with Wells’ emphasis on practices which lead us to 
571. Ibid., 226.
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take the right things for granted. Both emphasize the significance of repetitive 
encounters, as well as the creation of mental maps or descriptions that help us to see 
the world rightly. And both point to how these thick concepts help us to navigate 
ethically in the encounter with unfamiliar stimuli.
As noted above, it is not practices but Christ’s action upon us through practices 
which lead us to take the right things for granted. Moreover, we have seen that Christ 
acts upon on us through sacramental practices to initiate and sustain the personal 
relationships through which Christ’s Spirit sanctifies us. But what is the relationship 
between these things? How does Christ utilize sacramental practices to provide the 
gift of the right thick concepts through which we take the right things for granted?
My proposal is that the personal relationship created through sacramental 
practices provides the necessary pre-conditions for the mimesis through which Christ 
schools us. The relationship in which one experiences being addressed by Christ and 
responds to Christ grows over time. Interactions accumulate, and one grows in one’s 
appreciation of a shared history. One consequence of this personal relationship is a 
knowing of Christ such that his nature and will are rendered intelligible in the sense of
producing justifiable belief in Christ as one’s Lord. This justifiable belief, made 
possible only through the personal relationship with him, establishes the roles of 
exemplar and disciple described by Zagzebski. These are the necessary pre-conditions 
for mimesis. 
To be clear, Christ is the supreme exemplar, but we encounter not just Christ, but
also the phenomena of others who have imitated and are imitating Christ. The 
community in Christ properly provides a rich variety of exemplars whose story is one 
of imitating Christ well.
From this we see that through the sacraments and through the community that 
the sacraments create, Christ schools us as we are immersed in his story such that it 
becomes our story, or, rather, such that we begin to see ourselves as part of his story. 
Even better, as Wells might say, Christ sanctifies us as we see ourselves as actors in 
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the theodrama, called to improvise responsibly in such a way that our actions point to 
the New Jerusalem. Through our imitation of him, he creates our “aﬀective 
dispositions” and, ultimately, our mental maps of the world that correct our vision so 
that, over time, we see the world as it really is. By steps and degrees, Christ develops in
us the thick concepts which determine our improvisational responses to the 
contingent and variegated stimuli of life. Virtue arises from the creation of the right 
thick concepts which, in turn, motivate right actions. In this way, Christ utilizes 
sacramental practices to generate virtue in the body of which he is the head.
 Knowing God and Recognizing the Good, Revisited
So how do humans recognize the good? We’ve seen that, for Hooker, the entire 
created order is God’s symphony of truth,572 communicating God’s Word by which all 
things come to know who and what they are in God’s mind. Hooker could say today, 
with Hans Urs von Balthasar, that “Although ever since Luther we have become 
accustomed to call the Bible 'God's Word', it is not Sacred Scripture which is God's 
original language and self-expression, but rather Jesus Christ.”573 In Hooker’s 
rendering, that language and self-expression is the eternal law, which is perfectly 
transmitted but imperfectly received by the human rational agent, who then weaves 
that Word into the community’s common life through law, community norms, social 
structures, and shared practices. The Spirit gathers particular individuals into Christ’s 
Church, drawing them into personal relationships with Jesus Christ through which 
Christ tutors them mimetically in the pentecostal grammar which heals and empowers
their relational capacities, and generates the norms, structures, and practices through 
which the Church hears and embodies the Word. Yet, whether Christians recognize 
the Word in Scripture, communal practices, the created order, or in the spiritual 
experiences through which we receive our conjunction with Christ, and whether we 
572. I allude here to von Balthasar’s phrase, which I take to be an apt description that Hooker
could have adopted himself. Hans Urs von Balthasar, Truth is Symphonic: Aspects of Christian
Pluralism, ed.:28 (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1987). 7-10.
573. Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord, Vol. 1: Seeing the Form (the Glory of the Lord: A
Theological Aesthetics) (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2009-06-01). 23.
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conceptualize our encounters with it in terms of causes or reasons, all human knowing 
of the good is derived from the phenomenal. This includes the special category of 
revelation, which transcends human reason but is nonetheless encountered as 
phenomena perceived using the same human psychology.  As we have seen throughout
this study, this psychology has important implications for the defeasability of our 
communal judgments about the good, and the methods of ethical reasoning we 
embrace.
Extension through synthesis with Wellsian improvisation and Zagbeski’s divine 
motivation theory locates the Hookerian account squarely in the ecclesial ethicists’ 
camp. It clarifies what I suggest Hooker himself understood: that the proper focus of 
Christian ethics is neither ‘decisions’ nor ‘power’ nor “right actions” nor “right 
outcomes” nor abstract values like equality. Rather, the proper focus of Christian 
ethics is the “character” of the Christian.574 
It also highlights the ethical significance of another thread we’ve seen throughout 
this study - Hooker’s priority on the particular. For with Barth, Hauerwas, Wells, and 
other ecclesial ethicists, Hooker resists reduction of Christ to either an 
Enlightenment sage dispensing wisdom or to a new Moses figure dictating universal 
moral axioms. Rather, the Hookerian account sees the Christ as the self-expression of 
the triune God, calling humans to the abundance of love unleashed when we imitate 
the divine fellowship by living as one with the other  without annihilating diﬀerence. 
Christ calls us to imitate his always creative dispositions, but not by ceasing to be 
individuals called by name. Because Christ is always wholly other, he calls us to imitate
his dispositions in our unique narrative location, participating in the rationality of 
God by creatively manifesting the good he teaches us to desire. This returns us once 
more to the virtue of phronesis, the capacity to manifest the good for the sake of the 
good. In the Hookerian account, Christian virtue just is phronesis, reconfigured as the 
574. Per the Wellsian typology of ethical systems, universal ethics focus on decisions, subversive
ethics focus on power relationships, and ecclesial ethics focus on character. Wells and Quash,
Introducing Christian Ethics, 113-115. 
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capacity to create in our narrative location the good that we desire precisely because 
the risen Lord himself desires it. 
CRITICISM OF THE ECCLESIAL ETHICISTS
We’ve reached at last a preliminary answer to the question of how the mind of 
Christ is formed in community, and we’ve seen that the Hookerian account answers in
terms of mimetic virtue that is cultivated by the Spirit in the Church’s practices. 
Because the Hookerian account emphasizes the importance of practices, it is 
vulnerable to criticism aimed originally at ecclesial ethicists who emphasize narrative 
and practices. Critics of ecclesial ethicists have focused on four core concerns: their 
reluctance to make explicit claims about God and creation and a correlative tendency 
to identify the Church with its social ethics, the conflation of truth with the faith or 
beliefs of a particular community, and an overly-realized eschatology that leads to an 
irresponsible sectarianism. Related to these concerns are complaints that those who 
emphasize practices don’t attend closely to the specific words of Scripture and that 
they give insuﬃcient attention to particular Christian doctrines. Criticism is 
widespread and centered mostly around the work of Hauerwas due perhaps to the 
prominence of his corpus. Critiques by John Webster and Christopher Insole are 
illustrative of these concerns. In the remainder of this chapter, I will summarize their 
critiques and consider how the Hookerian account answers them. 
John Webster’s Barthian Critique
For John Webster,575 the ecclesial ethicists err to the extent that their description 
of the Church is based on what the Church does (its practices) rather than on what 
the Church suﬀers (God’s actions upon the Church). In their insistence that the 
visible Church not be separated from its language and practices, those who emphasize 
practices are vulnerable to the charge that they are identifying the phenomena of the 
575. John Webster, “The Church and the Perfection of God,” in The Community of the Word: Toward
an Evangelical Ecclesiology, ed. Mark Husbands and Daniel J. Treier, (IVP Academic,
2005-03-18), Kindle location 856-864, Sec. 1, para. 4.
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Church with the revelation of God’s reign. Due to their reluctance to speak about first
principles - and especially the “perfection of God,” their account of the Church is 
excessively immanentist and reflects an overly realized eschatology.
While acknowledging the importance of the eﬀort to reintegrate theology with 
the concrete life of the Church after decades of the “ecclesiological minimalism of 
much modern Protestantism,” Webster criticizes the eﬀorts of post-liberals for 
“ecclesiological inflation”.  Webster notes three consequences of the description of 
the Church in terms of its practices, all of which he summarizes as a distortion of the 
“asymmetry of gospel and church.” The first consequence is an “immanentist account 
of the Church which lacks strong interest in deploying direct language about God.” 
The second consequence is an overemphasis on the Church “as visible human 
communion,”576 an emphasis that he rightly notes is particularly strong in the Anglican
Communion currently. The third consequence is the relegation of the Gospel to mere 
background, oﬀering “little critical or corrective force upon the way in which Church 
practice is conceived.” Webster’s concerns can best be summarized by his pithy and 
ironic description of this school: “In short: Schleiermacher, not Barth.”577
Webster’s criticisms seemingly arise from two helpful Barthian concerns. First, 
ecclesiology must flow from proper confession of the alterity and perfection of the 
triune Word. Second, “the norm of ecclesiology” must be “the particular character of 
God as it is made known in revelation, rather than some common term in ecclesiology 
and theology proper  (such as the term relation, which is almost ubiquitous in 
contemporary discussion).”578 The consequences that worry him issue from these 
concerns. My Hookerian account shares Webster’s Barthian concerns and seems to 
meet his critique successfully.
We’ve already seen that Hooker explicitly satisfies the two overarching concerns 
576. John Webster, “The Visible Attests the Invisible,” in The Community of the Word: Toward an
Evangelical Ecclesiology, ed. Mark Husbands and Daniel J. Treier, (IVP Academic, 2005-03-18),
Kindle location 1149-1159, Sect. 1, para. 4.
577. Ibid. 
578. Webster, “The Church and the Perfection of God,” Kindle location 880, Sect. II, para. 1.
- 194 -
- 194 -
from which Webster’s portents derive. In his appropriation of Thomas’ description of
the eternal law, Hooker takes care to emphasize the alterity of the Trinity by 
conceiving it in a first and second form. Furthermore, Hooker himself echoes 
Webster’s concern that ecclesiology be grounded in the perfection of God: “the being 
of God is a kind of law to his working: for that perfection which God is, giveth 
perfection to that he doth.”579 Hooker’s argument begins where Webster would have it
begin - the extraordinary superabundance of the triune God:
The general end of God’s external working is the exercise of his most glorious and most
abundant virtue: which abundance doth show itself in variety, and for that cause this variety is
oftentimes in Scripture expressed by the name of riches.580
Similarly, we saw that the eternal law, for Hooker, is none other than the 
humiliated and exalted Christ. Christ is the eternal law, the Governor, Sustainer, and 
Reconciler of creation. Already we’ve seen that ecclesial laws have their source and 
standard in the eternal law, and thus in Christ. Humans come to know “the particular 
character of God as it is made known in revelation”581 through the Spirit’s cultivation 
of personal relationships with Christ. Clearly, the Hookerian account satisfies 
Webster’s second concern.
Webster’s worries about “an immanentist account of the Church” and his concern
that an emphasis on practices will lead to an overemphasis on the Church “as visible 
human communion” are both related to Webster’s encounter with ecclesiologies that 
are insuﬃciently pneumatological.582 We would expect from the foregoing that 
Hooker easily satisfies this concern, and that is correct. Webster’s insistence that a 
focus on practices not lead us to lose sight of the invisible church is worth pondering, 
however, for it helps to make explicit that which has been merely implicit in the 
Hookerian account developed thus far.
579. Laws.I.2.2; I.59.5-6.
580. Laws.I.2.4; 1.61.6-9. Emphasis original.
581. Ibid.
582. Webster, “The Visible Attests the Invisible,” Kindle location 1145, Sect.1, para 5.
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First, the current account satisfies Webster’s concern by explaining how the Spirit
generates the personal relationships with Christ that cause the common confession 
that constitutes the Church. Hooker cautions us regarding the invisibility of those so 
reconciled. We are unable “to show any cause why mercy may not do good where it 
will, and wheresover it will justice withhold good.”583 We can speak of those who are 
eternally elect, temporally obdurate, and eternally reprobate, but we are unable to sort 
ourselves into those categories here and now, for we don’t know if, when, or how the 
Spirit may bear fruit (Matt 25:31-44). 
This leads to a profound consequence for ethics and ecclesiology. As David 
Neelands notes, for Hooker, “there is no eﬀective or practical diﬀerence, just as there 
is not perceptible diﬀerence, between the visible and invisible church, except at the 
end, when it shall be clear if there be any in the church who do not persevere.”584 If 
there is no practical diﬀerence between the visible and the invisible church until the 
fulfillment of time, then, when theology speaks of a right ordering of the church, the 
practical assumption must be that we are all equal in our status before God. That is, 
we must assume that all are elect, and that our use of categories like godly and ungodly
are presumptuous because their contents are known only to God, and premature 
because time is not yet fulfilled. Therefore, in ordering the church politically, we 
rightly begin with an assumption of equality in its members:585
Howbeit concerning the state of all men with whom we live (for only of them our prayers are
meant) we may till the worlds end, for the present, always presume, that as far as in us there is
power to discern what others are, and as far as any duty of ours dependeth upon the notice of
their condition in respect of God, the safest axioms for charity to rest itself upon are these,
“He which already believeth is;” and “He which believeth not as yet may be the child of God.”
It becometh not us during life altogether to condemn any man seeing that (for anything we
583. Dublin.43; 4.161.26-28.
584. Neelands, “Hooker on the Visible and Invisable Church,” 109.
585. This may seem a commonplace to contemporary ears that may be accustomed to Eucharistic
prayers which proclaim that Christ is the “Savior and Redeemer of the world”, “a perfect
sacrifice for the whole world” sent “to bring to fulfillment the sanctification of all.” These are,
respectively, phrases from Eucharistic prayers A, B, and D of the Book of Common Prayer of
the Episcopal Church. But the division of the world into the godly and the ungodly, and the
instinct to exclude the ungodly from the church, are perennial weeds in the history of
Protestantism, and were among the priorities of Hooker’s opponents.
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know) there is hope of every man’s forgiveness the possibility of whose repentance is not yet
cut oﬀ by death.586
This pragmatic emphasis on the visible church, combined with Hooker’s high 
pneumatology, leads to Hooker’s remarkable and pithy definition of the Church as 
“that visible mystical body.”587 Hooker refuses to identify the Church either as the 
community whose liturgical practices are visible to the world or as the invisible 
multitude whose circumcised hearts are visible only to God (Rom. 2.29). For Hooker, 
precisely because Christ is really present in the Church’s worship, the visible liturgical 
practices unite all the elect translocally and transhistorically into a “society 
supernatural”588 that is simultaneously empirical and non-empirical. The body of 
Christ is always visible and mystical.589
This defends the current account from charges of excessive immanentism. But it 
also returns a suggestion to Webster and other Barthians. The Hookerian account of 
the Church - as the people visibly, translocally, and transhistorically gathered by the 
Spirit and governed by Christ the Eternal Law  - maps nicely to Barth’s account of the 
Church as the people liberated at the intersection of autonomy, heteronomy, and 
theonomy. As Woodard-Lehman observes in discussing Barth’s account of revelation, 
“Theonomy in itself is inert. Apart from its immanent heteronomous correlates, God’s
Word would be mute. God’s command would be silent.”590  On this Hooker and Barth
agree: it is proper for theology to emphasize the ecclesial practices by which the Word
is made visible. for without such visibility, “God’s Word would be mute.”591
Webster expresses concern that those who emphasize ecclesial practices give 
insuﬃcient attention to first principles about God, creation, and to Scripture. The 
Hookerian account, however, is derived from first principles, beginning with the 
586. Laws.V.49.2; 2:203.15-25.
587. Laws.24.1; 2:111.24-27.
588. Laws.I.15.2; 1:131.11
589. Shuger, “”Societie Supernaturall”,” 320.
590. Woodard-Lehman, “Freedom and Authority,” 187.
591. Hooker and Barth diﬀer, of course, in the priority they assign sacramental practice.
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doctrine of the perfection of God, as Webster commends, and describing creation, as 
Aquinas did, in terms of the eternal law. Hooker defends Scripture reading and 
proclamation as essential ecclesial practices. Scripture is necessarily a primary focus of 
the Hookerian account because the written Word is our most reliable testimony to 
the incarnate Word. Immersion in Scripture generates the iterative encounters with 
Jesus Christ by which the disciple develops the shared sociality of a personal 
relationship through which Christ’s dispositions are revealed. Webster’s criticism on 
this count is unfounded. A Hookerian emphasis on ecclesial practices presupposes 
that disciples are bathed daily in Scripture.
Christopher Insole’s Wittgensteinian Critique
In a critique of Hauerwas,592 Christopher Insole raises similar concerns about the 
reluctance of ecclesial ethicists to ground their critique of liberalism in theological 
first principles. Like Webster, he concludes that their account of the Church is 
excessively immanentist, constructivist, and suﬀering from the very Enlightenment 
epistemology that it is their aim to critique. For Insole, those who emphasize 
practices in speaking of truth (and, therefore, virtue) are vulnerable to the criticism 
that they misappropriate Wittgenstein’s understanding of practices. In order to  ‘bury 
skepticism’ they claim that truth is accessible to us through the observation of a 
community’s practices. Insole oﬀers a challenge to the ecclesial ethicists centered on 
two common interpretations of Wittgenstein’s use of the word ‘practice.’ If, by 
practices, one refers to replicable processes that are communicable, then Insole has no
concern, for such an understanding is what Wittgenstein had in mind. However, if, by 
practices, one refers to the activities of an actual community, and claims that the 
beliefs of that community are constituted by their practices, then one succumbs to the
folly of the empiricists whom one seeks to correct. Meaning is not constituted by our 
practices, but rather is manifested in them. We can observe what a community 
592. Christopher Insole, “The Truth Behind Practices: Wittgenstein, Robinson Crusoe and
Ecclesiology,” Studies in Christian Ethics 20.3, (2007): 364-382.
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believes by attending to their practices, but the practices themselves do not constitute
meaning immanently. Beliefs are prior to practices.593 
Moreover, we must always mind the gap between truth and beliefs that arises from
our finitude, and thus not identify truth with practices. To claim an identity of a 
community’s practices with truth is to claim an identity of a particular community’s 
beliefs with truth, which is to presuppose privileged access of that community to truth
which is inaccessible to those outside the community. That means that practices are 
therefore inherently incommunicable. An account of virtue based on knowledge of 
God that is inherently incommunicable results in an account of the Church that is 
constructivist and sectarian. Accordingly, Insole sees in the work of Stanley Hauerwas 
(in particular) an emphasis  on practices that is “sceptically-driven, constructivist and 
empiricist”594 to the extent that Hauerwas’ emphases on practices are received as an 
implicit claim that the Church’s practices constitute Christian truth and community.
Insole’s philosophical critique is especially relevant because he gestures plausibly 
toward a cause of divisions within the Church. He helpfully reminds us that our 
speech about ecclesial practices attends carefully to the criterion of communicability  
across the boundaries of actual communities or else it risks contributing to our 
fragmentation. I am in full sympathy with Insole’s concerns, but I think some nuance 
is needed. I also think he misreads Hauerwas. Finally, the Hookerian account satisfies 
his concerns.
These conclusions are best seen when we substitute Jeﬀrey Stout’s language of 
‘commitments’ in lieu of Insole’s word, ‘beliefs.’ Following Robert Brandom, Stout 
diﬀerentiates between doxastic or cognitive commitments and practical 
commitments. “Cognitive commitments are commitments to a claim or a judgment, 
whereas practical commitments are commitments to act.”595  “Ought-to-do 
593. Ibid., 373-374.
594. Ibid., 377.
595. Jeﬀrey Stout, Democracy and Tradition (New Forum Books) (Princeton University Press,
2005-07-05), 211.
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judgments… make explicit a commitment to the material soundness of a practical 
inference.”596 I take Stout’s cognitive commitments to be the subject matter of the 
virtue of episteme, and practical commitments to be the subject matter of the virtue of 
phronesis. With these substitutions, I agree with Insole that the cognitive 
commitments of a community are not constituted by its practices. Both cognitive and 
practical commitments are prior to practices. Practices instead manifest both kinds of 
commitments. So far, so good. The Hookerian account satisfies Insole’s concern. 
But the preceding account of practices shows that, importantly, practices do not 
merely manifest our commitments. By observing our actions, others can and do make 
inferences about the cognitive and practical commitments that motivate our actions.597
We have seen that successive encounters with others lead us to create inferentially our
own cognitive commitments regarding the dispositions of those we encounter, and our
own practical commitments regarding those dispositions we will or will not imitate.598 
As we participate in practices, certain persons are recognized as entitled to “discursive
authority and responsibility” which lead us to recognize their commitments as 
authoritative for ourselves.599 The Hookerian account names these authorities 
exemplars and names Jesus as the supreme exemplar. So practices don’t constitute 
commitments, but practices do reveal both cognitive and practical commitments, and,
because ecclesial practices are social practices, the commitments our practices 
manifest, in turn, generate new cognitive and practical commitments within our social
circles. Commitments are prior to practices, but practices dialectically shape both 
cognitive and practical commitments and thereby generate the unity and diversity that
mediates the mind of Christ. Lex credendi, lex orandi, lex vivendi.
Insole also warns against identifying a concrete community’s practices with truth. 
Following Hooker’s ontology, I understand Insole’s reference to the concept, truth, to
596. Ibid., 210.
597. Ibid.
598. See “Mimesis” on page 187.
599. Ibid.
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be about fulfillment of a thing’s telos. Truth is a thing’s proper becoming. Cognitive 
commitments are commitments to claims about a thing’s proper becoming or 
judgments about whether certain actions manifest a thing’s proper becoming. When 
Insole cautions us not to identify an actual community’s practices with truth, I do not 
take him to be expressing an epistemological skepticism; that is, I do not take him to 
be insisting that a fundamental reality stands beyond ordinary experience. Rather, I 
take him to be reminding us of the probablistic error inherent in our reasoning as a 
consequence of both creaturely finitude and sin. The Hookerian account agrees. “For 
now we see in a mirror, dimly, but then we will see face to face” (1 Cor 13:12). But 
Insole presses further. On his account, such an identification signals the assumption of
privileged access to meaning by that concrete community, renders its practices 
inherently incommunicable and thus unintelligible to those outside that community, 
and therefore renders its claims about them “constructivist and sectarian.”600 
Insole’s warning that ecclesial ethicists’ focus on practices can become sectarian is 
worth probing. Insole judges claims and judgments as incommunicable if and only if 
one cannot justify them across the boundaries of concrete communities. The problem 
is the claim of privileged access - the appeal to an authority whose credibility cannot 
be accessed by those outside the community. For example, Insole sees Hauerwasian 
emphasis on practices as constructivist and sectarian to the extent that Hauerwas 
claims that Christian practices should diverge from the world’s practices because 
Christians have privileged access to the source of all truth. My interest here is in 
Insole’s implication that a claim of unique access to authority necessarily leads to 
sectarianism. That’s important because the Hookerian account, like Hauerwas et al, 
makes such a claim. As we saw in chapter four, there are those whose participation in 
Christ is merely ontological - the participation of an eﬀect in its cause,  and there are 
those who recognize they are addressed by Christ and respond with cognitive and 
practical commitments that reflect their recognition of him as Lord.601 Is the 
600. Insole, “The Truth Behind Practices,” 376-378.
601. See “Communion with Christ” on page 146.
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Hookerian account sectarian?
Wittgenstein himself, upon whom Insole bases his critique, seems to suggest that 
there are certain claims for which linguistic communities require no justification and 
for which they take no challenge seriously. John Bowlin reminds us of Wittgenstein’s 
left foot:
360. I know that this is my foot. I could not accept any experience as proof to the contrary. -
That may be an exclamation; but what follows from it? At least that I shall act with a certainty
that knows no doubt, in accordance with my belief.602
There are certain claims that are communicable simply because they belong to the
set of “judgments about the goodness of certain ends and about the truth of certain 
propositions” that “mark the outer boundary of rational speech and human 
conduct.”603 They require no justification because they “specify… and generate our 
most basic linguistic practices.”604 Bowlin explains:
If language cannot be used without accepting certain judgements on authority, judgements
that give our concepts substance, then we can assert no principle of credibility that escapes
this dependence upon trust. At best, such a principle could do no more than point out that as
language-using creatures we must take certain judgements for true (On Certainty, §§191, 205-6).
Nature requires no less.605
“God has taught me that this is my left foot.”606 Certain actions that need no 
justification ensue from God’s authoritative teaching that this is my left foot. I will 
walk with a certainty that this is my left foot. “God has taught me that Christ is 
Creator, Sustainer, and Reconciler of the world.” Certain actions that need no 
justification ensue from God’s authoritative teaching that Jesus is Lord and Redeemer.
From their moment of doxastic causality, “Christians can rightly claim that to bear the
602. Ludwig. Wittgenstein, On Certainty / Uber Gewissheit, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe and Denis
Paul Wittgenstein (Basil Blackwell, 1969). in John R. Bowlin, “Nature’s Grace: Aquinas and
Wittgenstein on Natural Law and Moral Knowledge,” in Grammar and Grace: Reformulations
of Aquinas and Wittgenstein, ed. Jeﬀrey Stout and Robert MacSwain, (London: SCM Press,
2004), 165.
603. Ibid., 164.
604. Ibid.
605. Ibid., 167.
606. Ibid.
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cross is not a confession peculiar to them; rather their lives reveal the "grain of the 
universe."607 The Hookerian account, which claims that all created things encounter 
and are governed by the eternal law that is the Word, agrees that the most 
fundamental Christian commitment is that when we follow Jesus Christ, we align 
ourselves with the grain of the universe. That cognitive claim generates Christian 
linguistic practice.
But is it a sectarian claim? I think not. The Hookerian account gives a positive 
account of pagan virtue precisely because it does not claim that the Church has 
privileged access to Christ. All created things encounter Christ’s universal address. 
Human faculties remain apt in spite of the Fall, “and a will thereby framable to good 
things.”608 The distinction between Church and world is not that of ontological access 
but of noetic access. Those whose noetic access to Christ’s universal address empower 
them to recognize Christ as Lord are diﬀerently accountable, for their noetic access 
communicates Christ’s command that they live in such a way that they proclaim 
Christ’s Lordship in the world. All encounter Christ’s authoritative Word, but some 
are sent with trumpets as its heralds. It is not a matter of ontological but noetic 
access. It is not a matter of Church and world as two distinctive linguistic 
communities. It is a matter of Israel’s vocation to be a herald of the world Christ’s 
Word re-creates (John 20:21-22; Cf. Gen. 2:7).
Perhaps the distinction between ontological and noetic access is the key to 
understanding Hauerwas’ refrain that the task of the Church is to be the Church. I 
take that refrain to signal Hauerwas’ premise that, with his incarnation, Christ has 
ushered in a new humanity. Christ has redeemed the world, and that changes all 
things. In his humiliation and exaltation, the risen Christ proclaims a new covenant, 
and the Spirit summons all humans into Christ’s new covenantal community whose 
members the Spirit equips with an enflamed pentecostal tongue so that the body of 
607. Hauerwas, With the Grain of the Universe, 224.
608. Dublin 2; 4:103.19-21.
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Christ proclaims the Word within and across time. Certain cognitive and practical 
commitments are communicable simply because cross and resurrection mark the 
outer boundaries of rational speech within the world Christ has redeemed. The task of
the Church is to manifest the commitments proper to this re-created and redeemed 
world. 
Stout’s distinction between cognitive and practical commitments help to clarify 
why it is diﬃcult to sustain charges of sectarianism when applied to ecclesial ethicists 
like Hauerwas (and the current Hookerian account). Just as the Hookerian account 
developed thus far emphasizes the alterity of God, Hauerwas, with his Barthian 
Christology, maintains the conceptual gap between the Word and human 
commitments that denote it. As Webster complains, those who emphasize practices 
devote relatively little time to describing fundamental cognitive commitments at all. 
Their focus is on the practical inferences and commitments that logically follow such 
cognitive claims. But Hauerwas does not, as Insole worries, identify truth with the 
practices of an actual community. Rather, he dialectically engages others within the 
Church regarding what its ought-to-do judgments and practical commitments ought to
be given the cognitive commitments that generate its most basic linguistic practices.
This is how I understand Hauerwas and Wells, who, in their Christian Ethics, 
propose constructively that the Eucharist is “a corporate practice for discerning the 
good.”609 They do not propose a new foundationalism. Rather, Hauerwas and Wells 
invite the Church to reflect dialectically on what our concrete practical commitments 
should be given the cognitive commitments that generate the most basic linguistic 
practice of the Church - the Eucharist. They point the Church, in other words, to the 
virtue of phronesis. Ethical reasoning from principles mined from deconstruction of 
and reflection upon the Eucharist and other ecclesial practices is similar to ethical 
reasoning from principles mined from Scripture: such premises ought not be 
construed as self-authenticating, perspicuous, or objective. Ecclesial practices  
609. Hauerwas and Wells, Christian Ethics, 9.
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themselves are not a foundation; only Christ, who tutors us in our particularity, is.
CHAPTER SUMMARY
So, thus far: Hooker defends ecclesial practices on the grounds that they are the 
means of grace by which Christ’s Spirit sanctifies us. He derives an account of such 
practices grounded in first principles, beginning with reflection on the Trinity. 
Humans participate in Christ not through an innate capacity to know God through 
intellection of transcendentals, but through the personal relationship with Christ that 
the Spirit creates in the heart of the individual. Through sacramental practices, 
Christ’s history becomes our history, we discover ourselves addressed by him in our 
narrative location, and we discover ourselves transformed by his action upon us. This 
transformation caused by the Spirit renders possible a personal relation in which 
disciples are mentored by Christ himself, enabled to see him as the ultimate exemplar.
By steps and degrees, disciples learn to take the right things for granted, and, 
imitating him, learn to improvise in their ethical actions so that they carry on in the 
same way as Christ and also in the same way as citizens of the eschatological New 
Jerusalem. The Spirit causes us to recognize that we are addressed by Christ the 
Reconciler, actualizes our personal relationship with him, leads us to respond 
justifiably to him as Lord, and ultimately generates the right 'thick concepts' that are 
productive of virtue.
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- Chapter 6 -
Conclusion
HOOKER’S ADDRESS
 Hooker, the ecclesial ethicist
When one reads Richard Hooker as an ecclesial ethicist, an unexpectedly liberal 
impression surfaces. But this liberality is more congenial to Edmund Burke than to 
Thomas Paine,610 and addresses a stunning rebuke to Enlightenment liberals who sit 
on both sides of the aisle in contemporary Western society. When we penetrate the 
fog surrounding Hooker’s reputation, we discover his humanist commitment to a 
world governed by a natural law that is contingently given and at best probabilistically 
known. We discover he derives from both theological anthropology and the doctrine 
of election a strong sense of human equality under God, and describes the Church as 
the mystical visible society in which the elite and common are equals in their 
fellowship with God. We discover his challenge to those who fail to appreciate the 
good already embodied in their inherited practices and social structures. And we 
discover his deep skepticism of ethical reasoning which justifies either the 
sanctification or repeal of those practices and structures on the basis of appeals to 
timeless absolutes. As the fog dissipates, we see that Hooker’s famous three-legged 
stool of Scripture, reason, and tradition is not what we thought, and neither 
contemporary “liberal accommodationism” nor “postliberal traditionalism”611 can claim
Hooker as an apostle of their ideologies. 
610. Burke echoes Hooker to the extent that he sees received institutions as contingently given
signs and tokens of the good, or, as Burke put it, as “prescriptive.” Yuval Levin distinguishes
Burke’s and Paine’s liberalism in his The Great Debate: Edmund Burke, Thomas Paine, and the
Birth of Right and Left. Burke’s “conservative liberalism” sought to assure liberality through
“the gradual accumulation of practices and institutions of freedom and order,” whereas
Paine justified violence (e.g., the French Revolution) if necessary to re-set society to an
ordering revealed through reflection on our natural origins. Yuval Levin, The Great Debate:
Edmund Burke, Thomas Paine, and the Birth of Right and Left, Kindle ed. (Basic Books,
2013-12-03).
611. Miroslav Volf, “When Gospel and Culture Intersect: Notes on the Nature of Christian
Diﬀerence,” in Pentecostalism in Context: Essays in Honor of William W. Menzies, ed. Wonsuk
Ma and Robert P. Menzies, (Sheﬃeld, UK: Sheﬃeld Academic Press, 1997), 233.
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That conclusion signals the new direction to which I turn in this final chapter. I 
have shown in the preceding chapters that Hooker is fruitfully read as an ecclesial 
ethicist. But the hope of this study has not been merely to answer the question, “who 
is Richard Hooker?” Rather, my ultimate destination has been to answer the question,
“who is Richard Hooker for us? In particular, what does he teach us about how the 
mind of Christ is formed in community? I have tried to read Hooker bifocally -  
through the lens of his context, but always with a second context in focus - that of the 
particular contemporary questions we seek to answer.612 So far, the emphasis has been 
on his context in order to listen to what he said and meant. In this chapter, however, 
I’d like to shift into a diﬀerent tone and focus in order to gesture toward how the 
Hookerian account can fruitfully inform our contemporary discourse. 
We’ve now appropriated Hooker, and he sits comfortably at the table with us, 
recognizable as an ecclesial ethicist. Overhearing our discourse which is dominated by 
deontological claims, he leans toward us, reminding us that the eternal law cannot be 
fulfilled unless we engage things as they actually are in their particularity. In this 
chapter, I will respond to his address by performing what he bids us to do - to shift 
our focus from the general to the particular. At this point, it is right and proper to 
attend to that second focus and reflect upon who Hooker is for the parish, for our 
ethical discourse, and for our hopes for a global communion. If we are listening to 
Hooker, that will necessarily entail locating questions in their narrative situation, 
which I will achieve through the methods of a thought experiment and two case 
studies in ecclesiology. Before making that focal shift, however, I will first recapitulate
what we’ve learned so far.
 How the mind of Christ is formed in community
This study began with a complex thesis, and in the preceding chapters I have 
sought to open up methodically Hooker’s argument that Christ acts on his church 
through a complex interaction of community and practices to generate the identity, 
612. Rorty, “The Historiography of Philosophy: Four Genres,” 247.
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diversity, and virtue of his body. 
In chapter one, I suggested that Hooker may be helpful to our contemporary 
discourse because he, like us, lived in an context in which the most divisive questions 
turned on the underlying question of how we know what we know. Like ours, the 
Elizabethan epistemological answers to that underlying question were in a state of 
flux. I suggested there are important resonances between his defense of Elizabethan 
liturgical practices and the emphases of contemporary ecclesial ethicists. I proposed 
that, by examining these resonances and reading Hooker as an ecclesial ethicist, we 
can learn much about how the mind of Christ is formed in communities.
In chapter two, I uncovered Hooker’s rhetorical strategy, given his aim of 
defending the Elizabethan Settlement against an array of interlocutors which included 
Ramist realists claiming objective access to the good through privileged illumination 
by the Holy Spirit. I showed that Hooker defended ecclesial and civil laws by 
demonstrating their derivation from the eternal law, and that Hooker described an 
anthropology which limits human access to the good to that which is possible given an
empiricist, rather than rationalist, psychology. Reflection on this psychology led me to
suggest that, for Hooker, all human knowing is derived from the phenomological, and 
therefore, apart from divine revelation, the good is at best probablistically and 
contingently known. 
Chapter three revealed that Hooker’s treatise was a particularly fitting unmasking 
of English presbyterian ideology and a compelling refutation of Ramist realism as an 
ethical framework. Perhaps most importantly, I argued that ethical appeals to timeless
absolutes are problematic given the doctrine of election. This leads to Hooker’s 
‘special equity’ rule of ethical discernment: generalizations of the natural law 
inherently leave out information that must be considered if one is to conform to the 
demands of the eternal law in a particular situation. 
In chapter four, I built upon the ontological and anthropological account, 
examining Hooker’s account of our participation in Christ. Given Hookerian 
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emphasis on the alterity of God and our empiricist psychology, participation is best 
described as fellowship. The key move was a non-substantialist description of the real 
presence using the grammar of personhood borrowed from Wilfrid Sellars. By 
distinguishing between that which is known in the spaces of causes and reasons, I 
argued that the Spirit establishes a personal knowing of Jesus in the logical space of 
reasons that leads ultimately to the personal relationship with Jesus that is true 
fellowship.
In chapter five, I built upon this description of the personal fellowship the Spirit 
creates by demonstrating how ecclesial practices provide the context of our address 
and response to Jesus Christ which constitutes our personal knowing of him. Through 
sacramental practices, Christ’s history becomes our history, we discover ourselves 
addressed by him in our narrative location, and we discover ourselves transformed by 
his action upon us. We recognize him as our supreme exemplar. This, in turn, 
provides the ground of mimetic virtue. Christ himself tutors his church, teaching us to
imitate his dispositions, to take the right things for granted, and to pursue the good 
for the good’s sake. 
We have seen that the content of the mind of Christ - the ‘what is known?’ 
question - consists of both objective and subjective knowledge. All humans encounter 
Christ in our narrative situatedness as Creator and Governor through our encounter 
with the enfleshed Son, Jesus Christ, within the created order, and some recognize 
Christ as Reconciler. The objective content of the knowledge revealed in the 
encounter with Christ is not a set of propositions about natural law but is Jesus Christ 
himself, and this knowledge is first and foremost of a personal and life-changing 
historical relation to Jesus Christ as Creator and Reconciler, a personal relation 
through which all are summoned to a new common life in Jesus Christ, sharing in the 
vocation of Israel to be a light to all the nations.
We have seen as well that the mind of Christ that is formed in community does 
not consist merely of objective knowledge about Christ, but consists of justifying and 
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sanctifying dispositions shared by the community. Formation is not an event but a 
lifelong process. The description of the process by which such formation happens 
turns out to be complex. The who, for example, is part of the how: the community is 
the one formed and is also a means by which the Spirit forms. Conversely, the how is 
part of the who: we recognize the community being formed by observation of persons 
and groups who perform practices by which they are simultaneously set apart and 
transformed. This transformation caused by the Spirit renders possible a personal 
relation in which disciples are mentored by Christ himself, having been enpowered to 
see him as the ultimate exemplar. By steps and degrees, disciples learn to take the 
right things for granted, and, imitating him, learn to improvise in their ethical actions 
so that they carry on in the same way as Christ. Christ tutors his Church himself so 
that their actions announce the eschatological reality of the New Jerusalem. 
To suggest that the matter of virtue is complex is to engage in controversy, 
however. Many are quick to insist that the matter is simple.613 Some suggest that virtue
613. Virtue is not complex for those who identify virtue as obedience to perspicuous divine
commands and who deny the possibility of a eudaemonistic ethics. I refer here to those
whom Herdt describes as holding a hyper-Augustinian view, an approach to ethics arising
from “a demand for a kind of freedom and thus a kind of disinterestedness that Augustine
himself would not have found intelligible” (105). Herdt traces this view to late medieval
voluntarism, noting that its demand for “an utter break with eudaimonism” (105) displaced
the desire to participate in the rationality of God, replacing it with the quest for the selfless
love of God manifested by a pure obedience utterly stripped of “intrinsic meaning for the
agent” (106). Obedience, not participation, is key, evidence of “a free but finite will bending to
a free and infinite will” (106). Herdt, Putting on Virtue. But if one maintains that it is not
possible for humans to participate in God’s rationality because of our finitude, then our telos
will likely be conceived in terms of union with God. Such union is obedience, where
obedience denotes compliance with universal rules (obedience is not the cause but the form
or mark of such union). Sin is a great threat to the community because our relation to God is
described in voluntaristic terms. The community’s status before God may be described as
contingent upon conformance to axioms about divinely mandated behaviors. Participation in
Christ, if at all possible, tends to be described much more in Stoic language about suﬀering
because participation in God’s rationality is impossible philosophically. In my view,
Ephraim Radner presupposes this identification of virtue with deontological obedience in his
recent Brutal Unity. Ephraim Radner, A Brutal Unity: The Spiritual Politics of the Christian
Church (Baylor University Press, 2012-10-15). In contrast with the hyper-Augustinian view,
the Hookerian account embraces the irony motif of Hauerwas and Wells. Irony is, for Wells,
a “genre of eschatology.” It is the “contrast between how things appear and how they are….”
“An eschatological perspective is intensely ironic. It truly transforms fate into destiny.”
Wells is critical of “Christian realists” who describe faithfulness in terms of adapting to the
‘givens’ that “prevail in the contemporary world,” such that the ethical task is to
“adjudicat[e] between competing ‘givens.’ Wells contrasts this with an ethics that sees “the
only ‘given’ is the Church’s narrative: all else is potentially ‘gift.’”Wells, “How the Church
Performs Jesus’ Story,” 174, 212. Rather than describing suﬀering in the grammar of ironic
participation in the superabundance of God, those whom Herdt describes as hyper-
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is simply a matter of doing God's will, and doing God's will is simply a matter of 
obeying God's law, which is itself perspicuously identifiable in either Scripture, 
dogma, or the tenets of secular humanism. Some assume virtue to be identical to 
obedience to universal axioms mined from tradition, from Scripture, or via cool, 
detached Enlightenment ‘reason.’ Or, as Luther’s harsh criticisms of Aristotle, 
Aquinas, and Erasmus evince, a focus on virtue often provokes anxieties about 
Pelagianism.614 To suggest that the formation of the mind of Christ in community is 
more complex is therefore to engage in controversy. 
 Hooker’s address to us
The Hookerian account unsettles us because it takes seriously the claim that, 
“The Church’s one foundation is Jesus Christ our Lord.”615 Taking seriously such a 
claim as an ethical proposition challenges the ideologies with which we seek to obtain 
or maintain power. Hooker redirects our attention to a particular kind of liberality - 
the kind that blossoms only in the soil of freedom that just is governance by Christ, 
the eternal law.
Hooker addresses liberal accommodationism regarding the authority of reason in 
justifying its claims. Reason is not a cool, detached ratiocination, capable of putting 
the universe under its microscope. Rather, reason connotes participation in the 
rationality of God which, for human agents, means being ruled by the eternal law 
expressed in creation which is comprehended exclusively via the light of reason. 
Whether encountered in the form of divine or natural law, the eternal law, which is 
Christ himself, is always subject, acting upon all created beings, drawing them toward 
Augustinian describe suﬀering in terms of the acceptance of fate that constitutes union with
God, rather than participation in God.
614. For treatment of Luther’s criticisms of Aristotle, Aquinas, and Erasmus, see Steven Ozment,
The Age of Reform 1250-1550: An Intellectual and Religious History of Late Medieval and
Reformation Europe, ed.:427 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1980); Janz, Luther and
Late Medieval Thomism: A Study in Theological Anthropology; Herdt, Putting on Virtue. Jennifer
Herdt traces what she calls the hyper-Augustinian concerns about an emphasis on virtue and
its vulnerability to Pelagianism.
615. "The Church's One Foundation" (No 545) in The United Methodist Hymnal (Nashville, TN:
United Methodist Publishing House, 1989.)
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fulfillment of their telos. For Hooker, there is simply no such thing as a human agent 
who is liberated by reason, capable of distance from her objects of study, and 
flourishing in self-rule. 
Reason, for Hooker, always entails rule by the eternal law which is Christ himself. So 
when Hooker speaks of the authority of reason in ethical discernment, he never 
denotes a capacity for moral judgment severable from the person of Jesus Christ.616 
Hooker would object today to ethical proposals justified by appeals to the authority of
reason but which contradict the dispositions of Jesus Christ.617 Such proposals, 
Hooker would tell us, are, by definition, irrational. 
Similarly, Hooker addresses both postliberal traditionalism and contemporary 
biblicism618 regarding how we know what we know. Human reason connotes 
participation in the rationality of God, but that participation is fellowship created by 
616. Hooker would therefore heartily agree with John Howard Yoder’s address to liberal
accommodationism as expressed in his Authentic Transformation: A New Vision of Christ and
Culture. Yoder, responding to the 20th century phenomenon of appeals to the Holy Spirit in
such a way that the Spirit is merely the religious garb in which we dress our cool, detached
ratiocination, reminded H. Richard Niebuhr that the Holy Spirit is never severable from the
person of Jesus Christ: “[The] intention of the post-Nicene doctrine of the Trinity was
precisely not that through Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, diﬀering revelations come to us. The
entire point of the debate around the nature of the Trinity was the concern of the Church to
say just the opposite; namely, that in the Incarnation and in the continuing life of the Church
under the Spirit there is but one God.” John Howard Yoder, Glen Stassen, and D.M. Yeager,
Authentic Transformation: A New Vision of Christ and Culture, ed. Glen Stassen (Abingdon
Press, 1995-06), 62.
617. E.g., proposals involving eugenics. In a message posted to his Twitter account on August 20,
2014, atheist Richard Dawkins made the following proposal: “I think abortion is right if the
woman wants an abortion. Down syndrome is one very good, and extremely common
reason, to want it.” He went on to propose that aborting children diagnosed with Down’s
syndrome manifests the good. I imagine Hooker would be appalled by the proposition, and
observe that, by definition, such reasoning is irrational because reason can not justify such a
proposal without contradicting Christ. Christ reveals the divine disposition to create, and
not, destroy life, and also that the divine love is most abundantly found enveloping those
marginalized by human societies. The Hookerian point is that to be rational, a proposal
cannot contradict Christ’s dispositions. Richard Dawkins, Twitter post, August 20, 2014 (3:55
p.m.), accessed September 5, 2014, http://twitter.com/richarddawkins.
618. Biblicism is Barth’s word, and I invoke Barth’s distinction here between biblical and biblicist.
Barth, CD, 4/1 §60.1.368. For an example of postliberal traditionalism, see Philip Turner’s
appeal to Hooker in opposing The Episcopal Church’s decision to ordain Anglicanism’s first
openly gay bishop. Philip Turner, “Episcopal Authority Within a Communion of Churches,”
in The Fate of Communion: The Agony of Anglicanism and the Future of a Global Church, ed.
Ephraim Radner and Philip Turner, (Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2006), Section
'Authority and the Three-Legged Stool or, Perhaps Better, the Four-Legged Bench'.
Contemporary biblicism denotes the geneaological descendents or Ramist Realism, as
described in chapter three. In my view, Albert Mohler, R.C. Sproul, and J.I. Packer exemplify
contemporary biblicism in this sense.
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Christ eternally in the covenant of grace and recognized  and received by the human 
agent as a result of the Spirit’s irruption into time. Participation as fellowship means 
that Christ, the eternal law, is always wholly other even when ‘as one’ with those who 
participate in him. And that means we have no innate access to the divine Mind, no 
way of bypassing the risk of human subjectivity, no way of hearing the divine Word 
except as it is communicated through and to an imperfect, corruptible, natural form. 
And therefore there is no point at which we can avoid probabilistic error, no 
ahistorical absolute to which we can refer that will relieve us of responsibility for our 
historical hearing, no foundation upon which we can rest that will deliver us from our 
finite need for this fellowship through which Jesus himself tutors us. Our traditions 
can never be more than our communal approximations of the good. The eternal law is 
expressed in them, but is always other than them. 
Our endoxa, therefore, are signs and tokens of the good, like rocks marking the 
location of a well. The rocks have enormous weight, but they can never say more to 
each generation than “this is where we’ve discovered the fountain of life in the past.” 
To live - to know the good, each generation actually has to go past the rock and enter 
the well to drink themselves from the living water. Precisely because Christ re-creates 
and blesses anew as he justifies in each and every encounter, ethical appeals to timeless
absolutes must not shut down the conversation as we seek to name the coordinates of 
the good. As Rowan Williams put it:
Hooker's world is one shaped by a maker's intention; and that intention is unmistakeably the
diﬀusion of bliss in a world of history and diﬀerence, a world therefore of argument and
interpretation, even, we could say, of that intellectual charity which takes trouble with the
recalcitrant stranger in order to make him or her a partner in discourse.619 
CHARACTER, NOT DECISIONS
Recognition of the dynamic nature of reality enables us to complete the metaphor
preliminarily sketched in the introduction of this study (see “The Christian life 
619. Williams, “Forward,” xxv-xxvi.
- 213 -
- 213 -
according to Richard Hooker: a preliminary sketch” on page 80). There I described 
Hooker’s view of human life using the metaphor of a journey to the summit of the 
highest mountain, where union with Christ at the summit is our destiny. Ethics have 
to do with how to move toward the summit safely from wherever we find ourselves on 
the mountain. Ethical questions have to do with our next steps toward the summit. I 
anticipated there (chapter two) the conclusion that is now in full view. The right path 
to the summit is inherently local, contingently known, and particular to our 
coordinates at our moment in time. Now we understand that this is due to an 
ontological problem: our path to the summit can not be universally known in advance 
precisely because of Christ’s justifying acts of re-creation (see page 115).
I asked then, “how do we find our way to the summit given the fog through which 
we see only dimly?” In particular, given the fog and the great distance, how do we hear
and recognize Christ’s voice? How do we rightly navigate? We can now answer that 
navigation is possible because Christ is really present to us in our practices. Christ 
creates a personal relationship with us through the Spirit and addresses us in our 
particularity. Through mimesis, Christ shapes us along our journey, equipping us and 
guiding us out of the brambles into which we wander, away from precipices, and 
through our periods of wilderness wandering. We find our way to the summit that is 
our destiny by improvising in response to Christ’s voice which addresses us, justifying 
and re-creating us in each encounter by steps and degrees.
The statement that there are no universal rules upon which to ground our ethics 
ought not be understood as an assertion that there is nothing we can say in advance 
about right actions. To the contrary, there is much indeed that can be said. The first 
thing is simply to invoke all that has been said regarding the role of one’s community 
in shaping its members. The community’s endoxa, communicated didactically and 
through mimesis, provide the images of the world as we assume it to be. Hauerwas and
Wells call them convictions. They “become assumptions, habits, and even reflexes 
through years of practiced use. It is these skills, rather than moments of rational 
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decision, that will frame Christian life.”620 
Endoxa can not determine in advance what our right actions must be but they do 
shape how we perceive the phenomena we encounter. Moreover, community norms 
draw attention to actions most likely to constitute a prudential response. The 
Christian agent is not left to invent the good from scratch. As Wells notes, 
“Improvisation is not about being clever or original, but about being so trained in 
one's tradition that one trusts that the obvious is the appropriate.”621  There are no 
universal rules but there are contingent, provisionally-known, and providentially-given 
signs and tokens by which the community has marked the coordinates of the good. 
Just as the apprentice plumber is not sent without thermodynamic principles and 
mimetic experience to guide him, so, too, the apprentice Christian is not sent without
endoxa and mimetic experience to guide her.
For this reason, the focus of Christian ethics is properly on the cultivation of 
character. This is a controversial claim for those immersed in cultures whose canons 
presuppose a universal ethics, such as the United States, whose founding document 
begins with a claim about the “inalienable rights” of “all men.”622 As Wells and Quash 
note, “if one were to sum up universal ethics in one word, that word would probably 
be “decision.”623 Similarly, “if one were to sum up subversive ethics in one word, that 
word would probably be “power.”624 Finally, “if one were to sum up ecclesial ethics in 
one word, that would would be “character.”625 Ecclesial ethicists, like Hooker and 
Aquinas before them, recognize that the proper focus of Christian ethics is not on 
right actions or right outcomes, but on cultivating the character of the individuals who
constitute the society of souls - on virtue. In short, the focus of Christian ethics 
should be on cooperating with the Spirit’s formation of the mind of Christ in 
620. Wells, “How the Church Performs Jesus’ Story,” 215.
621. Ibid., 230.
622. The American Declaration of Independence names as its first “self-evident truth” the claim
that “all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights....”
623. Wells and Quash, Introducing Christian Ethics, 113.
624. Ibid., 114.
625. Ibid.
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community.
By listening closely to Hooker as he reasoned from first principles to a defense of 
the ecclesial practices of the Elizabethan Church, we’ve seen why this is so. That 
conclusion does not arise from a skeptical observation that we can never agree on 
right actions and outcomes, though that may be so. And it does not arise merely from 
the epistemological conclusion that humans lack innate knowledge of the good, 
though I believe that is so. And it does not arise merely from the recognition that 
appeals to timeless absolutes too often justify our violence, though I believe that is so, 
also. Rather, the conclusion that the right focus of Christian ethics is on the 
cultivation of character arises from the recognition that our knowledge of God is 
determined by God's continuing act of election which itself constitutes the cosmos. 
We cannot exhaustively prescribe the good because reality is not fixed materially but 
dynamic. The right focus of Christian ethics is on character precisely because of 
Christ’s justifying acts of re-creation. Character, in the Hookerian account, is the art 
of creating the good for the sake of the good. The person of high character, because of
her personal relationship with Christ, knows his dispositions, desires the good she 
therefore recognizes in her own narrative context,  and acts with ‘special equity’ in 
order to conform to the eternal law. The ecclesial ethicists are right: the focus of 
Christian ethics is properly on cooperating with the Spirit’s formation of the mind of 
Christ in community.
THE VIRTUE OF PRACTICES
The focus on character leads ecclesial ethicists to an emphasis on practices. 
Critics have complained that ecclesial ethicists fail to ground their claims about 
practices in the Church’s historic confessions about God and creation, that they tend 
to identify the Church with its social practices, that they inappropriately identify 
truth with the practices of a particular community, and that their logic leads to an 
irresponsible sectarianism. In this study, I’ve shown that the Hookerian account, 
- 216 -
- 216 -
which similarly connects character to the Church’s practices, is in fact derived from 
the doctrine of the Trinity and thoroughly grounded in Scripture.626 Hooker takes care
to emphasize the otherness of the Trinity and begins his argument with the 
extraordinary superabundance of the triune God. Moreover, I’ve emphasized that the 
Hookerian account exhibits a high pneumatology, for the Spirit generates the personal
relationships with Christ that cause the common confession that constitutes the 
Church. I defended the Hookerian emphasis on the visible Church, for, from a 
practical perspective, we must assume that all members are elect, and that our use of 
categories like godly and ungodly are premature because time is not yet fulfilled. 
Moreover, I argued that charges of excessive immanentism and sectarianism miss the 
mark. The Hookerian account does not suggest that practices constitute the cognitive 
and practical commitments of a community, but rather that, in its practices, a 
community’s commitments are manifest. By pointing to the practices of actual 
communities, ecclesial ethicsts are not claiming that such communities have privileged
access to the truth. Rather, recognizing the role of exemplars in tutoring the Church, 
ecclesial ethicists point to the practices of actual communities as exemplary of what 
the Church’s judgments and practical commitments ought to be, given the logic of the 
Church’s generative linguistic commitments. 
This recapitulation of what we’ve learned returns me to where I began this 
chapter. Given these things, I’d like to reflect upon who Hooker is for the parish, for 
our ethical discourse, and for our hopes that the Church’s universal’s fragments will be
reconciled. I have three suggestions.
626. See “The eternal law” on page 45 for Hooker’s derivation of the eternal law from the Trinity,
“Human participation in the Trinity” on page 125 for how the Spirit generates fellowship
with Christ, and “Mimetic virtue” on page 186 for the connection between our fellowship
with Christ and the cultivation of virtue.
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THE MIND OF CHRIST IN THE LOCAL PARISH
My first suggestion pertains to parish leadership. As a parish priest, it seems to me
that the Hookerian account has much to say that helps us understand how parish 
leaders can contribute to or impede the Church’s mission. My suggestion is actually a 
set of practical commitments that seems warranted by the findings of this study 
regarding how the mind of Christ is formed in community. Before describing those 
commitments, however, I first need to introduce the elements of a Hookerian 
Christian pedagogy.
Central to Hooker’s virtue ethics is the premise that virtuous actions are 
performed by virtuous people. Since virtuous actions follow rationally from cognitive 
and pragmatic commitments about objects and principles, it is important that we 
recall that such conclusions flow with consistency from persons comprehending in a 
thick way those objects and principles. In other words, such actions flow from persons
with habits of thought corresponding to an accurate comprehension of and prudential 
responses within their field of encounter. 
As we have seen, Hooker seems to presuppose much of Aquinas’ Aristotle-
inspired theory about how such practical wisdom is formed within individuals. His 
claim that humans begin as open books (see “The most genuine communion” on page 
147), his mockery of the Ramist realists,627 his deployment of the Aristotelian methods
of phenomena, endoxon, and dialectic as well as the Aristotelian virtues of episteme and
phronesis (see “Episteme and Phronesis” on page 72) led Hooker, like Aquinas, to 
describe the Christian life as a journey towards knowledge of God. I argue that we can
fruitfully thicken the Hookerian account, therefore, by recalling briefly the 
pedagogical premises that, though undeveloped in his corpus, Hooker presupposed.
Aquinas describes two stages along the path to non-sacred scientia. In the first 
stage, one takes note of certain eﬀects and inquires about their causes. Such causes 
627. Laws.1.6.4; 1:76.9-20.
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“are often hidden, and can only be discovered through more accessible eﬀects.”628 
Discovery of such causes involves demonstrations in which the cause and eﬀect 
relationship between objects is shown. Once such causes are understood, a learner 
proceeds to the second stage characterized by “a sort of cognitive re-structuring, so 
that his belief that something is a cause itself becomes the cause of (in the sense of 
epistemic ground of or reason for) his belief that something else is the eﬀect.”629 This 
re-structuring in our mind involves a “re-arrangement in our doxastic structure, so that
the causes, which were formerly less familiar, become more familiar and better known;
and the eﬀects, formerly better known, come to be believed on the grounds of our 
belief in the cause.”630 
This then is a Thomist description of the path to scientiae in general. We master 
the principles of a subject matter, relying upon the “cognitive potencies which [we] 
have by nature,” “grasp[ing] the quiddities of [objects] by [our] intellect and … 
reason[ing] discursively from premises to conclusions.”631 In pursuit of scientia, “we 
must submit ourselves to the training and guidance of masters within a field so that we
may acquire the needed habits and realize fully our cognitive potentiality.”632 
For both Thomas and the Zagzebski theory of divine motivation I’ve synthesized 
into the Hookerian account, the practice of apprenticeship is necessary, for one 
seeking to attain scientia “must submit himself to a teacher, and accept on the 
teacher's authority instruction about and guidance in the acquisition of habits 
necessary to become adept in the craft.”633 The master to whom we submit then walks 
alongside us as we receive the doxastic re-structurings required and as we begin to 
perceive in new ways the causes and eﬀects of our world, such that our habits of 
628. Jenkins, Knowledge and Faith, Kindle location 660, Chap 1, sect 1.7, para 16.
629. Ibid., Kindle location 660, Chap 1, sect 1.7, para 17.
630. Ibid.
631. Ibid., Kindle location 757, chap. 2, sec 2.1, para 8. Hooker, as we have seen, denied that
humans innately grasp the quiddities of objects. That distinction suggests that Hooker would
have placed even greater priority on mentoring relationships in which a trusted master
communicates endoxa.
632. Ibid., Kindle location 712, chap. 1, sec 1.8, para. 3.
633. Ibid.
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thought produce accurate recognition of Christian concepts and puzzles and 
prudential actions in response to them. As I developed in chapter five (see “Mimesis” 
on page 187), the path to discipleship goes through mimesis.
The Hookerian account clarifies that the mind of Christ is formed in community 
by Christ himself. Christ tutors the society the Spirit gathers by establishing personal 
relationships with Christ through which Christ’s dispositions are revealed and 
inscribed in the endoxa of the community for which Christ is Lord. On the basis of 
the foregoing, I suggest that the pedagogy that best cooperates with the Spirit’s action
in creating disciples is characterized by three forms of learning. First, trusted mentors,
themselves tutored by Christ, didactically instruct an inquirer in the first principles  - 
the generative cognitive commitments of the linguistic community that is the Church.
Second, mentors accompany the inquirer along the road to Emmaus, walking 
alongside them as their eyes are opened and they begin to develop new practical 
commitments -  new ways of being that reflect their new recognition that the world 
has been redeemed by Christ. Third, mentors create opportunities for immersion 
experiences in which the new pilgrim walks alone in this new world she’s perceived, 
practicing the new skills developed solo, and then reflecting upon her experience with 
the mentor. 
These three elements of the Hookerian Christian pedagogy don’t necessarily 
occur in the order in which I’ve described them. It may be the unexpected immersion 
in the Christian life while on a mission trip or serving food with a friend which 
awakens the student. Or it may be that learning the skill of knitting with Christian 
friends generates questions for which the first principles are the answers. But all three 
are necessary to an eﬀective Christian pedagogy for children, youth, and adults. When 
all three are not part of the steady diet of all age groups, the Church becomes 
malnourished.
With this pedagogical focus in view, I can now explain my first suggestion. In my 
introduction (see “The fire of Sabah” on page 9), I confessed that one of the 
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motivations for this study was a professional curiosity about why, if sacramental 
practices matter as much as ecclesial ehticists claim, I observe parishes which adhere 
rigorously to liturgical standards but which manifest neither a clear sense of mission 
nor an evangelistic impulse. Attendance trends, participation metrics, and the evident 
lack of energy led me to describe them as moribund. I contrasted such experiences 
with the pentecostal fire I observed in similarly Anglican parishes in Sabah, Malaysia. I
wondered why it is that we observe parishes with similar commitments to ecclesial 
practices but nearly opposite trajectories in terms of apparent missional eﬀectiveness. 
Though there are too many variables to isolate here to justify assertions about the 
causes of the diﬀerences, I believe this study has uncovered some factors that may 
help to explain the diﬀerences.
To illustrate the set of practical commitments I wish to commend in the parish, 
I’d like to imagine three diﬀerent ecclesial settings, all of which share the same 
denominational liturgical standard, and all of which are historically part of my personal
experience. I recognize that such a thought experiment is unusual in a PhD 
dissertation (though perhaps more common in a ThD thesis). As a parish priest, it is 
evident to me that the Hookerian account has important implications for liturgical 
praxis, homiletics, biblical hermeneutics, and catechesis. It therefore impacts how 
ministers equip the saints in the art of ethical discernment. Since Hooker’s treatise 
concerns particular views of these things and defends practices performed specifically 
in parochial settings, I would be remiss if I did not point to these implications by way 
of illustrative examples. By critiquing  illustrative settings, my intent is to perform the 
phronetic discrimination that Hooker teaches us. To that end, I’ve summarized these 
illustrations in Table I.634 I will describe these settings first and then critique them 
based on the Hookerian account of how the mind of Christ is formed in community.
Church A’s senior minister is a master of the liturgy. He strives to be orthodox in 
his teaching. Orthodoxy in his case denotes teaching within the boundaries of “the 
634. See Table I, “Illustrative examples of ministerial leadership,” on page 224.
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tradition” which, by his account, excludes doctrinal ‘innovations’ from Luther and all 
Protestants. Of my three examples, he emphasizes the liturgical practices which 
Hooker defends more than any other, rigorously following the classical Anglican 
spirituality consisting of weekly Eucharist, daily oﬃce, and daily devotion, and 
complementing these with medieval Catholic practices such as the Benediction and 
the Angelus. His piety reflects an understanding of the real presence as explained in 
terms of transubstantiation, and his sacerdotal self-understanding is that his role is to 
administer the means of grace, and, primarily, to distribute the grace which is objectively
given in the sacramental elements. The sacrament is the medicine of Christ, he 
teaches, and his task is to dispense that salvific medicine. Preaching is subordinate to 
this task. He understands preaching to be a practice which complements the 
Eucharist, and so each week he prepares brief reflections from assigned Gospel lessons
which he interprets through the lens of the Eucharist.
Church B’s senior minister is a master of evangelistic preaching and she, too, 
strives to be orthodox in her teaching. Orthodoxy denotes for her continuity with an 
ongoing dramatic “hermeneutical frame of reference” that her seminary professors 
taught her to name the regula fidei.635 Her sacramental ministry consists exclusively of 
baptism and Eucharist. She leads two distinctive services, one which might be called 
traditional, featuring organ music, and the other which might be called non-traditional
to the extent that it is less formal in its style and language and incorporates a wide 
range of musical styles. In lieu of daily oﬃce, she reads Scripture and theological texts 
daily, and each morning prays extemporaneously, following loosely a skeletal structure 
including thanksgiving, adoration, confession, and petition. Her understanding of the 
real presence is closest to Hooker’s, and so, through the example of her own joyful 
demeanor, she strives to lead the congregation to a communal yet subjective 
encounter with the real presence. Preaching is primary, and she understands the 
Eucharist to be the altar call at which her preaching aims. She preaches eighteen-
635. Paul M. Blowers, “The Regula Fidei and the Narrative Character of Early Christian Faith,” Pro
Ecclesia VI, no. 2 (1997), 202.
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minute sermons from Old and New Testaments using a narrative form which seeks to 
help the hearer locate himself within the story.
Church C’s senior minister is a gifted preacher who also strives to be orthodox in 
his teaching, which denotes for him an interpretive framework for Scripture which is 
recognizably in the genealogical line of what I’ve described as Ramist realism. His 
sacramental ministry consists strictly of private baptism when folks request it, and his 
congregation is not accustomed to the Eucharist, which reflects his neo- Zwinglian 
view that the rite is an antiquated memorial which is interesting but non-essential to 
creating a thriving flock. Worship is non-sacramental but vibrant, featuring a talented 
instrumental band, outstanding singing in which the congregation joins, and reaches 
its apogee in the sermon. He preaches topically, drawing topics from the news, and 
showing how the wisdom of Jesus and the commands of Scripture are relevant to our 
common life and anchor us ethically. There are no altar calls. Instead, he measures his 
success in terms of the numbers of folks who respond to his preaching by attending 
services and by flowing out into the community in missional action, feeding the poor, 
healing the sick, and preaching liberation to the oppressed.
We can anticipate how the Hookerian account would critique these ministerial 
profiles by simply recalling a primary learning of this study: that, for Hooker, there is 
no direct intermediary between the shepherd and his flock. Christ tutors his flock 
directly. And he does that through personal relationships through which Jesus 
addresses the disciple. All other heteronomous influences, including creeds, 
confessions, systematic theologies, and human mentors, serve as signs and tokens, 
leading the thirsty to the well. But the inquirer must drink ultimately from the living 
water in terms of experiencing Christ’s personal address. In terms of forming the mind
in Christ, the key is the cultivation of a historical personal relationship between the 
inquirer and Christ in which the inquirer experiences herself as addressed directly and 
authoritatively in her narrative situatedness. The Hookerian account views ministerial 
methods which cultivate such a personal relationship positively.
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Minister A Minister B Minister B
Hermeneutic Orthodoxy denotes 
teaching within the 
boundaries of “the 
tradition” which by 
his account excludes
doctrinal 
innovations from 
Luther and later
Orthodoxoy 
denotes continuity 
with the regula fidei, 
understood as a 
dramatic 
framework.
Derivative of  
Ramist realism
Sacramental 
practices
Classical Anglican 
spirituality 
consisting of weekly
Eucharist, daily 
oﬃce, and daily 
devotion, and 
complementing 
these with medieval 
Catholic practices.
Limited to baptism 
and Eucharist.
Consists strictly of 
private baptism 
when folks request 
it. No Eucharist.
Real presence Piety includes sets 
of micro-rituals 
based on 
transubstantiation. 
Grace is objectively 
given in the 
sacramental 
elements, and clergy
task is to administer
that salvific 
medicine. 
Like Hooker’s. 
Strives to lead the 
congregation to a 
communal yet 
subjective 
encounter with the 
real presence. 
Neo- Zwinglian 
view. Rite is an 
antiquated 
memorial which is 
interesting but non-
essential to creating 
a vibrant flock.
Non-sacramental 
practices
Limited to daily 
oﬃce
Skeletal structure to
prayer life including 
thanksgiving, 
adoration, 
confession, and 
petition.
Missional action 
such as feeding the 
poor, healing the 
sick, and preaching 
liberation to the 
oppressed.
Preaching Subordinate to 
Eucharist. Preaches 
10-minutes 
reflections largely 
interpreting the 
Eucharist
Preaching is 
primary. Preaches 
18-25 minute 
sermons using a 
narrative approach 
which seeks to help 
the hearer locate 
himself within the 
story.
Worship is non-
sacramental but 
vibrant. Reaches its 
apogee in simple, 
“relevant” 10-
minute sermons, 
which clarify what 
duty demands.
Table 1: Illustrative examples of ministerial leadership
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From this, we can anticipate that the Hookerian account criticizes the 
hermeneutics of ministers A and C to the extent that they teach that the histories of 
discernment by recent and current communities are in some sense irrelevant to our 
knowledge of the good. As we saw in chapter three, Hooker strongly resists the notion
of an ahistorical Christ who speaks to us timelessly rather than within our own 
history. In particular, the Hookerian account resists orthodoxies that exclude 
particular eras (such as everything since the Reformation) or which reduce Scripture 
to universal axioms (such as in Ramist realism). Hooker would likely commend 
Minister B, who reads Scripture in concert with the whole Church and understands 
scriptural reading as dialectical participation within a narrative.
Turning to the pedogical role of practices, the Hookerian account challenges both
Ministers B and C, and asks further questions about Minister A’s practices. The 
notions of private baptism and a church that does not gather in Eucharist receive 
harsh rebukes, for Hooker sees these as communal acts with formal significance. 
Baptism is a public communal act wherein the community acknowledges its faith in 
Christ’s promise that the Spirit has caused the baptisand to experience - or that the 
baptisand will experience - the doxastic restructuring that signals recognition of 
Christ as Lord, which is to recognize Christ’s authority as the supreme exemplar 
worthy of imitation. Similarly the Eucharist formally makes visible the mystical body 
of Christ. Such visibility is itself a means of grace through which the Spirit gathers the 
elect, for the visible body is the primary heteronomous structure through which the 
Word speaks. To Minister B, the Hookerian account would commend a host of 
additional sacramental practices which, while distinct from the two ordained 
sacraments themselves, similarly mediate the Word in a particularly authoritative way.
Hooker himself thus defends confirmation, ordination, holy matrimony, the 
reconciliation of a penitent, the commemoration of the saints, and the anointing of 
the sick. Hooker would likely applaud Minister A’s rich array of classical spiritual 
practices. The Benediction and Angelus might raise a Hookerian brow, but a Hooker 
seated at a contemporary table would listen patiently and carefully to learn more from 
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the minister about how those practices manifest the good. In particular, in their actual
execution, how well do they communicate Christ’s dispositions?
Much would depend on the ministers’ accounts of the real presence. As we saw in 
chapter four, Hooker directly criticizes the sacramental views of both Ministers A and
C. He dismisses C’s view as misguided, for Christ is freely and sovereignly present in 
the Church’s sacramental practices.636 Yet, pace Minister A, the objective presence of 
Christ in the Eucharist is assured not by a transubstantiation of the elements but by 
the promises of God in the covenant of grace. For Hooker, Christ transsubstantiates 
those who sup with him. The important thing in the current example, however, is not 
the metaphysics that serve as our handmaiden in thinking about the real presence, but
the recognition that the real presence is a personal and historical presence, an irruption 
of the eternal into time. The minister who understands the real presence in terms of 
transubstantiation is vulnerable (but not inevitably prone) to the error of reducing the 
real presence to materiality, as though the wafers themselves are salvific pills, and 
thereby pedagogically impeding the cultivation of a personal relationship in which the 
risen Christ speaks authoritatively into the life of the one who communes with him. 
The Hookerian account would commend all three of our ministers for the non-
sacramental practices that are already habitual, while urging them to learn from the 
practices of the other two. The important thing is that the practices be coherent 
responses to our experience of being addressed by Christ, and therefore that they be 
justifiably seen as imitative of his dispositions. Missional action, extemporaneous 
prayer, and formal prayer in the name of the Lord are signs and tokens of grace; they 
are historically coherent responses to the experience of being addressed by Christ. 
Hooker would urge each of the ministers to pursue a full and variegated menu of such 
practices.
636. Barth and Hooker diverge here. Barth worries that the claim that Christ is objectively present
in sacramental practices “might impinge upon God’s freedom and sovereignty in the
bestowal of grace and salvation.” In my view, Barth is rightly concerned but goes too far.
Part of the genius of the Hookerian account is that it maintains God’s freedom and
sovereignty.  Neder, Participation in Christ, 83.
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Perhaps the most important word from Hooker to parish leaders has to do with 
the art of preaching. When the aim of preaching is to cooperate with the Spirit in 
forming the mind of Christ in the congregation - which it often is - the best methods 
would be those which invite the hearer to locate themselves as characters within the 
theodrama, and which draw hearers (so situated) into an encounter with the person of 
Jesus Christ such that his dispositions are given focus. This is hardly novel in terms of 
preaching theory,637 but the Hookerian account provides the theological justification 
of such narrative and dramatic methods. 
Therefore, Hooker would ask sharp questions of Minister C. The very question of 
whether Christ the eternal law is “relevant” would be nonsensical to Hooker, for to be 
human is to participate in Christ’s rationality, and the question of relevance 
presupposes a realistic option of irrationality. Similarly, Hooker would be deeply 
critical of preaching that eﬀectively presents Jesus as though he was a first century 
Moses dictating timeless absolutes, or that presents Jesus as an Enlightenment sage 
dispensing timeless wisdom which may be relevant to 21st century persons. The same 
questions, perhaps less pointedly, would be addressed to Minister A. Is preaching 
given suﬃcient time, and does the method of preaching present Jesus’ multi-
dimensional personhood such that his nature is revealed narratively? Or is that hard 
work left undone in favor of a reflection that simply re-describes - perhaps in poetic 
terms - the preacher’s favorite theory of atonement? If preaching does not reveal 
Jesus’ descriptions of and responses to the world he encountered and thereby reveal 
his cognitive and pragmatic commitments, then it oﬀers insuﬃcient support for the 
cultivation of mimetic virtue.
637. E.g., Eugene L. Lowry, The Homiletical Plot, Expanded Edition: The Sermon as Narrative Art
Form, Exp Sub ed. (Westminster John Knox Press, 2000-12-01); Thomas G. Long, The Witness
of Preaching, Second Edition, 2 ed. (Westminster John Knox Press, 2005-10-20); Fred B.
Craddock, Preaching, Anniversary ed. (Abingdon Press, 2010-05-01). Narrative preaching
which presents the dispositions of Jesus in a personal form is a core characteristic of African-
American preaching.
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THE MIND OF CHRIST IN ETHICAL DISCOURSE
My second suggestion concerns ethical reasoning about the self-ordering of the 
church. As Wells and Quash observe in describing the perspective of ecclesial 
ethicists, “it is precisely the particular information which universal ethics shuns, that 
makes ethics comprehensible.”638 My suggestion is that ecclesial ethicists’ critique of 
universal claims can be fruitfully re-stated to distinguish between appropriate and 
inappropriate justifications in our discourse about the self-ordering of the church. 
Universal ethical claims are usually accompanied by ahistorical justifications, but 
election to life in Christ is always election to life within a narrative location, and so 
our ethical reasoning should always take account of our actual and historical 
particularities. To put this in Hookerian terms: universal axioms are always general, 
but in order to generalize human experience, the best a universal axiom can be is an 
approximation of the natural law. Sin and creaturely finitude mean that there will always
be a gap between our generalities and the engaged way that Christ is God-with-us in 
our narrative situatedness. Justifications of our claims regarding the self-ordering of 
communities are properly historical, not ahistorical. They take account of the 
“circumstances, commitments, and characters of those most closely involved.”639 We 
can therefore restate the ecclesial ethicists’ critique as follows: “Ethical appeals to 
timeless absolutes result in ‘inadequate descriptions.’ Proper ethical justifications 
relate Christ’s dispositions, as revealed in the theodrama, to the circumstances of 
actual communities, and they imagine how Christ might nourish those communities 
here and now.”
This circumscription of the range of appropriate justifications helps us to 
anticipate what I will show below - that irreconcilable positions concerning the self-
ordering of the Church often feature inappropriate appeals to timeless absolutes on 
both sides of the debate. On both sides, the parties assume uncritically that proper 
638. Wells and Quash, Introducing Christian Ethics, 192.
639. Ibid.
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ethical reasoning entails mining universal axioms from Scripture and tradition - or 
other sources -  in order to conquer opposition in an dispute over what ‘God 
commands.’ 
But the parties ask the wrong question. Proper ethical reasoning does not merely 
ask “what does God command?” as in deontological reasoning, precisely because Jesus 
is not properly reduced to a first-century Moses issuing divine commands.640 That’s 
the error of the Ramist realists. Jesus is properly recognized as much more than 
Moses. He is the the embodiment of the triune God’s decision to be eternally God-
with-us; Jesus is the embodied and risen Christ who summons us to live in fellowship 
with him. Because we recognize God’s self-determination is to be-with-us and sustain 
us, scriptural reasoning about the church’s self-ordering asks, “what ought to be the 
practical commitments of our community today in order “to receive [the] 
superabundant gifts of God from every possible source?”641
The distinction I am advocating is best seen with an example. In what follows, I 
will consider briefly how universal and subversive ethics have debated the question of 
women’s ordination to the episcopate within two related communities within the 
Anglican Communion, the Episcopal Church and the Church of England.642 My 
purpose simply is to illustrate that appeals to timeless absolutes are characteristic of 
both universal and subversive ethical approaches. I will not attempt to oﬀer a 
comprehensive description of the long and many-dimensioned debate. Fortunately, 
the House of Bishops of the Church of England has already done that with their 
Women Bishops in the Church of England? A Report of the House of Bishops' Working Party on 
Women in the Episcopate.643
The Church of England’s debates over the consecration of women bishops 
640. I am indebted to Sam Wells for this contrast between Jesus and Moses and the propensity of
universal ethicists to confuse the two.
641. Wells, God’s Companions, 36.
642. The Episcopal Church consecrated its first female bishop in 1989, and the Church of England
approved plans to begin consecrating female bishops on July 14, 2014.
643. Women Bishops in the Church of England? A Report of the House of Bishops’ Working Party on
Women in the Episcopate, ed. Michael Roﬀen (London: Church House Publishing, 2004).
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generally gravitated towards a small cluster of New Testament texts: 1 Corinthians 
11.12-16, 14.34-38, 1 Timothy 2.11-15, Ephesians 5.21 and Galatians 3.27-28. At stake, 
opponents argue, is the notion of headship.
For example, David Lickess voiced the common claim by opponents that 21st 
century consecration of women bishops is prohibited scripturally, because:
… there are clear NT markers that women are not to have authority in the Church to exercise
headship (1 Tim 2.12), & there's no record of any women doing so in the Early Church, or of
one having a sacramental or episcopal ministry.644
Roger Beckwith similarly argued that Paul’s epistles prohibit female headship in 
the congregation:
According to the testimony of St Paul in First Corinthians 11 and 14 and First Timothy 2,
headship in the congregation, as in the home, should be exercised by a member or members of
the male sex. He declares male headship to be [a] creation ordinance, which was reinforced at
the fall, and still obtains after the coming of Christ. The oﬃces of presbyter and bishop are
oﬃces of headship, as their very titles, meaning 'senior man' and 'overseer', indicate.645 
These two examples are characteristic of the claims of opponents of women’s 
ordination who argue on the basis of scriptural authority. The two examples are 
distinct, however. The first appeal is to a golden era. Lickess, like many opponents, 
presupposes that the practice of “the Early Church” is normative for all subsequent 
ages with respect to the vocational possibilities of women. Beckwith would certainly 
agree, but he grounds his appeal not in apostolic practice but in eternity.  For him, 
male headship is a primordial, indeed, pre-social absolute. The very cosmos itself 
presupposes male headship, and since governance of bishops entails headship, female 
bishops are an impossibility.
Geoﬀrey Kirk argues, in contrast with but towards the same objective of these 
conservative evangelical arguments, that it is an exegetical mistake to identify 
headship (keyphale) with authority. Instead, headship can be understood only in terms 
of Christ’s precedence as “Head of Table:”
644. Ibid.,  139.
645. Ibid., 153.
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[Christ’s] headship of the Church, moreover, is related to headship within the Church and
within the domestic church (the Christian family) in a way that only can be described as meta-
analogical: the submission of wives to husbands (Ephesians 5:22-3) and the wearing of head-
coverings by women (1 Corinthians 11.3-10ﬀ.) are not merely expressions, but outworkings of
this ultimate headship which devolves upon the Son as the oﬀspring of the Father.646
Arguing that the Lord’s Supper is a Passover meal, and that, because Passover is a 
rite in which “the [male] paterfamilias hands down the history of salvation to the 
youngest [male] present,” Kirk proposes that “… the bishop who presides at [the 
Eucharist] does so as the image of the Father. The bishop is the bridegroom of his 
local church and the paterfamilias who heads its eucharistic table.”647 Because in 
ancient celebration of the Passover rite, the paterfamilias was male, Kirk argues that, 
through analogy, the head who presides at the Eucharist must be male:  
That authority in the Church (‘headship’) is directly related to table presidency at the Pascha
of the New Israel, and that all this is related to the manner in which the paterfamilias, in
home and Eucharist, is the icon of Christ (Ephesians 5:23-32) should be apparent to every
unprejudiced reader.648
Notice that Kirk does not argue here that male headship is eternally normative for
all human social orderings, and he does not argue that governance by a female is 
prohibited on the basis of apostolic practice. Rather, his argument is analogical: we 
know that women cannot be bishops because bishops preside at the Eucharist and 
women cannot preside at the Eucharist. We know this, he argues, because the 
Eucharist was in the moment of its institution a Passover meal, and only males could 
preside at the Passover meal in the first century. Since women could not preside at the
Passover meal, women cannot preside at the Eucharist, and, if women cannot preside 
at the Eucharist, then women cannot be bishops.
Kirk’s argument is derivative of Roman Catholic reasoning. Aidan Nichols, 
describing pontifical illuminations by Paul VI and John Paul II, similarly argues on the
646. Geoﬀrey Kirk, “Fatherhood, Headship, and Tradition,” in Consecrated Women? Women
Bishops - a Catholic and Evangelical Response, ed. Jonathan Baker, (Canterbury Press,
2013-05-08), 171. Emphasis added.
647. Ibid., 172.
648. Ibid., 172-173.
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basis of “the nuptial theological symbolics”649 that “the notion of the bishop as 
paternally generative bridegroom for the particular church takes on enhanced 
importance in the context of the celebration of the Eucharist.”650 The bishop, per 
Nichols, is the “sacrament of the Bridegroom” who “exercise[s} the Father’s paternity 
through Christ in the Holy Spirit….”651 We know that a bishop must be male, 
therefore, because “the sacramentality of the ministerial priest in this prior 
“Christoform’ configuration requires the natural resemblance of his gender to Christ 
the bridegroom.”652
Whereas Lickess and Beckwith appeal to putative norms of either primordial or 
apostolic golden eras, Kirk and Nichols combine an appeal to a golden era (the era of 
Jesus’ earthly ministry) with a purportedly controlling analogy that similarly produces a
timeless absolute of male headship.
On the opposite side of the argument, proponents seemingly take for granted the 
premise that the self-ordering of a Pauline apostolic community is necessarily binding 
upon the contemporary Church. Their rebuttal therefore does not deny that premise 
but rather engages, like Travers and Whitgift in the Elizabethan era, over whose 
exegesis correctly interprets the controlling texts. Hence, Paula Gooder, for example, 
argues that “the Ephesians passage [Eph. 5:23-32] is about internal domestic 
relationships not about Church order.”653 Similarly, the stakes in 1 Corinthians 11:2-16 
are not as suggested by opponents of women’s ordination: “Women are not forbidden 
from engaging fully in the public profession of worship but are encouraged to do so in 
appropriate clothing. The point seems not to be subordination of one to the other but
gender diﬀerentiation.”654
649. Aidan Nichols, “The Bishop as Bridegroom of His Church: A Roman Catholic Contribution,”
in Consecrated Women? Women Bishops - a Catholic and Evangelical Response, ed. Jonathan
Baker, (Canterbury Press, 2013-05-08), 161.
650. Ibid., 162.
651. Ibid., 163.
652. Ibid.
653. Women Bishops?, 162.
654. Ibid., 163.
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Similarly, Trevor Hart argues not about whether apostolic practice is normative 
for contemporary practice, but whether the opponents’ describe apostolic practice 
correctly:
In fact we know the opposite is true. In Romans 16, for example, Paul refers to women
holding the oﬃces of deacon (Phoebe in verse 1), ‘fellow worker’ in Paul’s ministry of the
gospel (Priscilla in verse 3) and, strikingly, apostle (Junia in verse 7); and in 1 Corinthians 11
itself he alludes to women praying and prophesying in church, roles which, as one writer puts
it, ‘made them far more prominent and equal to men than they would have been in Judaism in
this period’
. . . Clearly, then, Paul did not think women unsuited to roles of responsible and authoritative
ministry within the church, and any interpretation of 1 Cor 14.33-35 and 1 Tim 2.11-14 must
reckon fully with this fact and be consistent with it.655
In the foregoing, we see examples, from both sides of the debate, of justifications 
based on appeals to precedent, either understood to be the golden era of the apostolic 
generation or human origins. But universal ethicists are not alone in appealing to 
claims about human origins as a way of rendering their arguments unassailable. 
Subversive ethicists do the same. This subversive perspective pervades the 1970’s 
debates over women’s ordination that took place in the United States within the 
Episcopal Church. The distinction, however, is that subversive ethicists often ground 
their arguments not in claims about timelessly-ordained ecclesial practices but in 
claims about timeless natural values. 
In the Episcopal Church debates over women’s ordination to the priesthood, we 
see the reasoning of Enlightenment liberalism. If we reason our way back to human 
origins, detaching humankind from all the developments and constructed social 
relations that cloud our judgment, we can discover what authentic humanity is. And it 
turns out that authentic, pre-social humanity manifests certain values that have been 
lost in time and must be recovered. Notice that this is quite diﬀerent than an appeal 
to putative norms found in the primordial stories of Genesis. Though the logic is 
similar, the source of authority is not Scripture, but Enlightenment conclusions about 
human origins.  In the illustration to which I turn from The Episcopal Church’s 
655. Ibid., 164.
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discourse, the timeless value requiring recovery is equality. The historic result of the 
discourse was the irregular (non-canonical) ordination of eleven women by retired 
bishops which was followed by crisis and schism within the The Episcopal Church. 
Carter Heyward, one of the first women ordained, explained, “Whereas prayer 
book revision is a matter of taste, women's ordination is a matter of justice.”656 The 
tacit assumption underlying Heyward’s description of the ordination of women in 
terms of justice is that we know what is just by looking at humanity in its natural, pre-
historic state. Her argument exemplifies Enlightenment liberalism’s presupposition 
that we have the capacity to peer into our pre-history to determine what is natural and
thereby to identify our “natural rights.”657 When reason recognizes that humanity’s 
pre-historic state is one of gender equality, then any deviation from gender equality 
can be described as a matter of justice and inalienable rights, and restoring justice can 
be construed as an urgent concern that justifies revolution, and not just reform, of the 
existing social ordering. Revolution is not only warranted but perhaps necessary 
because only power can overturn the unjust power relations entrenched by the status 
quo. Summarizing the rationale given for the irregular but valid ordination of eleven 
women to the priesthood in 1974, Pamela Darling observes that, “restoring equality 
between men and women as symbolized in the priesthood was a greater good than 
traditional church discipline.”658 The timeless value of equality justified revolutionary 
action:
They discovered that they could step outside the system and survive, and the possibility of
changing the system by deliberately breaking its rules became thinkable. This was a generation
656. Pamela W. Darling, New Wine: The Story of Women Transforming Leadership and Power in the
Episcopal Church, ed. NewWine (Cowley Publications, 1994-08), 123.
657. Compare Thomas Paine. “What does Paine see when he looks past history to our natural
beginnings? The very method of searching after the natural human condition in this way
suggests to Paine one inescapable fact about man first and foremost: At his origin, man is an
individual. And because he has no social relations to start with, he is burdened by no social
distinctions and therefore is equal to all other men. Social hierarchies have no natural
foundation….To imagine that we are unchanged since the beginning of time is to believe that
the means of human generation and the procession of generations through time tell us
nothing of great importance about human life. That is, social relations and distinctions built
up over generations have no inherent authority.” Levin, The Great Debate, 45.
658. Darling, New Wine: The Story of Women Transforming Leadership and Power in the Episcopal
Church, 129-130.
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well acquainted with the civil disobedience tactics of both the civil rights and antiwar
movements, actions widely viewed as justifiable means to bring about change within an
unwieldy or resistant system. When the duly constituted authorities of the institutional
church, in the form of both the General Convention and subsequently their individual
dioceses and bishops, refused to do what the activists believed was right, some felt justified in
proceeding without authorization.659 
As I noted above, my interest and intent is not to catalogue exhaustively the 
arguments of opponents and proponents of women’s ordination to the episcopate. My
concern is simply to illustrate that both sides often justify their positions on the basis 
of appeals to timeless absolutes. They oﬀer other justifications, of course, which do 
not rely on such appeals.660 To the extent that their proposals rely on appeals to 
timeless absolutes, however, their arguments are vulnerable to the Hookerian critique 
outlined in chapter three. 
As we have seen, Hooker denies the indefeasibility of the judgments of all eras:
The glory of God and the good of his Church was the thing which the apostles aimed at, and
therefore ought to be the mark whereat we also level. But seeing those rites and orders may be
at one time more, which at another are less available unto that purpose, what reason is there
in these things to urge the state of one only age as a pattern for all to follow?661
We saw in chapter three that, while teaching us to place a high value on endoxa, 
Hooker also urges an allergy to generalizations based on appeals to timeless absolutes. 
Such generalizations fail to fulfill the natural law because they fail to follow Christ’s 
pattern of ‘special equity.’ Jesus neither feeds nor judges in general. Rather, Christ 
justifies by meeting all thirsty Samaritan women and men at the well and gives us in 
our particular narrative situatedness the precise form of living water we need to live (John
4:1-42). Therefore, Hooker asks, “Are we bound while the world standeth to put 
nothing in practice but only that which was the very first?”662 
We saw that, in his treatment of the Church Fathers, Hooker listens carefully to 
the authority of every generation, for all are part of the transtemporal discourse 
659. Ibid., 131.
660. For example, opponents oﬀer the pragmatic argument that consecration of women bishops
will damage ecumenical relations with the Roman Catholic and other churches.
661. Laws.IV.2.3; I.278.15-21.
662. Laws.IV.2.3; I.278.15-21.
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created by the Spirit. Hooker concludes, “Our end ought always to be the same, our ways 
and means thereunto not so.”663 Moreover, we saw that the Hookerian account’s 
prescription is that our ethical reasoning should be informed by the superabundance 
of God’s love as reflected in the extraordinary diversity in both nature and in the 
Church itself:
A more dutiful and religious way for us were to admire the wisdom of God, which shineth in
the beautiful variety of things, but most in the manifold and yet harmonious dissimilitude of those
ways, whereby his Church upon earth is guided from age to age, throughout all generations of
men.664
The Hookerian account would therefore potentially result in diﬀerent conclusions
about women’s ordination in diﬀerent generations. Stephen Sykes is probably correct 
in suggesting that Hooker would not have argued for women’s ordination in 1595, but 
that the logic of his ethics left open the possibility of a future generation making that 
choice.665 Hookerian ethics would place a high value on the long tradition of the male-
only priesthood without seeing that self-ordering as immutably prescriptive for all 
generations. Consideration of historical precedent is important and interesting, but 
such precedent does not compel those who follow. The question of self-ordering, for 
Hooker, cannot merely be “what does God command?” - which presupposes 
comprehensive knowledge of what God contingently wills - but rather, “how do we in 
our generation best manifest the good, as we have come to know it, in our life with 
God?” With the ecclesial ethicists, the Hookerian account would engage in the 
debates over women’s ordination with the question, ““what ought to be the practical 
commitments of our community today in order “to receive [the] superabundant gifts 
of God from every possible source?”666 
663. Laws.IV.2.3; I.278.14.15
664. Laws.III.11.8; I.253.15-20. Emphasis added.
665. Women Bishops?, 169-171.
666. Wells, God’s Companions. Wells, God’s Companions, 36..
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THE MIND OF CHRIST IN THE CHURCH UNIVERSAL
My third suggestion concerns the implications of the Hookerian account for 
ecumenical relations. Again, the Church of England’s debates over women’s ordination
bring into view the possibility of restoration and reconciliation of the Church’s 
fragments. Some opponents of women’s ordination argued that:
Ordaining women as bishops would lead the Church of England to diﬀer from those provinces
within the Anglican Communion who do not have women bishops and would further damage
ecumenical relationships with those churches, such as the Orthodox and Roman Catholic
churches, in which... the ordination of women is not accepted.667
This worry that a decision to create female bishops would aﬀect ecumenical relations 
seems to have been pragmatic. Within three days of the decision, Archbishop of 
Canterbury Justin Welby wrote the Church of England’s ecumenical partners with 
this concern in view, noting that “we are also aware that our other ecumenical partners
may find this a further diﬃculty on the journey towards full communion.”668 
The concern that such a decision might harm ecumenical relations seemingly 
arises from an assumption that ethical reasoning about the self-ordering of a local 
church properly sorts such decisions into the categories of necessity and adiaphora. 
My suggestion is that the possibility of reconciliation would be heightened if 
contemporary leaders recognized, with Hooker, that the categories of necessity and 
adiaphora insuﬃciently describe the ethical task of ecclesial self-ordering. Questions 
of self-ordering are matters of action and not matters of knowledge. As such, they are 
the subject matter of phronesis. They concern the creation of the good for the sake of 
the good.669 My suggestion is that ecumenical relations would be less fraught if leaders 
recognized that decisions about self-ordering are phronetic and not epistemic matters. 
To develop this suggestion, I will draw upon an account of an actual ecumenical 
breach, and then explain how the Hookerian account might inform our approach to 
667. Women Bishops?, 134.
668. Justin Welby, “Archbishop Writes to Ecumenical Partners About Women Bishops,” http:/
/www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/articles.php/5371/archbishop-writes-to-ecumenical-
partners-about-women-bishops (accessed July 17, 2014).
669. See “Episteme and Phronesis” on page 72.
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ecumenical relations.
In 1963, Anglican delegates gathered in Toronto for a landmark meeting known as 
the Third Anglican Congress. It was a time of great hope for the Anglican 
Communion. Kennedy reigned in Camelot, the remaining colonies of the former 
British Empire were well on their way to nationhood, the Second Vatican Council was
in session, and the time seemed ripe to embrace a new vision for the Anglican 
Communion: "Mutual Responsibility and Interdependence in the Body of Christ" 
(MRI). MRI envisioned a future in which a radical ecclesiology  would replace colonial
relationships rooted in Western hegemony. As Ian Douglas notes, MRI celebrated 
the commitment of constituent members of the communion to “interdependence, 
mutual responsibility,” and to relations characterized by “equality and partnership 
between all Anglicans.”670 
The sunny hope of 1963 constrasts starkly with the urgent call in 2004 for 
Anglican churches throughout the world to walk together in synodality.671 The bonds of
aﬀection binding Anglican provinces into a global communion were tragically broken, 
and the Lambeth Commission’s call was an eﬀort to name a way forward.  The fruit of 
their eﬀorts, a work in ecclesiology named The Windsor Report (TWR), was born amidst
the shattered post-colonial dreams of mutual responsibility and interdependence 
celebrated at the 1963 Anglican Congress. The chairman of the Lambeth Commission,
Archbishop Robin Eames, explained:
The decision by the 74th General Convention of the Episcopal Church (USA) to give consent
to the election of bishop Gene Robinson to the Diocese of New Hampshire, the authorising
by a diocese of the Anglican Church of Canada of a public Rite of Blessing for same sex
unions and the involvement in other provinces by bishops without the consent or approval of
the incumbent bishop to perform episcopal functions have uncovered major divisions
throughout the Anglican Communion. There has been talk of crisis, schism and realignment.
Voices and declarations have portrayed a Communion in crisis.672
According to the authors of The Windsor Report, “crisis, schism, and realignment” 
670. Ian T Douglas, “The Exigency of Times and Occasions: Power and Identity in the Anglican
Communion Today,” in Beyond Colonial Anglicanism : The Anglican Communion in the Twenty-
First Century, ed. Ian Douglas, T. and Pui-lan Kwok, (New York: Church Publishing, 2001),
27-28.
671. Windsor Report 2004: Lambeth Commission on Communion (Windsor Report) (London: Anglican
Communion Oﬃce, 2004), 32.
672. Ibid., 4.
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once again were the fruit of unilateral decisions by the North American churches 
regarding their own self-ordering. In this case, the self-ordering concerned the 
vocational and marital possibilities of gay persons. 
The Windsor Report’s authors partially explain the crisis by deploying the 
Reformation concepts of necessity and adiaphora. They correctly point out the 
concept of adiaphora was:
... invoked and developed by the early English Reformers, particularly in their claim that, in
matters of eucharistic theology, specific interpretations (transubstantiation was particularly in
mind) were not to be insisted upon as 'necessary to be believed', and that a wider range of
interpretations was to be allowed.673
It is important to notice that the distinction between necessity and adiaphora, as 
Hooker was at pains to remind his interlocutors, mostly concerned matters of 
knowledge, the subject matter of the virtue of episteme. The concept, adiaphora, 
properly concerns the domain of cognitive commitments. I qualify this claim, 
however, because there is a point at which episteme and phronesis converge. In what 
follows, I will touch briefly on this qualification. I name this qualification in passing 
because, for the most part, we can ignore the qualification because questions about 
the self-ordering of the Church are outside of this convergence.  
My qualification is to concede that there is a point at which matters of knowledge 
and action intersect. The distinction between matters of faith and matters of action 
breaks down when pressed in the soteriological direction. There are some practical 
actions which are universally demanded of Jesus’ disciples and thus are not 
appropriately categorized as local, particular, and contingent. Hooker himself names 
ecclesial laws requiring the sacraments of baptism and Eucharist as immutable and 
non-contingent. As we saw in chapter four, they are so because those actions are 
ordained by Christ. They are ‘necessary to salvation’ to the extent that Christ uses 
them instrumentally to convey his real presence. For Hooker, they are part of the 
divine law prescribed in both Scripture and human law:
Some things in such sort are allowed that they be also required as necessary unto salvation, by
way of direct, immediate, and proper necessity final, so that without performance of them we
673. Ibid., 38.
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cannot by ordinary course be saved, nor by any means excluded from life observing them. In
actions of this kind our chiefest direction is from Scripture, for nature is no suﬃcient teacher
what we should do that we may attain unto life everlasting.674 
In other words, Christology complicates the episteme/phronesis distinction at a 
certain point. Christ’s election generates a universal ethical demand requiring an act 
which cannot be distinguished as either a matter of faith or action. The universal 
ethical demand is for a personal knowing. The action is the knowing. But once we get 
beyond this intersection of knowing and doing that Hooker names the supernatural 
path in Christ, the distinction becomes more helpful. For the means by which we 
manifest our acceptance of our redemption, except for the special categories we've 
mentioned, are of a phronetic character. That's where the local, particular, and 
contingent nature of endoxa arises, and therefore where the distinction is helpful.
With that qualification, I return to my assertion that the necessity/adiaphora 
commitment properly pertains to cognitive commitments and not to the pragmatic 
commitments by which we respond to our election in Christ. As Aristotle taught, a 
cognitive commitment is necessary if it can be demonstrated that “it cannot be 
otherwise.”675 Adiaphora is the category of cognitive commitments - matters of 
knowledge - which can be otherwise. The English Reformers’ deployment of adiaphora
to describe beliefs about how Christ is really present in the Eucharist was a claim that 
it is impossible to demonstrate that “it cannot be otherwise” than transubstantiation 
theory proposes. Necessity and adiaphora properly are categories concerned with 
cognitive commitments and are unhelpful in negotiationg practical commitments.
Unfortunately, The Windsor Report’s authors confuse matters of knowledge and 
matters of action. They apply the Protestant categories of necessity and adiaphora to 
matters of action, also. They name Romans 14.1-15.13 and 1 Corinthians 8-10 as “the 
classical biblical statements [of the concept of adiaphora]:”
There, in diﬀerent though related contexts, Paul insists that such matters as food and drink
(eating meat and drinking wine, or abstaining from doing so; eating meat that had been
674. Laws.II.8.3; I.187.30-188.4
675. See note 194 on page 75 for more on the distinction between episteme and phronesis.
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oﬀered to idols, or refusing to do so), are matters of private conviction over which Christians
who take diﬀerent positions ought not to judge one another.676 
But, of course, these are matters of action, not knowledge. These are practical 
commitments and not cognitive commitments. They are the subject matter of the 
virtue of phronesis because “that which can be done is capable of being otherwise.”677 
Indeed, Paul himself speaks of these actions in the grammar of phronesis - performing 
the good for the sake of the good. The Windsor Report’s authors read the 16th century 
concept of adiaphora into the text. 
The authors apply the categories of necessity and adiaphora to matters of action 
in order to make the claim that there are some behaviors which scandalize and 
thereby threaten a community with disintegration:
Paul is quite clear that there are several matters – obvious examples being incest (1
Corinthians 5) and lawsuits between Christians before non-Christian courts (1 Corinthians 6) –
in which there is no question of saying "some Christians think this, other Christians think
that, and you must learn to live with the diﬀerence". On the contrary: Paul insists that some
types of behaviour are incompatible with inheriting God's coming kingdom, and must not
therefore be tolerated within the Church.678 
While the authors are correct in asserting that, for Paul, certain types of behavior 
are incoherent and must not be tolerated within Christian community, one need not 
confuse matters of knowledge and matters of action in order to circumscribe 
Christian behavior. Rather than inappropiately applying the epistemological concepts 
of necessity and adiaphora to matters of action, the Hookerian account describes the 
ethical behaviors mentioned - incest and lawsuits between Christians - and other sinful
actions as privations of the good. 
To clarify why conflating matters of knowledge (episteme) and matters of action 
(phronesis) is significant ecumenically, I will demonstrate briefly how Hooker maintains
this distinction without sacrificing the Church’s prophetic “No” to incoherent and 
intolerable behavior. To do that, I’ll recall Hooker’s description of sin.
Eschatology drives our Hookerian account of sin. If human destiny is to “proceed 
676. Ibid.
677. See note 194 on page 75.
678. Ibid., 39.
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in the knowledge of truth and grow in the exercise of virtue,”679 then sin is a detour 
along the way to that destiny.680 Just as knowledge of the good is an act of reason, 
“there was never sin committed wherein a less good was not preferred before a greater,
and that willfully.”681 Our “natural thirst for knowledge”682 is frustrated by ignorance, 
for the good we seek “hath evidence enough for itself, if reason were diligent to search
it out.”683 But communal “neglect” of the good causes “a show of that which is not,” 
and we choose that which is “less good.”684 Sometimes, in our choices, we are deceived 
by Satan; “sometimes the hastiness of our wills prevent[ ] the more considerate advice 
of sound reason,” and “sometimes the very custom of evil make[s] the heart obdurate 
against whatsoever instructions to the contrary.”685 “Lewd and wicked custom” is 
particularly problematic, for it “smother[s} the light of natural understanding” such 
that, over time, “men will not bend their wits to examine whether things wherewith 
they have been accustomed be good or evil.”686 Long entrenched evil custom within 
the community, therefore, is the reason that, though “the greatest part of the law 
moral being so easy for all men to know… so many thousands of men notwithstanding 
have been ignorant even of principal moral duties, not imagining the breach of them 
to be sin.”687 Sin, for Hooker, is willfully and irrationally choosing a lesser good.
Hooker maintains the capacity to name behaviors as unacceptable without 
resorting to the binary construction of necessity and adiaphora and without confusing 
knowledge with action. Sin in a general sense can be described in binary form in terms of
obedience/disobedience to God’s desire that we act rationally and thereby participate 
in the divine rationality. Sin in a phenomenological sense, however, cannot be described 
679. Laws.I.5.3; I.73.32-74.1
680. Lake notes that “compared to the views of other protestants, Hooker’s vision of sin as a
species of ignorance, a sort of intellectual laziness, seemed almost benign.” Lake, Anglicans
and Puritans, 150.
681. Laws.I.7.7; I.80.24-29.
682. Laws.I.7.7; I.81.16.
683. Laws.I.7.6; I.80.24-29
684. Laws.I.7.7; I.80.5, 24-29.
685. Laws.I.7.7; I.81.1-2, 4-5.
686. Laws I.8.11; I.91.30-34.
687. Laws.I.8.11; I. 91.25-29.
- 242 -
- 242 -
suﬃciently with a simple Ramist binary. Phenomenologically, sin, for Hooker, is 
always a matter of willfully preferring “a less good... before a greater.”688 Actions such 
as incest and lawsuits between Christians are irrational in that they diverge from the 
path of a Christian’s and a Christian community’s proper becoming. Or, to frame this 
using the grammar of the preceding chapter: sinful actions reflect incoherent practical 
commitments given the cognitive commitments that generate the most basic 
linguistic practice of the Church - the Eucharist. When we see the redeemed world 
rightly, we move rationally in thanksgiving towards the good. Sin is blindness and 
therefore cognitive failure for Hooker.689
 From this phenomenological description of sin in terms of our irrational failure to 
perform the good for the sake of the good, we can see that it is insuﬃcient and 
reductive to categorize practical actions using the epistemological categories of 
necessity and adiaphora. Either we accept Christ’s particular Word to us in our 
narrative situation or not, but a spectrum of concrete responses are possible, ranging from the
performance of the greatest good to its irrational opposite. Rather than reducing our 
possible responses to the necessity/adiaphora binary, it is more fruitful to describe the 
range of possible responses as Hooker did: eschatologically, in terms of our proper 
becoming. To what extent do we recognize the fullness of the good expressed in this 
practical action? To what extent does this action manifest the good’s privation? 
Recognition that Christian ethics is about our phronetic response to the grace of 
God helps us to see that questions about our ecclesial self-ordering are not properly 
framed in terms of necessity and adiaphora. They are, rather, the subject matter of 
phronesis, the virtue of creating the good for the good’s sake. The goal of mimetic 
virtue is not the replicable production of events in which God’s law is obeyed, but 
rather the performance of the good for its own sake, which constitutes exemplary 
obedience. The distinction is crucial “because action and making are diﬀerent kinds of
688. Laws.I.7.7; I.80.25-26.
689. See note 124 on page 53.
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things…. For while making has an end other than itself, action cannot; for good action 
itself is its end.”690 Like a poem or a song or the dramatic arts, the goal of phronetic 
action is the good itself, “and that which can be done is capable of being otherwise.”691 
“Sundry actions may be equally consonant unto the general axioms of the Scripture”692 precisely 
because of the superabundance of the good. 
The authors of The Windsor Report claim that the Anglican crisis of 2004 arose in 
part because of a dispute over whether certain actions were properly categorized as 
necessity or adiaphora. North American churches thought “that the questions they 
were deciding were things upon which Christians might have legitimate diﬀerence, 
while large numbers of other Anglicans around the world did not regard them in this 
way.693 This diagnosis also underlies the aforementioned 2014 concern that the 
consecration of women bishops by the Church of England will harm its ecumenical 
relations. But questions of whether women or gay persons can become bishops, or 
whether a church must have bishops at all, are questions of ecclesial self-ordering. 
They are matters of phronesis, not episteme. Liberated from the false dichotomy of 
necessity and adiaphora, charity recognizes that many ways are consonant and makes 
space for the other.
Ecumenical relations harden when leaders exhibit puzzlement by confusing 
episteme and phronesis. The possibility of reconciliation between ecumenical 
counterparts would be heightened if leaders recognized that decisions about self-
ordering are phronetic and not epistemic matters. It is more ecumenically fruitful to do 
as Hooker did: to describe the range of possible self-orderings in terms of the 
Church’s eschatological becoming. Given our eschatological orientation, to what 
extent do we recognize the fullness of the good expressed in a practical decision to 
order the local church in a certain way? To what extent does this action manifest the 
690. Aristotle, Complete Works Vol 2, EN.1140a.24 - 1140b.12.
691. Ibid.
692. Laws.III.2.1; I: 207.29-208.9. Emphasis added. In context, Hooker is explaining why the
Genevan discipline is not the only self-ordering a church can embrace and remain a church.
“Sundry actions are equally consonant....”
693. Windsor Report, 21.
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good’s privation? And, drawing upon the discussion of women’s ordination above, 
given the witness of our ecumenical counterparts, how ought the practical 
commitments of our community today evolve in order “to receive [the] superabundant
gifts of God from every possible source?”694 Is there good already in our midst that our
practical commitments exclude?
The Eucharist is the Church’s most basic linguistic practice. As such, the 
Eucharist generates certain practical commitments - certain ought-to-be judgments 
about our relations with other Christians and their communities. These include the 
practical commitments to preserve all Christian’s “place at God’s table,” to “sit at table
with one another,” to “recognize the sacramental and moral discipline and order 
required” to maintain sacramental bread-sharing, and to “share in the practices of this 
special act of sharing in Christ’s body....”695 As Wells and Quash note, “this is a 
hierarchical and sequential series designed to sustain unity.”696 The binary grammar of 
necessity and adiaphora can drive us to a binary description of our unity as well: either 
we are in, or out, of communion with our ecumenical counterparts. But recognizing 
that the self-ordering of the church is phronetic action helps us also to see that some 
self-orderings manifest the fullness of the good more than others, but only those 
oriented towards the privation of the good could conceivably necessitate “the severing 
of communion.”697 “Sundry actions may be equally consonant....”698
Recognition that “sundry actions may be equally consonant,” precisely because of 
the superabundance of the good, means that our unity in and with Christ is not based 
on, caused, or constituted by our being of one accord in matters of action. Geneva can
be Geneva, Zurich can be Zurich, Rome can be Rome, and England can be England. 
Unison in our self-ordering is not the formal cause of unity. Rather, the reverse is true 
- Christian community is solely dependent upon “our shared commitment to and 
694. Wells, God’s Companions, 36.
695. Wells and Quash, Introducing Christian Ethics, 306.
696. Ibid.
697. Ibid.
698. Laws.III.2.1; I: 207.29-208.9
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promise to be with the risen Jesus”699 - a commitment caused by Christ’s Spirit. This 
shared commitment is created and sustained through the personal relationship with 
the transcendent unity, even in tension and dissonance, that is our mutual indwelling 
in Christ through which the Spirit cultivates the faith, hope, and charity which makes 
authentic communion possible. The recognition that all ethics are phronetic is prior 
to and sustained by the concrete unity which cherishes God-given diversity.
Hookerian ethics therefore helps the church to imagine a robust communion 
ecclesiology in which diverse societies of souls, blessed with an abundance of richly 
variegated gifts, outlooks, and dispositions, are given the space of freedom and 
welcomed within a global communion which is ever striving towards “polyphonous 
concord700” in matters of faith and action, such that they coherently speak the 
common Pentecostal grammar which constitutes the visible mystical body of Christ 
through which Christ is reconciling the world. Such speech joins the symphony701 
through which the Word of God is heard and through which the love of God is 
manifest.
RICHARD HOOKER’S REPUTATION, REVISITED
As I noted in my introduction, Richard Hooker’s reputation has evolved in the 
four hundred years since his death. It is a commonplace within Anglican discourse to 
hear Hooker’s name invoked to justify proposals that seek to negotiate ‘a middle way’ 
between entrenched positions. In my experience, those present often have no idea or 
have long sense forgotten what those entrenched positions were, but they nod 
aﬃrmatively, for everyone knows that Hooker taught the Church to seek the via media
in order to keep our ecclesial factions under one big tent. If asked, some present could
confidently explain that Hooker sought the middle way between Geneva and Rome, 
699. Rowan Williams, “Incarnation and the Renewal of Community,” in On Christian Theology
(Challenges in Contemporary Theology), (Wiley, 1999), 237.
700. Balthasar, Truth is Symphonic: Aspects of Christian Pluralism, 7-10. 
701. Ibid.
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and for that reason, the Anglicanism Hooker envisioned became the perfect tradition 
for couples seeking to compromise between twenty-first century Protestantism and 
Roman Catholicism.
Of course, as MacCulloch reminds us,702 Hooker neither sought a middle way 
between Geneva and Rome nor suggested that seeking the middle way is the 
prudential way of a pilgrim Church. The myth of Hooker’s middle way, of course, is a 
Tractarian fiction, deployed by Newman and his colleagues to justify their nineteenth 
century platform. The commonplace, in this case, is universally-known nonsense. My 
study discovered no cause to challenge the current consensus of Hooker scholars: 
Hooker did not aim for a middle ground between Geneva and Rome, but instead 
engaged most of his career in an intramural theopolitical struggle between Geneva-
inspired English protestants advocating presbyterian reforms and Zurich-inspired 
English protestants advocating conformity with the Elizabethan Settlement. To this, 
I’ve added the proposal that Hooker’s treatise seems perfectly designed as a 
repudiation of the Ramist realism arising at Cambridge at the time Hooker published 
Laws.
It is also a commonplace to hear Hooker’s name invoked to justify practical 
proposals for the Church on the basis of the three pillars of Scripture, reason, and 
tradition.  We’ve seen, however, that these are not standalone silos of authority from 
which one chooses as needed to advance one’s projects. Rather, they are interrelated  
categories of dialectically constructed endoxa which store a community’s deductions 
about the eternal law based on its life with Christ the Creator, Governor, and 
Reconciler. Because the eternal law is Jesus Christ, those endoxa are derived from the 
Word and inseverable from the Word. It is impossible that either Scripture, reason, 
or tradition rightly contradict Jesus Christ. Whether we appeal to Scripture, tradition,
or reason, it is impossible that we avoid Christ’s pressure upon us, guiding us to act as 
necessary to close the gap between our enshrined generalizations about the eternal law
702. MacCulloch, “Richard Hooker’s Reputation,”
- 247 -
- 247 -
and its particular demands in the moment of our encounter with our neighbor. 
Therefore, contemporary “liberal accommodationism” and “postliberal 
traditionalism”703 can no longer coopt Hooker to justify their ideologies. There is no 
avoiding the living Word with which Christ addresses us.
Which returns us to the question of Hooker’s reputation. When I began this 
project, I noted Hooker’s similarities to contemporary ecclesial ethicists and decided 
to use ‘ecclesial ethicist’ as a heuristic device with which to interrogate Hooker. Along
the way, the device gave way to description: I discovered that Hooker is an ecclesial 
ethicist. During a time of great flux in his culture’s premises about how we know what 
we know, Hooker identified serious flaws in the foundation underlying certain 
positions of his Elizabethan colleagues - both opponents and allies. He preserved an 
account of virtue evocative of Aristotle, emphasized the centrality of Jesus, and placed
a high valuation on the tradition and practices of the Church as the most reliable, 
dialectically-identified signs and tokens of the good. And he did all of this within an 
Elizabethan Reformed grammar that already evinced skepticism toward a 
“substantialist form of ancient metaphysics as applied to the problem of an ontology 
of the person.”704 His achievement is extraordinary. 
So who is Hooker for us? 
As I have shown in this study, it is with good reason that scholars throughout the 
ages have noticed Hooker’s significant debts to Aquinas. He quoted, alluded to, or 
borrowed from Thomas extensively, and his accounts of the eternal law and of the 
Christian life as a journey of sanctification are recognizably Thomist in character. 
We’ve seen, however, that we understate his genius if we simply note his resonances 
with Aquinas. For, in a hyper-Augustinian era, Hooker achieved a great synthesis. He 
described a vision of the Church that unites a Reformed description of the alterity of 
God and fellowship with Jesus Christ with an account of mimetic virtue. The 
703. Volf, “When Gospel and Culture Intersect,” 33.
704. McCormack, “Karl Barth’s Historicized Christology: Just How “chalcedonian” is it?,” Kindle
location 2602, Sect 2, para 8.
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Reformed quality of his catholicism is decisive. If Hooker is “the English Thomas,” he
is also the “Anglican Barth.”
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